chore: declare and check MSRV (#1034)
* chore: declare and check MSRV * fix: clippy fixes for collapsing if-statements * ci: add explicit contents read permission to MSRV job
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1 changed files with 322 additions and 315 deletions
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@ -1248,56 +1248,56 @@ impl AuthorizationManager {
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/// the client if credentials are found. Returns `false` when credentials
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/// are absent or discarded after an authorization-server change.
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pub async fn initialize_from_store(&mut self) -> Result<bool, AuthError> {
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if let Some(stored) = self.credential_store.load().await? {
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if stored.token_response.is_some() {
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if self.metadata.is_none() {
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let metadata = self.discover_metadata().await?;
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self.metadata = Some(metadata);
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}
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if let (Some(stored_issuer), Some(current_issuer)) =
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(stored.issuer.as_deref(), self.metadata_issuer().as_deref())
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{
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// A CIMD client ID is the client's metadata URL, so it is
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// portable across authorization servers and exempt here.
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if stored_issuer != current_issuer {
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if is_https_url(&stored.client_id) {
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// A CIMD client ID is the client's metadata URL, so it is
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// portable across authorization servers — but the tokens
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// were minted by the previous AS and must not be reused.
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tracing::warn!(
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stored_issuer,
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current_issuer,
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"authorization server issuer changed; discarding tokens but keeping portable CIMD client ID"
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);
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self.credential_store
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.save(
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StoredCredentials::new(
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stored.client_id.clone(),
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None,
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vec![],
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None,
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)
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.with_issuer(self.metadata_issuer()),
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)
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.await?;
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self.configure_client_id(&stored.client_id)?;
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return Ok(false);
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}
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if let Some(stored) = self.credential_store.load().await?
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&& stored.token_response.is_some()
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{
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if self.metadata.is_none() {
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let metadata = self.discover_metadata().await?;
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self.metadata = Some(metadata);
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}
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if let (Some(stored_issuer), Some(current_issuer)) =
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(stored.issuer.as_deref(), self.metadata_issuer().as_deref())
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{
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// A CIMD client ID is the client's metadata URL, so it is
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// portable across authorization servers and exempt here.
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if stored_issuer != current_issuer {
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if is_https_url(&stored.client_id) {
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// A CIMD client ID is the client's metadata URL, so it is
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// portable across authorization servers — but the tokens
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// were minted by the previous AS and must not be reused.
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tracing::warn!(
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stored_issuer,
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current_issuer,
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"authorization server issuer changed; clearing stored credentials bound to the previous issuer"
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"authorization server issuer changed; discarding tokens but keeping portable CIMD client ID"
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);
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self.credential_store.clear().await?;
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self.credential_store
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.save(
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StoredCredentials::new(
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stored.client_id.clone(),
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None,
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vec![],
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None,
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)
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.with_issuer(self.metadata_issuer()),
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)
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.await?;
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self.configure_client_id(&stored.client_id)?;
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return Ok(false);
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}
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}
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self.configure_client_id(&stored.client_id)?;
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return Ok(true);
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tracing::warn!(
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stored_issuer,
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current_issuer,
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"authorization server issuer changed; clearing stored credentials bound to the previous issuer"
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);
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self.credential_store.clear().await?;
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return Ok(false);
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}
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}
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self.configure_client_id(&stored.client_id)?;
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return Ok(true);
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}
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Ok(false)
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}
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@ -1425,10 +1425,10 @@ impl AuthorizationManager {
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// RFC 8414 RECOMMENDS response_types_supported in the metadata. This field is optional,
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// but if present and does not include the flow we use ("code"), bail out early with a clear error.
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if let Some(response_types_supported) = metadata.response_types_supported.as_ref() {
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if !response_types_supported.contains(&response_type.to_string()) {
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return Err(AuthError::InvalidScope(response_type.to_string()));
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}
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if let Some(response_types_supported) = metadata.response_types_supported.as_ref()
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&& !response_types_supported.contains(&response_type.to_string())
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{
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return Err(AuthError::InvalidScope(response_type.to_string()));
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}
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// The client always sends an S256 challenge. A server that advertises
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@ -1713,12 +1713,11 @@ impl AuthorizationManager {
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}
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// nothing requested or challenged yet: seed from AS metadata, then caller defaults
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if let Some(metadata) = &self.metadata {
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if let Some(scopes_supported) = &metadata.scopes_supported {
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if !scopes_supported.is_empty() {
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return scopes_supported.clone();
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}
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}
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if let Some(metadata) = &self.metadata
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&& let Some(scopes_supported) = &metadata.scopes_supported
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&& !scopes_supported.is_empty()
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{
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return scopes_supported.clone();
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}
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default_scopes.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
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@ -1730,12 +1729,11 @@ impl AuthorizationManager {
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if scopes.is_empty() || scopes.iter().any(|s| s == "offline_access") {
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return;
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}
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if let Some(metadata) = &self.metadata {
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if let Some(supported) = &metadata.scopes_supported {
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if supported.iter().any(|s| s == "offline_access") {
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scopes.push("offline_access".to_string());
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}
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}
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if let Some(metadata) = &self.metadata
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&& let Some(supported) = &metadata.scopes_supported
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&& supported.iter().any(|s| s == "offline_access")
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{
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scopes.push("offline_access".to_string());
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}
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}
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@ -2255,10 +2253,10 @@ impl AuthorizationManager {
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self.validate_resource_metadata_resource(&resource_metadata)?;
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// store scopes_supported from protected resource metadata for select_scopes()
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if let Some(scopes) = resource_metadata.scopes_supported {
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if !scopes.is_empty() {
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*self.resource_scopes.write().await = scopes;
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}
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if let Some(scopes) = resource_metadata.scopes_supported
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&& !scopes.is_empty()
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{
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*self.resource_scopes.write().await = scopes;
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}
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let mut candidates = Vec::new();
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@ -2701,20 +2699,18 @@ impl AuthorizationManager {
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if let ClientCredentialsConfig::PrivateKeyJwt {
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signing_algorithm, ..
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} = config
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{
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if let Some(algs) = metadata
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&& let Some(algs) = metadata
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.additional_fields
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.get("token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported")
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.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
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{
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let alg_str = signing_algorithm.as_str();
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if !algs.iter().any(|a| a.as_str() == Some(alg_str)) {
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let supported: Vec<&str> = algs.iter().filter_map(|a| a.as_str()).collect();
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return Err(AuthError::ClientCredentialsError(format!(
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"Authorization server does not support signing algorithm '{}'. Supported: {:?}",
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alg_str, supported
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)));
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}
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{
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let alg_str = signing_algorithm.as_str();
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if !algs.iter().any(|a| a.as_str() == Some(alg_str)) {
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let supported: Vec<&str> = algs.iter().filter_map(|a| a.as_str()).collect();
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return Err(AuthError::ClientCredentialsError(format!(
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"Authorization server does not support signing algorithm '{}'. Supported: {:?}",
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alg_str, supported
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)));
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}
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}
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