* Add DPoP client conformance scenario + shared DPoP helpers (SEP-1932, #368)
Client-anchored packaging: carries the shared DPoP foundation (dpopProof /
dpopToken helpers, the createAuthServer DPoP core, and sep-1932.yaml) together
with the client scenario, so it can merge first; the server (#369) and
authorization-server (#370) scenarios are follow-ups that depend on it.
DPoP is treated as a draft/not-yet-official feature (mirroring the WIF SEP-1933
scenario): the scenario's source is `introducedIn: DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION` and
it is registered in draftScenariosList (informational, not scored). It is NOT
registered in EXTENSION_IDS, since the ext-auth DPoP extension is still on a
branch rather than merged.
Client checks (the two extension MUSTs, RFC 9449 §7.1 / §4.2-4.3):
- sep-1932-client-dpop-auth-scheme — token presented with the DPoP scheme.
- sep-1932-client-fresh-proof — a fresh, well-formed DPoP proof per request.
The test MCP server judges the client via an opt-in DPoP middleware
(dpopResourceAuth) passed through createServer's authMiddleware hook; a compliant
example client (covered by the Client Draft Scenarios loop) plus deliberately-
broken bearer/replay variants drive the pass/fail acceptance tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* client/dpop: split into nonce-less baseline + nonce-required scenario
Server-provided nonces are optional in RFC 9449 (AS §8 "MAY", RS §9 "can
also choose"), and the nonce-less flow is the common case. The single
auth/dpop scenario hard-wired nonce enforcement on both the test AS and
MCP server, so a plain nonce-less proof was never accepted end-to-end and
a client that only does plain proofs was never exercised on its happy path.
Parameterize DPoPClientScenario with `requireNonce` and register it twice:
- auth/dpop (requireNonce=false) — nonce-less baseline; emits the
three baseline checks (token-request-proof, dpop-auth-scheme, fresh-proof).
- auth/dpop-nonce (requireNonce=true) — prior behavior; adds as-nonce and
rs-nonce (five checks).
Check IDs are reused (no new IDs, no sep-1932.yaml change); the two nonce
checks are emitted only by auth/dpop-nonce, so traceability stays intact.
Add auth-test-dpop-no-nonce.ts (nonce-incapable but otherwise compliant)
asserting SUCCESS against auth/dpop — proof that a client with no nonce
handling still completes DPoP when the server does not require a nonce.
Baseline negatives stay on auth/dpop (nonce-independent); the two nonce
negatives are re-pointed to auth/dpop-nonce.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* client/dpop: round-4 nonce-surface correctness fixes
Address review findings on the auth/dpop-nonce posture:
- Record the token-request proof observation BEFORE the §8 nonce challenge,
so a client that is challenged but does not retry is no longer mis-reported
by token-request-proof as "never completed a token request" (its proof was
just validated). (#2)
- Record the resource-request jti/replay on ANY valid proof (before the §9
nonce gate), so fresh-proof is never asserted on zero evidence and a client
that never honours the RS nonce fails ONLY rs-nonce. (#5)
- Require challengeIssued && honored for as-nonce/rs-nonce SUCCESS, closing a
vacuous-pass path (a client that pre-sends the nonce is never challenged). (#3a)
- Gate the AS nonce observation on the authorization_code exchange, matching
recordTokenRequestProof (a refresh exchange must not satisfy §8). (#3c)
- Collapse duplicate shared token-flow check IDs (token-request, pkce-*) that
the §8 round-trip re-POST would otherwise emit twice. (#4)
- Example client: retry the token request only on a use_dpop_nonce error code,
not any 400 carrying a DPoP-Nonce header (consistent with the RS path). (#6)
- Fix the DpopTokenRequestObservation docstring ("last write wins" →
sticky-failure). (#7)
Adds an expectedSuccessSlugs option to the client test helper and tightens the
two nonce negative tests to pin the now-clean behavior (token-request-proof
SUCCESS for no-as-nonce; only rs-nonce fails for no-rs-nonce).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* client/dpop: round-5 fixes — dedupe masking, wording, replay decision
- dedupeSharedChecks was masking failures: it kept the last occurrence of a
duplicate check ID regardless of status and ran in BOTH postures, so a
FAILURE on a challenged POST (or an earlier attempt in a restarted flow) was
silently dropped. Replace with an exported, unit-tested collapseDuplicateChecks
that prefers the MOST-SEVERE occurrence, and only apply it in the nonce
posture (the baseline keeps genuinely distinct repeated attempts). (R5 #1)
- Reword the token-request-proof description: it can be SUCCESS for a client
that presented a valid proof but never obtained a token (challenged, no
retry), so it no longer claims "obtaining a DPoP-bound access token". (R5 #2)
- Reword the as-nonce/rs-nonce failure messages to cover a client that DID
retry but whose retry proof was rejected (not only "did not retry"). (R5 #3)
- Document the deliberate replay decision: recording jti on challenged requests
means re-sending the identical proof across the challenge/retry boundary trips
replay detection — a genuine RFC 9449 §4.2 jti-uniqueness violation. (R5 #5)
Adds src/scenarios/client/auth/dpop.test.ts unit-testing collapseDuplicateChecks
(prefers failures, keeps INFO, preserves order) — the dedupe fix is now pinned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* client/dpop: round-6 polish — pin collapse wiring; docstring
- Add an integration assertion that the §8/§9 double-POST is collapsed to one
token-request/pkce-* entry each in auth/dpop-nonce, so the requireNonce gating
of collapseDuplicateChecks can't be silently deleted or inverted (previously
mutation-survivable). runClientAgainstScenario now returns the emitted checks
so callers can make occurrence-level assertions (backward-compatible).
