ruby-sdk/lib/mcp/client/http.rb
Koichi ITO cb0eb3892b Support SSE Reconnection Per SEP-1699 in the HTTP Client Transport
## Motivation and Context

Resolves the `sse-retry` client conformance scenario (SEP-1699,
https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/issues/1699).

Per SEP-1699, a server may close a request's SSE stream right after a priming event
(an event carrying an `id:`) without delivering the response, expecting the client
to treat the graceful close like a network failure: wait the server-specified
`retry:` interval, then reconnect with an HTTP GET carrying `Last-Event-ID`
so the server can replay the pending response on the resumed stream.

The Ruby client previously read the entire SSE body to EOF and parsed it afterward,
so it had no notion of per-event state (`id:`, `retry:`) or reconnection,
and the scenario failed all three checks (graceful reconnect, retry timing, `Last-Event-ID`).

`MCP::Client::HTTP#send_request` now consumes responses incrementally
via Faraday's `on_data` streaming callback, feeding SSE chunks to `event_stream_parser`
as they arrive while buffering plain JSON bodies as before. A new internal `SSEStream`
tracks the last received event id, the `retry:` reconnection delay,
and the awaited JSON-RPC response; once the response arrives, a held-open stream is
abandoned via an internal control-flow exception since servers may never close it.
When a stream closes gracefully after a priming event but before the response,
the client sleeps for the `retry:` interval (default 1000ms when the server sent none),
then issues a GET with `Accept: text/event-stream`, the session headers, and `Last-Event-ID`,
for up to 2 attempts. The defaults match the Python SDK's `DEFAULT_RECONNECTION_DELAY_MS` and
`MAX_RECONNECTION_ATTEMPTS` (`streamable_http.py`); the TypeScript SDK's `StreamableHTTPClientTransport`
(`streamableHttp.ts`) likewise lets the `retry:` field override its backoff and reconnects only when
a priming event was received and no response has arrived.

The public behavior of `send_request` is unchanged: same return values, same error mapping,
and a stream that closes without a priming event still raises the "No valid JSON-RPC response found in SSE stream" error
without reconnecting. Because the previous implementation read `response.body` and therefore worked with any Faraday adapter,
a fallback keeps that compatibility: when nothing was parsed during streaming, the body is read from `response.body`
(adapters without `on_data` support, e.g. the Faraday test adapter) or from the buffered chunks
(Faraday < 2.1, which invokes `on_data` without `env`).

The conformance client gains an `sse-retry` branch that calls the harness's `test_reconnection` tool,
and the scenario is removed from the expected failures baseline.

## How Has This Been Tested?

New unit tests covering: reconnection with `Last-Event-ID` after a primed graceful close including the `retry:` wait,
the default 1000ms delay when `retry:` is absent, raising after the reconnection attempt cap with `Last-Event-ID`
advancing across attempts, no reconnection for unprimed streams, and the non-streaming fallbacks
(JSON and SSE responses through the Faraday test adapter, which ignores `on_data`, plus buffered SSE chunks
when `on_data` receives no `env`)

## Breaking Changes

None. The `send_request` contract is unchanged; SSE bodies are now parsed incrementally instead of after EOF,
and reconnection only activates when the server opts in by sending a priming event.
2026-06-28 11:56:02 +09:00

752 lines
33 KiB
Ruby

# frozen_string_literal: true
require "securerandom"
require_relative "../../json_rpc_handler"
require_relative "../configuration"
require_relative "../methods"
require_relative "../version"
module MCP
class Client
# TODO: A standalone HTTP GET listening stream for server-initiated messages is not yet implemented;
# GET is currently used only to resume a request's SSE stream after a disconnect.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#listening-for-messages-from-the-server
class HTTP
ACCEPT_HEADER = "application/json, text/event-stream"
SSE_ACCEPT_HEADER = "text/event-stream"
SESSION_ID_HEADER = "Mcp-Session-Id"
PROTOCOL_VERSION_HEADER = "MCP-Protocol-Version"
METHOD_HEADER = "Mcp-Method"
NAME_HEADER = "Mcp-Name"
LAST_EVENT_ID_HEADER = "Last-Event-ID"
