ruby-sdk/lib/mcp/server/transports/streamable_http_transport.rb
Koichi ITO 3da0c10bed Make subscriptions/listen refusable for hosts that cannot stream
## Motivation and Context

The documented Rails controller pattern builds a fresh transport per request and renders `body.first`,
but a modern client's `subscriptions/listen` made `handle_request` return the streaming `Proc` body,
so exactly the documented configuration answered every notification-stream request with a 500 - quietly,
since tool calls and listings kept working. Nothing gated the route: `serves_subscriptions_listen?` was
hardcoded `true` and consulted only by `Server#discover` for capability stripping,
and the modern path deliberately ignores `stateless:`.

`StreamableHTTPTransport.new` now accepts `serve_subscriptions_listen:` (default `true`, behavior unchanged).
When `false`, the transport skips the listen interception so the method falls through the dispatcher as
unimplemented - the spec's 404 with JSON-RPC `-32601`, in an Array body the controller pattern can render - and
`serves_subscriptions_listen?` reflects the setting, so `Server#discover` stops advertising the `listChanged`/`subscribe`
capability flags through its existing wiring and the advertisement agrees with the actual behavior.
The documented controller example passes the flag and explains why; refusing implicitly in `stateless:` mode
was rejected because a stateless transport mounted as a long-lived Rack app serves listen streams correctly
(listen delivery deliberately precedes the stateless notification guard).

On the default streaming side, the listen body is now a small streaming-body object rather than a bare `Proc`:
it still responds to `call` and deliberately not to `each` (Rack would otherwise classify it as enumerable
and break the streaming), while `first` raises an error naming `serve_subscriptions_listen: false`
and pointing at the transports documentation, so a host that buffers the body the documented way fails with
guidance instead of a bare `NoMethodError`.

Fixes #531.

## How Has This Been Tested?

With the issue's reproduction script (default: a streaming body whose `body.first` raises the guidance;
with the flag: 404, `application/json`, and an Array body whose first element is the `-32601` error),
new transport tests covering the refusal shape, the capability stripping on `server/discover`, and the guidance
raise with the body's streaming classification, the full suite, RuboCop, and the conformance suite, all green;
the docs build passes every internal link and anchor check.

## Breaking Changes

None. The keyword defaults to the current behavior; refusal is opt-in.
2026-08-25 02:53:08 +09:00

1993 lines
91 KiB
Ruby

# frozen_string_literal: true
require "json"
require_relative "../../result_type"
require_relative "../../transport"
# This file is autoloaded only when `StreamableHTTPTransport` is referenced,
# so the `rack` dependency does not affect `StdioTransport` users.
begin
require "rack"
rescue LoadError
raise LoadError, "The 'rack' gem is required to use the StreamableHTTPTransport. " \
"Add it to your Gemfile: gem 'rack'"
end
module MCP
class Server
module Transports
class StreamableHTTPTransport < Transport
class InvalidJsonError < StandardError; end
# `x-accel-buffering: no` tells reverse proxies (nginx and friends) not to buffer the response,
# which the spec asks of every SSE stream: a buffering proxy holds events back instead of
# delivering them as they are written, and on a long-lived `subscriptions/listen` stream that
# also swallows the keepalive frames a dropped peer would otherwise be detected by.
# The TypeScript and Python SDKs send it on their SSE responses for the same reason.
SSE_HEADERS = {
"content-type" => "text/event-stream",
"cache-control" => "no-cache",
"connection" => "keep-alive",
"x-accel-buffering" => "no",
}.freeze
# Secure defaults for stateful mode. Without a finite idle timeout, sessions live until an explicit client DELETE,
# so an unauthenticated `initialize` flood retains unbounded `ServerSession` objects until memory is exhausted.
# These defaults expire idle sessions and cap the concurrent count, like the C# SDK (the only reference SDK that
# hardens this by default, with a 2h idle timeout and a 10k idle-session count). One difference: at the cap this transport
# rejects a new `initialize` with 503 (after reclaiming any already-expired slots), whereas the C# SDK evicts
# the oldest idle session. Rejecting keeps established sessions stable and avoids evicting a legitimate idle session on
# an attacker's behalf, at the cost of refusing new sessions while genuinely full. Pass `session_idle_timeout: nil` to
# opt out of expiry and `max_sessions: nil` to opt out of the cap.
DEFAULT_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT = 1800
DEFAULT_MAX_SESSIONS = 10_000
# Cap on concurrent `subscriptions/listen` streams (SEP-2575). Each stream holds an open SSE connection
# for its lifetime, so without a bound an unauthenticated client can retain unbounded connections,
# like the session-flood case `DEFAULT_MAX_SESSIONS` guards. A listen request past the cap is rejected with HTTP 503;
# pass `max_listen_subscriptions: nil` to opt out.
DEFAULT_MAX_LISTEN_SUBSCRIPTIONS = 1_000
# Distinguishes "argument omitted, apply the secure default" from an explicit `nil` (opt out of expiry).
UNSET_IDLE_TIMEOUT = Object.new.freeze
private_constant :UNSET_IDLE_TIMEOUT
# Default deadline in seconds for a server-to-client request (sampling, elicitation, `roots/list`, `ping`).
# The spec asks implementations to bound every sent request so a peer that never answers cannot exhaust
# the sender's resources; without one, a client that opens a session and simply never replies parks
# a worker thread for good.
#
# Ten minutes matches the TypeScript SDK, which raises its uniform 60-second request default to 600 seconds
# for the legs of its legacy `input_required` shim because they are "human-paced, so the 60s protocol default
# is wrong". Every request this transport can send is that kind of leg: someone answering an elicitation
# prompt, or the client's own model producing a sample. (The Python SDK leaves the deadline unset and bounds
# nothing by default.) Deployments that want a tighter bound pass a smaller value here; a single handler
# that legitimately waits longer passes `timeout:`.
#
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/lifecycle#timeouts
DEFAULT_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT = 600
# Default upper bound on the JSON-RPC request body. `handle_post` reads the whole
# body into memory and parses it, so without a cap a single unauthenticated POST
# can allocate gigabytes and OOM the worker. 4 MiB comfortably
# fits a typical JSON-RPC request (a 4 MiB JSON string decodes to ~3 MiB of base64
# payload); raise `max_request_bytes:` for unusually large payloads. Matches the
# TypeScript SDK's 4 MB default.
DEFAULT_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024
# Conservative bound on JSON nesting depth, so a deeply nested body cannot exhaust
# the stack or amplify parse cost (complements the byte cap).
MAX_JSON_NESTING = 64
# Cap on the notifications buffered for one modern request (SEP-2575). The sink holds them
# in memory until the handler returns, so a handler that emits notifications in proportion to
# client-supplied input would otherwise let one request grow memory without bound.
# Notifications past the cap are not delivered and the notify helpers report `false`,
# the same non-delivery degradation they have on every other undeliverable path.
MAX_MODERN_REQUEST_NOTIFICATIONS = 1_000
# Interval in seconds between SSE keepalive comment frames on a `subscriptions/listen` stream.
# Without them a silently dropped connection holds its slot until the next fan-out write fails,
# so on a quiet server a dead peer would occupy a `max_listen_subscriptions` slot indefinitely.
# The periodic write detects the dead peer and frees the slot. Matches the TypeScript SDK's
# 15-second default; pass `listen_keepalive_interval: nil` when an upstream proxy pings the stream.
DEFAULT_LISTEN_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL = 15
# Creates a Streamable HTTP transport that can be mounted as a Rack app.
#
# @param server [MCP::Server] the server whose requests this transport dispatches.
# @param stateless [Boolean] when `true`, no session is issued and each POST is self-contained.
# @param enable_json_response [Boolean] when `true`, a request is answered with a single JSON
# object instead of an SSE stream.
# @param session_idle_timeout [Numeric, nil] seconds before an idle session is reaped; defaults
# to `DEFAULT_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` (1800) in stateful mode, and an explicit `nil` disables
# expiry. Not supported in stateless mode.
# @param max_sessions [Integer, nil] cap on the concurrent session count in stateful mode; a new
# `initialize` past the cap is rejected with HTTP 503, and `nil` disables the cap.
# @param allowed_origins [Array<String>, nil] extra `Origin` values accepted in addition to
# same-origin requests, for DNS rebinding protection.
# @param allowed_hosts [Array<String>, nil] extra `Host` values accepted beyond the loopback
# defaults (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, `localhost`); each entry matches a bare host name (any port)
