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fix: harden signing key handling (#1166)

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* fix: harden signing key handling

* fix: validate static keys at compile time
This commit is contained in:
Dale Seo 2026-08-18 21:56:58 +09:00 • committed by GitHub
commit d5c46b3fe0
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6 changed files with 214 additions and 43 deletions
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6
conformance/src/bin/server.rs
View file

@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ fn custom_header_tool() -> Tool {
/// Signing key for SEP-2322 `requestState` sealing. A fixed key is fine for a
/// conformance harness; real servers must load a secret out of clients' reach.
const REQUEST_STATE_KEY: &[u8] = b"rust-sdk-conformance-request-state-key!!";
const _: () = assert!(
REQUEST_STATE_KEY.len() >= RequestStateCodec::MIN_KEY_LENGTH,
"REQUEST_STATE_KEY is shorter than RequestStateCodec::MIN_KEY_LENGTH",
);
#[derive(Clone)]
struct ConformanceServer {
@ -70,7 +74,7 @@ impl ConformanceServer {
subscriptions: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
next_subscription: Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0)),
log_level: Arc::new(Mutex::new(LoggingLevel::Debug)),
request_state_codec: RequestStateCodec::new(REQUEST_STATE_KEY),
request_state_codec: RequestStateCodec::new_unchecked(REQUEST_STATE_KEY),
tasks: TaskManager::new(),
}
}

3
crates/rmcp/Cargo.toml
View file

@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ base64 = { version = "0.23", optional = true }
# for SEP-2322 requestState integrity sealing (opt-in via the `request-state` feature)
hmac = { version = "0.13", optional = true }
sha2 = { version = "0.11", optional = true }
zeroize = { version = "1", optional = true }
# for HTTP client
reqwest = { version = "0.13.2", default-features = false, features = [
@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ macros = ["dep:rmcp-macros", "dep:pastey"]
elicitation = ["dep:url"]
# SEP-2322 requestState integrity helper (HMAC-SHA256 seal/open codec)
request-state = ["dep:hmac", "dep:sha2", "base64"]
request-state = ["dep:hmac", "dep:sha2", "dep:zeroize", "base64"]
# reqwest http client
__reqwest = ["dep:reqwest"]