# SEP-1699 reconnection tuning: the SSE `retry:` field from the server takes precedence;
# this default applies when the server sent none. Both values match the Python SDK
# (`DEFAULT_RECONNECTION_DELAY_MS`, `MAX_RECONNECTION_ATTEMPTS`); the TypeScript SDK uses
# an exponential backoff that the `retry:` field likewise overrides.
DEFAULT_RECONNECTION_DELAY_MS = 1000
MAX_RECONNECTION_ATTEMPTS = 2
# Raised when an `oauth:` provider is paired with an MCP URL that is neither HTTPS nor
# a loopback `http://` URL, since a bearer token sent over plain HTTP to a remote host
# is trivially observed and stolen.
class InsecureURLError < ArgumentError; end
# Faraday request middleware that compares the outgoing request URL
# against the URL snapshotted at `MCP::Client::HTTP#initialize` time.
# Registered after the user's customizer so it sees `env.url` *after*
# any custom middleware has had a chance to rewrite it - closing
# the `Faraday env.url = URI("https://attacker...")` bypass that a plain
# `client.url_prefix` check would miss. The comparison includes
# the query string, so a middleware that rewrites `env.url.query` to
# a different tenant (e.g. `?tenant=evil`) is rejected as well; otherwise
# the audience-binding check on the OAuth side could be bypassed at
# the send step.
class OAuthURLGuard
def initialize(app, expected_url:)
@app = app
@expected_url = expected_url
end
def call(env)
effective = MCP::Client::OAuth::Discovery.canonicalize_url(env.url.to_s)
unless effective == @expected_url
# Surface the *canonicalized* form (no userinfo, no fragment) so
# credentials like `user:pass@` cannot leak into logs, stack
# traces, or exception reporters.
raise InsecureURLError,
"Effective request URL #{effective.inspect} does not match the URL " \
"validated at initialize time (#{@expected_url.inspect}); refusing to send a bearer token."
end
@app.call(env)
end
end
# Internal control-flow signal raised inside the streaming callback to stop reading
# an SSE stream once the awaited JSON-RPC response has arrived; servers may hold
# a stream open indefinitely (notably the standalone GET stream), so EOF cannot be relied on.
class StreamAbort < StandardError; end
private_constant :StreamAbort
# Per-exchange SSE state shared between the initial POST stream and any SEP-1699 reconnection GET streams:
# the incrementally parsed JSON-RPC response, the last received SSE event id (for `Last-Event-ID`),
# and the server's `retry:` reconnection delay. Non-SSE bodies accumulate in `buffer` for the JSON path.
class SSEStream
attr_reader :buffer, :response, :last_event_id, :retry_ms
attr_accessor :abortable
def initialize(abortable:)
@abortable = abortable
@buffer = +""
@parser = nil
@response = nil
@last_event_id = nil
@retry_ms = nil
end
# Whether the server sent a SEP-1699 priming event (any event carrying an id),
# which marks the stream as resumable after a graceful close.
def primed?
!@last_event_id.nil?
end
# Faraday `on_data` streaming callback. SSE chunks are parsed incrementally;
# anything else (JSON bodies) accumulates in `buffer`.
def on_data
proc do |chunk, _received_bytes, env|
if event_stream?(env)
feed(chunk)
raise StreamAbort if @abortable && @response
else
@buffer << chunk
end
end
end
# A fresh parser for a new HTTP connection (reconnection GET),
# so a partial line from the previous stream cannot corrupt the next one.
def reset_parser!
@parser = nil
end
# Parses an SSE body that was delivered outside the streaming callback:
# Faraday versions that do not pass `env` to `on_data` leave SSE chunks in `buffer`
# (consumed here so they are not parsed twice), and adapters without `on_data` support
# yield the whole body only via `fallback_body` (the Faraday `response.body`).
def ingest_pending!(fallback_body)
text = @buffer.empty? ? fallback_body : @buffer.slice!(0..-1)
feed(text) if text.is_a?(String) && !text.empty?
end
private
def event_stream?(env)
headers = env&.response_headers
content_type = headers && (headers["content-type"] || headers["Content-Type"])
!!content_type&.include?("text/event-stream")
end
def feed(chunk)
parser.feed(chunk) do |_type, data, id, reconnection_time|
@last_event_id = id if id && !id.empty?