# or a full `host:port`.
# @param dns_rebinding_protection [Boolean] when `true` (default), validates the `Host` and
# `Origin` headers to prevent DNS rebinding; pass `false` when an upstream proxy already
# validates them.
# @param session_request_validator [#call, nil] An optional
# `->(request, session_id) { true | false }` invoked on every non-`initialize` POST, GET, and DELETE
# against an existing session (regular requests, notifications, and client responses alike).
# Returning a falsy value rejects the request with HTTP 403. The SDK issues a random `SecureRandom.uuid`
# session ID and otherwise only checks existence/idle-timeout, so binding a session to a user is
# the deploying application's responsibility (the transport never receives the authenticated identity
# on its own); this is the seam to enforce ownership and mitigate session poisoning. Without a validator,
# ownership is not enforced.
# @param max_request_bytes [Integer] upper bound in bytes on a POST request body; larger
# requests are rejected with HTTP 413. Defaults to 4 MiB.
# @param max_listen_subscriptions [Integer, nil] cap on concurrent `subscriptions/listen`
# streams; a listen request past the cap is rejected with HTTP 503, and `nil` disables
# the cap.
# @param listen_keepalive_interval [Numeric, nil] seconds between SSE keepalive comment frames
# on a `subscriptions/listen` stream; the periodic write frees the stream's slot when the peer
# has gone away. Defaults to `DEFAULT_LISTEN_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL` (15); pass `nil` to disable
# when an upstream proxy already keeps the stream alive.
# @param serve_subscriptions_listen [Boolean] whether `subscriptions/listen` opens a stream.
# A host that buffers responses and cannot serve an open SSE stream (e.g. the Rails controller pattern,
# which builds a fresh transport per request and renders the body) passes `false`:
# the method then answers 404 with JSON-RPC `-32601` like any unimplemented method,
# and `Server#discover` stops advertising the `listChanged`/`subscribe` capability flags,
# keeping the advertisement and the actual behavior in agreement. Defaults to `true`.
# @param server_to_client_request_timeout [Numeric] seconds a server-to-client request waits for its
# response before the transport stops waiting and raises `MCP::Server::RequestTimeoutError`.
# Defaults to `DEFAULT_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` (600); individual calls override it with `timeout:`.
def initialize(
server,
stateless: false,
enable_json_response: false,
session_idle_timeout: UNSET_IDLE_TIMEOUT,
max_sessions: DEFAULT_MAX_SESSIONS,
allowed_origins: nil,
allowed_hosts: nil,
dns_rebinding_protection: true,
session_request_validator: nil,
max_request_bytes: DEFAULT_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES,
max_listen_subscriptions: DEFAULT_MAX_LISTEN_SUBSCRIPTIONS,
listen_keepalive_interval: DEFAULT_LISTEN_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL,
serve_subscriptions_listen: true,
server_to_client_request_timeout: DEFAULT_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT
)
super(server)
# Maps `session_id` to `{ get_sse_stream: stream_object, server_session: ServerSession, last_active_at: float_from_monotonic_clock, origin: origin_header }`.
@sessions = {}
@mutex = Mutex.new
@stateless = stateless
@enable_json_response = enable_json_response
@session_request_validator = session_request_validator
@dns_rebinding_protection = dns_rebinding_protection
# Host names are case-insensitive, so the allow lists are compared down-cased.
@allowed_hosts = (DEFAULT_LOOPBACK_HOSTS + Array(allowed_hosts)).map(&:downcase).freeze
@allowed_origins = Array(allowed_origins).map(&:downcase).freeze
@pending_responses = {}
# Maps a `subscriptions/listen` request id to `{ stream: stream_object, filter: honored_subscription_filter }` (SEP-2575).
# In-process only; a multi-worker deployment needs an external event bus to fan notifications out across processes,
# which is a follow-up.
@listen_subscriptions = {}
# Maps a modern request's ephemeral session id to the Array collecting the notifications its handler emits;
# `handle_modern` registers the sink and flushes it as SSE frames ahead of the final response (SEP-2575).
@modern_request_sinks = {}
# Resolve the idle timeout: an explicit value (including `nil` to opt out) wins; otherwise apply the secure default,
# which does not apply to stateless mode since it retains no sessions.
@session_idle_timeout = if session_idle_timeout.equal?(UNSET_IDLE_TIMEOUT)
stateless ? nil : DEFAULT_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT
else
session_idle_timeout
end
if @session_idle_timeout
if @stateless
raise ArgumentError, "session_idle_timeout is not supported in stateless mode."
elsif @session_idle_timeout <= 0
raise ArgumentError, "session_idle_timeout must be a positive number."
end
end
unless max_sessions.nil? || (max_sessions.is_a?(Integer) && max_sessions > 0)
raise ArgumentError, "max_sessions must be a positive Integer or nil"
end
# The cap guards the stateful session store; stateless mode keeps none.
@max_sessions = stateless ? nil : max_sessions
unless max_request_bytes.is_a?(Integer) && max_request_bytes > 0
raise ArgumentError, "max_request_bytes must be a positive Integer"
end
@max_request_bytes = max_request_bytes
if !max_listen_subscriptions.nil? && !(max_listen_subscriptions.is_a?(Integer) && max_listen_subscriptions > 0)
raise ArgumentError, "max_listen_subscriptions must be a positive Integer or nil"
end
@max_listen_subscriptions = max_listen_subscriptions
if !listen_keepalive_interval.nil? && !(listen_keepalive_interval.is_a?(Numeric) && listen_keepalive_interval > 0)
raise ArgumentError, "listen_keepalive_interval must be a positive number or nil"
end
@listen_keepalive_interval = listen_keepalive_interval
@serve_subscriptions_listen = serve_subscriptions_listen
unless server_to_client_request_timeout.is_a?(Numeric) && server_to_client_request_timeout.positive?
raise ArgumentError, "server_to_client_request_timeout must be a positive number"
end
@server_to_client_request_timeout = server_to_client_request_timeout
start_reaper_thread if @session_idle_timeout
end
REQUIRED_POST_ACCEPT_TYPES_SSE = ["application/json", "text/event-stream"].freeze
REQUIRED_POST_ACCEPT_TYPES_JSON = ["application/json"].freeze
REQUIRED_GET_ACCEPT_TYPES = ["text/event-stream"].freeze
STREAM_WRITE_ERRORS = [IOError, Errno::EPIPE, Errno::ECONNRESET].freeze
SESSION_REAP_INTERVAL = 60
# Loopback hosts always accepted by DNS rebinding protection. A locally bound MCP server (the canonical pattern) is
# protected out of the box; non-loopback deployments widen the list via `allowed_hosts:`.
DEFAULT_LOOPBACK_HOSTS = ["127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"].freeze
# JSON-RPC methods whose target name is mirrored into the `Mcp-Name` header (SEP-2575).
NAME_BEARING_METHODS = [Methods::TOOLS_CALL, Methods::RESOURCES_READ, Methods::PROMPTS_GET].freeze
# Maps broadcast notification methods to the `SubscriptionFilter` field that opts in to them on
# a `subscriptions/listen` stream (SEP-2575). `notifications/resources/updated` is matched by URI
# against `resourceSubscriptions` instead.
LISTEN_FILTER_FIELDS = {
Methods::NOTIFICATIONS_TOOLS_LIST_CHANGED => :toolsListChanged,
Methods::NOTIFICATIONS_PROMPTS_LIST_CHANGED => :promptsListChanged,
Methods::NOTIFICATIONS_RESOURCES_LIST_CHANGED => :resourcesListChanged,
}.freeze
# JSON-RPC error codes that surface as HTTP 400 on the modern path. `-32601` maps to 404
# (disambiguating an unknown method from a legacy HTTP+SSE 404) and everything else, including internal errors,
# stays 200, matching the Python SDK's status ladder.
MODERN_BAD_REQUEST_CODES = [
ErrorCodes::HEADER_MISMATCH,
ErrorCodes::MISSING_REQUIRED_CLIENT_CAPABILITY,
ErrorCodes::UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::PARSE_ERROR,
JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_PARAMS,
].freeze
# Rack app interface. This transport can be mounted as a Rack app.
def call(env)
handle_request(Rack::Request.new(env))
end
# Whether this transport serves the `subscriptions/listen` notification stream (SEP-2575).
# Gates both the route (a refusing transport answers the method as unimplemented) and
# the `listChanged`/`subscribe` capability flags `Server#discover` advertises,
# so the two always agree. Set via the `serve_subscriptions_listen:` constructor keyword.
def serves_subscriptions_listen?
