--- shape: how-to description: 'Sign an end user in from a client you build with the OAuth authorization-code flow.' --- # Authenticate a user with OAuth Protecting a server you run → [Require authorization](../serving/authorization.md). Signing a user in from a client → this page. No user present → [Authenticate without a user](./machine-auth.md). ## Hand the transport an OAuth provider Pass an **`OAuthClientProvider`** as the transport's `authProvider` — it, and every other symbol on this page, comes from `@modelcontextprotocol/client`. ```ts source="../../examples/guides/clients/oauth.examples.ts#authProvider_connect" const provider = new MyOAuthProvider(); const client = new Client({ name: 'my-app', version: '1.0.0' }); const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(new URL('https://api.example.com/mcp'), { authProvider: provider }); try { await client.connect(transport); } catch (error) { if (!(error instanceof UnauthorizedError)) throw error; // The transport already called provider.redirectToAuthorization(url): // the end user is in the browser, at the authorization server. } ``` When the server requires authorization and the provider has no token, the SDK runs discovery against the server, registers (or looks up) your OAuth client, calls the provider's `redirectToAuthorization(url)`, and `connect()` throws `UnauthorizedError`. The end user finishes signing in out of band; your callback endpoint picks the flow back up below. ::: info With protocol-version negotiation in play (`versionNegotiation: { mode: 'auto' }` or a pin), the connect-time `UnauthorizedError` propagates unchanged from `connect()` — the same `instanceof` check works in every mode (older releases wrapped it as an `SdkError` with the error at `error.data.cause`). See [Protocol versions](../protocol-versions.md). ::: ## Implement OAuthClientProvider The provider is the storage and redirect surface the SDK drives: client registrations, tokens, the PKCE verifier, discovery state, and the browser hand-off. Key client credentials by `ctx.issuer` so a `client_id` registered with one authorization server is never sent to another. ```ts source="../../examples/guides/clients/oauth.examples.ts#MyOAuthProvider_class" class MyOAuthProvider implements OAuthClientProvider { // Key DCR-obtained credentials by issuer so a client_id registered with one // authorization server is never returned for another (SEP-2352). private creds = new Map(); private storedTokens?: OAuthTokens; private verifier?: string; private discovery?: OAuthDiscoveryState; lastState?: string; readonly redirectUrl = 'http://localhost:8090/callback'; readonly clientMetadata: OAuthClientMetadata = { client_name: 'My MCP Client', redirect_uris: ['http://localhost:8090/callback'], // Loopback redirect → the SDK would default this to 'native'; set // explicitly when the heuristic is wrong for your deployment (SEP-837). application_type: 'native' }; clientInformation(ctx?: OAuthClientInformationContext) { return ctx ? this.creds.get(ctx.issuer) : undefined; } saveClientInformation(info: OAuthClientInformationMixed, ctx?: OAuthClientInformationContext) { if (ctx) this.creds.set(ctx.issuer, info); } tokens() { return this.storedTokens; } saveTokens(tokens: OAuthTokens) { // In production, persist to OS keychain / secure storage — never plain files. this.storedTokens = tokens; } // CSRF binding for the redirect — the SDK puts this on the authorize URL; // your callback handler compares it before calling `finishAuth`. state() { this.lastState = crypto.randomUUID(); return this.lastState; } // Callback-leg AS-binding (SEP-2352): record what discovery resolved before // the redirect so the SDK can verify the code is exchanged at the same AS. saveDiscoveryState(state: OAuthDiscoveryState) { this.discovery = state; } discoveryState() { return this.discovery; } redirectToAuthorization(url: URL) { onRedirect(url); } saveCodeVerifier(v: string) { this.verifier = v; } codeVerifier() { if (!this.verifier) throw new Error('no code verifier'); return this.verifier; } } ``` The SDK calls the `save*` methods as the flow produces values and reads them back through `tokens()`, `clientInformation()`, `codeVerifier()`, and `discoveryState()`. On a later `connect()` it reads `tokens()` before anything else, so a provider backed by durable storage skips the browser round trip. ## Finish the flow from the callback The authorization server redirects the end user to `redirectUrl` with `code` and `state` in the query. Compare `state`, hand the whole query to `finishAuth`, and reconnect. ```ts source="../../examples/guides/clients/oauth.examples.ts#finishAuth_callback" const callbackUrl = await waitForCallback(); // however your app receives the redirect const params = new URL(callbackUrl).searchParams; // The SDK does not validate `state` — compare it to the value your provider generated. if (params.get('state') !