@retry_ms = reconnection_time if reconnection_time
next if data.nil? || data.empty?
begin
parsed = JSON.parse(data)
rescue JSON::ParserError
next
end
if parsed.is_a?(Hash) && (parsed.key?("result") || parsed.key?("error"))
@response ||= parsed
end
end
end
def parser
@parser ||= begin
require "event_stream_parser"
EventStreamParser::Parser.new
rescue LoadError
raise LoadError, "The 'event_stream_parser' gem is required to parse SSE responses. " \
"Add it to your Gemfile: gem 'event_stream_parser', '>= 1.0'. " \
"See https://rubygems.org/gems/event_stream_parser for more details."
end
end
end
private_constant :SSEStream
attr_reader :url, :session_id, :protocol_version, :server_info, :oauth
def initialize(url:, headers: {}, oauth: nil, &block)
if oauth && !MCP::Client::OAuth::Discovery.secure_url?(url)
# Mask credentials (userinfo) and query parameters before quoting the URL in the error message
# so they cannot leak into logs.
safe_url = MCP::Client::OAuth::Discovery.canonicalize_origin_and_path(url)
raise InsecureURLError,
"MCP URL #{safe_url.inspect} must use https or be a loopback http URL when an oauth provider is set; " \
"sending bearer tokens over plain http to a remote host would leak them on the wire."
end
@url = url
@headers = headers
@faraday_customizer = block
@oauth = oauth
# Snapshot the canonical URL at construction time. This single value
# serves two related roles, both of which need to see the query string:
#
# - As the RFC 8707 `resource` claim sent on the authorization and
# token requests (and as the base for PRM discovery URLs) -
# matching the TS / Python SDKs' `resourceUrlFromServerUrl` /
# `resource_url_from_server_url` so multi-tenant servers that scope
# by `?tenant=...` round-trip correctly.
# - As the comparison value for the URL guard middleware. Comparing
# query strings as well as origin + path is required so a Faraday
# middleware that rewrites `env.url.query` to a different tenant
# cannot send the bearer token to the wrong audience while
# the resource binding on the OAuth side stays correct.
#
# Saved only when `oauth:` is set so non-OAuth transports keep their
# existing behavior.
@oauth_server_url = oauth ? MCP::Client::OAuth::Discovery.canonicalize_url(url) : nil
@session_id = nil
@protocol_version = nil
@server_info = nil
@connected = false
end
# Performs the MCP `initialize` handshake: sends an `initialize` request
# followed by the required `notifications/initialized` notification.
# The server's `InitializeResult` (protocol version, capabilities, server
# info, instructions) is cached on the transport and returned.
#
# Idempotent: a second call returns the cached `InitializeResult` without
# contacting the server. After `close`, state is cleared and `connect`
# will handshake again.
#
# @param client_info [Hash, nil] `{ name:, version: }` identifying the client.
# Defaults to `{ name: "mcp-ruby-client", version: MCP::VERSION }`.
# @param protocol_version [String, nil] Protocol version to offer. Defaults
# to `MCP::Configuration::LATEST_STABLE_PROTOCOL_VERSION`.
# @param capabilities [Hash] Capabilities advertised by the client. Defaults to `{}`.
# @return [Hash] The server's `InitializeResult`.
# @raise [RequestHandlerError] If the server responds with a JSON-RPC error
# or a malformed result.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/lifecycle#initialization
def connect(client_info: nil, protocol_version: nil, capabilities: {})
return @server_info if connected?
client_info ||= { name: "mcp-ruby-client", version: MCP::VERSION }
protocol_version ||= MCP::Configuration::LATEST_STABLE_PROTOCOL_VERSION
response = send_request(request: {
jsonrpc: JsonRpcHandler::Version::V2_0,
id: SecureRandom.uuid,
method: MCP::Methods::INITIALIZE,
params: {
protocolVersion: protocol_version,
capabilities: capabilities,
clientInfo: client_info,
},
})
if response.is_a?(Hash) && response.key?("error")
clear_session
error = response["error"]
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Server initialization failed: #{error["message"]}",
{ method: MCP::Methods::INITIALIZE },
error_type: :internal_error,
)
end
unless response.is_a?(Hash) && response["result"].is_a?(Hash)
clear_session
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Server initialization failed: missing result in response",
{ method: MCP::Methods::INITIALIZE },
error_type: :internal_error,
)
end
@server_info = response["result"]
negotiated_protocol_version = @server_info["protocolVersion"]
unless MCP::Configuration::SUPPORTED_STABLE_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS.include?(negotiated_protocol_version)
clear_session
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Server initialization failed: unsupported protocol version #{negotiated_protocol_version.inspect}",
{ method: MCP::Methods::INITIALIZE },
error_type: :internal_error,
)
end
begin
send_request(request: {
jsonrpc: JsonRpcHandler::Version::V2_0,
method: MCP::Methods::NOTIFICATIONS_INITIALIZED,
})