149
crates/rmcp/src/model/request_state.rs
View file

@ -40,9 +40,10 @@
//!
//! ```
//! use rmcp::model::{RequestStateCodec, SealOptions};
//! # fn main() -> Result<(), rmcp::model::RequestStateError> {
//!
//! // Derive the key from a per-process secret; keep it out of client reach.
//! let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"a-32-byte-or-longer-secret-key!!!");
//! let codec = RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"a-32-byte-or-longer-secret-key!!!")?;
//!
//! // Bind the state to the caller and the originating request.
//! let context = b"user:alice|tools/call:weather";
@ -53,11 +54,13 @@
//!
//! // On retry the client echoes `sealed` back untouched; the server re-derives
//! // the same context and opens it.
//! let opened = codec.open_with(&sealed, context).expect("integrity check passes");
//! let opened = codec.open_with(&sealed, context)?;
//! assert_eq!(opened, b"step=2");
//!
//! // A different principal (different context) is rejected.
//! assert!(codec.open_with(&sealed, b"user:bob|tools/call:weather").is_err());
//! # Ok(())
//! # }
//! ```
use std::time::Duration;
@ -67,6 +70,7 @@ use hmac::{Hmac, KeyInit, Mac};
use serde::{Serialize, de::DeserializeOwned};
use sha2::Sha256;
use thiserror::Error;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
@ -81,10 +85,17 @@ const DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rmcp/mrtr/request-state/v1";
/// front of every sealed body. `0` means "no expiry".
const EXPIRY_LEN: usize = 8;
/// Errors returned when opening a sealed [`RequestStateCodec`] value.
/// Errors returned when constructing a [`RequestStateCodec`] or processing a
/// sealed value.
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum RequestStateError {
/// The signing key is shorter than [`RequestStateCodec::MIN_KEY_LENGTH`].
#[error(
"request state signing key is too short: expected at least {minimum} bytes, got {actual}"
)]
KeyTooShort { minimum: usize, actual: usize },
/// The value is not a well-formed sealed request state (wrong prefix or
/// missing sections).
#[error("request state is malformed or uses an unsupported format")]
@ -156,11 +167,12 @@ impl<'a> SealOptions<'a> {
/// [`open`](Self::open) a value, so it has to survive across the rounds of a
/// single MRTR exchange (e.g. a stable per-process or per-deployment secret).
///
/// The key may be any length; HMAC internally normalizes it. For meaningful
/// security use a high-entropy key of at least 32 bytes.
/// Use [`try_new`](Self::try_new) to require at least
/// [`MIN_KEY_LENGTH`](Self::MIN_KEY_LENGTH) bytes of high-entropy key material.
/// The stored key material is zeroized when the codec is dropped.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct RequestStateCodec {
key: Box<[u8]>,
key: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>,
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for RequestStateCodec {
@ -173,11 +185,44 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for RequestStateCodec {
}
impl RequestStateCodec {
/// Creates a codec from a signing key.
/// Minimum accepted signing-key length in bytes.
pub const MIN_KEY_LENGTH: usize = 32;
/// Creates a codec from a signing key without validating its length.
#[deprecated(
since = "3.1.4",
note = "use RequestStateCodec::try_new to enforce the minimum signing-key length"
)]
pub fn new(key: impl Into<Vec<u8>>) -> Self {
Self {
key: key.into().into_boxed_slice(),
Self::new_unchecked(key)
}
/// Creates a codec without validating the signing-key length.
///
/// Prefer [`try_new`](Self::try_new) unless the key length has already been
/// validated.
pub fn new_unchecked(key: impl Into<Vec<u8>>) -> Self {
Self {
key: Zeroizing::new(key.into()),
}
}
/// Creates a codec from a signing key after validating its length.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns [`RequestStateError::KeyTooShort`] when `key` contains fewer
/// than [`MIN_KEY_LENGTH`](Self::MIN_KEY_LENGTH) bytes.
pub fn try_new(key: impl Into<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, RequestStateError> {
let key = Zeroizing::new(key.into());
if key.len() < Self::MIN_KEY_LENGTH {
return Err(RequestStateError::KeyTooShort {
minimum: Self::MIN_KEY_LENGTH,
actual: key.len(),
});
}
Ok(Self { key })
}
/// Seals raw bytes into an opaque, integrity-protected string suitable for
@ -347,8 +392,8 @@ impl RequestStateCodec {
/// body. The length prefix keeps the `associated_data`/`body` boundary
/// unambiguous so distinct inputs cannot collide.
fn mac_for(&self, associated_data: &[u8], body: &[u8]) -> HmacSha256 {
let mut mac =
HmacSha256::new_from_slice(&self.key).expect("HMAC accepts keys of any length");
let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(self.key.as_slice())
.expect("HMAC accepts keys of any length");
mac.update(DOMAIN);
mac.update(&(associated_data.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
mac.update(associated_data);
@ -365,9 +410,42 @@ impl RequestStateCodec {
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn try_new_accepts_key_at_minimum_length() {
let result = RequestStateCodec::try_new(vec![0; RequestStateCodec::MIN_KEY_LENGTH]);
assert!(result.is_ok(), "unexpected result: {result:?}");
}
#[test]
fn try_new_rejects_key_below_minimum_length() {
let actual = RequestStateCodec::MIN_KEY_LENGTH - 1;
let error = RequestStateCodec::try_new(vec![0; actual]).unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(
&error,
RequestStateError::KeyTooShort {
minimum: RequestStateCodec::MIN_KEY_LENGTH,
actual: error_actual,
} if *error_actual == actual
),
"unexpected error: {error}"
);
}
#[test]
#[allow(deprecated)]
fn new_accepts_short_key_for_backward_compatibility() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"key".to_vec());
assert_eq!(codec.open(&codec.seal(b"state")).unwrap(), b"state");
}
#[test]
fn seal_open_roundtrips_bytes() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"test-key-test-key-test-key-32byte".to_vec());
let codec =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"test-key-test-key-test-key-32byte".to_vec()).unwrap();
let sealed = codec.seal(b"hello world");
assert!(sealed.starts_with("rs1."));
assert_eq!(codec.open(&sealed).unwrap(), b"hello world");
