Reject duplicate in-flight JSON-RPC request IDs

## Motivation and Context

A request id is the only key that routes request-scoped messages back to the request that caused them:
progress and log notifications, server-to-client requests such as sampling and elicitation,
and `notifications/cancelled` all resolve through it. Nothing checked that the id was free,
so a second request arriving under an id already in flight took the routing entry over.
From that point the first request's notifications were written to the second request's SSE stream,
and whichever finished first removed the shared entry, leaving the survivor's messages nowhere to go.

The spec puts the uniqueness obligation on the sender, and 2026-07-28 draws it at exactly
the window this change enforces: "The request ID MUST NOT match the ID of any other request the sender
has issued and not yet received a response for". Earlier revisions worded it as never reusing an id within
the session. Neither says what a receiver does with a duplicate, but the Streamable HTTP rules require
that messages the server sends before the response "SHOULD relate to the originating client request",
and two live requests sharing one id make that impossible to honor for either of them.
Answering the second one is the only option that stays correct, so it is refused the same way
a duplicate `initialize` is, and for the same reason: a repeated id must not silently displace state
the first one established.

The reference SDKs currently accept the duplicate and let the newer request take the entry.
That is not a settled design: the Python SDK carries a TODO naming rejection with `INVALID_REQUEST`
as the revisit, so this moves toward where they expect to end up rather than away from them.

`ServerSession#register_in_flight` now claims the id atomically and reports a collision instead of overwriting,
which `Server` turns into an Invalid Request for every transport. `StreamableHTTPTransport` refuses
the colliding POST with 409 before it registers a stream, since the stream is registered ahead of dispatch
and would otherwise take over the routing entry for as long as the rejection takes.

Removal is now guarded by identity everywhere the registry is keyed by request id, so a request that loses
a race cannot retire a registration it does not own. `initialize` never registers, so its `ensure` no longer unregisters:
a refused duplicate `initialize` reusing an in-flight id used to evict that registration on the way out,
silently disabling cancellation for the request that owned it (Streamable HTTP refuses such a POST before dispatch;
stdio reached this path). `drop_broken_stream` had a sharper form of the same bug: it removed whichever stream held
the id while closing the one passed in, which are not necessarily the same stream.

Only ids that are in flight are refused, which is the scope the current spec draws.
Enforcing the older "never within the session" wording would instead mean remembering every id a session ever used,
and the in-flight window is the part routing depends on either way. Sequential reuse keeps working,
and neither this SDK's client (`SecureRandom.uuid`) nor a client built on the TypeScript SDK (a per-connection counter)
can produce a collision.

## How Has This Been Tested?

New tests in `test/mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport_test.rb` reproduce the collision:
a tool parked mid-request, a second POST reusing its id, and assertions that the second POST is refused
and that the first request still receives the progress frame it emits afterwards. Others cover
the identity-guarded removal and confirm that an id can be reused once the earlier request has finished.
New tests in `test/mcp/server_cancellation_test.rb` cover the registry directly, including
the transport-independent Invalid Request and the survival of an in-flight registration across
a refused duplicate `initialize` under the same id. All of them except the sequential-reuse guard fail
without this change. `bundle exec rake` (tests, RuboCop, and conformance baseline) passes.

## Breaking Changes

A request whose id is already in flight on the same session is now answered with Invalid Request
(HTTP 409 on Streamable HTTP) instead of being processed. A client that reuses ids concurrently was
already violating the specification and was already having its notifications misrouted.

lib/mcp/server_session.rb

@@ -58,19 +58,41 @@ module MCP
       @era = era
     end
 
-    # Registers a `Cancellation` token for an in-flight request.
+    # Registers a `Cancellation` token for an in-flight request, or returns `nil` when `request_id` is already in flight.
+    # The request id is the only key that routes request-scoped notifications, server-to-client requests,
+    # and `notifications/cancelled` back to the request that caused them, so a second live request under the same id
+    # has no destination of its own. Rather than let the newcomer displace the registration, report the collision
+    # and leave the first request intact; the caller turns that into an Invalid Request.
     def register_in_flight(request_id)
       return if request_id.nil?
 
       cancellation = Cancellation.new(request_id: request_id)
-      @in_flight_mutex.synchronize { @in_flight[request_id] = cancellation }
-      cancellation
+      registered = @in_flight_mutex.synchronize do
+        next false if @in_flight.key?(request_id)
+
+        @in_flight[request_id] = cancellation
+        true
+      end
+
+      registered ? cancellation : nil
     end
 
-    def unregister_in_flight(request_id)
+    # Removes an in-flight registration. Passing the `Cancellation` that `register_in_flight` returned removes
+    # the entry only while it is still that one, so a request can never evict a registration it does not own.
+    def unregister_in_flight(request_id, cancellation: nil)
       return if request_id.nil?
 
-      @in_flight_mutex.synchronize { @in_flight.delete(request_id) }
+      @in_flight_mutex.synchronize do
+        next if cancellation && !@in_flight[request_id].equal?(cancellation)
+
+        @in_flight.delete(request_id)
+      end
+    end
+
+    # Whether `request_id` is currently in flight, so a transport can refuse a colliding request
+    # before registering any state of its own for it.
+    def in_flight?(request_id)
+      !lookup_in_flight(request_id).nil?
     end
 
     def lookup_in_flight(request_id)