## Motivation and Context `ClientCredentialsProvider` builds a fixed `client_credentials` token request: `grant_type`, `scope`, `resource`, and the client authentication that `Flow#post_to_token_endpoint` adds. An authorization server that requires further parameters, such as Auth0's `audience`, cannot be used through `oauth:` at all, and giving up `oauth:` also gives up the bearer header and the 401-driven retry that the transport provides. RFC 6749 Section 8.2 allows extension parameters on the token request, and the TypeScript SDK lets a provider shape its token request through `prepareTokenRequest`. `ClientCredentialsProvider.new` now takes `token_request_params:`, a Hash of String keys and values added to every token request the provider makes, and `Flow#post_to_token_endpoint` reads the same name by duck typing, so a `Provider` or `CrossAppAccessProvider` subclass that defines the method gets the same treatment on its authorization code exchange, refresh, or `jwt-bearer` request. `Provider.new` and `CrossAppAccessProvider.new` take the same keyword, held by `StorageBackedProvider` like `authorization_request_validator`, so every bundled provider refuses a bad value before anything is stored. The parameters go underneath the flow's own, so the SDK's values always win, and a key the SDK sets itself (`Flow::RESERVED_TOKEN_REQUEST_PARAMS`) is refused rather than silently overridden: with `ArgumentError` from the constructor, before any `client_information` is written, and again with `ArgumentError` from the flow, before the token request is sent. Only Strings are accepted because `URI.encode_www_form` encodes other scalars and Arrays in ways the caller did not write, and the provider keeps a frozen copy so a later change to the caller's Hash cannot alter what is sent. A Hash comparing keys by identity is refused too, since two equal keys are two entries there, sent twice by a provider method or silently collapsed into one by the copy. The flow raises `ArgumentError` rather than `AuthorizationError` because `MCP::Client::HTTP` treats a failed refresh as a reason to run the interactive flow, which would then fail the same way after the user signed in. Both refusals raise `Flow::InvalidTokenRequestParamsError`, a subclass of `ArgumentError`, so a caller can tell them from an unknown keyword, and the copy duplicates keys as well as values, since `Hash` copies only keys whose class is exactly `String`. Fixes #554. ## How Has This Been Tested? New tests cover every token request the parameters can ride (the `client_credentials` grant under all three client authentication methods, the authorization code exchange, refresh, and `jwt-bearer`), both refusal boundaries (the constructors of all three providers, and the flow for a provider defining the method), and the transport surfacing a refused hook from a refresh attempt without starting the interactive flow. All of them fail against the previous library. ## Breaking Changes None. The keyword is optional and the hook is opt-in; a provider that does not define `token_request_params` sends the same requests as before.
138 lines
7.9 KiB
Ruby
138 lines
7.9 KiB
Ruby
# frozen_string_literal: true
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module MCP
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class Client
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module OAuth
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# Pluggable OAuth client configuration for the OAuth 2.1 Authorization Code + PKCE flow,
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# handed to `MCP::Client::HTTP` via the `oauth:` keyword.
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# Inspired by the OAuthClientProvider in the TypeScript SDK and the httpx.Auth-based provider
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# in the Python SDK. For the non-interactive machine-to-machine `client_credentials` grant,
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# use `ClientCredentialsProvider` instead.
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#
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# Required keyword arguments:
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# - `client_metadata` - Hash sent to the authorization server's Dynamic Client
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# Registration endpoint. Must include at minimum `redirect_uris`,
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# `grant_types`, `response_types`, and `token_endpoint_auth_method`.
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# When `application_type` is omitted, the SDK infers `"native"` or `"web"`
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# from `redirect_uris` per SEP-837 before registering; an explicit value
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# always wins.
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# - `redirect_uri` - String: the redirect URI used for the authorization
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# request. Must be one of `redirect_uris` in `client_metadata`.
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# - `redirect_handler` - Callable invoked with the fully-built authorization
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# URL (a `URI`). Implementations typically open the user's browser.
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# - `callback_handler` - Callable invoked after `redirect_handler`. Returns
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# `[code, state]` or `[code, state, iss]`, where `code` is the authorization code,
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# `state` is the `state` parameter received on the redirect URI, and `iss` is
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# the RFC 9207 `iss` parameter (or nil when the authorization response carried none).
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# Returning the 3-element form opts into SEP-2468 issuer validation: a present `iss`
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# must match the authorization server's issuer, and a nil `iss` is
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# rejected when the AS advertises `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported`.
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# The 2-element form skips the check for backward compatibility.
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#
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# Optional keyword arguments:
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# - `scope` - String of space-separated scopes to request when the server's
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# `WWW-Authenticate` does not specify one.
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# - `storage` - Object responding to `tokens`, `save_tokens(tokens)`,
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# `client_information`, and `save_client_information(info)`. Defaults to
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# an `InMemoryStorage`. Persisted `client_information` is stamped with
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# an `"issuer"` member binding it to the authorization server that
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# issued it (SEP-2352); when the authorization server changes, the SDK discards
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# the stale registration and tokens and re-registers.