@serve_subscriptions_listen
end
def handle_request(request)
rebinding_error = validate_dns_rebinding(request)
return rebinding_error if rebinding_error
# Header-primary era routing (SEP-2575). An `MCP-Protocol-Version` header naming a version outside
# every supported list routes to the sessionless modern path, so an unknown future version receives
# the spec-mandated `-32022` with the supported list instead of the legacy path's generic invalid-request error.
# Requests without the header, or with a stable-only version, take the existing paths untouched.
# An empty header value is malformed rather than a version claim, so it stays on the legacy path
# and fails legacy header validation as before.
#
# A modern header value (2026-07-28) alone cannot decide the era: sessionless modern traffic carries it,
# and requests of an established legacy session may stamp it as well (the handshake itself never negotiates it):
# an `Mcp-Session-Id` binds the request to an established legacy session (POST requests, the GET SSE stream,
# and DELETE termination keep working), and a session-less POST whose body is `initialize` is
# the legacy-distinctive handshake. Everything else under a dual-era header is sessionless modern traffic
# (`server/discover`, envelope-carrying requests, and envelope-missing requests that get the modern path's error shape).
header_version = request.env["HTTP_MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION"]
if header_version && !header_version.empty? && !stable_only_version?(header_version)
unless MCP::Configuration.modern_protocol_version?(header_version)
return handle_modern(request, header_version)
end
if extract_session_id(request).nil?
return handle_modern(request, header_version) unless request.env["REQUEST_METHOD"] == "POST"
# The body is readable only once (Rack 3 inputs need not be rewindable), so the era sniff reads it here,
# bounded, and hands the string to whichever path serves the request.
body_string = read_bounded_body(request)
return payload_too_large_response if body_string.nil?
unless legacy_handshake_body?(body_string)
return handle_modern(request, header_version, body_string: body_string)
end
return handle_post(request, body_string: body_string)
end
end
case request.env["REQUEST_METHOD"]
when "POST"
handle_post(request)
when "GET"
handle_get(request)
when "DELETE"
handle_delete(request)
else
method_not_allowed_response
end
end
def close
@reaper_thread&.kill
@reaper_thread = nil
teardown_listen_subscriptions
removed_sessions = @mutex.synchronize do
@sessions.each_key.filter_map { |session_id| cleanup_session_unsafe(session_id) }
end
removed_sessions.each do |session|
close_stream_safely(session[:get_sse_stream])
close_post_request_streams(session)
end
end
def send_notification(method, params = nil, session_id: nil, related_request_id: nil)
# `subscriptions/listen` streams (SEP-2575) receive matching change notifications regardless of the delivery below:
# a resource updated by one session's tool call changed globally, so modern subscribers hear about it too.
# Runs before the per-request sink and the stateless guard because the listen registry does not depend on sessions,
# and a sink capturing the notification for its own response stream must not hide it from other subscriptions.
deliver_to_listen_subscriptions(method, params)
notification = {
jsonrpc: "2.0",
method: method,
}
notification[:params] = params if params
# A modern request's notifications ride its own response stream (SEP-2575): `handle_modern` registers
# a per-request sink for its ephemeral session and flushes it as SSE frames ahead of the final response.
# Checked before the stateless guard, since modern requests are served in stateless deployments too.
# The sink is bounded; past `MAX_MODERN_REQUEST_NOTIFICATIONS` the notification is dropped as
# non-delivery (`false`), never handed to the legacy paths below.
sink = @mutex.synchronize { session_id && @modern_request_sinks[session_id] }
if sink
return false if sink.size >= MAX_MODERN_REQUEST_NOTIFICATIONS
sink << notification
return true
end
# Stateless mode has no streams to deliver notifications on. Report non-delivery instead of raising
# so the ephemeral per-request session's notify_* helpers (e.g. progress or log notifications from
# a tool handler) degrade gracefully rather than spamming the exception reporter on every call.
return false if @stateless
if session_id
deliver_targeted_notification(notification, session_id, related_request_id)
else
deliver_broadcast_notification(notification)
end
end
def deliver_targeted_notification(notification, session_id, related_request_id)
# JSON response mode returns a single JSON object as the POST response,
# so request-scoped notifications (e.g. progress, log) cannot be delivered
# alongside it. Session-scoped standalone notifications
# (e.g. `resources/updated`, `elicitation/complete`) still flow via GET SSE.
return false if @enable_json_response && related_request_id
streams_to_close = []
# Resolve the target stream under the lock, then write outside it: a stalled SSE reader
# must not block every other session that needs `@mutex`.
stream = @mutex.synchronize do
next unless (session = @sessions[session_id])
if session_expired?(session)
cleanup_and_collect_stream(session_id, streams_to_close)
next
end
active_stream(session, related_request_id: related_request_id)
end
close_streams(streams_to_close)
return false unless stream
write_notification(stream, notification, session_id, related_request_id)
end
def deliver_broadcast_notification(notification)
streams_to_close = []
# Snapshot the connected streams under the lock, then write to each outside it.
targets = @mutex.synchronize do
expired_session_ids = []
collected = @sessions.filter_map do |session_id, session|
next unless (stream = session[:get_sse_stream])
if session_expired?(session)
expired_session_ids << session_id
next
end
[session_id, stream]
end
expired_session_ids.each do |session_id|
cleanup_and_collect_stream(session_id, streams_to_close)
end
collected
end
close_streams(streams_to_close)
targets.count do |session_id, stream|
write_notification(stream, notification, session_id, nil)
end
end
# Writes a notification to an SSE stream without holding `@mutex`. On a write error,
# drops the broken stream and returns false; on success returns true.
def write_notification(stream, notification, session_id, related_request_id)
send_to_stream(stream, notification)
true
rescue *STREAM_WRITE_ERRORS => e
MCP.configuration.exception_reporter.call(e, { session_id: session_id, error: "Failed to send notification" })
drop_broken_stream(session_id, stream, related_request_id)
false
end
# Removes a stream that failed to accept a write. A request-scoped stream is dropped on its own;
# a session-scoped (GET SSE) failure tears down the whole session. The `@sessions` mutation runs
# under `@mutex`, and the affected streams are closed outside it.
def drop_broken_stream(session_id, stream, related_request_id)
streams_to_close = []
@mutex.synchronize do
session = @sessions[session_id]
if related_request_id
# Unregister only our own stream: removing on the id alone would drop whichever stream currently holds it,
# which is not necessarily the one that failed. The failed stream is closed either way, and a request-scoped
# failure never reaches the session teardown below.
registered = session&.dig(:post_request_streams, related_request_id)
session[:post_request_streams].delete(related_request_id) if registered.equal?(stream)
streams_to_close << stream
else
cleanup_and_collect_stream(session_id, streams_to_close)
end
end
close_streams(streams_to_close)
end
def close_streams(streams)
streams.each do |stream|
close_stream_safely(stream)
end
end
# Sends a server-to-client JSON-RPC request (e.g., `sampling/createMessage`) and blocks until
# the client responds.
#
# Uses a `PendingResponse` for cross-thread synchronization: this method registers one,
# sends the request via SSE stream, then waits on it. When the client POSTs a response,
# `handle_response` matches it by `request_id` and resolves the pending response,
# unblocking this thread. A cancellation and session teardown resolve it the same way.
#
# The wait is bounded by `timeout` (defaulting to the transport's `server_to_client_request_timeout`),
# so a client that never answers cannot park the calling thread for good. On expiry the peer is
# sent `notifications/cancelled` and `MCP::Server::RequestTimeoutError` is raised.
def send_request(method, params = nil, session_id: nil, related_request_id: nil, parent_cancellation: nil, server_session: nil, timeout: nil)
# The modern lifecycle (SEP-2575) forbids server-initiated JSON-RPC requests;
# multi round-trip `input_required` results (SEP-2322) replace them. A modern session has never reached
# the rest of this method anyway, since `handle_modern` mints its session without registering it in `@sessions`,
# but that is incidental: without the rule stated here a modern handler that reaches for elicitation
# or sampling is told "Session not found: <uuid>", which points at everything except the actual reason.
# `StdioTransport#send_request` refuses the same way.
if server_session&.era == :modern
raise "Server-initiated requests are not available in the modern lifecycle (SEP-2575)."
end
if @stateless
raise "Stateless mode does not support server-to-client requests."
end
if @enable_json_response
raise "JSON response mode does not support server-to-client requests."
end
unless session_id
raise "session_id is required for server-to-client requests."
end
request_id = generate_request_id
pending_response = PendingResponse.new
wait_timeout = timeout || @server_to_client_request_timeout
cancel_hook = nil
request = { jsonrpc: "2.0", id: request_id, method: method }
request[:params] = params if params
# Register the pending response and resolve the stream under the lock, but perform
# the write outside it so a stalled reader cannot block every other session on `@mutex`.
stream = @mutex.synchronize do
unless (session = @sessions[session_id])
raise "Session not found: #{session_id}."
end
@pending_responses[request_id] = { queue: pending_response, session_id: session_id }
active_stream(session, related_request_id: related_request_id)
end
sent = false
if stream
begin
send_to_stream(stream, request)
sent = true
rescue *STREAM_WRITE_ERRORS
drop_broken_stream(session_id, stream, related_request_id)
end
end
# TODO: Replace with event store + replay when resumability is implemented.
# Resumability is a separate MCP specification feature (SSE event IDs, Last-Event-ID replay,
# event store management) independent of sampling.
# See: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/latest/basic/transports#resumability-and-redelivery
#
# The TypeScript and Python SDKs buffer messages and replay on reconnect.
# Until then, raise to prevent queue.pop from blocking indefinitely.
unless sent
raise "No active stream for #{method} request."