- Docstring: note the severity ladder ranks SKIPPED below SUCCESS, and that
equal-severity ties keep the last occurrence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): add JWT-bearer helper for WIF client conformance (SEP-1933)
Adds createWorkloadJwt and generateWorkloadKeypair to provide reusable,
tested JWT signing infrastructure for the upcoming wif-jwt-bearer scenario
(PR #2). Also extracts JWT_BEARER_GRANT_TYPE constant and migrates
cross-app-access.ts to use it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): add JWT-bearer helper for WIF client conformance (SEP-1933)
Adds createWorkloadJwt and generateWorkloadKeypair to provide reusable,
tested JWT signing infrastructure for the upcoming wif-jwt-bearer scenario
(PR #2). Also extracts JWT_BEARER_GRANT_TYPE constant and migrates
cross-app-access.ts to use it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): add WIF JWT-bearer scenario and negative tests (SEP-1933)
Adds the auth/wif-jwt-bearer client conformance scenario using the RFC 7523
JWT-bearer grant (urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer).
The scenario pre-signs valid, wrong-audience, and expired JWTs on start()
to simulate cloud workload identity tokens. The conformance AS verifies the
assertion and emits per-class checks (wif-assertion-verified,
wif-assertion-missing, wif-assertion-audience, wif-assertion-expired,
wif-assertion-malformed). Broken example clients exercise the missing-assertion
and wrong-audience failure paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: apply prettier formatting to wif-jwt-bearer.ts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): add expired-assertion negative test; clarify wif-jwt-bearer comments
- Add runWifJwtBearerExpiredAssertion + auth-test-wif-expired-assertion.ts
to exercise the wif-assertion-expired check path (was dead code)
- Clarify WifAssertionVerified description to note iss is not validated
- Add comment explaining clockTolerance: 5 is intentional (same-run keypair)
- Add comment explaining numeric expiresIn is absolute epoch seconds
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(wif-jwt-bearer): disable DCR, detect retries, improve getChecks description
- Add WIF_CLIENT_ID constant; pre-seed provider's clientInformation() so
the SDK skips Dynamic Client Registration entirely (disableDynamicRegistration
on the auth server + pre-seeded client_id on the provider side)
- Add failedOnce/tokenRequestReceived tracking on the scenario; reject and
record wif-no-retry FAILURE if the client attempts a second token request
after the first fails
- Add hasAttempted guard in WifJwtBearerProvider.prepareTokenRequest() to
throw on retry from the client side
- Fix getChecks() sentinel description: distinguish "no request made" from
"request made but verification failed"
- Add client_id to context and Zod schema
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: prettier formatting on everything-client.ts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(wif-jwt-bearer): let errors propagate from broken example clients
The try/catch blocks were silently swallowing auth failures, so the
negative tests passed purely because expectedFailureSlugs found the
AS-emitted check — not because client error-surfacing was verified.
allowClientError: true on the test cases handles the non-zero exit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(wif-jwt-bearer): tag as draft, add scope-rejected check, add SEP traceability
- Change specVersions from ['extension'] to [DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION] and add
source = { introducedIn: DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION } so the scenario is
reachable via --spec-version draft (extension tag excluded it from all
spec-version runs)
- Move registration from extensionScenariosList to draftScenariosList in
index.ts to match the tag/list convention enforced by spec-version.test.ts
- Add wif-assertion-scope-rejected check: AS returns invalid_scope for a
valid JWT when the client requests the reserved 'wif.rejected' scope;
verify client surfaces the error and does not retry
- Add runWifJwtBearerScopeRejected to everything-client.ts; add optional
scope param to WifJwtBearerProvider; add CLI entry point and vitest case
- Add src/seps/sep-1933.yaml with requirements mapped to each check ID,
covering the three deferred checks (iss, sub, jti) with exclusion rationale
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: prettier formatting
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(wif-jwt-bearer): add wif-grant-fallback check for unauthorized_client fallback
Client bug class: WIF client receives unauthorized_client from JWT-bearer grant
and silently switches to authorization_code instead of surfacing the error.
