ruby-sdk/conformance/client.rb
Koichi ITO 14b4f7c8c7 Validate the RFC 9207 iss Authorization Response Parameter per SEP-2468
## Motivation and Context

SEP-2468 (modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol#2468, merged for the 2026-07-28 spec release) recommends
that authorization servers include the RFC 9207 `iss` parameter in authorization responses and requires MCP clients
to validate a present `iss` against the expected issuer before redeeming the authorization code.
This mitigates mix-up attacks in multi-IdP setups, where an attacker-controlled authorization server could otherwise capture
a code minted by an honest server.

This mirrors the TypeScript SDK's approach (typescript-sdk#2272, with typescript-sdk#1957 as the reference implementation),
adapted to the Ruby provider contract:

- `Provider`'s `callback_handler` may now return `[code, state, iss]` in addition to the existing `[code, state]`.
  The 3-element form opts into validation; returning `iss = nil` asserts the caller inspected the authorization response
  and found no `iss`.
- `Flow#run!` validates the issuer after the `state` check and before `exchange_authorization_code`,
  implementing the RFC 9207 Section 2.4 rules: a present `iss` must equal the AS metadata `issuer` exactly
  (the value `ensure_issuer_matches!` already pinned to the discovery URL); a nil `iss` from a 3-element callback is rejected
  when the AS metadata advertises `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true`; a legacy 2-element callback skips the check,
  so every existing integration keeps working. On any violation the flow aborts with `AuthorizationError` before
  the code reaches a token endpoint.
- The conformance client now returns the 3-element form, plumbing `iss` through from the redirect URL.

Resolves #386.

## How Has This Been Tested?

New tests in `test/mcp/client/oauth/flow_test.rb`:

- a matching `iss` completes the flow and persists tokens
- a mismatched `iss` raises `AuthorizationError` and never contacts the token endpoint (`assert_not_requested` on the token POST)
- a nil `iss` with `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true` raises without contacting the token endpoint (fail closed)
- a legacy 2-element callback completes even when the AS advertises `iss` support (backward compatibility)
- a nil `iss` without the advertisement completes
- a mismatched `iss` is rejected even without the advertisement (validate-when-present is unconditional)

`bundle exec rake` (tests, RuboCop, and conformance baseline with the 3-element conformance callback) passes.

## Breaking Changes

None. The 2-element `callback_handler` contract continues to work unchanged; issuer validation activates only
when a callback opts in by returning the 3-element form.
2026-06-28 20:40:29 +09:00

