ruby-sdk/lib/mcp/client/http.rb
Koichi ITO a407cea086 Re-run OAuth flow on 403 insufficient_scope (step-up)
## Motivation and Context

The MCP authorization specification (2025-11-25 scope-selection-strategy)
and RFC 6750 Section 3.1 describe OAuth 2.0 step-up authentication:
the client already holds a valid access token, but the server returns a 403
with `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="..."`
to demand a higher-privileged scope for a specific operation.
The client is expected to run a fresh authorization request with
the escalated scope and retry.

Until now the Ruby SDK only ran the OAuth flow on 401 responses.
A 403 surfaced unchanged as a `RequestHandlerError` and the operation
that needed the escalated scope failed permanently, even with a valid token
in storage. This lined up with the `auth/scope-step-up` conformance
scenario being listed in `conformance/expected_failures.yml`.

The change adds:

- `MCP::Client::HTTP#send_request` recognises a 403 carrying
  an `insufficient_scope` Bearer challenge as a step-up signal,
  re-runs a full authorization request with the scope from the challenge,
  and retries the original request. Retries are capped at
  one per `send_request` call so a server that repeatedly demands more
  scope cannot loop the transport.
- `run_step_up_flow!` deliberately bypasses the refresh-token path that
  `run_oauth_flow!` uses on 401. Refreshing would re-issue the same
  scope set the existing token already has and the server already
  rejected. Only a fresh `authorization_code` grant with the escalated
  scope can succeed.
- A plain 403 with no `insufficient_scope` challenge continues to
  surface as `RequestHandlerError` with `error_type: :forbidden`.
- `conformance/client.rb` invokes a tool for the `auth/scope-step-up`
  scenario; the scenario's authorization middleware only requires
  the escalated scope on `tools/call`, so the previous `tools/list`-only
  client could never trigger the second authorization.
- `auth/scope-step-up` is removed from `conformance/expected_failures.yml`.

Resolves #383.

## How Has This Been Tested?

New `HTTPOAuthTest` cases cover: the 403 insufficient_scope path
re-authorizes with the escalated scope from the challenge and retries
the original request with the new bearer token; a plain 403 without
the `insufficient_scope` challenge is surfaced as
`error_type: :forbidden` with no OAuth side effects; repeated
`insufficient_scope` responses retry at most once and then surface the 403;
a provider with a saved `refresh_token` still goes through
the full authorization request rather than exchanging the refresh token,
because the existing scope set is precisely what was rejected.

Conformance: `auth/scope-step-up` now passes 22/22 with no warnings.
`bundle exec rake test`, `bundle exec rake rubocop`, and
`bundle exec rake conformance` are all green.

## Breaking Changes

None. Behaviour on 401 is unchanged. A 403 without the `insufficient_scope`
Bearer challenge still raises the same `RequestHandlerError` as before.
The new retry only fires when both the WWW-Authenticate header signals step-up
and the transport was constructed with an OAuth provider.
2026-06-12 11:59:02 +09:00