rescue StandardError
clear_session
raise
end
@connected = true
@server_info
end
# Returns true once `connect` has completed the full handshake
# (`initialize` response received and `notifications/initialized` sent).
# Returns false before the first handshake and after `close`.
def connected?
@connected
end
# Sends a JSON-RPC request and returns the parsed response body.
# After a successful `initialize` handshake, the session ID and protocol version returned by
# the server are captured and automatically included on subsequent requests.
#
# If a block is given, it is invoked just before Faraday's `post` is called.
# Faraday's synchronous `post` does not expose a post-write / pre-response hook,
# so this is the latest send-boundary signal the adapter exposes; the actual TCP write happens
# inside `post`. `MCP::Client#dispatch_with_cancellation` uses this yield to release
# the cancel-dispatch thread, which then issues a separate `notifications/cancelled` POST
# that may overlap with the original request on the network. The spec covers this:
# the sender has issued the request and still believes it in-progress, and receivers MAY ignore
# a cancellation referring to an unknown request id when the cancel POST happens to arrive first.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/utilities/cancellation
def send_request(request:)
method = request[:method] || request["method"]
params = request[:params] || request["params"]
oauth_retried = false
step_up_retried = false
begin
# The response is consumed incrementally so that an SSE stream the server holds open
# (or closes early per SEP-1699) can be handled; `initialize` streams are read to EOF
# so the response object (and its `Mcp-Session-Id` header) is always available for capture.
stream = SSEStream.new(abortable: method.to_s != MCP::Methods::INITIALIZE)
yield if block_given?
response = begin
client.post("", request, session_headers.merge(request_metadata_headers(method, params))) do |req|
req.options.on_data = stream.on_data
end
rescue StreamAbort
nil
end
body = resolve_response_body(stream, response, method, params)
capture_session_info(method, response, body) if response
body
rescue Faraday::BadRequestError => e
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"The #{method} request is invalid",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :bad_request,
original_error: e,
)
rescue Faraday::UnauthorizedError => e
# Run the OAuth flow at most once per `send_request` invocation.
# The `oauth_retried` flag lives outside the `begin` so it survives `retry`,
# ensuring a server returning 401 indefinitely raises rather than loops.
if @oauth && !oauth_retried
oauth_retried = true
run_oauth_flow!(unauthorized_error: e)
retry
end
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"You are unauthorized to make #{method} requests",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :unauthorized,
original_error: e,
)
rescue Faraday::ForbiddenError => e
# OAuth 2.0 step-up: a 403 carrying `error="insufficient_scope"` in
# the Bearer challenge means the existing access token is valid
# but lacks scopes the server now requires for this operation.
# Re-run the full authorization flow with the escalated scope from
# the challenge and retry once. A plain 403 without the challenge is
# surfaced unchanged.
if @oauth && !step_up_retried && insufficient_scope_challenge?(e)
step_up_retried = true
run_step_up_flow!(forbidden_error: e)
retry
end
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"You are forbidden to make #{method} requests",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :forbidden,
original_error: e,
)
rescue Faraday::ResourceNotFound => e
# Per spec, 404 is the session-expired signal only when the request
# actually carried an `Mcp-Session-Id`. A 404 without a session attached
# (e.g. wrong URL or a stateless server) surfaces as a generic not-found.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#session-management
if @session_id
clear_session
raise SessionExpiredError.new(
"The #{method} request is not found",
{ method: method, params: params },
original_error: e,
)
else
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"The #{method} request is not found",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :not_found,
original_error: e,
)
end
rescue Faraday::UnprocessableEntityError => e
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"The #{method} request is unprocessable",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :unprocessable_entity,
original_error: e,
)
rescue Faraday::Error => e
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Internal error handling #{method} request",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :internal_error,
original_error: e,
)
