George Lambert
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Cure53 Berlin 2019 and ROS Amsterdam 2024 are pentests, not HIPAA/SOC2/ISO certificates. BAA/DPA guidance for ciphertext-at-rest on cryptree+IPFS.
85 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
85 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
# BAAs and DPAs when ciphertext has no host keys
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This is **guidance for an evidence pack**, not legal advice.
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## The operator statement
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Data at rest lives in the **encrypted Peergos cryptree**. Restore uses
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**distributed, hash-verified, encrypted IPFS blocks**. Hosts and backup
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media see **opaque blobs** (and random CHAMP labels), not filenames, not
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PHI, not social graph — if keys never leave the client / customer HSM.
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That is **true of the Peergos design** (see `PEERGOS-VERIFICATION.md`).
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It **changes the BAA/DPA conversation**. It does **not** auto-delete the
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need for contracts.
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## HIPAA (US) — Business Associate
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A Business Associate is a person who **creates, receives, maintains, or
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transmits ePHI** for a covered entity.
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**Technical argument you can make (and should document):**
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1. ePHI is encrypted **before** it leaves the endpoint (Peergos client /
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DataCube writer).
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2. The storage node, IPFS, disk, and backup hold **ciphertext + hashes**.
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3. Private keys **do not** reside on the storage host (customer HSM /
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client). Hash verification detects tampering.
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4. Therefore the host **cannot maintain ePHI in intelligible form**.
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HHS has long distinguished **conduits** and parties that never have
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access to ePHI. Many security programs still **sign a BAA anyway** when
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a vendor touches infrastructure, because:
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- misconfiguration could later expose keys or plaintext logs;
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- support staff might be asked to handle a decrypted export;
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- OCR looks at **your** risk analysis, not only crypto papers.
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**Practical pack:** risk analysis memo citing cryptree + IPFS hash
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checks + key custody (`HSM-CUSTODY` in system-git-sync); BAA **or**
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written determination that the vendor is **not** a BA because they
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cannot decrypt; list every party with disk/backup (ns1, IPFS cluster,
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offsite replica).
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## GDPR (EU/UK) — processor vs technical measure
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Encrypted data can still be **personal data** if it is reasonably
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attributable (usernames, IPs, invoice identity). GDPR **Art. 32**
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explicitly lists encryption as a security measure.
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**Technical argument:**
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- Peergos is designed so the **server is an adversary** for content and
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most metadata.
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- EU-based **independent pentests** (Cure53 DE, ROS NL) evaluated that
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design.
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- Processing location for **self-host** is *your* ns1 / customer region,
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not peergos.net’s Germany hosting, unless you use peergos.net.
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You may still need a **DPA (Art. 28)** with anyone who **processes**
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personal data (even usernames, logs, billing). Ciphertext-only storage
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**narrows** the DPA’s technical annex (they never see PHI bodies) but
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rarely deletes the contract if they run the VM.
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## NATS operators
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NATS is an **untrusted broker**. Content is HPKE; destinations and
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subjects are in the clear. A NATS operator:
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- **cannot** read message bodies if they lack endpoint private keys;
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- **can** see routing metadata (who talks to which inbox, sizes, timing);
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- **can** drop/delay/copy **ciphertext**.
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Treat NATS like a **transit provider**: DPA/BAA depends on whether
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routing metadata is personal data in your jurisdiction. Document
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passthrough + HPKE in the data-flow diagram.
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## What “making yourself audit-ready” means here
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You are **not** buying Peergos’s Cure53/ROS reports as *your* SOC 2.
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You are **reusing** those public evaluations as **vendor/component
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assurance** (like using an audited TLS library), then adding:
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- your scope, RoPA, key-custody, inspect k-of-n, admin-history;
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- evidence *your* instance ran those controls;
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- contracts that match who can actually see plaintext.
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