The MCP SDK retries after UnauthorizedClientError (auth.js:152-154), calling
prepareTokenRequest() a second time. WifGrantFallbackProvider exploits this by
returning authorization_code params on the second call.
Spec anchor: RFC 7523 §2.1 — clients MUST use the JWT-bearer grant type;
silent grant-type switching hides authentication failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: rename unused scope param in WifGrantFallbackProvider
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(wif-jwt-bearer): use realistic SPIFFE and K8s PSAT token formats
valid_jwt uses a SPIFFE JWT-SVID subject (spiffe://conformance-test.local/...)
issued by a SPIRE-style issuer. wrong_audience_jwt uses a Kubernetes PSAT
subject and kubernetes.io claims, mirroring how K8s projected service-account
tokens look in production. Token verification and client behaviour are
unchanged; the formats ground the scenario in real workload identity platforms.
k8s_issuer and k8s_subject added to context and schema for external clients
that want to construct their own K8s-style assertions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: prettier formatting on wif-jwt-bearer.ts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(wif-jwt-bearer): drop informational k8s_issuer/k8s_subject from context
These fields were not used by any client handler and are redundant since
the K8s claims are already baked into wrong_audience_jwt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(wif-jwt-bearer): address pre-merge review feedback
- Downgrade wif-no-retry, wif-grant-fallback, and wif-assertion-scope-rejected
to WARNING; RFC 7523 is silent on client retry and grant-type switching, so
FAILURE status was not traceable to spec text
- Add WifRetryProvider broken client that re-sends JWT-bearer after
unauthorized_client, making wif-no-retry actually exercisable as a WARNING
- Drop getChecks() sentinel (non-standard pattern that overloaded the
wif-assertion-verified check ID); test harness detects empty check sets
- Add comment on DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION workaround for runner limitation
- Add comment explaining why both slash/no-slash audience forms are accepted
- Tighten schema comments for audience URL constraint and ES256 literal
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(wif-jwt-bearer): drop decorative fields and neutralise JWT fixtures
- Remove issuer and subject from context schema and scenario return value;
neither is validated by the AS or used by the client, making them
misleading. The iss exclusion rationale is updated to explain why.
- Replace SPIFFE/K8s-PSAT constants and the kubernetes.io additionalClaims
with neutral values across all three JWT fixtures; no check inspects
token format, so format flavour was decorative and invited false
assumptions about fixture semantics.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(wif-jwt-bearer): remove workaround comment, drop signing_algorithm, annotate retry provider
- Remove self-admitted workaround comment on DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION; the
classification stands on its own and the comment was inviting challenge
- Drop signing_algorithm from context schema and scenario return; the field
was redundant once the value was fixed to ES256, and the assertion is opaque
to the client regardless
- Add comment to WifRetryProvider explaining it deliberately omits the
hasAttempted guard so the SDK retry reaches the AS
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(wif-jwt-bearer): export scope constants, remove unused AS field, annotate state machine
- Export WIF_TRIGGER_UNAUTHORIZED_SCOPE and WIF_REJECTED_SCOPE from
createWorkloadJwt.ts and import them in everything-client.ts; removes
duplicate bare-string declarations that could silently diverge
- Remove tokenEndpointAuthSigningAlgValuesSupported from mock AS config;
the SDK does not consume this field in the JWT-bearer flow
- Add comment to onTokenRequest clarifying wif-no-retry and wif-grant-fallback
fire on any second request after any failure, not only post-unauthorized_client
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(wif-jwt-bearer): address pcarleton review comments
- Move all broken WIF provider classes and runners to wif-broken-clients.ts;
everything-client.ts now contains only the conformant WifJwtBearerProvider
- Add sentinel in getChecks() for !tokenRequestReceived to prevent a silent
pass when the client never sends a request
- Drop wif-assertion-scope-rejected check; the no-retry behaviour after
invalid_scope is already covered by wif-no-retry, and sep-1933.yaml updated
accordingly
- Remove audience from context schema and scenario return; the field was
unused by any client implementation
- Expand scenario description to tell a client implementer what to implement
- Apply suggested description fix to wif-grant-fallback (does not assume
unauthorized_client was the specific error that preceded the fallback)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(wif-jwt-bearer): drop number type from expiresIn, use jose duration strings