end
end
# Sends a JSON-RPC notification (no response expected). Used by `Client#cancel` to deliver
# `notifications/cancelled` for an in-flight request. The server acknowledges with HTTP 202 Accepted
# per the Streamable HTTP spec.
def send_notification(notification:)
method = notification[:method] || notification["method"]
client.post("", notification, session_headers)
nil
rescue Faraday::Error => e
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Failed to send #{method} notification",
{ method: method },
error_type: :internal_error,
original_error: e,
)
end
# Terminates the session by sending an HTTP DELETE to the MCP endpoint
# with the current `Mcp-Session-Id` header, and clears locally tracked
# session state afterward. No-op when no session has been established.
#
# Per spec, the server MAY respond with HTTP 405 Method Not Allowed when
# it does not support client-initiated termination, and returns 404 for
# a session it has already terminated. Both mean the session is gone —
# the desired end state. Other errors surface to the caller; local
# session state is cleared either way.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#session-management
def close
unless @session_id
clear_session
return
end
begin
client.delete("", nil, session_headers)
rescue Faraday::ClientError => e
raise unless [404, 405].include?(e.response&.dig(:status))
ensure
clear_session
end
end
private
attr_reader :headers
def client
require_faraday!
@client ||= Faraday.new(url) do |faraday|
faraday.request(:json)
faraday.response(:json)
faraday.response(:raise_error)
faraday.headers["Accept"] = ACCEPT_HEADER
headers.each do |key, value|
faraday.headers[key] = value
end
@faraday_customizer&.call(faraday)
# Register the URL identity guard *after* the user's customizer
# so it sits closest to the adapter in the request stack. That way
# the guard sees `env.url` after any customizer-added middleware has had
# a chance to rewrite it, closing the `env.url = URI("https://...")`
# bypass that a `Faraday::Connection#url_prefix` check cannot detect.
faraday.use(OAuthURLGuard, expected_url: @oauth_server_url) if @oauth_server_url
end
end
# Per spec, the client MUST include `MCP-Session-Id` (when the server assigned one)
# and `MCP-Protocol-Version` on all requests after `initialize`.
#
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#session-management
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#protocol-version-header
def session_headers
request_headers = {}
request_headers[SESSION_ID_HEADER] = @session_id if @session_id
request_headers[PROTOCOL_VERSION_HEADER] = @protocol_version if @protocol_version
if @oauth && (token = @oauth.access_token)
request_headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer #{token}"
end
request_headers
end
# Per SEP-2243, mirror the JSON-RPC method and target name/uri into HTTP headers so intermediaries
# can route and inspect requests without parsing the body. `Mcp-Name` comes from `params.name`
# (tools, prompts) or, when absent, `params.uri` (resources).
#
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/draft/basic/transports/streamable-http#request-metadata
def request_metadata_headers(method, params)
return {} unless method
metadata_headers = { METHOD_HEADER => method }
if params.is_a?(Hash)
name = params[:name] || params["name"]
name = params[:uri] || params["uri"] unless name.is_a?(String)
metadata_headers[NAME_HEADER] = encode_header_value(name) if name.is_a?(String)
end
metadata_headers
end
# A header value that is not safe to transmit as-is - non-ASCII, control characters (including CR/LF,
# which would otherwise allow header injection), or significant leading/trailing whitespace - is wrapped as
# `=?base64?<base64>?=`. Safe ASCII values are sent unchanged.
def encode_header_value(value)
return value if safe_header_value?(value)
"=?base64?#{[value].pack("m0")}?="
end
def safe_header_value?(value)
value.bytes.all? { |byte| byte.between?(0x20, 0x7e) } &&
(value.empty? || (!value.start_with?(" ", "\t") && !value.end_with?(" ", "\t"))) &&
!(value.start_with?("=?base64?") && value.end_with?("?="))