531 lines
23 KiB
Ruby

# frozen_string_literal: true
require "securerandom"
require_relative "../../json_rpc_handler"
require_relative "../configuration"
require_relative "../methods"
require_relative "../version"
module MCP
class Client
# TODO: HTTP GET for SSE streaming is not yet implemented.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#listening-for-messages-from-the-server
# TODO: Resumability and redelivery with Last-Event-ID is not yet implemented.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#resumability-and-redelivery
class HTTP
ACCEPT_HEADER = "application/json, text/event-stream"
SESSION_ID_HEADER = "Mcp-Session-Id"
PROTOCOL_VERSION_HEADER = "MCP-Protocol-Version"
# Raised when an `oauth:` provider is paired with an MCP URL that is neither HTTPS nor
# a loopback `http://` URL, since a bearer token sent over plain HTTP to a remote host
# is trivially observed and stolen.
class InsecureURLError < ArgumentError; end
# Faraday request middleware that compares the outgoing request URL
# against the URL snapshotted at `MCP::Client::HTTP#initialize` time.
# Registered after the user's customizer so it sees `env.url` *after*
# any custom middleware has had a chance to rewrite it - closing
# the `Faraday env.url = URI("https://attacker...")` bypass that a plain
# `client.url_prefix` check would miss. The comparison includes
# the query string, so a middleware that rewrites `env.url.query` to
# a different tenant (e.g. `?tenant=evil`) is rejected as well; otherwise
# the audience-binding check on the OAuth side could be bypassed at
# the send step.
class OAuthURLGuard
def initialize(app, expected_url:)
@app = app
@expected_url = expected_url
end
def call(env)
effective = MCP::Client::OAuth::Discovery.canonicalize_url(env.url.to_s)
unless effective == @expected_url
# Surface the *canonicalized* form (no userinfo, no fragment) so
# credentials like `user:pass@` cannot leak into logs, stack
# traces, or exception reporters.
raise InsecureURLError,
"Effective request URL #{effective.inspect} does not match the URL " \
"validated at initialize time (#{@expected_url.inspect}); refusing to send a bearer token."
end
@app.call(env)
end
end
attr_reader :url, :session_id, :protocol_version, :server_info, :oauth
def initialize(url:, headers: {}, oauth: nil, &block)
if oauth && !MCP::Client::OAuth::Discovery.secure_url?(url)
# Mask credentials (userinfo) and query parameters before quoting the URL in the error message
# so they cannot leak into logs.
safe_url = MCP::Client::OAuth::Discovery.canonicalize_origin_and_path(url)
raise InsecureURLError,
"MCP URL #{safe_url.inspect} must use https or be a loopback http URL when an oauth provider is set; " \
"sending bearer tokens over plain http to a remote host would leak them on the wire."
end
@url = url
@headers = headers
@faraday_customizer = block
@oauth = oauth
# Snapshot the canonical URL at construction time. This single value
# serves two related roles, both of which need to see the query string:
#
# - As the RFC 8707 `resource` claim sent on the authorization and
# token requests (and as the base for PRM discovery URLs) -
# matching the TS / Python SDKs' `resourceUrlFromServerUrl` /
# `resource_url_from_server_url` so multi-tenant servers that scope
# by `?tenant=...` round-trip correctly.
# - As the comparison value for the URL guard middleware. Comparing
# query strings as well as origin + path is required so a Faraday
# middleware that rewrites `env.url.query` to a different tenant
# cannot send the bearer token to the wrong audience while
# the resource binding on the OAuth side stays correct.
#
# Saved only when `oauth:` is set so non-OAuth transports keep their
# existing behavior.
@oauth_server_url = oauth ? MCP::Client::OAuth::Discovery.canonicalize_url(url) : nil
@session_id = nil
@protocol_version = nil
@server_info = nil
@connected = false
end
# Performs the MCP `initialize` handshake: sends an `initialize` request
# followed by the required `notifications/initialized` notification.
# The server's `InitializeResult` (protocol version, capabilities, server
# info, instructions) is cached on the transport and returned.
#
# Idempotent: a second call returns the cached `InitializeResult` without
# contacting the server. After `close`, state is cleared and `connect`
# will handshake again.
#
# @param client_info [Hash, nil] `{ name:, version: }` identifying the client.
# Defaults to `{ name: "mcp-ruby-client", version: MCP::VERSION }`.
# @param protocol_version [String, nil] Protocol version to offer. Defaults
# to `MCP::Configuration::LATEST_STABLE_PROTOCOL_VERSION`.
# @param capabilities [Hash] Capabilities advertised by the client. Defaults to `{}`.
# @return [Hash] The server's `InitializeResult`.
# @raise [RequestHandlerError] If the server responds with a JSON-RPC error
# or a malformed result.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/lifecycle#initialization
def connect(client_info: nil, protocol_version: nil, capabilities: {})
