Merge pull request #439 from koic/issuer_bound_client_credentials

Bind Stored Client Credentials to the Authorization Server Issuer per SEP-2352
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Koichi ITO 2026-07-12 02:16:12 +09:00 • committed by GitHub
commit e1fabe3fcb
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3 changed files with 288 additions and 6 deletions

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@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ module MCP
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/authorization
def run_client_credentials!(as_metadata:, prm:, resource:, scope:)
client_info = client_credentials_client_info
ensure_client_credentials_issuer!(client_info, as_metadata: as_metadata)
form = { "grant_type" => "client_credentials" }
effective_scope = resolve_scope(scope: scope, prm: prm)
@ -134,6 +135,25 @@ module MCP
info
end
# Per SEP-2352, static machine-to-machine credentials are bound to their authorization
# server the same way registered ones are: when the stored `client_information` records
# an `issuer` that differs from the current authorization server, surface an error
# instead of silently sending another server's credentials (the spec's "SHOULD surface
# an error"; the TypeScript SDK raises `AuthorizationServerMismatchError` here).
# Re-registration is not an option for the `client_credentials` grant - the credentials
# are pre-registered, not DCR results - so the operator must update the stored credentials.
# Credentials without a recorded issuer keep working unchanged.
def ensure_client_credentials_issuer!(client_info, as_metadata:)
stored_issuer = client_info_required_value(client_info, "issuer")
return if stored_issuer.nil?
return if stored_issuer == as_metadata["issuer"]
raise AuthorizationError,
"Stored client credentials are bound to a different authorization server " \
"(stored issuer #{stored_issuer.inspect}, current #{as_metadata["issuer"].inspect}); " \
"refusing to send them to the current authorization server (SEP-2352)."
end
# Exchanges the saved `refresh_token` for a fresh access token (RFC 6749 Section 6).
# Re-discovers PRM and AS metadata so we always pick up a moved token endpoint, and re-runs the audience / issuer / security
# checks before talking to it.
@ -173,6 +193,7 @@ module MCP
client_info = if have_stored_client_info
# Pre-registered / DCR-issued `client_information` always wins: if the user picked an explicit identity,
# do not silently swap it for the CIMD URL even when the AS also advertises CIMD support.
ensure_refreshable_client_information!(stored_client_info, as_metadata: as_metadata)
stored_client_info
elsif as_metadata["client_id_metadata_document_supported"] == true
{ "client_id" => @provider.client_id_metadata_document_url }
@ -419,8 +440,8 @@ module MCP
end
def ensure_client_registered(as_metadata:)
existing = @provider.client_information
return existing if existing.is_a?(Hash) && client_info_required_value(existing, "client_id")
existing = stored_client_information_for(issuer: as_metadata["issuer"])
return existing if existing
# Per the MCP authorization specification and `draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document`,
# if the authorization server advertises Client ID Metadata Document support and the provider has
@ -469,7 +490,12 @@ module MCP
"Dynamic client registration response is missing `client_id`."
end
@provider.save_client_information(info)
# Per SEP-2352, persisted client credentials are keyed by the issuer identifier of
# the authorization server that minted them, so a later flow can detect an AS change and
# re-register instead of replaying another server's credentials. `issuer` is not an RFC 7591 response field;
# the SDK adds it to the opaque persisted hash.
@provider.save_client_information(info.merge("issuer" => as_metadata["issuer"]))
info
end
@ -487,6 +513,60 @@ module MCP
metadata.merge("application_type" => Discovery.infer_application_type(redirect_uris))
end
# Returns the stored `client_information` when it may be used against the authorization server
# identified by `issuer`, applying SEP-2352's authorization server binding rules:
#
# - Credentials persisted with an `"issuer"` binding MUST NOT be reused against
# a different authorization server. When the AS changed, the stale registration and its tokens
# are discarded (tokens minted by the old AS are dead at the new one) and nil is returned so
# the flow re-registers.
# - Stored credentials without an `"issuer"` binding (data persisted by an older SDK version,
# or user-supplied pre-registered credentials) are bound to the current issuer on first use.
# - A CIMD `client_id` (an HTTPS URL) is portable across authorization servers, so it is reused
# and re-bound instead of discarded.
#
# https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2352
def stored_client_information_for(issuer:)
existing = @provider.client_information
return unless existing.is_a?(Hash) && client_info_required_value(existing, "client_id")
stored_issuer = client_info_required_value(existing, "issuer")
return existing if stored_issuer == issuer
return rebind_client_information(existing, issuer: issuer) if stored_issuer.nil?
client_id = client_info_required_value(existing, "client_id")
return rebind_client_information(existing, issuer: issuer) if Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?(client_id)
@provider.save_client_information(nil)
@provider.clear_tokens!
nil
end
def rebind_client_information(info, issuer:)
rebound = info.merge("issuer" => issuer)
@provider.save_client_information(rebound)
rebound
end
# Per SEP-2352, stored client credentials are bound to the authorization server that issued them;
# refuse to replay another AS's credentials at this token endpoint. `HTTP#attempt_refresh` rescues
# the error and falls back to the full flow, which discards the stale registration and re-registers.
# Credentials without an `"issuer"` binding predate this check and are allowed through;
# CIMD `client_id`s are portable.
def ensure_refreshable_client_information!(client_info, as_metadata:)
stored_issuer = client_info_required_value(client_info, "issuer")
return if stored_issuer.nil?
return if stored_issuer == as_metadata["issuer"]
client_id = client_info_required_value(client_info, "client_id")
return if Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?(client_id)
raise AuthorizationError,
"Cannot refresh: stored client credentials were issued by a different authorization server " \
"(stored issuer #{stored_issuer.inspect}, current #{as_metadata["issuer"].inspect}); " \
"re-registration is required (SEP-2352)."
end
# Reads `key` from a `client_information` hash that may use either string or
# symbol keys, so users can persist the result of `JSON.parse` *or* a hand-built
# `{ client_id:, client_secret: }` and have both work.

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@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ module MCP
# - `client_information`: the hash returned by Dynamic Client Registration
# or supplied as pre-registered credentials
# (`client_id`, optional `client_secret`, optional
# `token_endpoint_auth_method`).
# `token_endpoint_auth_method`). The SDK additionally stamps an `"issuer"` member
# binding the credentials to the authorization server that issued them (SEP-2352);
# custom storages should treat the hash as opaque and persist it as-is.
#
# This class keeps everything in process memory, so the credentials live
# only for the lifetime of the Ruby process. Applications that need

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@ -34,7 +34,10 @@ module MCP
# `WWW-Authenticate` does not specify one.
# - `storage` - Object responding to `tokens`, `save_tokens(tokens)`,
# `client_information`, and `save_client_information(info)`. Defaults to
# an `InMemoryStorage`.
# an `InMemoryStorage`. Persisted `client_information` is stamped with
# an `"issuer"` member binding it to the authorization server that
# issued it (SEP-2352); when the authorization server changes, the SDK discards
# the stale registration and tokens and re-registers.
# - `client_id_metadata_document_url` - URL where the client publishes its Client ID Metadata Document
# (`draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-00` and the MCP authorization specification).
# When the authorization server advertises `client_id_metadata_document_supported: true`,