end
# Drives the OAuth orchestrator on a 401 from the MCP endpoint.
# The `WWW-Authenticate` header (when present) supplies the `resource_metadata`
# URL and an optional `scope` challenge per RFC 9728 Section 5.1.
#
# If the provider already holds a refresh token, we try to exchange it
# for a fresh access token first; only when that fails (e.g., the refresh token was revoked)
# do we fall back to the full Authorization Code + PKCE + DCR flow.
#
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/authorization#error-handling
def run_oauth_flow!(unauthorized_error:)
params = parse_www_authenticate_from_error(unauthorized_error)
flow = MCP::Client::OAuth::Flow.new(provider: @oauth)
return if attempt_refresh(flow: flow, resource_metadata_url: params["resource_metadata"])
run_full_authorization_flow!(flow: flow, params: params)
end
# Drives a full Authorization Code + PKCE flow without first attempting
# to refresh the access token. Used for the MCP scope-selection-strategy
# step-up path: the provider already holds a valid access token,
# but the server returned a 403 with
# `WWW-Authenticate: ... error="insufficient_scope", scope="..."`
# per RFC 6750 Section 3.1. Refreshing the existing token would re-issue
# the same scope set the server already rejected, so the SDK must run
# a fresh authorization request. The request asks for the union of
# the currently granted scope and the newly demanded scope; otherwise
# the caller would lose previously held scopes and trigger another step-up
# on the next operation that needs them.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/authorization#scope-selection-strategy
def run_step_up_flow!(forbidden_error:)
params = parse_www_authenticate_from_error(forbidden_error)
flow = MCP::Client::OAuth::Flow.new(provider: @oauth)
params = params.merge("scope" => escalated_step_up_scope(params["scope"]))
run_full_authorization_flow!(flow: flow, params: params)
end
# Returns the space-separated union of the currently granted scope (read
# from the stored token response per RFC 6749 Section 5.1) and the scope
# demanded by the step-up challenge. Duplicates are collapsed; order
# follows first appearance so existing scopes precede the newly added
# ones. Returns `nil` when neither side carries a scope so
# `build_authorization_url` omits the `scope` parameter entirely.
def escalated_step_up_scope(challenge_scope)
tokens = @oauth.tokens
granted = tokens.is_a?(Hash) ? (tokens["scope"] || tokens[:scope]) : nil
scopes = [granted, challenge_scope].compact.flat_map { |scope| scope.to_s.split }.uniq
scopes.empty? ? nil : scopes.join(" ")
end
# True when the response on `forbidden_error` carries a Bearer challenge
# with `error="insufficient_scope"` per RFC 6750 Section 3.1 and the MCP
# scope-selection-strategy section. A 403 without that signal is not a
# step-up challenge and must not trigger re-authorization.
def insufficient_scope_challenge?(forbidden_error)
parse_www_authenticate_from_error(forbidden_error)["error"] == "insufficient_scope"
end
def parse_www_authenticate_from_error(error)
response = error.response || {}
response_headers = response[:headers] || {}
header = response_headers["www-authenticate"] || response_headers["WWW-Authenticate"]
MCP::Client::OAuth::Discovery.parse_www_authenticate(header)
end
def run_full_authorization_flow!(flow:, params:)
# Use the URL snapshotted at `initialize` time so a post-construction
# mutation of `@url` cannot redirect PRM/AS discovery and the authorize
# URL to an attacker-controlled host.
flow.run!(
server_url: @oauth_server_url,
resource_metadata_url: params["resource_metadata"],
scope: params["scope"],
)
end
# Tries to swap a saved `refresh_token` for a fresh access token. Returns truthy
# on success and falsy on either "no refresh token available" or "refresh attempt failed"
# (in which case the caller should run the full interactive flow).
def attempt_refresh(flow:, resource_metadata_url:)
return false unless refresh_token_available?
# Use the snapshotted URL for the same reason as `run_oauth_flow!` above:
# post-construction `@url` mutation must not redirect token-refresh
# discovery to an attacker-controlled host. Use the query-bearing form
# so the refresh request's RFC 8707 `resource` claim matches
# the original authorization request.
flow.refresh!(server_url: @oauth_server_url, resource_metadata_url: resource_metadata_url)
true
rescue MCP::Client::OAuth::Flow::InvalidGrantError
# The refresh token has been revoked or expired by the AS. Wipe it so
# the full interactive flow runs fresh on the retry.
@oauth.clear_tokens!
false
rescue MCP::Client::OAuth::Flow::AuthorizationError
# Transient failure (network, 5xx, AS metadata, etc.). Leave the refresh
# token in place; the next attempt may succeed and we avoid forcing
# the user through an interactive reauth for a recoverable error.
false
end
def refresh_token_available?
tokens = @oauth.tokens
return false unless tokens.is_a?(Hash)
!(tokens["refresh_token"] || tokens[:refresh_token]).to_s.empty?
end
def capture_session_info(method, response, body)
return unless method.to_s == Methods::INITIALIZE
# Faraday normalizes header names to lowercase.
session_id = response.headers[SESSION_ID_HEADER.downcase]
@session_id ||= session_id unless session_id.to_s.empty?