return @server_info if connected?
client_info ||= { name: "mcp-ruby-client", version: MCP::VERSION }
protocol_version ||= MCP::Configuration::LATEST_STABLE_PROTOCOL_VERSION
response = send_request(request: {
jsonrpc: JsonRpcHandler::Version::V2_0,
id: SecureRandom.uuid,
method: MCP::Methods::INITIALIZE,
params: {
protocolVersion: protocol_version,
capabilities: capabilities,
clientInfo: client_info,
},
})
if response.is_a?(Hash) && response.key?("error")
clear_session
error = response["error"]
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Server initialization failed: #{error["message"]}",
{ method: MCP::Methods::INITIALIZE },
error_type: :internal_error,
)
end
unless response.is_a?(Hash) && response["result"].is_a?(Hash)
clear_session
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Server initialization failed: missing result in response",
{ method: MCP::Methods::INITIALIZE },
error_type: :internal_error,
)
end
@server_info = response["result"]
negotiated_protocol_version = @server_info["protocolVersion"]
unless MCP::Configuration::SUPPORTED_STABLE_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS.include?(negotiated_protocol_version)
clear_session
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Server initialization failed: unsupported protocol version #{negotiated_protocol_version.inspect}",
{ method: MCP::Methods::INITIALIZE },
error_type: :internal_error,
)
end
begin
send_request(request: {
jsonrpc: JsonRpcHandler::Version::V2_0,
method: MCP::Methods::NOTIFICATIONS_INITIALIZED,
})
rescue StandardError
clear_session
raise
end
@connected = true
@server_info
end
# Returns true once `connect` has completed the full handshake
# (`initialize` response received and `notifications/initialized` sent).
# Returns false before the first handshake and after `close`.
def connected?
@connected
end
# Sends a JSON-RPC request and returns the parsed response body.
# After a successful `initialize` handshake, the session ID and protocol
# version returned by the server are captured and automatically included
# on subsequent requests.
def send_request(request:)
method = request[:method] || request["method"]
params = request[:params] || request["params"]
oauth_retried = false
step_up_retried = false
begin
response = client.post("", request, session_headers)
body = parse_response_body(response, method, params)
capture_session_info(method, response, body)
body
rescue Faraday::BadRequestError => e
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"The #{method} request is invalid",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :bad_request,
original_error: e,
)
rescue Faraday::UnauthorizedError => e
# Run the OAuth flow at most once per `send_request` invocation.
# The `oauth_retried` flag lives outside the `begin` so it survives `retry`,
# ensuring a server returning 401 indefinitely raises rather than loops.
if @oauth && !oauth_retried
oauth_retried = true
run_oauth_flow!(unauthorized_error: e)
retry
end
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"You are unauthorized to make #{method} requests",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :unauthorized,
original_error: e,
)
rescue Faraday::ForbiddenError => e
# OAuth 2.0 step-up: a 403 carrying `error="insufficient_scope"` in
# the Bearer challenge means the existing access token is valid
# but lacks scopes the server now requires for this operation.
# Re-run the full authorization flow with the escalated scope from
# the challenge and retry once. A plain 403 without the challenge is
# surfaced unchanged.
if @oauth && !step_up_retried && insufficient_scope_challenge?(e)
step_up_retried = true
run_step_up_flow!(forbidden_error: e)
retry
end
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"You are forbidden to make #{method} requests",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :forbidden,
original_error: e,
)
rescue Faraday::ResourceNotFound => e
# Per spec, 404 is the session-expired signal only when the request
# actually carried an `Mcp-Session-Id`. A 404 without a session attached
# (e.g. wrong URL or a stateless server) surfaces as a generic not-found.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#session-management
if @session_id
clear_session
raise SessionExpiredError.new(
"The #{method} request is not found",
{ method: method, params: params },
original_error: e,
)
else
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"The #{method} request is not found",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :not_found,
original_error: e,
)
end
rescue Faraday::UnprocessableEntityError => e
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"The #{method} request is unprocessable",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :unprocessable_entity,
original_error: e,
)