156 lines
6.1 KiB
Ruby

# frozen_string_literal: true
# Conformance test client for the MCP Ruby SDK.
# Invoked by the conformance runner:
# MCP_CONFORMANCE_SCENARIO=<scenario> bundle exec ruby conformance/client.rb <server-url>
#
# The server URL is passed as the last positional argument.
# The scenario name is read from the MCP_CONFORMANCE_SCENARIO environment variable,
# which is set automatically by the conformance test runner.
require "faraday"
require "json"
require_relative "../lib/mcp"
scenario = ENV["MCP_CONFORMANCE_SCENARIO"]
server_url = ARGV.last
unless scenario && server_url
abort("Usage: MCP_CONFORMANCE_SCENARIO=<scenario> ruby conformance/client.rb <server-url>")
end
# URL the conformance harness expects to see as the OAuth `client_id` for the `auth/basic-cimd` scenario
# when the AS advertises `client_id_metadata_document_supported`. The harness does not fetch the document,
# only matches the value, so the URL does not need to resolve.
CONFORMANCE_CIMD_URL = "https://conformance-test.local/client-metadata.json"
# The conformance harness optionally injects scenario-specific data via
# the `MCP_CONFORMANCE_CONTEXT` environment variable as a JSON document. The shape is
# defined by the harness, not the MCP spec, and has varied between versions:
#
# - Newer (`@modelcontextprotocol/conformance` >= 0.x): scenario fields are
# spread at the top level alongside `name`, e.g.
# `{"name":"auth/pre-registration","client_id":"...","client_secret":"..."}`.
# - Older: a nested `context` object: `{"name":"...","context":{...}}`.
#
# Both shapes are accepted so the client conforms to whichever harness version
# the developer has on hand.
def conformance_context
raw = ENV["MCP_CONFORMANCE_CONTEXT"]
return {} if raw.nil? || raw.empty?
parsed = JSON.parse(raw)
return {} unless parsed.is_a?(Hash)
if parsed["context"].is_a?(Hash)
parsed["context"]
else
parsed.reject { |key, _| key == "name" }
end
rescue JSON::ParserError
{}
end
# Saves the pre-registered `client_id` / `client_secret` the harness injects
# via context (used by pre-registration and client_credentials scenarios).
def storage_for(context)
storage = MCP::Client::OAuth::InMemoryStorage.new
if context["client_id"]
storage.save_client_information(
"client_id" => context["client_id"],
"client_secret" => context["client_secret"],
"token_endpoint_auth_method" => context["token_endpoint_auth_method"] || "client_secret_basic",
)
end
storage
end
# Builds a `client_credentials`-only provider (machine-to-machine, no redirect).
# The pre-registered credentials are injected by the harness via context.
def build_client_credentials_provider(context)
MCP::Client::OAuth::ClientCredentialsProvider.new(
client_id: context["client_id"],
client_secret: context["client_secret"],
token_endpoint_auth_method: context["token_endpoint_auth_method"] || "client_secret_basic",
)
end
# Builds an OAuth provider that drives the authorization code + PKCE + DCR flow
# non-interactively against the conformance test's auth server. The conformance
# `/authorize` endpoint redirects synchronously to `redirect_uri` with
# `code=test-auth-code`, so we follow it manually instead of opening a browser.
def build_oauth_provider(context, scenario:)
callback_holder = {}
redirect_uri = "http://localhost:0/callback"
redirect_handler = ->(authorization_url) do
response = Faraday.new.get(authorization_url) do |req|
req.options.params_encoder = nil
end
location = response.headers["location"] || response.headers["Location"]
abort("Authorization request did not redirect: #{response.status}.") unless location
callback_holder[:url] = URI.parse(location)
end
callback_handler = -> do
query = URI.decode_www_form(callback_holder.fetch(:url).query).to_h
# The 3-element form opts into SEP-2468 / RFC 9207 `iss` validation;
# `query["iss"]` is nil when the authorization response carried no `iss`.
[query["code"], query["state"], query["iss"]]
end
MCP::Client::OAuth::Provider.new(
client_metadata: {
client_name: "ruby-sdk-conformance-client",
redirect_uris: [redirect_uri],
grant_types: ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
response_types: ["code"],
token_endpoint_auth_method: "none",
},
redirect_uri: redirect_uri,
redirect_handler: redirect_handler,
callback_handler: callback_handler,
storage: storage_for(context),
client_id_metadata_document_url: (scenario == "auth/basic-cimd" ? CONFORMANCE_CIMD_URL : nil),
)
end
def build_provider_for(scenario, context)
if scenario.start_with?("auth/client-credentials")
build_client_credentials_provider(context)
else
build_oauth_provider(context, scenario: scenario)
end
end
oauth = scenario.start_with?("auth/") ? build_provider_for(scenario, conformance_context) : nil
transport = MCP::Client::HTTP.new(url: server_url, oauth: oauth)
client = MCP::Client.new(transport: transport)
client.connect(client_info: { name: "ruby-sdk-conformance-client", version: MCP::VERSION })
case scenario
when "initialize"
client.tools
when "tools_call"
tools = client.tools
add_numbers = tools.find { |t| t.name == "add_numbers" }
abort("Tool add_numbers not found") unless add_numbers
client.call_tool(tool: add_numbers, arguments: { a: 1, b: 2 })
when %r|\Aauth/|
# Auth-only scenarios: the protocol-level checks (PRM/AS metadata, DCR, PKCE, token usage)
# are observed by the conformance server during `connect` and the subsequent request below.
# Listing tools forces a second authenticated MCP request so the bearer token usage check fires.
tools = client.tools
# `auth/scope-step-up` only fires its escalation 403 on `tools/call`, not `tools/list`,
# so the client must actually invoke a tool to drive the second authorization request
# the scenario asserts on.
if scenario == "auth/scope-step-up"
tool = tools.find { |t| t.name == "test-tool" } || tools.first
abort("No tool exposed by conformance server for #{scenario}") unless tool
client.call_tool(tool: tool, arguments: {})
end
else
abort("Unknown or unsupported scenario: #{scenario}")
end