end
if parent_cancellation && server_session
cancel_hook = parent_cancellation.on_cancel do |reason|
server_session.send_peer_cancellation(
nested_request_id: request_id,
related_request_id: related_request_id,
reason: reason,
)
end
end
response = pending_response.pop(timeout: wait_timeout) do
# Expiry cancels as well as stops waiting, so a client that answers late does not act on
# a request the server has abandoned. Only connections speaking 2025-11-25 or earlier get here:
# the modern lifecycle forbids server-to-client requests outright, and its sessionless requests
# never register the session this method looks up. Those revisions ask the sender to "issue
# a cancellation notification for that request and stop waiting", letting either side send one.
# (The 2026-07-28 rule reserving `notifications/cancelled` for `subscriptions/listen` teardown
# governs the era that has no such requests to cancel.) Both reference SDKs send this same
# courtesy cancel on timeout.
server_session&.send_peer_cancellation(
nested_request_id: request_id,
related_request_id: related_request_id,
reason: "Timed out after #{wait_timeout} seconds",
)
raise RequestTimeoutError.new(
"#{method} request timed out after #{wait_timeout} seconds",
request_id: request_id,
timeout: wait_timeout,
)
end
if response.is_a?(Hash) && response.key?(:error)
raise StandardError, "Client returned an error for #{method} request (code: #{response[:error][:code]}): #{response[:error][:message]}"
end
if response == :session_closed
raise "SSE session closed while waiting for #{method} response."
end
if response == :cancelled
reason = @mutex.synchronize { @pending_responses.dig(request_id, :cancel_reason) }
raise MCP::CancelledError.new(
"#{method} request was cancelled",
request_id: request_id,
reason: reason,
)
end
response
ensure
parent_cancellation.off_cancel(cancel_hook) if cancel_hook
if request_id
@mutex.synchronize do
@pending_responses.delete(request_id)
end
end
end
# Unblocks a `send_request` awaiting a response when the peer is being cancelled.
# The waiting thread will see `:cancelled` on its queue and raise `MCP::CancelledError`.
#
# Race note: this is first-writer-wins on the pending-response queue. If a real response
# has already been pushed (client responded before the cancel hook fired), that response
# wins and `:cancelled` is enqueued behind it but never read - `send_request` returns
# the real response and deletes the pending entry in its `ensure` block. Conversely,
# if `:cancelled` arrives first, any later client response is silently dropped in `handle_response`
# because the pending entry has been removed.
def cancel_pending_request(request_id, reason: nil)
@mutex.synchronize do
if (pending = @pending_responses[request_id])
pending[:cancel_reason] = reason
pending[:queue].push(:cancelled)
end
end
end
private
def start_reaper_thread
@reaper_thread = Thread.new do
loop do
sleep(SESSION_REAP_INTERVAL)
reap_expired_sessions
rescue StandardError => e
MCP.configuration.exception_reporter.call(e, error: "Session reaper error")
end
end
end
def reap_expired_sessions
return unless @session_idle_timeout
removed_sessions = @mutex.synchronize do
@sessions.each_key.filter_map do |session_id|
next unless session_expired?(@sessions[session_id])
cleanup_session_unsafe(session_id)
end
end
removed_sessions.each do |session|
close_stream_safely(session[:get_sse_stream])
close_post_request_streams(session)
end
end
def send_to_stream(stream, data)
message = data.is_a?(String) ? data : data.to_json
stream.write("data: #{message}\n\n")
stream.flush
end
def send_ping_to_stream(stream)
stream.write(": ping #{Time.now.iso8601}\n\n")
stream.flush
end
# Serves one request of the stateless modern lifecycle (MCP 2026-07-28, SEP-2575):
# a single POST/JSON exchange with no session. The modern path never consults
# `@stateless`, `@sessions`, or `@enable_json_response`, and never issues or accepts
# an `Mcp-Session-Id`. GET (the legacy listening stream, replaced by `subscriptions/listen`)
# and DELETE (session termination) have no modern meaning.
def handle_modern(request, header_version, body_string: nil)
return method_not_allowed_response unless request.env["REQUEST_METHOD"] == "POST"
accept_error = validate_accept_header(request, REQUIRED_POST_ACCEPT_TYPES_SSE)
return accept_error if accept_error
content_type_error = validate_content_type(request)
return content_type_error if content_type_error
if body_string.nil?
body_string = read_bounded_body(request)
return payload_too_large_response if body_string.nil?
end
begin
body = parse_request_body(body_string)
rescue InvalidJsonError
return invalid_json_response
end
unless body.is_a?(Hash)
return invalid_request_response("Invalid Request: JSON-RPC body must be a single request object")
end
# The version check precedes everything else that depends on request content,
# so a client probing with an unknown future version always receives the `-32022` signal
# (with the supported list to select from) rather than an incidental error.
unless MCP::Configuration.modern_protocol_version?(header_version)
return json_rpc_error_response(
status: 400,
code: ErrorCodes::UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
message: "Unsupported protocol version",
data: {
supported: MCP::Configuration::SUPPORTED_MODERN_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS,
requested: header_version,
},
id: body[:id],
)
end
if extract_session_id(request)
return json_rpc_error_response(
status: 400,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: "Bad Request: Mcp-Session-Id is not accepted in the modern lifecycle",
id: body[:id],
)
end
mismatch_error = validate_modern_headers(request, body, header_version)
return mismatch_error if mismatch_error
# `subscriptions/listen` is a long-lived notification stream served at the transport layer;
# it never dispatches through `Server#handle`. A transport constructed with
# `serve_subscriptions_listen: false` skips the interception, so the method falls through
# to the dispatcher as unimplemented (404 with `-32601`) - the refusal a host that cannot
# serve an open SSE stream needs, instead of a `Proc` body it can never call.
if body[:method] == Methods::SUBSCRIPTIONS_LISTEN && serves_subscriptions_listen?
return handle_subscriptions_listen(body)
end
session = modern_session
notifications = @mutex.synchronize { @modern_request_sinks[session.session_id] = [] }
begin
response = @server.handle(body, session: session)
ensure
@mutex.synchronize { @modern_request_sinks.delete(session.session_id) }
end
# `nil` covers notifications and cancellation-suppressed responses; ack with 202 like the legacy notification path.
return handle_accepted if response.nil?
# Notifications a handler emitted during the request ride the request's own response stream as SSE frames ahead of
# the final response (SEP-2575); a request that emitted none keeps the single JSON exchange and its HTTP status ladder.
# Delivery is buffered: frames flush after the handler returns, preserving order but not real-time interleaving
# (the TypeScript and Python SDKs stream live), and the sink grows with the handler's notification count.
# Live streaming can follow without changing the wire shape.
if notifications.empty?
[modern_http_status(response), { "content-type" => "application/json" }, [response.to_json]]
else
frames = notifications + [response]
sse_body = frames.map { |frame| "event: message\ndata: #{frame.to_json}\n\n" }.join
[200, SSE_HEADERS.dup, [sse_body]]
end
rescue StandardError => e
MCP.configuration.exception_reporter.call(e, { request: body_string })
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 500,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INTERNAL_ERROR,
message: "Internal server error",
)
end
# Enforces the SEP-2575 header/body match rules (`-32020`, HTTP 400): the `MCP-Protocol-Version` header
# MUST match the `_meta`-carried version, and the `Mcp-Method` / `Mcp-Name` mirror headers MUST match
# the body when sent. Absent mirror headers are tolerated for interoperability while other SDK serving stacks
# converge on enforcement.
def validate_modern_headers(request, body, header_version)
params = body[:params]
meta_version = params.is_a?(Hash) ? params.dig(:_meta, :"io.modelcontextprotocol/protocolVersion") : nil
if meta_version && meta_version != header_version
return header_mismatch_response(
"MCP-Protocol-Version header value '#{header_version}' does not match body value '#{meta_version}'",
body[:id],
)
end
# `Mcp-Method` is required on every modern POST and `Mcp-Name` on the name-bearing methods:
# the spec lists a missing required standard header among the validation failures that MUST be rejected,
# and the TypeScript SDK enforces presence the same way. Absence cannot be treated as "nothing to compare":
# the headers exist so intermediaries can route without parsing bodies, and a client that omits them
# defeats that contract silently.
method_header = request.env["HTTP_MCP_METHOD"]
if method_header.to_s.empty?
return header_mismatch_response(
"Mcp-Method header is required on the modern path",
body[:id],
)
end
if method_header != body[:method]
return header_mismatch_response(
"Mcp-Method header value '#{method_header}' does not match body value '#{body[:method]}'",
body[:id],
)
end
if NAME_BEARING_METHODS.include?(body[:method])
body_name = params.is_a?(Hash) ? params[:name] || params[:uri] : nil
name_header = request.env["HTTP_MCP_NAME"]
if body_name
if name_header.to_s.empty?
