## Motivation and Context The MCP `io.modelcontextprotocol/oauth-client-credentials` extension (SEP-1046, modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol#1046) specifies two client authentication methods for the `client_credentials` grant: `client_secret_basic` and the RECOMMENDED `private_key_jwt` (RFC 7523 Section 2.2 JWT client assertion). The previous commit added the grant with secret-based authentication; this adds the JWT method, which is what the `auth/client-credentials-jwt` conformance scenario exercises. This mirrors the merged implementations in the TypeScript SDK (`PrivateKeyJwtProvider`, typescript-sdk#1157) and the Python SDK (`PrivateKeyJWTOAuthProvider` / `SignedJWTParameters`, python-sdk#1663), adapted to this SDK's provider design: - New `MCP::Client::OAuth::JWTClientAssertion` builds the RFC 7523 compact JWS with openssl, keeping the SDK free of a JWT gem dependency (the TypeScript and Python SDKs use jose and PyJWT). Claims follow SEP-1046: `iss` and `sub` carry the client_id, `aud` carries the authorization server's issuer identifier, plus `exp` (300-second lifetime, matching both SDKs), `iat`, and a unique `jti`. ES256 and RS256 are supported; ES256 signatures are converted from OpenSSL's ASN.1 DER form to the raw 64-byte `r || s` encoding JWS requires (RFC 7518 Section 3.4). - `ClientCredentialsProvider` accepts `token_endpoint_auth_method: "private_key_jwt"` with `private_key:` (PEM string or `OpenSSL::PKey::PKey`) and a required `signing_algorithm:` (no default, so an algorithm mismatch with the server's `token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported` fails loudly at construction; both reference SDKs also take the algorithm explicitly). The key stays on the provider and is never written to `storage`; a throwaway assertion is signed at construction to fail fast on an unparseable key or a key/algorithm mismatch. - `Flow#post_to_token_endpoint` sends `client_assertion_type` and a freshly signed `client_assertion` for `private_key_jwt`, using the `ensure_issuer_matches!`-validated issuer as the audience, and omits `client_id` from the body per SEP-1046 (identity travels in the assertion's claims). - The conformance client builds a `private_key_jwt` provider when the harness injects `private_key_pem`, defaulting the algorithm to ES256 like the TypeScript and Python conformance clients, and `auth/client-credentials-jwt` is removed from `conformance/expected_failures.yml`. Scope notes: only ES256 and RS256 are supported for now (the TypeScript and Python SDKs accept whatever their JWT libraries support); adding further algorithms is additive. There is also no injection point yet for externally signed assertions (the TypeScript SDK's `StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider` and the Python SDK's `assertion_provider` callback cover KMS/HSM-held keys); that is a separate follow-up. ## How Has This Been Tested? New `test/mcp/client/oauth/jwt_client_assertion_test.rb` covers the JWS construction: header and RFC 7523 claims, unpadded base64url segments, ES256 signature round-trip verification (raw -> DER -> `OpenSSL::PKey::EC#verify`), RS256 verification, PEM and parsed-key input, lifetime override, unique `jti` per assertion, and rejection of unsupported algorithms, key/algorithm mismatches (including a P-384 key with ES256), unparseable PEM, and public-only keys. New tests in `test/mcp/client/oauth/client_credentials_provider_test.rb` cover the provider surface: `private_key_jwt` construction, the key and secret never reaching `client_information`, required `private_key` / `signing_algorithm`, rejection of a simultaneous `client_secret`, fail-fast on key/algorithm mismatch, and `client_assertion(audience:)` producing a JWT with the expected claims. A new test in `test/mcp/client/oauth/flow_test.rb` runs the full grant against WebMock stubs and asserts the token request carries `grant_type=client_credentials`, the RFC 7523 `client_assertion_type`, an assertion whose `iss`/`sub` are the client_id and whose `aud` is the issuer, the RFC 8707 `resource`, and neither `client_id` nor any secret in the body or headers. `bundle exec rake` passes; the `auth/client-credentials-jwt` conformance scenario passes 7/7 checks and the baseline check passes with its expected-failure entry removed. ## Breaking Changes None. `client_secret:` becomes optional on `ClientCredentialsProvider` only in the signature; it is still required for the secret-based methods, and all existing construction paths behave unchanged.
147 lines
6.5 KiB
Ruby
147 lines
6.5 KiB
Ruby
# frozen_string_literal: true
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module MCP
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class Client
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module OAuth
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# OAuth client configuration for the OAuth 2.1 `client_credentials` grant
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# (machine-to-machine, no user and no browser redirect). Handed to
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# `MCP::Client::HTTP` via the `oauth:` keyword, the same as `Provider`.
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# The interactive Authorization Code flow lives in `Provider`;
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# this class exists so a credentials-only client never has to supply
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# the redirect arguments that grant has no use for, mirroring the dedicated
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# `ClientCredentialsProvider` in the TypeScript SDK and
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# `ClientCredentialsOAuthProvider` in the Python SDK.