@protocol_version ||= body.is_a?(Hash) ? body.dig("result", "protocolVersion") : nil
end
def clear_session
@session_id = nil
@protocol_version = nil
@server_info = nil
@connected = false
end
def require_faraday!
require "faraday"
rescue LoadError
raise LoadError, "The 'faraday' gem is required to use the MCP client HTTP transport. " \
"Add it to your Gemfile: gem 'faraday', '>= 2.0'" \
"See https://rubygems.org/gems/faraday for more details."
end
# Determines the logical JSON-RPC body of the exchange after the POST stream finished
# (or was aborted because the response already arrived).
def resolve_response_body(stream, response, method, params)
return stream.response if stream.response
# 202 Accepted is the server's ACK for a JSON-RPC notification or response; no body is expected.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#sending-messages-to-the-server
return if response.status == 202
content_type = response.headers["Content-Type"]
if content_type&.include?("text/event-stream")
# Nothing was parsed during streaming: either the adapter does not support `on_data`
# (the whole body sits in `response.body`) or Faraday did not pass `env` to `on_data`
# (Faraday < 2.1; the SSE chunks sit in `buffer`). Parse whichever holds the body.
unless stream.primed?
stream.ingest_pending!(response.body)
return stream.response if stream.response
end
# SEP-1699: a graceful close after a priming event (an event with an id) but before
# the response means "reconnect via GET to resume".
return await_response_after_disconnect(stream, method, params) if stream.primed?
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"No valid JSON-RPC response found in SSE stream",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :parse_error,
)
elsif content_type&.include?("application/json")
return parse_json_buffer(stream.buffer, method, params) unless stream.buffer.empty?
# Adapters without `on_data` support deliver the body via `response.body`,
# already parsed by the json response middleware.
response.body.is_a?(String) ? parse_json_buffer(response.body, method, params) : response.body
else
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Unsupported Content-Type: #{content_type.inspect}. Expected application/json or text/event-stream.",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :unsupported_media_type,
)
end
end
def parse_json_buffer(buffer, method, params)
return if buffer.empty?
JSON.parse(buffer)
rescue JSON::ParserError => e
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Failed to parse JSON response: #{e.message}",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :parse_error,
)
end
# SEP-1699 resumability: the server closed the SSE stream after a priming event
# without delivering the response. Treat the graceful close like a network failure:
# wait the server-specified `retry:` interval (default 1000ms), then reconnect with
# a GET carrying `Last-Event-ID` so the server can replay the pending response on
# the standalone stream. Mirrors the TypeScript SDK's `StreamableHTTPClientTransport`
# reconnection and the Python SDK's `_handle_reconnection` (including its 2-attempt cap).
# https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/issues/1699
def await_response_after_disconnect(stream, method, params)
stream.abortable = true
MAX_RECONNECTION_ATTEMPTS.times do
sleep((stream.retry_ms || DEFAULT_RECONNECTION_DELAY_MS) / 1000.0)
stream.reset_parser!
reconnect_response = begin
client.get("") do |req|
req.headers.update(session_headers)
req.headers["Accept"] = SSE_ACCEPT_HEADER
req.headers[LAST_EVENT_ID_HEADER] = stream.last_event_id if stream.last_event_id
req.options.on_data = stream.on_data
end
rescue StreamAbort
# The awaited response arrived on the reconnected stream.
nil
end
# Same fallback as `resolve_response_body` for adapters that do not stream via `on_data`.
if reconnect_response && stream.response.nil?
stream.ingest_pending!(reconnect_response.body)
end
return stream.response if stream.response
end
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Server closed the SSE stream without a response for #{method} " \
"after #{MAX_RECONNECTION_ATTEMPTS} reconnection attempts",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :internal_error,
)
end
end
end
end