return header_mismatch_response(
"Mcp-Name header is required for `#{body[:method]}`",
body[:id],
)
end
decoded_name = decode_header_value(name_header)
if decoded_name != body_name
return header_mismatch_response(
"Mcp-Name header value '#{decoded_name}' does not match body value '#{body_name}'",
body[:id],
)
end
end
end
nil
end
# Serves `subscriptions/listen` (SEP-2575): opens a long-lived SSE stream whose first message is
# `notifications/subscriptions/acknowledged` with the subset of requested notification types
# the server agreed to honor. Notifications delivered on the stream carry `io.modelcontextprotocol/subscriptionId`
# (= the listen request id) in `_meta`. A graceful teardown (transport `close`) sends a `SubscriptionsListenResult`
# response; an abrupt disconnect sends nothing. A keepalive comment frame is written every
# `listen_keepalive_interval` seconds so a dropped connection frees its slot.
def handle_subscriptions_listen(body)
request_id = body[:id]
params = body[:params]
# A listen frame without an id could never receive stream teardown correlation.
unless request_id
return invalid_request_response("Invalid Request: subscriptions/listen requires an id")
end
begin
if RequestEnvelope.modern?(params)
RequestEnvelope.parse!(params, request: params)
else
return invalid_request_response("Invalid Request: modern requests require the SEP-2575 `_meta` envelope")
end
rescue Server::RequestHandlerError => e
return json_rpc_error_response(
status: 400,
code: e.error_code || JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: e.message,
data: e.error_data,
id: request_id,
)
end
filter = params[:notifications]
unless filter.is_a?(Hash)
return json_rpc_error_response(
status: 400,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_PARAMS,
message: "Invalid params: subscriptions/listen requires a `notifications` filter object",
id: request_id,
)
end
# Best-effort cap check before committing to the SSE response; the registration inside
# `listen_sse_body` re-checks atomically for the race between two concurrent listens
# crossing the cap together.
if listen_subscriptions_full?
return too_many_listen_subscriptions_response(request_id)
end
[200, SSE_HEADERS.dup, listen_sse_body(request_id, honored_filter(filter))]
end
def listen_subscriptions_full?
return false unless @max_listen_subscriptions
@mutex.synchronize { @listen_subscriptions.size >= @max_listen_subscriptions }
end
def too_many_listen_subscriptions_response(request_id)
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 503,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INTERNAL_ERROR,
message: "Service unavailable: maximum concurrent subscriptions/listen streams (#{@max_listen_subscriptions}) reached",
id: request_id,
)
end
# The Rack streaming body of a `subscriptions/listen` response. It responds to `call`
# and deliberately not to `each`, so Rack keeps classifying it as a streaming body;
# `first` exists only to turn the buffered-host mistake (e.g. `render(json: body.first)`
# in the Rails controller pattern) from a bare `NoMethodError` into guidance naming the fix.
class ListenStreamBody
def initialize(&block)
@block = block
end
def call(stream)
@block.call(stream)
end
def first
raise <<~MESSAGE
subscriptions/listen returned a streaming SSE body, which cannot be buffered into a JSON response. \
A host that cannot hold an SSE response open should construct the transport with `serve_subscriptions_listen: false`, \
so the method is answered as unimplemented instead.
See the Rails (controller) section at https://ruby.sdk.modelcontextprotocol.io/server/transports/ for the hosting patterns.
MESSAGE
end
end
private_constant :ListenStreamBody
# The body registers the stream and returns, leaving the response open like
# the legacy GET stream (`create_sse_body`).
def listen_sse_body(request_id, honored)
ListenStreamBody.new do |stream|
rejected = false
@mutex.synchronize do
if @listen_subscriptions.key?(request_id) ||
(@max_listen_subscriptions && @listen_subscriptions.size >= @max_listen_subscriptions)
rejected = true
else
@listen_subscriptions[request_id] = { stream: stream, filter: honored }
end
end
if rejected
close_stream_safely(stream)
else
acknowledgement = {
jsonrpc: "2.0",
method: Methods::NOTIFICATIONS_SUBSCRIPTIONS_ACKNOWLEDGED,
params: {
notifications: honored,
_meta: { RequestEnvelope::SUBSCRIPTION_ID_META_KEY.to_sym => request_id },
},
}
begin
send_to_stream(stream, acknowledgement)
start_listen_keepalive_thread(request_id)
rescue *STREAM_WRITE_ERRORS
remove_listen_subscription(request_id)
close_stream_safely(stream)
end
end
end
end
# Periodically writes an SSE keepalive comment frame to a listen stream so a silently dropped
# connection is detected and its slot freed, rather than held until the next fan-out write.
# Mirrors the legacy GET stream's `start_keepalive_thread`; a comment frame (not a data frame)
# cannot corrupt an interleaved notification's JSON.
def start_listen_keepalive_thread(request_id)
return unless @listen_keepalive_interval
Thread.new do
while listen_subscription_active?(request_id)
sleep(@listen_keepalive_interval)
send_listen_keepalive_ping(request_id)
end
rescue *STREAM_WRITE_ERRORS
# The peer went away; the ensure frees the slot. A dropped listen stream is the normal
# way this loop ends, so it is not reported.
rescue StandardError => e
MCP.configuration.exception_reporter.call(e, { subscription_id: request_id })
ensure
stream = @mutex.synchronize do
subscription = @listen_subscriptions.delete(request_id)
subscription && subscription[:stream]
end
close_stream_safely(stream) if stream
end
end
def listen_subscription_active?(request_id)
@mutex.synchronize { @listen_subscriptions.key?(request_id) }
end
# Resolves the stream under the lock, then writes outside it so a stalled reader cannot block
# every other subscription on `@mutex`. A write error propagates to end the keepalive loop.
def send_listen_keepalive_ping(request_id)
stream = @mutex.synchronize do
subscription = @listen_subscriptions[request_id]
subscription && subscription[:stream]
end
return unless stream
send_ping_to_stream(stream)
end
# Per SEP-2575, the server MUST NOT send notification types the client has not requested,
# and the acknowledgement only includes types the server actually supports
# (derived from its declared capabilities).
def honored_filter(filter)
capabilities = @server.capabilities
honored = {}
honored[:toolsListChanged] = true if filter[:toolsListChanged] && capability_flag?(capabilities, :tools, :listChanged)
honored[:promptsListChanged] = true if filter[:promptsListChanged] && capability_flag?(capabilities, :prompts, :listChanged)
honored[:resourcesListChanged] = true if filter[:resourcesListChanged] && capability_flag?(capabilities, :resources, :listChanged)
subscriptions = filter[:resourceSubscriptions]
if capability_flag?(capabilities, :resources, :subscribe) && subscriptions.is_a?(Array) && !subscriptions.empty?
honored[:resourceSubscriptions] = subscriptions
end
honored
end
# Reads a nested capability flag tolerating both symbol and string keys, since user-supplied capability hashes arrive
# in either form. The flag that promises delivery (`listChanged` / `subscribe`) decides honoring, the same derivation
# `Server#discover` uses for its era-aware capability stripping; the mere presence of the primitive's capability is not enough.
def capability_flag?(capabilities, name, flag)
value = capabilities[name] || capabilities[name.to_s]
return false unless value.is_a?(Hash)
!!(value[flag] || value[flag.to_s])
end
# Fans a notification out to every `subscriptions/listen` stream whose honored filter opted in to it,
# stamping the correlating `subscriptionId` into `_meta`. Matching against the honored filter
# (not the requested one) enforces the MUST NOT-send-unrequested-types rule.
def deliver_to_listen_subscriptions(method, params)
field = LISTEN_FILTER_FIELDS[method]
return if field.nil? && method != Methods::NOTIFICATIONS_RESOURCES_UPDATED
# The matching snapshot is taken under `@mutex`, but stream writes happen outside it:
# a slow or stalled subscriber must not block the transport, matching the legacy delivery paths.
matched = @mutex.synchronize do
@listen_subscriptions.filter_map do |request_id, subscription|
hit = if field
subscription[:filter][field]
else
uris = subscription[:filter][:resourceSubscriptions]
uri = params.is_a?(Hash) ? params[:uri] || params["uri"] : nil
uris.is_a?(Array) && uris.include?(uri)
end
[request_id, subscription[:stream]] if hit
end
end
matched.each do |request_id, stream|
meta = { RequestEnvelope::SUBSCRIPTION_ID_META_KEY.to_sym => request_id }
notification_params = (params || {}).merge(_meta: meta)
notification = { jsonrpc: "2.0", method: method, params: notification_params }
begin
send_to_stream(stream, notification)
rescue *STREAM_WRITE_ERRORS => e
MCP.configuration.exception_reporter.call(
e,
{ subscription_id: request_id, error: "Failed to send notification" },
)
remove_listen_subscription(request_id)
close_stream_safely(stream)
end
end
end
def remove_listen_subscription(request_id)