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#
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# Required keyword arguments:
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#
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# - `client_id` - String identifying the pre-registered confidential client.
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# - `client_secret` - String shared secret for the `client_secret_basic` /
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# `client_secret_post` methods. The `client_credentials` grant is for
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# confidential clients, so a credential is mandatory; with
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# `private_key_jwt` the credential is the `private_key` instead.
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#
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# Optional keyword arguments:
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#
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# - `token_endpoint_auth_method` - `"client_secret_basic"` (default),
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# `"client_secret_post"`, or `"private_key_jwt"` (RFC 7523 JWT client
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# assertion, per the `io.modelcontextprotocol/oauth-client-credentials`
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# extension / SEP-1046). `"none"` is rejected: an unauthenticated
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# `client_credentials` request is meaningless.
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# - `private_key` - PEM string (or `OpenSSL::PKey::PKey`) used to sign
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# the JWT client assertion. Required with `private_key_jwt`.
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# The key is held on the provider and never written to `storage`.
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# - `signing_algorithm` - `"ES256"` or `"RS256"`. Required with
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# `private_key_jwt`; there is no default, so a mismatch with
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# the server's `token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported` fails
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# loudly at construction instead of as a 401 (the TypeScript and Python SDKs
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# also take the algorithm as an explicit option).
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# - `scope` - String of space-separated scopes to request when the server's
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# `WWW-Authenticate` and the Protected Resource Metadata do not specify one.
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# - `storage` - Object responding to `tokens`, `save_tokens(tokens)`,
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# `client_information`, and `save_client_information(info)`. Defaults to
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# an `InMemoryStorage`. The `client_id` / `client_secret` are written
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# into it so the token exchange reads them through the same path as
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# a pre-registered authorization-code client.
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class ClientCredentialsProvider
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include StorageBackedProvider
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# Raised when the credentials required for the `client_credentials` grant are
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# missing or the requested client authentication method cannot carry them.
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class InvalidCredentialsError < ArgumentError; end
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SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS = ["client_secret_basic", "client_secret_post", "private_key_jwt"].freeze
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attr_reader :scope, :storage
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def initialize(
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client_id:,
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client_secret: nil,
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token_endpoint_auth_method: "client_secret_basic",
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private_key: nil,
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signing_algorithm: nil,
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scope: nil,
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storage: nil
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)
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if blank?(client_id)
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raise InvalidCredentialsError, "client_id is required for the client_credentials grant."
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end
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unless SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS.include?(token_endpoint_auth_method)
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raise InvalidCredentialsError,
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"token_endpoint_auth_method must be one of #{SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS.inspect} for the " \
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"client_credentials grant (got #{token_endpoint_auth_method.inspect}); an unauthenticated " \
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"client_credentials request is not allowed."
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end
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client_information = { "client_id" => client_id, "token_endpoint_auth_method" => token_endpoint_auth_method }
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if token_endpoint_auth_method == "private_key_jwt"
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validate_private_key_jwt_arguments!(
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client_secret: client_secret,
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private_key: private_key,
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signing_algorithm: signing_algorithm,
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)
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# Fail fast on an unparseable key or a key/algorithm mismatch by
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# signing a throwaway assertion now rather than at token time.
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JWTClientAssertion.generate(
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client_id: client_id,
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audience: "urn:mcp:credential-validation",
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private_key: private_key,
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signing_algorithm: signing_algorithm,
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)
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else
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if blank?(client_secret)
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raise InvalidCredentialsError, "client_secret is required for the client_credentials grant with #{token_endpoint_auth_method}."
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end
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client_information["client_secret"] = client_secret
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end
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@client_id = client_id
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@private_key = private_key
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@signing_algorithm = signing_algorithm
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@scope = scope
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@storage = storage || InMemoryStorage.new
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@storage.save_client_information(client_information)
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end
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# See `Provider#authorization_flow`.
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def authorization_flow
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:client_credentials
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end
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# Returns a freshly signed RFC 7523 JWT client assertion for the `private_key_jwt` method.
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# `audience` is the authorization server's issuer identifier. Called by `Flow#post_to_token_endpoint`.
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def client_assertion(audience:)
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JWTClientAssertion.generate(
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client_id: @client_id,
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audience: audience,
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private_key: @private_key,
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signing_algorithm: @signing_algorithm,
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)
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end
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private
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def validate_private_key_jwt_arguments!(client_secret:, private_key:, signing_algorithm:)
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unless client_secret.nil?
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raise InvalidCredentialsError, "client_secret must not be set with private_key_jwt; the private key is the credential."
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end
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if private_key.nil?
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raise InvalidCredentialsError, "private_key is required for the client_credentials grant with private_key_jwt."
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end
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return unless blank?(signing_algorithm)
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raise InvalidCredentialsError, "signing_algorithm is required with private_key_jwt (one of #{JWTClientAssertion::SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS.inspect})."
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end
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def blank?(value)
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value.nil? || (value.is_a?(String) && value.strip.empty?)
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end
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end
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end
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end
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end
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