rescue Faraday::Error => e
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Internal error handling #{method} request",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :internal_error,
original_error: e,
)
end
end
# Terminates the session by sending an HTTP DELETE to the MCP endpoint
# with the current `Mcp-Session-Id` header, and clears locally tracked
# session state afterward. No-op when no session has been established.
#
# Per spec, the server MAY respond with HTTP 405 Method Not Allowed when
# it does not support client-initiated termination, and returns 404 for
# a session it has already terminated. Both mean the session is gone —
# the desired end state. Other errors surface to the caller; local
# session state is cleared either way.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#session-management
def close
unless @session_id
clear_session
return
end
begin
client.delete("", nil, session_headers)
rescue Faraday::ClientError => e
raise unless [404, 405].include?(e.response&.dig(:status))
ensure
clear_session
end
end
private
attr_reader :headers
def client
require_faraday!
@client ||= Faraday.new(url) do |faraday|
faraday.request(:json)
faraday.response(:json)
faraday.response(:raise_error)
faraday.headers["Accept"] = ACCEPT_HEADER
headers.each do |key, value|
faraday.headers[key] = value
end
@faraday_customizer&.call(faraday)
# Register the URL identity guard *after* the user's customizer
# so it sits closest to the adapter in the request stack. That way
# the guard sees `env.url` after any customizer-added middleware has had
# a chance to rewrite it, closing the `env.url = URI("https://...")`
# bypass that a `Faraday::Connection#url_prefix` check cannot detect.
faraday.use(OAuthURLGuard, expected_url: @oauth_server_url) if @oauth_server_url
end
end
# Per spec, the client MUST include `MCP-Session-Id` (when the server assigned one)
# and `MCP-Protocol-Version` on all requests after `initialize`.
#
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#session-management
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#protocol-version-header
def session_headers
request_headers = {}
request_headers[SESSION_ID_HEADER] = @session_id if @session_id
request_headers[PROTOCOL_VERSION_HEADER] = @protocol_version if @protocol_version
if @oauth && (token = @oauth.access_token)
request_headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer #{token}"
end
request_headers
end
# Drives the OAuth orchestrator on a 401 from the MCP endpoint.
# The `WWW-Authenticate` header (when present) supplies the `resource_metadata`
# URL and an optional `scope` challenge per RFC 9728 Section 5.1.
#
# If the provider already holds a refresh token, we try to exchange it
# for a fresh access token first; only when that fails (e.g., the refresh token was revoked)
# do we fall back to the full Authorization Code + PKCE + DCR flow.
#
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/authorization#error-handling
def run_oauth_flow!(unauthorized_error:)
params = parse_www_authenticate_from_error(unauthorized_error)
flow = MCP::Client::OAuth::Flow.new(provider: @oauth)
return if attempt_refresh(flow: flow, resource_metadata_url: params["resource_metadata"])
run_full_authorization_flow!(flow: flow, params: params)
end
# Drives a full Authorization Code + PKCE flow without first attempting
# to refresh the access token. Used for the MCP scope-selection-strategy
# step-up path: the provider already holds a valid access token,
# but the server returned a 403 with
# `WWW-Authenticate: ... error="insufficient_scope", scope="..."`
# per RFC 6750 Section 3.1. Refreshing the existing token would re-issue
# the same scope set the server already rejected, so the SDK must run
# a fresh authorization request. The request asks for the union of
# the currently granted scope and the newly demanded scope; otherwise
# the caller would lose previously held scopes and trigger another step-up
# on the next operation that needs them.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/authorization#scope-selection-strategy
def run_step_up_flow!(forbidden_error:)
params = parse_www_authenticate_from_error(forbidden_error)
flow = MCP::Client::OAuth::Flow.new(provider: @oauth)
params = params.merge("scope" => escalated_step_up_scope(params["scope"]))
run_full_authorization_flow!(flow: flow, params: params)
end
# Returns the space-separated union of the currently granted scope (read
# from the stored token response per RFC 6749 Section 5.1) and the scope
# demanded by the step-up challenge. Duplicates are collapsed; order
# follows first appearance so existing scopes precede the newly added
# ones. Returns `nil` when neither side carries a scope so
# `build_authorization_url` omits the `scope` parameter entirely.
def escalated_step_up_scope(challenge_scope)
tokens = @oauth.tokens
granted = tokens.is_a?(Hash) ? (tokens["scope"] || tokens[:scope]) : nil