@mutex.synchronize { @listen_subscriptions.delete(request_id) }
end
# Graceful teardown (SEP-2575): each open listen stream receives its `SubscriptionsListenResult` response
# before the stream closes.
def teardown_listen_subscriptions
removed = @mutex.synchronize do
subscriptions = @listen_subscriptions.dup
@listen_subscriptions.clear
subscriptions
end
removed.each do |request_id, subscription|
begin
send_to_stream(subscription[:stream], {
jsonrpc: "2.0",
id: request_id,
result: {
# `SubscriptionsListenResult` is served at the transport layer and never
# passes through the dispatch path, so the REQUIRED 2026-07-28 `resultType` is
# stamped at its construction site.
resultType: ResultType::COMPLETE,
_meta: { RequestEnvelope::SUBSCRIPTION_ID_META_KEY.to_sym => request_id },
},
})
rescue *STREAM_WRITE_ERRORS
nil
end
close_stream_safely(subscription[:stream])
end
end
def header_mismatch_response(message, id)
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 400,
code: ErrorCodes::HEADER_MISMATCH,
message: "Header mismatch: #{message}",
id: id,
)
end
# Mirrors `MCP::Client::HTTP#encode_header_value`: a value wrapped as `=?base64?<base64>?=` decodes to
# its original UTF-8 string; anything else is taken verbatim. Duplicated here because the client transport
# requires faraday, which servers do not depend on.
def decode_header_value(value)
match = value.match(/\A=\?base64\?(.*)\?=\z/m)
return value unless match
match[1].unpack1("m0").force_encoding(Encoding::UTF_8)
rescue ArgumentError
value
end
# Each modern request is self-contained: handlers run against an ephemeral per-request `ServerSession` locked to
# the modern era. The session carries a fresh unregistered `session_id` so notification and server-initiated-request plumbing
# keyed by session lookup degrades gracefully (delivery returns `false`) instead of broadcasting to unrelated legacy sessions
# via the `session_id.nil?` branch.
def modern_session
ServerSession.new(server: @server, transport: self, session_id: SecureRandom.uuid, era: :modern)
end
def modern_http_status(response)
error_code = response.is_a?(Hash) ? response.dig(:error, :code) : nil
if error_code.nil?
200
elsif error_code == JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::METHOD_NOT_FOUND
404
elsif MODERN_BAD_REQUEST_CODES.include?(error_code)
400
else
200
end
end
def handle_post(request, body_string: nil)
required_types = @enable_json_response ? REQUIRED_POST_ACCEPT_TYPES_JSON : REQUIRED_POST_ACCEPT_TYPES_SSE
accept_error = validate_accept_header(request, required_types)
return accept_error if accept_error
content_type_error = validate_content_type(request)
return content_type_error if content_type_error
if body_string.nil?
body_string = read_bounded_body(request)
return payload_too_large_response if body_string.nil?
end
session_id = extract_session_id(request)
begin
body = parse_request_body(body_string)
rescue InvalidJsonError
return invalid_json_response
end
# Streamable HTTP (2025-11-25) requires a single JSON-RPC message object per POST.
# Batched/array bodies are not supported; reject with `-32600` instead of falling through to
# a malformed Rack response.
unless body.is_a?(Hash)
return invalid_request_response("Invalid Request: JSON-RPC body must be a single request object")
end
# Header-primary routing sends sessionless modern traffic to `handle_modern` before this method runs,
# so a body carrying the modern `_meta` triple (SEP-2575) arrives here in two shapes only.
# Bound to a session under a dual-era header (2026-07-28), it is a lifecycle violation: the session
# already negotiated the legacy lifecycle via `initialize`, and a connection can never change eras
# (mirroring the stdio era lock). Otherwise the header is missing or names a stable-only version,
# which violates the header/body match requirement and would fall through the legacy path via
# the header default; reject that as a header mismatch.
if RequestEnvelope.modern?(body[:params])
header_version = request.env["HTTP_MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION"]
if header_version && MCP::Configuration.modern_protocol_version?(header_version)
return invalid_request_response(
"Invalid Request: the session already negotiated the legacy lifecycle via `initialize`",
request_id: body[:id],
)
end
return header_mismatch_response(
"MCP-Protocol-Version header is missing or legacy while the body carries the modern _meta envelope",
body[:id],
)
end
# The `MCP-Protocol-Version` header is only meaningful after negotiation, so on `initialize`
# the JSON-RPC body `params.protocolVersion` is authoritative and the header (if any) is ignored.
# This matches the TypeScript and Python SDKs.
# `server/discover` (SEP-2575) is likewise exempt: it is sessionless capability discovery that
# happens before (or instead of) negotiation.
unless initialize_request?(body) || discover_request?(body)
return missing_session_id_response if !@stateless && !session_id
protocol_version_error = validate_protocol_version_header(request)
return protocol_version_error if protocol_version_error
end
if initialize_request?(body)
if !@stateless && session_id
# An `initialize` request carrying an `Mcp-Session-Id` header is either a duplicate
# initialization attempt against a live session, or a retry against an unknown/expired
# one. In the live case, reject with `-32600` so the original session is not abandoned.
# In the unknown/expired case, return 404 so the client retries from scratch instead
# of silently inheriting a fresh session under the old ID.
return already_initialized_response(body[:id]) if session_active?(session_id)
return session_not_found_response
end
handle_initialization(request, body_string, body)
else
# Ownership gate for every request against an existing session, applied uniformly to notifications, client responses,
# and regular requests. This covers write paths beyond tool calls - notably `notifications/cancelled`, which would
# otherwise let a stolen session ID cancel a victim's in-flight request. `initialize` is exempt (it establishes the session).
if !@stateless && session_id && !validate_session_request(request, session_id)
return forbidden_response
end
if notification?(body)
# Reject a notification carrying an unknown or expired session ID instead of
# dispatching it against the shared `Server`. Mirrors the response and regular-request
# branches; without it a custom notification handler could run without a live session.
return session_not_found_response if !@stateless && !session_active?(session_id)
dispatch_notification(body_string, session_id)
handle_accepted
elsif response?(body)
return session_not_found_response if !@stateless && !session_exists?(session_id)
handle_response(body, session_id: session_id)
else
handle_regular_request(body_string, session_id, related_request_id: body[:id])
end
end
rescue StandardError => e
MCP.configuration.exception_reporter.call(e, { request: body_string })
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 500,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INTERNAL_ERROR,
message: "Internal server error",
)
end
def handle_get(request)
if @stateless
return method_not_allowed_response
end
accept_error = validate_accept_header(request, REQUIRED_GET_ACCEPT_TYPES)
return accept_error if accept_error
session_id = extract_session_id(request)
return missing_session_id_response unless session_id
error_response = validate_and_touch_session(session_id)
return error_response if error_response
return forbidden_response unless validate_session_request(request, session_id)
protocol_version_error = validate_protocol_version_header(request)
return protocol_version_error if protocol_version_error
return session_already_connected_response if get_session_stream(session_id)
setup_sse_stream(session_id)
end
def handle_delete(request)
success_response = [200, { "content-type" => "application/json" }, [{ success: true }.to_json]]
if @stateless
protocol_version_error = validate_protocol_version_header(request)
return protocol_version_error if protocol_version_error
# Stateless mode doesn't support sessions, so we can just return a success response
return success_response
end
return missing_session_id_response unless (session_id = extract_session_id(request))
return session_not_found_response unless session_exists?(session_id)
return forbidden_response unless validate_session_request(request, session_id)
protocol_version_error = validate_protocol_version_header(request)
return protocol_version_error if protocol_version_error
cleanup_session(session_id)
success_response
end
def cleanup_session(session_id)
session = @mutex.synchronize do
cleanup_session_unsafe(session_id)
end
if session
close_stream_safely(session[:get_sse_stream])
close_post_request_streams(session)
end
end
# Removes a session from `@sessions` and returns it. Does not close the stream.
# Callers must close the stream outside the mutex to avoid holding the lock during
# potentially blocking I/O.
def cleanup_session_unsafe(session_id)
session = @sessions.delete(session_id)
# Unblock threads waiting on pending responses for this session.
@pending_responses.each_value do |pending_response|
if pending_response[:session_id] == session_id
pending_response[:queue].push(:session_closed)
end
end
session
end
def cleanup_and_collect_stream(session_id, streams_to_close)
return unless (removed = cleanup_session_unsafe(session_id))
streams_to_close << removed[:get_sse_stream]
removed[:post_request_streams]&.each_value { |stream| streams_to_close << stream }
end
def close_stream_safely(stream)
stream&.close
rescue StandardError
# Ignore close-related errors from already closed/broken streams.
end
def close_post_request_streams(session)
return unless (post_request_streams = session[:post_request_streams])
post_request_streams.each_value do |stream|
close_stream_safely(stream)
end
end
def extract_session_id(request)
request.env["HTTP_MCP_SESSION_ID"]
end
# Session-ownership gate for requests against an existing session (the spec's session-binding guidance).
# The session ID alone is unguessable but not proof of ownership, so a stolen ID must not silently grant access.
# Two layers, both returning `false` to trigger a 403:
#
# - Built-in Origin consistency (defense in depth, not authentication): if the session recorded an `Origin`
# at `initialize` and this request carries a different one, reject. Both must be present to compare,
# so non-browser clients that send no `Origin` are unaffected.
# - The application-supplied `session_request_validator`, which can enforce true ownership when it has
# an authenticated principal.
def validate_session_request(request, session_id)
session = @mutex.synchronize { @sessions[session_id] }
return true unless session
session_origin = session[:origin]
request_origin = request.env["HTTP_ORIGIN"]
return false if session_origin && request_origin && session_origin != request_origin
return @session_request_validator.call(request, session_id) if @session_request_validator
true
end
def validate_accept_header(request, required_types)
accept_header = request.env["HTTP_ACCEPT"]
return not_acceptable_response(required_types) unless accept_header
accepted_types = parse_accept_header(accept_header)
return if accepted_types.include?("*/*")
missing_types = required_types - accepted_types
return not_acceptable_response(required_types) unless missing_types.empty?
