ruby-sdk/lib/mcp/client/oauth/client_credentials_provider.rb
Koichi ITO 4327fc8373 Support private_key_jwt Client Authentication for the client_credentials Grant
## Motivation and Context

The MCP `io.modelcontextprotocol/oauth-client-credentials` extension
(SEP-1046, modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol#1046) specifies
two client authentication methods for the `client_credentials` grant:
`client_secret_basic` and the RECOMMENDED `private_key_jwt`
(RFC 7523 Section 2.2 JWT client assertion). The previous commit added
the grant with secret-based authentication; this adds the JWT method,
which is what the `auth/client-credentials-jwt` conformance scenario exercises.

This mirrors the merged implementations in the TypeScript SDK
(`PrivateKeyJwtProvider`, typescript-sdk#1157) and the Python SDK
(`PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider` / `SignedJWTParameters`, python-sdk#1663),
adapted to this SDK's provider design:

- New `MCP::Client::OAuth::JWTClientAssertion` builds the RFC 7523 compact
  JWS with openssl, keeping the SDK free of a JWT gem dependency
  (the TypeScript and Python SDKs use jose and PyJWT). Claims follow SEP-1046:
  `iss` and `sub` carry the client_id, `aud` carries the authorization
  server's issuer identifier, plus `exp` (300-second lifetime, matching both SDKs),
  `iat`, and a unique `jti`. ES256 and RS256 are supported; ES256 signatures are
  converted from OpenSSL's ASN.1 DER form to the raw 64-byte `r || s` encoding
  JWS requires (RFC 7518 Section 3.4).
- `ClientCredentialsProvider` accepts
  `token_endpoint_auth_method: "private_key_jwt"` with `private_key:`
  (PEM string or `OpenSSL::PKey::PKey`) and a required `signing_algorithm:`
  (no default, so an algorithm mismatch with the server's
  `token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported` fails loudly at construction;
  both reference SDKs also take the algorithm explicitly).
  The key stays on the provider and is never written to `storage`;
  a throwaway assertion is signed at construction to fail fast on an unparseable key
  or a key/algorithm mismatch.
- `Flow#post_to_token_endpoint` sends `client_assertion_type` and a freshly
  signed `client_assertion` for `private_key_jwt`,
  using the `ensure_issuer_matches!`-validated issuer as the audience,
  and omits `client_id` from the body per SEP-1046
  (identity travels in the assertion's claims).
- The conformance client builds a `private_key_jwt` provider
  when the harness injects `private_key_pem`, defaulting the algorithm to
  ES256 like the TypeScript and Python conformance clients,
  and `auth/client-credentials-jwt` is removed from
  `conformance/expected_failures.yml`.

Scope notes: only ES256 and RS256 are supported for now (the TypeScript and
Python SDKs accept whatever their JWT libraries support);
adding further algorithms is additive. There is also no injection point yet for
externally signed assertions (the TypeScript SDK's `StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider` and
the Python SDK's `assertion_provider` callback cover KMS/HSM-held keys);
that is a separate follow-up.

## How Has This Been Tested?

New `test/mcp/client/oauth/jwt_client_assertion_test.rb` covers the JWS construction:
header and RFC 7523 claims, unpadded base64url segments,
ES256 signature round-trip verification (raw -> DER -> `OpenSSL::PKey::EC#verify`),
RS256 verification, PEM and parsed-key input, lifetime override, unique `jti` per assertion,
and rejection of unsupported algorithms, key/algorithm mismatches
(including a P-384 key with ES256), unparseable PEM, and public-only keys.

New tests in `test/mcp/client/oauth/client_credentials_provider_test.rb` cover
the provider surface: `private_key_jwt` construction, the key and
secret never reaching `client_information`, required `private_key` / `signing_algorithm`,
rejection of a simultaneous `client_secret`, fail-fast on key/algorithm mismatch,
and `client_assertion(audience:)` producing a JWT with the expected claims.

A new test in `test/mcp/client/oauth/flow_test.rb` runs the full grant against WebMock stubs
and asserts the token request carries `grant_type=client_credentials`,
the RFC 7523 `client_assertion_type`, an assertion whose `iss`/`sub` are the client_id
and whose `aud` is the issuer, the RFC 8707 `resource`, and neither `client_id` nor
any secret in the body or headers.

`bundle exec rake` passes; the `auth/client-credentials-jwt` conformance scenario
passes 7/7 checks and the baseline check passes with its expected-failure entry removed.