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# - `client_id_metadata_document_url` - URL where the client publishes its Client ID Metadata Document
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# (`draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-00` and the MCP authorization specification).
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# When the authorization server advertises `client_id_metadata_document_supported: true`,
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# the SDK uses this URL as the OAuth `client_id` and skips Dynamic Client Registration.
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# Spec-required: `https://` scheme, a non-root path, and no fragment, userinfo, or `.`/`..` segments.
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# The SDK additionally refuses to send query strings (the draft marks them only SHOULD NOT include,
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# but different encodings of the same query would yield different `client_id` strings for the same document).
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# The document served at the URL is a separate JSON artifact from the `client_metadata` keyword:
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# DCR `client_metadata` MUST NOT include `client_id`, while the CIMD document MUST include `client_id` set
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# to the URL, `client_name`, and `redirect_uris` covering `redirect_uri`.
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# - `token_request_params` - Hash of String keys and values added to every token request this provider makes
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# (the authorization code exchange and refresh), for parameters the authorization server requires beyond
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# the grant itself. The authorization request is not affected. A key in `Flow::RESERVED_TOKEN_REQUEST_PARAMS`
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# raises `Flow::InvalidTokenRequestParamsError`.
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# The Hash is copied and frozen. See `StorageBackedProvider#token_request_params`.
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class Provider
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include StorageBackedProvider
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# Raised when `Provider#initialize` is called with a `redirect_uri` that
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# is neither HTTPS nor a loopback `http://` URL, per the MCP
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# authorization spec's Communication Security requirement.
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class InsecureRedirectURIError < ArgumentError; end
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# Raised when the `redirect_uri` argument is not listed in
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# `client_metadata[:redirect_uris]` / `["redirect_uris"]`. Registering
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# the URI with the authorization server but then sending a different
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# one with the authorization request would be rejected by the AS at
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# runtime; failing at construction surfaces the bug earlier.
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class UnregisteredRedirectURIError < ArgumentError; end
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# Raised when `client_id_metadata_document_url` is provided but does not meet
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# the structural requirements for a Client ID Metadata Document URL:
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# HTTPS, non-root path, and no fragment, query, userinfo, or `.`/`..` segments.
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# The CIMD URL is sent to the authorization server as the OAuth `client_id`,
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# so the same Communication Security guarantee that protects the redirect URI
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# applies and the value must unambiguously identify the document.
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class InvalidClientIDMetadataDocumentURLError < ArgumentError; end
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attr_reader :client_metadata,
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:redirect_uri,
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:scope,
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:storage,
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:redirect_handler,
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:callback_handler,
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:client_id_metadata_document_url
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def initialize(
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client_metadata:,
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redirect_uri:,
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redirect_handler:,
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callback_handler:,
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scope: nil,
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storage: nil,
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client_id_metadata_document_url: nil,
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authorization_request_validator: nil,
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token_request_params: nil
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)
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unless Discovery.secure_url?(redirect_uri)
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raise InsecureRedirectURIError,
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"redirect_uri #{redirect_uri.inspect} must use https or be a loopback http URL " \
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"(localhost, 127.0.0.0/8, or ::1) per the MCP authorization Communication Security requirement."
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end
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registered = Array(client_metadata[:redirect_uris] || client_metadata["redirect_uris"])
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unless registered.include?(redirect_uri)
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raise UnregisteredRedirectURIError,
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"redirect_uri #{redirect_uri.inspect} must be listed in client_metadata[:redirect_uris] " \
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"(got #{registered.inspect}); otherwise the authorization server will reject the authorization request."
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end
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if client_id_metadata_document_url && !Discovery.client_id_metadata_document_url?(client_id_metadata_document_url)
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raise InvalidClientIDMetadataDocumentURLError,
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"client_id_metadata_document_url #{client_id_metadata_document_url.inspect} must be an https URL " \
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"with a non-root path and no fragment, query, userinfo, or `.`/`..` segments, " \
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"per the MCP authorization specification and `draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document`."
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end
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@client_metadata = client_metadata
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@redirect_uri = redirect_uri
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@redirect_handler = redirect_handler
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@callback_handler = callback_handler
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@scope = scope
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@storage = storage || InMemoryStorage.new
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@client_id_metadata_document_url = client_id_metadata_document_url
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@authorization_request_validator = authorization_request_validator
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@token_request_params = frozen_token_request_params(token_request_params)
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end
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# Identifies the OAuth flow this provider drives.
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# `Flow` dispatches on this rather than inspecting `client_metadata[:grant_types]`,
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# which is protocol metadata for the authorization server, not an SDK control signal.
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def authorization_flow
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:authorization_code
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end
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end
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end
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end
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end
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