nil
end
def parse_accept_header(header)
header.split(",").map do |part|
part.split(";").first.strip.downcase
end
end
def validate_content_type(request)
content_type = request.env["CONTENT_TYPE"]
media_type = content_type&.split(";")&.first&.strip&.downcase
return if media_type == "application/json"
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 415,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: "Unsupported Media Type: Content-Type must be application/json",
)
end
def not_acceptable_response(required_types)
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 406,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: "Not Acceptable: Accept header must include #{required_types.join(" and ")}",
)
end
# Reads the request body with a hard byte cap so an unbounded POST cannot exhaust
# memory. A declared `Content-Length` over the cap is rejected
# without reading; the actual read is also bounded to one byte past the cap, so
# a missing or spoofed `Content-Length` (e.g. chunked transfer) is still caught.
# Returns `nil` when the body exceeds the cap.
def read_bounded_body(request)
content_length = request.content_length
return if content_length && content_length.to_i > @max_request_bytes
body = request.body.read(@max_request_bytes + 1)
return "" if body.nil?
return if body.bytesize > @max_request_bytes
body
end
def payload_too_large_response
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 413,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: "Payload too large: request body exceeds #{@max_request_bytes} bytes",
)
end
def parse_request_body(body_string)
# `max_nesting` bounds parse depth; a too-deep body raises `JSON::NestingError`,
# a subclass of `JSON::ParserError`, so it is caught below as a parse error.
JSON.parse(body_string, symbolize_names: true, max_nesting: MAX_JSON_NESTING)
rescue JSON::ParserError, TypeError
raise InvalidJsonError
end
def invalid_json_response
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 400,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::PARSE_ERROR,
message: "Parse error: Invalid JSON",
)
end
def initialize_request?(body)
body.is_a?(Hash) && body[:method] == Methods::INITIALIZE
end
def discover_request?(body)
body.is_a?(Hash) && body[:method] == Methods::SERVER_DISCOVER
end
# A version with no modern meaning, whose header can only accompany legacy traffic.
# A modern version's header (2026-07-28) can accompany either era's traffic - the handshake never negotiates it,
# but requests of an established legacy session may stamp it - so that value needs further disambiguation.
def stable_only_version?(version)
MCP::Configuration::SUPPORTED_STABLE_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS.include?(version) &&
!MCP::Configuration.modern_protocol_version?(version)
end
# Era sniff for a sessionless POST under a dual-era header version: only an `initialize` body
# WITHOUT the modern `_meta` envelope is legacy-distinctive. An `initialize` carrying
# the envelope comes from a modern client naming a method its lifecycle removed, so it stays
# on the modern path and answers with -32601/404 (SEP-2575).
# Unparsable or non-object bodies go to the modern path, whose error responses cover them.
def legacy_handshake_body?(body_string)
body = parse_request_body(body_string)
return false unless initialize_request?(body)
!RequestEnvelope.modern?(body[:params])
rescue InvalidJsonError
false
end
def validate_protocol_version_header(request)
header_value = request.env["HTTP_MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION"] || MCP::Configuration::DEFAULT_NEGOTIATED_PROTOCOL_VERSION
return if MCP::Configuration::SUPPORTED_STABLE_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS.include?(header_value)
supported = MCP::Configuration::SUPPORTED_STABLE_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS.join(", ")
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 400,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: "Bad Request: Unsupported protocol version: #{header_value}. Supported versions: #{supported}",
)
end
def json_rpc_error_response(status:, code:, message:, data: nil, id: nil)
error = { code: code, message: message }
error[:data] = data if data
body = { jsonrpc: "2.0", id: id, error: error }
[status, { "content-type" => "application/json" }, [body.to_json]]
end
def notification?(body)
!body[:id] && !!body[:method]
end
# Dispatches a client-originated notification (e.g. `notifications/cancelled`,
# `notifications/initialized`) through the server so it can update session state.
def dispatch_notification(body_string, session_id)
server_session = nil
if @stateless
server_session = ephemeral_session
elsif session_id
@mutex.synchronize do
session = @sessions[session_id]
server_session = session[:server_session] if session
end
end
dispatch_handle_json(body_string, server_session)
rescue => e
MCP.configuration.exception_reporter.call(e, { error: "Failed to dispatch notification" })
end
def response?(body)
!!body[:id] && !body[:method]
end
# Verifies that the response came from the expected session to prevent
# cross-session response injection if request IDs are ever leaked.
def handle_response(body, session_id:)
request_id = body[:id]
@mutex.synchronize do
if (pending_response = @pending_responses[request_id]) && pending_response[:session_id] == session_id
if body.key?(:error)
error = body[:error]
pending_response[:queue].push(error: { code: error[:code], message: error[:message] })
else
pending_response[:queue].push(body[:result])
end
end
end
handle_accepted
end
def handle_initialization(request, body_string, body)
session_id = nil
if @stateless
server_session = ephemeral_session
else
session_id = SecureRandom.uuid
server_session = ServerSession.new(server: @server, transport: self, session_id: session_id)
# Cap the concurrent session count so an `initialize` flood cannot retain unbounded sessions until memory is exhausted.
# The check and insert share the mutex so concurrent initializes cannot race past the limit.
reclaimed = []
inserted = @mutex.synchronize do
# When at the cap, first reclaim slots held by already-expired sessions the 60s reaper has not yet collected,
# so the cap rejects only when genuinely full rather than up to a reaper interval after sessions expired.
if @max_sessions && @sessions.size >= @max_sessions
@sessions.each_key.select { |id| session_expired?(@sessions[id]) }.each do |id|
cleanup_and_collect_stream(id, reclaimed)
end
end
next false if @max_sessions && @sessions.size >= @max_sessions
@sessions[session_id] = {
get_sse_stream: nil,
server_session: server_session,
last_active_at: Process.clock_gettime(Process::CLOCK_MONOTONIC),
# Captured for the built-in Origin-consistency defense in `validate_session_request`.
# Not authentication.
origin: request.env["HTTP_ORIGIN"],
}
true
end
reclaimed.each { |stream| close_stream_safely(stream) }
return too_many_sessions_response unless inserted
end
response = server_session.handle_json(body_string)
# `initialize_request?` matches on the method alone, so an `initialize` sent without
# an id (framed as a notification) reaches here. `Server#init` marks the session initialized,
# but JSON-RPC emits no response for an id-less request, so `response` is nil.
# Returning `[200, ..., [nil]]` would place nil in the Rack body (which the web server cannot serialize),
# and the session would be retained since it is marked initialized. Discard the orphaned session
# and ack with 202, mirroring the nil-response handling in a regular request.
if response.nil?
cleanup_session(session_id) if session_id
return handle_accepted
end
# If `Server#init` produced an error response (e.g., malformed JSON-RPC envelope),
# `mark_initialized!` was never called. Discard the orphaned session and omit
# the `Mcp-Session-Id` header so the client retries from a clean state instead of
# reusing a never-initialized ID that would later look like a duplicate `initialize`.
if session_id && !server_session.initialized?
cleanup_session(session_id)
session_id = nil
end
headers = {
"content-type" => "application/json",
}
headers["mcp-session-id"] = session_id if session_id
[200, headers, [response]]
end
def handle_accepted
[202, {}, []]
end
def too_many_sessions_response
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 503,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INTERNAL_ERROR,
message: "Service unavailable: maximum concurrent sessions (#{@max_sessions}) reached",
)
end
def handle_regular_request(body_string, session_id, related_request_id: nil)
server_session = nil
if @stateless
server_session = ephemeral_session
elsif session_id
error_response = validate_and_touch_session(session_id)
return error_response if error_response
@mutex.synchronize do
session = @sessions[session_id]
server_session = session[:server_session] if session
end
end
# `Server` refuses a duplicate id as well, but only once the request reaches it. The SSE branch below
# registers this request's stream under that id first, so without this check the colliding request
# would take over the routing entry for the moment it takes to be rejected, and its `ensure` would then
# clear the entry the original request still needs.
if related_request_id && server_session&.in_flight?(related_request_id)
return request_id_conflict_response
end
if session_id && !@stateless && !@enable_json_response
handle_request_with_sse_response(body_string, session_id, server_session, related_request_id: related_request_id)
else
response = dispatch_handle_json(body_string, server_session)
# `Server#handle_json` returns `nil` when cancellation has suppressed the JSON-RPC response per spec.
# Mirror the notification path and ack with 202 instead of returning a 200 with a `nil` Rack body,
# which would produce an empty body the client cannot parse as JSON.
return handle_accepted if response.nil?