## Breaking Changes

None. `client_secret:` becomes optional on `ClientCredentialsProvider` only
in the signature; it is still required for the secret-based methods, and all
existing construction paths behave unchanged.
2026-06-28 20:59:37 +09:00

147 lines
6.5 KiB
Ruby

# frozen_string_literal: true
module MCP
class Client
module OAuth
# OAuth client configuration for the OAuth 2.1 `client_credentials` grant
# (machine-to-machine, no user and no browser redirect). Handed to
# `MCP::Client::HTTP` via the `oauth:` keyword, the same as `Provider`.
# The interactive Authorization Code flow lives in `Provider`;
# this class exists so a credentials-only client never has to supply
# the redirect arguments that grant has no use for, mirroring the dedicated
# `ClientCredentialsProvider` in the TypeScript SDK and
# `ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider` in the Python SDK.
#
# Required keyword arguments:
#
# - `client_id` - String identifying the pre-registered confidential client.
# - `client_secret` - String shared secret for the `client_secret_basic` /
# `client_secret_post` methods. The `client_credentials` grant is for
# confidential clients, so a credential is mandatory; with
# `private_key_jwt` the credential is the `private_key` instead.
#
# Optional keyword arguments:
#
# - `token_endpoint_auth_method` - `"client_secret_basic"` (default),
# `"client_secret_post"`, or `"private_key_jwt"` (RFC 7523 JWT client
# assertion, per the `io.modelcontextprotocol/oauth-client-credentials`
# extension / SEP-1046). `"none"` is rejected: an unauthenticated
# `client_credentials` request is meaningless.
# - `private_key` - PEM string (or `OpenSSL::PKey::PKey`) used to sign
# the JWT client assertion. Required with `private_key_jwt`.
# The key is held on the provider and never written to `storage`.
# - `signing_algorithm` - `"ES256"` or `"RS256"`. Required with
# `private_key_jwt`; there is no default, so a mismatch with
# the server's `token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported` fails
# loudly at construction instead of as a 401 (the TypeScript and Python SDKs
# also take the algorithm as an explicit option).
# - `scope` - String of space-separated scopes to request when the server's
# `WWW-Authenticate` and the Protected Resource Metadata do not specify one.
# - `storage` - Object responding to `tokens`, `save_tokens(tokens)`,
# `client_information`, and `save_client_information(info)`. Defaults to
# an `InMemoryStorage`. The `client_id` / `client_secret` are written
# into it so the token exchange reads them through the same path as
# a pre-registered authorization-code client.
class ClientCredentialsProvider
include StorageBackedProvider
# Raised when the credentials required for the `client_credentials` grant are
# missing or the requested client authentication method cannot carry them.
class InvalidCredentialsError < ArgumentError; end
SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS = ["client_secret_basic", "client_secret_post", "private_key_jwt"].freeze
attr_reader :scope, :storage
def initialize(
client_id:,
client_secret: nil,
token_endpoint_auth_method: "client_secret_basic",
private_key: nil,
signing_algorithm: nil,
scope: nil,
storage: nil
)
if blank?(client_id)
raise InvalidCredentialsError, "client_id is required for the client_credentials grant."
end
unless SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS.include?(token_endpoint_auth_method)
raise InvalidCredentialsError,
"token_endpoint_auth_method must be one of #{SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS.inspect} for the " \
"client_credentials grant (got #{token_endpoint_auth_method.inspect}); an unauthenticated " \
"client_credentials request is not allowed."
end
client_information = { "client_id" => client_id, "token_endpoint_auth_method" => token_endpoint_auth_method }
if token_endpoint_auth_method == "private_key_jwt"
validate_private_key_jwt_arguments!(
client_secret: client_secret,
private_key: private_key,
signing_algorithm: signing_algorithm,
)
# Fail fast on an unparseable key or a key/algorithm mismatch by
# signing a throwaway assertion now rather than at token time.
JWTClientAssertion.generate(
client_id: client_id,
audience: "urn:mcp:credential-validation",
private_key: private_key,
signing_algorithm: signing_algorithm,
)
else
if blank?(client_secret)
raise InvalidCredentialsError, "client_secret is required for the client_credentials grant with #{token_endpoint_auth_method}."
end
client_information["client_secret"] = client_secret
end
@client_id = client_id
@private_key = private_key
@signing_algorithm = signing_algorithm
@scope = scope
@storage = storage || InMemoryStorage.new
@storage.save_client_information(client_information)
end
# See `Provider#authorization_flow`.
def authorization_flow
:client_credentials
end
# Returns a freshly signed RFC 7523 JWT client assertion for the `private_key_jwt` method.
# `audience` is the authorization server's issuer identifier. Called by `Flow#post_to_token_endpoint`.
def client_assertion(audience:)
JWTClientAssertion.generate(
client_id: @client_id,
audience: audience,
private_key: @private_key,
signing_algorithm: @signing_algorithm,
)
end
private
def validate_private_key_jwt_arguments!(client_secret:, private_key:, signing_algorithm:)
unless client_secret.nil?
raise InvalidCredentialsError, "client_secret must not be set with private_key_jwt; the private key is the credential."
end
if private_key.nil?
raise InvalidCredentialsError, "private_key is required for the client_credentials grant with private_key_jwt."
end
return unless blank?(signing_algorithm)
raise InvalidCredentialsError, "signing_algorithm is required with private_key_jwt (one of #{JWTClientAssertion::SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS.inspect})."
end
def blank?(value)
value.nil? || (value.is_a?(String) && value.strip.empty?)
end
end
end
end
end