== provider.lastState) throw new Error('state mismatch'); await transport.finishAuth(params); // Reconnect on a FRESH transport — a started transport cannot be restarted. // OAuth state (tokens, verifier, discovery) lives on the provider, not the transport. await client.connect(new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(url, { authProvider: provider })); ``` `finishAuth(params)` extracts `code`, validates the RFC 9207 `iss` parameter, exchanges the code at the authorization server discovery resolved before the redirect, and saves the tokens through your provider. The second `connect()` finds those tokens and completes without another redirect. ::: tip `finishAuth` also takes a positional form, `finishAuth(code, iss)`. Pass the `URLSearchParams` instead: the SDK reads both values from it, and a positional call that drops `iss` is rejected when the authorization server advertises RFC 9207 support. ::: ## Handle issuer mismatch `finishAuth` throws **`IssuerMismatchError`** when the callback's `iss` does not match the issuer the flow started with. ```ts source="../../examples/guides/clients/oauth.examples.ts#finishAuth_issuerMismatch" try { await transport.finishAuth(params); } catch (error) { if (error instanceof IssuerMismatchError) { // Mix-up attack: never render params.get('error_description') to the user. throw new Error('Authorization failed: issuer mismatch'); } throw error; } ``` The error's `kind` is `'authorization_response'` here; the same check runs during discovery against the authorization server's published `issuer` (RFC 8414 §3.3) and throws with `kind: 'metadata'`. ::: warning A mismatch means the callback came from an authorization server you did not start the flow with — a mix-up attack. The callback's `error` and `error_description` are attacker-controlled: never render them. The transport's `skipIssuerMetadataValidation` option disables the discovery-leg check; leave it off unless you control the server. ::: ## Pin the resource indicator The SDK binds tokens to your server with the RFC 8707 `resource` parameter: when the server publishes protected resource metadata (RFC 9728), the SDK checks the metadata's `resource` against the server URL and attaches it to the authorization redirect and every token request. Override `validateResourceURL` to force the value — return the URL to send, or `undefined` to omit the parameter. ```ts source="../../examples/guides/clients/oauth.examples.ts#validateResourceURL_pin" class PinnedResourceProvider extends MyOAuthProvider { async validateResourceURL(serverUrl: string | URL, resource?: string): Promise { const expected = resourceUrlFromServerUrl(serverUrl); // strips the fragment (RFC 8707 §2) if (resource && !checkResourceAllowed({ requestedResource: expected, configuredResource: resource })) { throw new Error(`Refusing resource ${resource} for server ${expected.href}`); } return expected; } } ``` `PinnedResourceProvider` sends the server's own URL as `resource` on every leg of the flow and refuses metadata that names a different one. `checkResourceAllowed` and `resourceUrlFromServerUrl` are exported for exactly this override. ## Recap - This page signs in an end user; machine-to-machine flows live on [Authenticate without a user](./machine-auth.md). - Pass an `OAuthClientProvider` as the transport's `authProvider`; `connect()` throws `UnauthorizedError` after sending the user to the authorization server. - `finishAuth(params)` with the whole callback query validates `iss` (RFC 9207) and exchanges the code. - Reconnect on a fresh transport; OAuth state lives on the provider, not the transport. - `IssuerMismatchError` is the mix-up defense — never render the callback's `error_description`. - `validateResourceURL` overrides the RFC 8707 `resource` parameter the SDK sends.