[200, { "content-type" => "application/json" }, [response]]
end
end
# Returns the POST response as an SSE stream so the server can send
# JSON-RPC requests and notifications during request processing.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#sending-messages-to-the-server
def handle_request_with_sse_response(body_string, session_id, server_session, related_request_id: nil)
body = proc do |stream|
@mutex.synchronize do
session = @sessions[session_id]
if session && related_request_id
session[:post_request_streams] ||= {}
# Claim the id only while it is free. `handle_regular_request` already refused the colliding request,
# so reaching an occupied slot means a race got past that check; leaving the first stream in place keeps
# its messages going where they belong.
session[:post_request_streams][related_request_id] ||= stream
end
end
begin
response = dispatch_handle_json(body_string, server_session)
send_to_stream(stream, response) if response
ensure
if related_request_id
@mutex.synchronize do
session = @sessions[session_id]
# Only retire our own registration: a request that never claimed the id, or one whose claim has
# already been replaced, must not unregister the stream that owns it.
registered = session&.dig(:post_request_streams, related_request_id)
session[:post_request_streams].delete(related_request_id) if registered.equal?(stream)
end
end
begin
stream.close
rescue StandardError
# Ignore close-related errors from already closed/broken streams.
end
end
end
[200, SSE_HEADERS.dup, body]
end
# Returns the SSE stream available for server-to-client messages.
# When `related_request_id` is given, returns only the POST response
# stream for that request (no fallback to GET SSE). This prevents
# request-scoped messages from leaking to the wrong stream.
# When `related_request_id` is nil, returns the GET SSE stream.
def active_stream(session, related_request_id: nil)
if related_request_id
session.dig(:post_request_streams, related_request_id)
else
session[:get_sse_stream]
end
end
def dispatch_handle_json(body_string, server_session)
if server_session
server_session.handle_json(body_string)
else
@server.handle_json(body_string)
end
end
def validate_and_touch_session(session_id)
removed = nil
response = @mutex.synchronize do
next session_not_found_response unless (session = @sessions[session_id])
next unless @session_idle_timeout
if session_expired?(session)
removed = cleanup_session_unsafe(session_id)
next session_not_found_response
end
session[:last_active_at] = Process.clock_gettime(Process::CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
nil
end
if removed
close_stream_safely(removed[:get_sse_stream])
removed[:post_request_streams]&.each_value do |stream|
close_stream_safely(stream)
end
end
response
end
def get_session_stream(session_id)
@mutex.synchronize { @sessions[session_id]&.fetch(:get_sse_stream, nil) }
end
def session_exists?(session_id)
@mutex.synchronize { @sessions.key?(session_id) }
end
# Each stateless POST is self-contained (SEP-2567): handlers run against an ephemeral per-request `ServerSession`
# so client info, logging level, and initialized state never leak onto the shared `Server` instance or across concurrent requests.
# https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2567
def ephemeral_session
ServerSession.new(server: @server, transport: self, session_id: nil)
end
# Returns true iff a session exists and is not past its idle timeout. Expired sessions
# are evicted as a side effect so a live request never observes a zombie session that
# the reaper hasn't yet pruned. Does NOT update `last_active_at`; callers that are
# rejecting a request must not extend the session's lifetime.
def session_active?(session_id)
removed = nil
active = @mutex.synchronize do
next false unless (session = @sessions[session_id])
if session_expired?(session)
removed = cleanup_session_unsafe(session_id)
next false
end
true
end
if removed
close_stream_safely(removed[:get_sse_stream])
close_post_request_streams(removed)
end
active
end
# Per MCP 2025-11-25, servers MUST validate the `Origin` header and SHOULD bind only to localhost
# to prevent DNS rebinding attacks against locally bound MCP servers. Protection is on by default;
# pass `dns_rebinding_protection: false` to disable it (e.g. when an upstream proxy or middleware already
# performs the check). The `Host` header is validated against the loopback defaults plus `allowed_hosts:`,
# and the `Origin` header, when present, must be same-origin or in `allowed_origins:`.
def validate_dns_rebinding(request)
return unless @dns_rebinding_protection
validate_host(request) || validate_origin(request)
end
# Rejects a rebound `Host` (e.g. `evil.example.com` re-pointed at 127.0.0.1).
# A request without a `Host` header (e.g. HTTP/1.0) is allowed; the rebinding vector this guards against always carries one.
def validate_host(request)
host = request.env["HTTP_HOST"]
return if host.nil?
# An `allowed_hosts:` entry matches either the bare host name (any port)
# or the full `host:port` value, so both `"app.example.com"` and
# `"app.example.com:8443"` can be configured.
normalized = host.downcase
return if @allowed_hosts.include?(request_hostname(normalized)) || @allowed_hosts.include?(normalized)
forbidden_response("Forbidden: Invalid Host header")
end
# A request without an `Origin` header (typical for non-browser MCP clients) is allowed. A browser cross-origin request is
# rejected unless the origin is same-origin or explicitly allow-listed via `allowed_origins:`.
def validate_origin(request)
origin = request.env["HTTP_ORIGIN"]
return if origin.nil?
return if same_origin?(origin, request)
return if @allowed_origins.include?(origin.downcase)
forbidden_response("Forbidden: Invalid Origin header")
end
# Extracts the host name from a `Host` header value, stripping any port and IPv6 brackets
# (`[::1]:8080` becomes `::1`, `127.0.0.1:8080` becomes `127.0.0.1`).
def request_hostname(host)
return host[/\A\[([^\]]+)\]/, 1] if host.start_with?("[")
host.split(":").first
end
# Compares the `Origin` authority (host:port) against the request's own `Host`.
# Scheme is not compared (the `Host` header carries none, and `request.scheme` is unreliable behind proxies),
# but the `Origin`'s scheme is used to drop a redundant default port (`:80` for http, `:443` for https) from
# both sides so `http://example.com` matches `Host: example.com:80`. Comparison is case-insensitive.
def same_origin?(origin, request)
host = request.env["HTTP_HOST"]
return false if host.nil?
normalized = origin.downcase
default_port = normalized.start_with?("https://") ? ":443" : ":80"
authority = normalized.sub(%r{\Ahttps?://}, "")
authority.delete_suffix(default_port) == host.downcase.delete_suffix(default_port)
end
def forbidden_response(message = "Forbidden: session request validation failed")
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 403,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: message,
)
end
def method_not_allowed_response
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 405,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: "Method not allowed",
)
end
def missing_session_id_response
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 400,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: "Missing session ID",
)
end
def session_not_found_response
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 404,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: "Session not found",
)
end
def already_initialized_response(request_id)
invalid_request_response("Invalid Request: Server already initialized", request_id: request_id)
end
def invalid_request_response(message, request_id: nil)
body = {
jsonrpc: "2.0",
id: request_id,
error: {
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: message,
},
}
[400, { "content-type" => "application/json" }, [body.to_json]]
end
def session_already_connected_response
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 409,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: "Conflict: Only one SSE stream is allowed per session",
)
end
# The POST counterpart of the GET conflict above. A request id already in flight cannot be given
# a stream of its own, because the id is what routes request-scoped messages back.
def request_id_conflict_response
json_rpc_error_response(
status: 409,
code: JsonRpcHandler::ErrorCode::INVALID_REQUEST,
message: "Conflict: Request id is already in flight for this session",
)
end
def setup_sse_stream(session_id)
body = create_sse_body(session_id)
[200, SSE_HEADERS.dup, body]
end
def create_sse_body(session_id)
proc do |stream|
stored = store_stream_for_session(session_id, stream)
start_keepalive_thread(session_id) if stored
end
end
def store_stream_for_session(session_id, stream)
@mutex.synchronize do
session = @sessions[session_id]
if session && !session[:get_sse_stream]
session[:get_sse_stream] = stream
else
# Either session was removed, or another request already established a stream.
stream.close
# `stream.close` may return a truthy value depending on the stream class.
# Explicitly return nil to guarantee a falsy return for callers.
nil
end
end
end
def start_keepalive_thread(session_id)
Thread.new do
while session_active_with_stream?(session_id)
sleep(30)
send_keepalive_ping(session_id)
end
rescue StandardError => e
MCP.configuration.exception_reporter.call(e, { session_id: session_id })
ensure
cleanup_session(session_id)
end
end
def session_active_with_stream?(session_id)
@mutex.synchronize { @sessions.key?(session_id) && @sessions[session_id][:get_sse_stream] }
end
def send_keepalive_ping(session_id)
# Resolve the stream under the lock, then write outside it so a stalled reader
# cannot block every other session on `@mutex`.
stream = @mutex.synchronize do
session = @sessions[session_id]
session && session[:get_sse_stream]
end
return unless stream
send_ping_to_stream(stream)
rescue *STREAM_WRITE_ERRORS => e
MCP.configuration.exception_reporter.call(
e,
{ session_id: session_id, error: "Stream closed" },
)
raise # Re-raise to exit the keepalive loop
end
def session_expired?(session)
return false unless @session_idle_timeout
Process.clock_gettime(Process::CLOCK_MONOTONIC) - session[:last_active_at] > @session_idle_timeout
end
end
end
end
end