Let a provider add parameters to the token requests it makes

## Motivation and Context

`ClientCredentialsProvider` builds a fixed `client_credentials` token request: `grant_type`, `scope`,
`resource`, and the client authentication that `Flow#post_to_token_endpoint` adds. An authorization server
that requires further parameters, such as Auth0's `audience`, cannot be used through `oauth:` at all,
and giving up `oauth:` also gives up the bearer header and the 401-driven retry that the transport provides.

RFC 6749 Section 8.2 allows extension parameters on the token request, and the TypeScript SDK lets
a provider shape its token request through `prepareTokenRequest`. `ClientCredentialsProvider.new` now takes
`token_request_params:`, a Hash of String keys and values added to every token request the provider makes,
and `Flow#post_to_token_endpoint` reads the same name by duck typing, so a `Provider` or `CrossAppAccessProvider`
subclass that defines the method gets the same treatment on its authorization code exchange, refresh,
or `jwt-bearer` request.
`Provider.new` and `CrossAppAccessProvider.new` take the same keyword, held by `StorageBackedProvider` like
`authorization_request_validator`, so every bundled provider refuses a bad value before anything is stored.

The parameters go underneath the flow's own, so the SDK's values always win, and a key the SDK sets itself
(`Flow::RESERVED_TOKEN_REQUEST_PARAMS`) is refused rather than silently overridden: with `ArgumentError`
from the constructor, before any `client_information` is written, and again with `ArgumentError` from the flow,
before the token request is sent. Only Strings are accepted because `URI.encode_www_form` encodes other scalars
and Arrays in ways the caller did not write, and the provider keeps a frozen copy so a later change to
the caller's Hash cannot alter what is sent.
A Hash comparing keys by identity is refused too, since two equal keys are two entries there, sent twice
by a provider method or silently collapsed into one by the copy. The flow raises `ArgumentError` rather than
`AuthorizationError` because `MCP::Client::HTTP` treats a failed refresh as a reason to run the interactive flow,
which would then fail the same way after the user signed in.
Both refusals raise `Flow::InvalidTokenRequestParamsError`, a subclass of `ArgumentError`, so a caller can tell them
from an unknown keyword, and the copy duplicates keys as well as values, since `Hash` copies only keys
whose class is exactly `String`.

Fixes #554.

## How Has This Been Tested?

New tests cover every token request the parameters can ride (the `client_credentials` grant under
all three client authentication methods, the authorization code exchange, refresh, and `jwt-bearer`),
both refusal boundaries (the constructors of all three providers, and the flow for a provider defining the method),
and the transport surfacing a refused hook from a refresh attempt without starting the interactive flow.
All of them fail against the previous library.

## Breaking Changes

None. The keyword is optional and the hook is opt-in; a provider that does not define `token_request_params` sends
the same requests as before.
This commit is contained in:
Koichi ITO 2026-09-17 00:52:10 +09:00
commit 8ad80dd0b4

View file

@ -17,6 +17,23 @@ module MCP
TOKEN_ENDPOINT_ERROR_MAX_LENGTH = 128
TOKEN_ENDPOINT_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_MAX_LENGTH = 512
# Token request parameters the flow sets itself. Its values win over a provider's `token_request_params`,
# so a provider naming one of these is refused rather than left believing its value was sent.
RESERVED_TOKEN_REQUEST_PARAMS = [
"grant_type",
"client_id",
"client_secret",
"client_assertion",
"client_assertion_type",
"scope",
"resource",
"code",
"code_verifier",
"redirect_uri",
"refresh_token",
"assertion",
].freeze
class AuthorizationError < StandardError
attr_reader :http_status, :error, :error_description
@ -40,6 +57,33 @@ module MCP
# or authorization server metadata failure by rescuing a class rather than by matching the message text.
class AuthorizationRefusedError < AuthorizationError; end
# Raised for a `token_request_params` value the SDK refuses: a reserved key, a Hash comparing keys by identity,
# or anything but a Hash of Strings. An `ArgumentError` because the value is a configuration mistake,
# not a failed authorization, and deliberately outside `AuthorizationError`, which `MCP::Client::HTTP` treats on
# a failed refresh as a reason to run the interactive flow.
class InvalidTokenRequestParamsError < ArgumentError; end
class << self
# Returns why `params` cannot ride a token request as `token_request_params`, or `nil` when it can.
# Shared by the provider constructors and the flow, which both refuse the value with `InvalidTokenRequestParamsError`,
# so the same problem reads the same wherever it surfaces.
def token_request_params_problem(params)
return "must be a Hash (got #{params.class})." unless params.is_a?(Hash)
# Two equal keys are two entries here, which would be sent twice from a provider method
# or silently collapse into one when the constructors copy the Hash.
return "must not compare keys by identity." if params.compare_by_identity?
params.each do |key, value|
return "keys must be Strings (got #{key.class})." unless key.is_a?(String)
return "values must be Strings (got #{value.class} for #{key.inspect})." unless value.is_a?(String)
return "must not set #{key.inspect}, which the SDK sets itself." if RESERVED_TOKEN_REQUEST_PARAMS.include?(key)
end
nil
end
end
def initialize(provider:, http_client_factory: nil)
@provider = provider
@http_client_factory = http_client_factory || -> { default_http_client }
@ -960,6 +1004,22 @@ module MCP
@provider.authorization_flow
end
# Parameters the provider adds to every token request it makes (RFC 6749 Section 8.2 leaves room for them;
# Auth0's `audience` is the usual one). Duck-typed like `authorization_flow`, so a provider without the method,
# or one returning `nil`, adds nothing.
# A bad value raises `InvalidTokenRequestParamsError`, as the provider constructors do.
def provider_token_request_params
return {} unless @provider.respond_to?(:token_request_params)
params = @provider.token_request_params
return {} if params.nil?
problem = self.class.token_request_params_problem(params)
raise InvalidTokenRequestParamsError, "The provider's token_request_params #{problem}" if problem
params
end
def build_authorization_url(as_metadata:, client_id:, scope:, state:, code_challenge:, resource:)
authorization_endpoint = as_metadata["authorization_endpoint"]
unless authorization_endpoint
@ -1012,6 +1072,9 @@ module MCP
# Submits a form-encoded token request using the authentication method
# stored in `client_information`. The method determines whether client
# credentials belong in the form body, a Basic header, or a JWT assertion.
# A provider's `token_request_params` go underneath the flow's own parameters,
# which therefore win, and are refused before the request is sent when they name
# a reserved parameter or are not a Hash of Strings.
def post_to_token_endpoint(as_metadata:, client_info:, form:)
client_id = client_info_required_value(client_info, "client_id")
unless client_id
@ -1021,6 +1084,7 @@ module MCP
client_secret = client_info_required_value(client_info, "client_secret")
token_endpoint_auth_method = client_info_value(client_info, "token_endpoint_auth_method")
form = provider_token_request_params.merge(form)
# Apply one client authentication method per request (RFC 6749 Section 2.3).
headers = {}