Merge pull request #414 from koic/2025_03_26_backcompat

Fall Back to Legacy 2025-03-26 OAuth Discovery for Servers Without PRM
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Koichi ITO 2026-06-17 10:49:00 +09:00 • committed by GitHub
commit 60f0088877
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@ -38,22 +38,18 @@ module MCP
ensure_secure_url!(resource_metadata_url, label: "WWW-Authenticate resource_metadata URL")
end
prm = fetch_protected_resource_metadata(
prm, authorization_server = locate_authorization_server(
server_url: server_url,
resource_metadata_url: resource_metadata_url,
)
authorization_server = first_authorization_server(prm)
ensure_secure_url!(authorization_server, label: "PRM `authorization_servers` entry")
# Per RFC 8707 + MCP authorization, the canonical MCP server URI is sent on
# both the authorization and token requests. When PRM advertises a `resource`,
# it MUST identify the same MCP server we are talking to; otherwise we are
# being redirected to credentials minted for a different audience.
resource = canonical_resource(server_url: server_url, prm_resource: prm["resource"])
resource = canonical_resource(server_url: server_url, prm_resource: prm&.dig("resource"))
as_metadata = fetch_authorization_server_metadata(issuer_url: authorization_server)
ensure_issuer_matches!(expected: authorization_server, returned: as_metadata["issuer"])
ensure_secure_endpoints!(as_metadata)
as_metadata = authorization_server_metadata(authorization_server: authorization_server, legacy: prm.nil?)
if provider_authorization_flow == :client_credentials
return run_client_credentials!(as_metadata: as_metadata, prm: prm, resource: resource, scope: scope)
@ -63,7 +59,7 @@ module MCP
client_info = ensure_client_registered(as_metadata: as_metadata)
effective_scope = resolve_scope(scope: scope, prm: prm)
effective_scope = resolve_scope(scope: scope, prm: prm || {})
effective_scope = normalize_offline_access_scope(effective_scope, as_metadata: as_metadata)
pkce = PKCE.generate
state = SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(32)
@ -158,18 +154,14 @@ module MCP
ensure_secure_url!(resource_metadata_url, label: "WWW-Authenticate resource_metadata URL")
end
prm = fetch_protected_resource_metadata(
prm, authorization_server = locate_authorization_server(
server_url: server_url,
resource_metadata_url: resource_metadata_url,
)
authorization_server = first_authorization_server(prm)
ensure_secure_url!(authorization_server, label: "PRM `authorization_servers` entry")
resource = canonical_resource(server_url: server_url, prm_resource: prm["resource"])
resource = canonical_resource(server_url: server_url, prm_resource: prm&.dig("resource"))
as_metadata = fetch_authorization_server_metadata(issuer_url: authorization_server)
ensure_issuer_matches!(expected: authorization_server, returned: as_metadata["issuer"])
ensure_secure_endpoints!(as_metadata)
as_metadata = authorization_server_metadata(authorization_server: authorization_server, legacy: prm.nil?)
client_info = if have_stored_client_info
# Pre-registered / DCR-issued `client_information` always wins: if the user picked an explicit identity,
@ -221,6 +213,87 @@ module MCP
fetch_metadata_json(urls, label: "protected resource metadata")
end
# Locates the authorization server for `server_url` and returns `[prm, authorization_server]`.
#
# Modern path (2025-06-18+): Protected Resource Metadata names the authorization server in
# `authorization_servers`.
#
# Legacy path (2025-03-26 backwards compatibility): when the server publishes no PRM, `prm` is nil
# and the MCP server's own origin acts as the authorization base URL, matching the TypeScript and Python SDKs.
# Any PRM discovery failure (404s, network errors, malformed documents) selects the legacy path, mirroring both SDKs' behavior.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-03-26/basic/authorization#fallbacks-for-servers-without-metadata-discovery
def locate_authorization_server(server_url:, resource_metadata_url:)
prm = begin
fetch_protected_resource_metadata(
server_url: server_url,
resource_metadata_url: resource_metadata_url,
)
rescue AuthorizationError
nil
end
if prm
authorization_server = first_authorization_server(prm)
ensure_secure_url!(authorization_server, label: "PRM `authorization_servers` entry")
[prm, authorization_server]
else
authorization_base = server_origin!(server_url)
ensure_secure_url!(authorization_base, label: "MCP server origin (legacy authorization base URL)")
[nil, authorization_base]
end
end
# Fetches and validates the authorization server's RFC 8414 metadata.
#
# On the modern path the metadata `issuer` must be byte-identical to the discovery URL (RFC 8414 Section 3.3).
# On the legacy 2025-03-26 path that validation is skipped: the legacy spec predates the requirement,
# and a pre-PRM server may host its OAuth endpoints under a path prefix whose `issuer` legitimately differs from
# the origin the metadata was discovered at (neither the TypeScript nor the Python SDK validates the issuer on this path).
# When even the metadata document is absent, the legacy spec's default endpoints are used.
def authorization_server_metadata(authorization_server:, legacy:)
metadata = if legacy
begin
fetch_authorization_server_metadata(issuer_url: authorization_server)
rescue AuthorizationError
default_legacy_metadata(authorization_server)
end
else
fetch_authorization_server_metadata(issuer_url: authorization_server).tap do |fetched|
ensure_issuer_matches!(expected: authorization_server, returned: fetched["issuer"])
end
end
ensure_secure_endpoints!(metadata)
metadata
end
# The 2025-03-26 spec's "Fallbacks for Servers without Metadata Discovery": clients MUST use these default endpoint paths
# relative to the authorization base URL. PKCE S256 is assumed because the legacy spec mandates PKCE and there is no metadata
# to advertise it (the TypeScript and Python SDKs hardcode S256 on this path too).
def default_legacy_metadata(authorization_base)
{
"issuer" => authorization_base,
"authorization_endpoint" => "#{authorization_base}/authorize",
"token_endpoint" => "#{authorization_base}/token",
"registration_endpoint" => "#{authorization_base}/register",
"code_challenge_methods_supported" => ["S256"],
}
end
# Returns `scheme://host[:port]` of `server_url`, the legacy 2025-03-26 authorization base URL for servers without PRM.
def server_origin!(server_url)
uri = URI.parse(server_url.to_s)
unless uri.is_a?(URI::HTTP) && uri.host
raise AuthorizationError,
"Cannot derive a legacy authorization base URL from MCP server URL #{server_url.inspect}."
end
port_part = uri.port == uri.default_port ? "" : ":#{uri.port}"
"#{uri.scheme}://#{uri.host}#{port_part}"
rescue URI::InvalidURIError => e
raise AuthorizationError, "MCP server URL #{server_url.inspect} is not a valid URI: #{e.message}."
end
def fetch_authorization_server_metadata(issuer_url:)
urls = Discovery.authorization_server_metadata_urls(issuer_url)
fetch_metadata_json(urls, label: "authorization server metadata")