@ -380,7 +458,8 @@ mod tests {
tool: String,
round: u32,
}
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"another-strong-signing-key-here!!".to_vec());
let codec =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"another-strong-signing-key-here!!".to_vec()).unwrap();
let state = State {
tool: "weather".into(),
round: 3,
@ -392,14 +471,16 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn empty_payload_roundtrips() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"k".to_vec());
let codec =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"empty-payload-test-signing-key!!".to_vec()).unwrap();
let sealed = codec.seal(b"");
assert_eq!(codec.open(&sealed).unwrap(), b"");
}
#[test]
fn tampered_payload_is_rejected() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"signing-key-signing-key-signing!!".to_vec());
let codec =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"signing-key-signing-key-signing!!".to_vec()).unwrap();
let sealed = codec.seal(b"amount=100");
// Replace the body section but keep the original tag.
@ -416,8 +497,10 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn different_key_is_rejected() {
let signer = RequestStateCodec::new(b"the-real-signing-key-value-here!!".to_vec());
let attacker = RequestStateCodec::new(b"a-totally-different-forged-key!!!".to_vec());
let signer =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"the-real-signing-key-value-here!!".to_vec()).unwrap();
let attacker =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"a-totally-different-forged-key!!!".to_vec()).unwrap();
let sealed = signer.seal(b"trusted");
assert!(matches!(
attacker.open(&sealed),
@ -427,7 +510,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn appended_bytes_are_rejected() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"key-key-key-key-key-key-key-key!!".to_vec());
let codec =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"key-key-key-key-key-key-key-key!!".to_vec()).unwrap();
let mut sealed = codec.seal(b"state");
sealed.push('x');
assert!(codec.open(&sealed).is_err());
@ -435,7 +519,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn wrong_version_prefix_is_malformed() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"key".to_vec());
let codec =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"wrong-version-test-signing-key!!".to_vec()).unwrap();
let sealed = codec.seal(b"state");
let bumped = sealed.replacen("rs1.", "rs2.", 1);
assert!(matches!(
@ -446,7 +531,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn missing_sections_are_malformed() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"key".to_vec());
let codec =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"missing-sections-test-signing-key".to_vec()).unwrap();
assert!(matches!(
codec.open("rs1"),
Err(RequestStateError::MalformedFormat)
@ -463,7 +549,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn non_base64_sections_are_invalid_encoding() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"key".to_vec());
let codec =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"invalid-base64-test-signing-key!!".to_vec()).unwrap();
assert!(matches!(
codec.open("rs1.!!!!.!!!!"),
Err(RequestStateError::InvalidEncoding)
@ -472,7 +559,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn debug_does_not_leak_key() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"super-secret-key".to_vec());
let codec =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"super-secret-key-super-secret-key!!".to_vec()).unwrap();
let rendered = format!("{codec:?}");
assert!(!rendered.contains("super-secret-key"));
assert!(rendered.contains("redacted"));
@ -483,7 +571,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn matching_context_opens() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"key-key-key-key-key-key-key-key!!".to_vec());
let codec =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"key-key-key-key-key-key-key-key!!".to_vec()).unwrap();
let ctx = b"user:alice|tools/call:weather";
let sealed = codec.seal_with(b"state", &SealOptions::new().associated_data(ctx));
assert_eq!(codec.open_with(&sealed, ctx).unwrap(), b"state");
@ -491,7 +580,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn different_context_is_rejected() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"key-key-key-key-key-key-key-key!!".to_vec());
let codec =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"key-key-key-key-key-key-key-key!!".to_vec()).unwrap();
let sealed =
codec.seal_with(b"state", &SealOptions::new().associated_data(b"user:alice"));
assert!(matches!(
@ -502,7 +592,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn missing_context_is_rejected() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(b"key-key-key-key-key-key-key-key!!".to_vec());
let codec =
RequestStateCodec::try_new(b"key-key-key-key-key-key-key-key!!".to_vec()).unwrap();
let sealed =
codec.seal_with(b"state", &SealOptions::new().associated_data(b"user:alice"));
// Opening without the associated data must fail closed.
@ -520,7 +611,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn within_ttl_opens() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(KEY.to_vec());
let codec = RequestStateCodec::try_new(KEY.to_vec()).unwrap();
let sealed = codec.seal_at(
b"state",
&SealOptions::new().ttl(Duration::from_secs(60)),
@ -532,7 +623,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn past_ttl_is_expired() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(KEY.to_vec());
let codec = RequestStateCodec::try_new(KEY.to_vec()).unwrap();
let sealed = codec.seal_at(
b"state",
&SealOptions::new().ttl(Duration::from_secs(60)),
@ -547,14 +638,14 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn no_ttl_never_expires() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(KEY.to_vec());
let codec = RequestStateCodec::try_new(KEY.to_vec()).unwrap();
let sealed = codec.seal_at(b"state", &SealOptions::new(), 1_000);
assert_eq!(codec.open_at(&sealed, &[], i64::MAX).unwrap(), b"state");
}
#[test]
fn ttl_and_associated_data_combine() {
let codec = RequestStateCodec::new(KEY.to_vec());
let codec = RequestStateCodec::try_new(KEY.to_vec()).unwrap();
let ctx = b"user:alice";
let sealed = codec.seal_at(
b"state",