scopes = [granted, challenge_scope].compact.flat_map { |scope| scope.to_s.split }.uniq
scopes.empty? ? nil : scopes.join(" ")
end
# True when the response on `forbidden_error` carries a Bearer challenge
# with `error="insufficient_scope"` per RFC 6750 Section 3.1 and the MCP
# scope-selection-strategy section. A 403 without that signal is not a
# step-up challenge and must not trigger re-authorization.
def insufficient_scope_challenge?(forbidden_error)
parse_www_authenticate_from_error(forbidden_error)["error"] == "insufficient_scope"
end
def parse_www_authenticate_from_error(error)
response = error.response || {}
response_headers = response[:headers] || {}
header = response_headers["www-authenticate"] || response_headers["WWW-Authenticate"]
MCP::Client::OAuth::Discovery.parse_www_authenticate(header)
end
def run_full_authorization_flow!(flow:, params:)
# Use the URL snapshotted at `initialize` time so a post-construction
# mutation of `@url` cannot redirect PRM/AS discovery and the authorize
# URL to an attacker-controlled host.
flow.run!(
server_url: @oauth_server_url,
resource_metadata_url: params["resource_metadata"],
scope: params["scope"],
)
end
# Tries to swap a saved `refresh_token` for a fresh access token. Returns truthy
# on success and falsy on either "no refresh token available" or "refresh attempt failed"
# (in which case the caller should run the full interactive flow).
def attempt_refresh(flow:, resource_metadata_url:)
return false unless refresh_token_available?
# Use the snapshotted URL for the same reason as `run_oauth_flow!` above:
# post-construction `@url` mutation must not redirect token-refresh
# discovery to an attacker-controlled host. Use the query-bearing form
# so the refresh request's RFC 8707 `resource` claim matches
# the original authorization request.
flow.refresh!(server_url: @oauth_server_url, resource_metadata_url: resource_metadata_url)
true
rescue MCP::Client::OAuth::Flow::InvalidGrantError
# The refresh token has been revoked or expired by the AS. Wipe it so
# the full interactive flow runs fresh on the retry.
@oauth.clear_tokens!
false
rescue MCP::Client::OAuth::Flow::AuthorizationError
# Transient failure (network, 5xx, AS metadata, etc.). Leave the refresh
# token in place; the next attempt may succeed and we avoid forcing
# the user through an interactive reauth for a recoverable error.
false
end
def refresh_token_available?
tokens = @oauth.tokens
return false unless tokens.is_a?(Hash)
!(tokens["refresh_token"] || tokens[:refresh_token]).to_s.empty?
end
def capture_session_info(method, response, body)
return unless method.to_s == Methods::INITIALIZE
# Faraday normalizes header names to lowercase.
session_id = response.headers[SESSION_ID_HEADER.downcase]
@session_id ||= session_id unless session_id.to_s.empty?
@protocol_version ||= body.is_a?(Hash) ? body.dig("result", "protocolVersion") : nil
end
def clear_session
@session_id = nil
@protocol_version = nil
@server_info = nil
@connected = false
end
def require_faraday!
require "faraday"
rescue LoadError
raise LoadError, "The 'faraday' gem is required to use the MCP client HTTP transport. " \
"Add it to your Gemfile: gem 'faraday', '>= 2.0'" \
"See https://rubygems.org/gems/faraday for more details."
end
def require_event_stream_parser!
require "event_stream_parser"
rescue LoadError
raise LoadError, "The 'event_stream_parser' gem is required to parse SSE responses. " \
"Add it to your Gemfile: gem 'event_stream_parser', '>= 1.0'. " \
"See https://rubygems.org/gems/event_stream_parser for more details."
end
def parse_response_body(response, method, params)
# 202 Accepted is the server's ACK for a JSON-RPC notification or response; no body is expected.
# https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/transports#sending-messages-to-the-server
return if response.status == 202
content_type = response.headers["Content-Type"]
if content_type&.include?("text/event-stream")
parse_sse_response(response.body, method, params)
elsif content_type&.include?("application/json")
response.body
else
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"Unsupported Content-Type: #{content_type.inspect}. Expected application/json or text/event-stream.",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :unsupported_media_type,
)
end
end
def parse_sse_response(body, method, params)
require_event_stream_parser!
json_rpc_response = nil
parser = EventStreamParser::Parser.new
parser.feed(body.to_s) do |_type, data, _id|
next if data.empty?
begin
parsed = JSON.parse(data)
json_rpc_response = parsed if parsed.is_a?(Hash) && (parsed.key?("result") || parsed.key?("error"))
rescue JSON::ParserError
next
end
end
return json_rpc_response if json_rpc_response
raise RequestHandlerError.new(
"No valid JSON-RPC response found in SSE stream",
{ method: method, params: params },
error_type: :parse_error,
)
end
end
end
end