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Validate Host and Origin Headers to Prevent DNS Rebinding per MCP 2025-11-25

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## Motivation and Context

MCP 2025-11-25 (modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol#1439) requires servers to validate
the `Origin` header on incoming Streamable HTTP connections and recommends binding only to localhost,
to prevent DNS rebinding attacks against locally bound MCP servers.
`StreamableHTTPTransport` previously validated neither `Host` nor `Origin`,
so a malicious web page could rebind its own hostname to 127.0.0.1 and reach a local server cross-origin,
invoking tools and exfiltrating their output. This is disclosed as GHSA-rjr6-rcgv-9m7m.

The TypeScript SDK (`enableDnsRebindingProtection` defaults to `false`, and is deprecated in favor of
external middleware) and the Python SDK (`transport_security.py` disables protection by default)
both ship this off for backwards compatibility, a constraint they cannot escape after 1.0.
Because this gem is still pre-1.0, it adopts the secure default now so protection is baked into the stable baseline:

- `Host` is validated against the loopback defaults (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, `localhost`) plus any `allowed_hosts:`,
  compared case-insensitively; each entry matches the bare host name (any port) or a full `host:port`.
  This check is the primary anti-rebinding control, because a rebound request carries a foreign `Host`.
  A request without a `Host` header (e.g. HTTP/1.0) is allowed because the rebinding vector always sends one.
- `Origin`, when present, must be same-origin or in `allowed_origins:`. Same-origin compares authority (host:port)
  case-insensitively and uses the `Origin`'s own scheme to drop a redundant default port, so `http://example.com` matches
  `Host: example.com:80`. Non-browser MCP clients that send no `Origin` header are unaffected.
- `dns_rebinding_protection: false` disables the check when an upstream proxy or middleware already validates these headers.

A rejected request returns HTTP 403 with a JSON-RPC error response carrying no `id`, as the spec permits.

## How Has This Been Tested?

New tests in `test/mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport_test.rb`:

- a cross-origin `Origin` is rejected by default, and a same-origin browser request is allowed
- a rebound foreign `Host` is rejected with the `Invalid Host header` body, while loopback values
  (`127.0.0.1`, `localhost`, `[::1]`) are allowed
- an upper-cased loopback `Host` is accepted (case-insensitive matching)
- a non-loopback `Host` listed in `allowed_hosts:` is allowed
- a request with no `Host` header, and one with no `Origin` header, are allowed
- a default-port `Origin` (`http://localhost`) matches `Host: localhost:80`
- opaque and malformed `Origin`s (`null`, `file://`, a path suffix) are rejected
- a `host:port` `allowed_hosts:` entry matches that port only
- `Host` validation also applies to GET requests
- `dns_rebinding_protection: false` lets a forged `Host`/`Origin` through

## Breaking Changes

`StreamableHTTPTransport` now rejects non-loopback `Host` and cross-origin `Origin` requests by default.
A deployment behind a reverse proxy or bound to a non-loopback interface must set `allowed_hosts:` / `allowed_origins:`,
or pass `dns_rebinding_protection: false` when validation is handled upstream. Loopback servers and non-browser clients
are unaffected.

Co-authored-by: tonghuaroot <tonghuaroot@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Koichi ITO 2026-05-01 02:19:38 +09:00
commit ba543083a7
1 changed files with 426 additions and 1 deletions
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106
lib/mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport.rb
View file