72
crates/rmcp/src/transport/auth.rs
View file

@ -914,7 +914,7 @@ impl JwtSigningAlgorithm {
/// This supports two authentication methods:
/// - `ClientSecret`: credentials sent in the request body
/// - `PrivateKeyJwt`: RFC 7523 signed JWT assertion (requires `auth-client-credentials-jwt` feature)
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[derive(Clone)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum ClientCredentialsConfig {
/// Client secret authentication (credentials in request body)
@ -937,6 +937,42 @@ pub enum ClientCredentialsConfig {
},
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for ClientCredentialsConfig {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match self {
Self::ClientSecret {
client_id,
scopes,
resource,
..
} => f
.debug_struct("ClientSecret")
.field("client_id", client_id)
.field("client_secret", &"<redacted>")
.field("scopes", scopes)
.field("resource", resource)
.finish(),
#[cfg(feature = "auth-client-credentials-jwt")]
Self::PrivateKeyJwt {
client_id,
signing_algorithm,
token_endpoint_audience,
scopes,
resource,
..
} => f
.debug_struct("PrivateKeyJwt")
.field("client_id", client_id)
.field("signing_key", &"<redacted>")
.field("signing_algorithm", signing_algorithm)
.field("token_endpoint_audience", token_endpoint_audience)
.field("scopes", scopes)
.field("resource", resource)
.finish(),
}
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "auth-client-credentials-jwt")]
fn client_authentication_audience<'a>(
metadata: &'a AuthorizationMetadata,
@ -7501,6 +7537,40 @@ mod tests {
assert!(matches!(oauth_client.auth_type(), AuthType::RequestBody));
}
#[test]
fn client_secret_credentials_debug_redacts_secret() {
let config = super::ClientCredentialsConfig::ClientSecret {
client_id: "client-id".to_string(),
client_secret: "client-secret-value".to_string(),
scopes: vec![],
resource: None,
};
let rendered = format!("{config:?}");
assert!(!rendered.contains("client-secret-value"), "{rendered}");
}
#[cfg(feature = "auth-client-credentials-jwt")]
#[test]
fn private_key_jwt_credentials_debug_redacts_signing_key() {
let config = super::ClientCredentialsConfig::PrivateKeyJwt {
client_id: "client-id".to_string(),
signing_key: b"private-signing-key-value".to_vec(),
signing_algorithm: super::JwtSigningAlgorithm::RS256,
token_endpoint_audience: None,
scopes: vec![],
resource: None,
};
let rendered = format!("{config:?}");
assert!(
!rendered.contains("private-signing-key-value"),
"{rendered}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn configure_client_credentials_sets_correct_client_id() {
let mut mgr = manager_with_metadata(None).await;

8
crates/rmcp/tests/test_mrtr_behavior.rs
View file

@ -594,11 +594,15 @@ async fn request_state_codec_seals_and_verifies_through_the_loop() -> anyhow::Re
use rmcp::model::RequestStateCodec;
// A shared per-process signing key, mirroring how a real server would derive one.
static KEY: &[u8] = b"integration-signing-key-32-bytes!";
const KEY: &[u8] = b"integration-signing-key-32-bytes!";
const _: () = assert!(
KEY.len() >= RequestStateCodec::MIN_KEY_LENGTH,
"KEY is shorter than RequestStateCodec::MIN_KEY_LENGTH",
);
fn codec() -> &'static RequestStateCodec {
static CODEC: OnceLock<RequestStateCodec> = OnceLock::new();
CODEC.get_or_init(|| RequestStateCodec::new(KEY))
CODEC.get_or_init(|| RequestStateCodec::new_unchecked(KEY))
}
#[derive(Clone, Default)]

21
examples/servers/src/mrtr.rs
View file

@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ use rmcp::{
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_json::json;
/// A stable, high-entropy secret. In a real deployment, load this from your
/// secret manager and keep it out of clients' reach. It must stay constant for
/// A fixed key for this example. Real deployments should load at least 32 bytes
/// of random secret key material from a secret manager and keep it stable for
/// the lifetime of any in-flight MRTR exchange.
const REQUEST_STATE_KEY: &[u8] = b"example-request-state-signing-key-32b!";
@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ struct WeatherServer {
codec: RequestStateCodec,
}
impl Default for WeatherServer {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
codec: RequestStateCodec::new(REQUEST_STATE_KEY),
}
impl WeatherServer {
fn new(key: impl Into<Vec<u8>>) -> Result<Self, RequestStateError> {
Ok(Self {
codec: RequestStateCodec::try_new(key)?,
})
}
}
@ -197,10 +197,11 @@ impl ClientHandler for InteractiveClient {
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let (server_transport, client_transport) = tokio::io::duplex(8192);
let server = WeatherServer::new(REQUEST_STATE_KEY)?;
// Spin up the server side.
tokio::spawn(async move {
let server = WeatherServer::default()
let server = server
.serve(server_transport)
.await
.expect("server should start");
@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
});
// Connect the client (this performs the initialize handshake).
let client = InteractiveClient::default().serve(client_transport).await?;
let client = InteractiveClient.serve(client_transport).await?;
// 1. High-level auto mode: the SDK fulfils the elicitation and retries for us.
println!("== auto mode (call_tool) ==");
@ -316,7 +317,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn open_request_state_rejects_unknown_phase() {
let server = WeatherServer::default();
let server = WeatherServer::new(REQUEST_STATE_KEY).unwrap();
let sealed = server
.codec
.seal_json(&json!({ "awaiting": "country" }))