@ -24,7 +24,31 @@ module MCP
"Connection" => "keep-alive",
}.freeze
def initialize(server, stateless: false, enable_json_response: false, session_idle_timeout: nil)
# Creates a Streamable HTTP transport that can be mounted as a Rack app.
#
# @param server [MCP::Server] the server whose requests this transport dispatches.
# @param stateless [Boolean] when `true`, no session is issued and each POST is self-contained.
# @param enable_json_response [Boolean] when `true`, a request is answered with a single JSON
# object instead of an SSE stream.
# @param session_idle_timeout [Numeric, nil] seconds before an idle session is reaped; `nil`
# disables expiry. Not supported in stateless mode.
# @param allowed_origins [Array<String>, nil] extra `Origin` values accepted in addition to
# same-origin requests, for DNS rebinding protection.
# @param allowed_hosts [Array<String>, nil] extra `Host` values accepted beyond the loopback
# defaults (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, `localhost`); each entry matches a bare host name (any port)
# or a full `host:port`.
# @param dns_rebinding_protection [Boolean] when `true` (default), validates the `Host` and
# `Origin` headers to prevent DNS rebinding; pass `false` when an upstream proxy already
# validates them.
def initialize(
server,
stateless: false,
enable_json_response: false,
session_idle_timeout: nil,
allowed_origins: nil,
allowed_hosts: nil,
dns_rebinding_protection: true
)
super(server)
# Maps `session_id` to `{ get_sse_stream: stream_object, server_session: ServerSession, last_active_at: float_from_monotonic_clock }`.
@sessions = {}
@ -33,6 +57,11 @@ module MCP
@stateless = stateless
@enable_json_response = enable_json_response
@session_idle_timeout = session_idle_timeout
@dns_rebinding_protection = dns_rebinding_protection
# Host names are case-insensitive, so the allow lists are compared down-cased.
@allowed_hosts = (DEFAULT_LOOPBACK_HOSTS + Array(allowed_hosts)).map(&:downcase).freeze
@allowed_origins = Array(allowed_origins).map(&:downcase).freeze
@pending_responses = {}
if @session_idle_timeout
@ -52,12 +81,19 @@ module MCP
STREAM_WRITE_ERRORS = [IOError, Errno::EPIPE, Errno::ECONNRESET].freeze
SESSION_REAP_INTERVAL = 60
# Loopback hosts always accepted by DNS rebinding protection. A locally bound MCP server (the canonical pattern) is
# protected out of the box; non-loopback deployments widen the list via `allowed_hosts:`.
DEFAULT_LOOPBACK_HOSTS = ["127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"].freeze
# Rack app interface. This transport can be mounted as a Rack app.
def call(env)
handle_request(Rack::Request.new(env))
end
def handle_request(request)
rebinding_error = validate_dns_rebinding(request)
return rebinding_error if rebinding_error
case request.env["REQUEST_METHOD"]
when "POST"
handle_post(request)
@ -808,6 +844,74 @@ module MCP
active
end
# Per MCP 2025-11-25, servers MUST validate the `Origin` header and SHOULD bind only to localhost
# to prevent DNS rebinding attacks against locally bound MCP servers. Protection is on by default;
# pass `dns_rebinding_protection: false` to disable it (e.g. when an upstream proxy or middleware already
# performs the check). The `Host` header is validated against the loopback defaults plus `allowed_hosts:`,
# and the `Origin` header, when present, must be same-origin or in `allowed_origins:`.
def validate_dns_rebinding(request)
return unless @dns_rebinding_protection
validate_host(request) || validate_origin(request)
end
# Rejects a rebound `Host` (e.g. `evil.example.com` re-pointed at 127.0.0.1).
# A request without a `Host` header (e.g. HTTP/1.0) is allowed; the rebinding vector this guards against always carries one.
def validate_host(request)
host = request.env["HTTP_HOST"]
return if host.nil?
# An `allowed_hosts:` entry matches either the bare host name (any port)
# or the full `host:port` value, so both `"app.example.com"` and
# `"app.example.com:8443"` can be configured.
normalized = host.downcase
return if @allowed_hosts.include?(request_hostname(normalized)) || @allowed_hosts.include?(normalized)
forbidden_response("Forbidden: Invalid Host header")
end
# A request without an `Origin` header (typical for non-browser MCP clients) is allowed. A browser cross-origin request is
# rejected unless the origin is same-origin or explicitly allow-listed via `allowed_origins:`.
def validate_origin(request)
origin = request.env["HTTP_ORIGIN"]
return if origin.nil?
return if same_origin?(origin, request)
return if @allowed_origins.include?(origin.downcase)
forbidden_response("Forbidden: Invalid Origin header")
end
# Extracts the host name from a `Host` header value, stripping any port and IPv6 brackets
# (`[::1]:8080` becomes `::1`, `127.0.0.1:8080` becomes `127.0.0.1`).
def request_hostname(host)
return host[/\A\[([^\]]+)\]/, 1] if host.start_with?("[")
host.split(":").first
end
# Compares the `Origin` authority (host:port) against the request's own `Host`.
# Scheme is not compared (the `Host` header carries none, and `request.scheme` is unreliable behind proxies),
# but the `Origin`'s scheme is used to drop a redundant default port (`:80` for http, `:443` for https) from
# both sides so `http://example.com` matches `Host: example.com:80`. Comparison is case-insensitive.
def same_origin?(origin, request)
host = request.env["HTTP_HOST"]
return false if host.nil?
normalized = origin.downcase
default_port = normalized.start_with?("https://") ? ":443" : ":80"
authority = normalized.sub(%r{\Ahttps?://}, "")
authority.delete_suffix(default_port) == host.downcase.delete_suffix(default_port)
end
def forbidden_response(message)
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 403,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: message,
)
end
def method_not_allowed_response
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 405,