Jose supports negative duration strings ('-60s', '60 seconds ago') that produce
already-expired tokens without needing absolute epoch arithmetic. Drop the
number overload, update the expired_jwt call site to '-60s', and update the
unit test accordingly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: split draft-spec scenarios into their own suite
- add --suite draft to the server command, selecting scenarios whose
source.introducedIn is the draft protocol version
- exclude draft scenarios from the default active suite until the draft
spec is published as a dated release
- derive the client command's draft suite from source.introducedIn so the
non-auth draft scenarios (SEP-2243/2575/2322/2106) are included alongside
the auth ones
- keep everything-server self-test coverage for draft scenarios in
all-scenarios.test.ts (active + non-pending draft)
- document available suites in the README and add suite-membership tests
* fix: repair broken specReferences URLs
- SEP-986: SEP/SEP-986.md no longer exists in the spec repo; point at the
Tool Names section of the published 2025-11-25 tools page instead
- SEP-990: the ext-auth spec file is enterprise-managed-authorization.mdx,
not enterprise-oauth.mdx
Fixes#313
* feat: add conformance tests for iss parameter (SEP-2468)
Adds 5 draft conformance scenarios testing RFC 9207 issuer parameter
validation in OAuth authorization responses:
- auth/iss-supported: server advertises support and sends correct iss
- auth/iss-not-advertised: server omits iss parameter entirely
- auth/iss-supported-missing: client must reject missing iss when required
- auth/iss-wrong-issuer: client must reject mismatched iss value
- auth/iss-unexpected: client must reject iss when not advertised
Also adds auth-test-iss-validation.ts, a reference client that correctly
validates iss per RFC 9207, and negative tests confirming the standard
client fails all three rejection scenarios.
TODO: Update RFC_9207_ISS_PARAMETER spec reference once SEP-2468
(modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol#2468) is merged.
* update scenarios
* fix: createAuthServer iss option type/guard and NotAdvertised scenario duplication
The doc comments said 'Default: not included' but the destructure defaulted
to true/'correct', and the `!== undefined` guard at L155 was unreachable —
so there was no way to omit the metadata field, and IssParameterNotAdvertised
silently advertised support (a duplicate of IssParameterSupported).
Kept the on-by-default behavior (mock AS models a well-behaved server) but
made issParameterSupported `boolean | null` so callers pass null to omit,
matching the codeChallengeMethodsSupported pattern. Doc comments now match.
Scenarios that need omission pass null/'omit' explicitly.
* fix: rejection scenarios silently pass when client never reaches auth endpoint
correctlyRejected = !tokenRequestMade reports SUCCESS if the client errors
out before hitting /authorize. Gate on authReached so a setup failure shows
as FAILURE with authReached:false in details.
* fix: iss-unexpected scenario contradicts SEP-2468 spec table row 3
The spec table says: supported=false/absent + iss present -> *Compare* to
the recorded issuer (not reject). The scenario sent a *correct* iss and
FAILed compliant clients for proceeding after a successful comparison.
Now sends a mismatched iss so the comparison fails and rejection is the
spec-required outcome. Reference client updated to compare-when-present
instead of throw-on-presence.
* refactor: replace harness-config checks with client-proceeded checks
iss-advertised-in-metadata / iss-sent-in-redirect (and the not-* variants)
fired in onAuthorizationRequest before the redirect happened, asserting only
that the harness was configured correctly — a client that ignores iss passes
identically. Replaced with one check per scenario keyed on tokenRequestMade,
which observes that the client actually proceeded through the iss path.
* refactor: rename check IDs to sep-2468-* and align with spec table rows
One ID per spec table row; auth/iss-supported and auth/iss-wrong-issuer
both emit sep-2468-client-compare-iss-supported (same comparison, opposite
input) per the same-slug-for-SUCCESS-and-FAIL convention.
* feat: add sep-2468.yaml requirement traceability
8 check rows (4 client table-row checks, 1 metadata-issuer, 2 AS-side,
1 no-normalization), 1 excluded (error-display is UI-facing). The
record-issuer MUST is merged into the compare-iss-supported row text
since it has no independent wire observation.
* fix: migrate iss scenarios specVersions->source (post-#265)
Replaces `specVersions: ['draft']` with `source: { introducedIn: DRAFT_PROTOCOL_VERSION }`
in the 5 iss-parameter scenarios.
This commit typechecks once the stack is rebased onto main >= #265 (the
ScenarioSource migration). Adding it now so the rebase is mechanical.
* fix: include application_type in iss-validation example DCR (post-#284)
The SEP-837 application_type check now runs in every auth scenario; the
hand-rolled DCR in auth-test-iss-validation.ts was omitting the field.
---------
Co-authored-by: Paul Carleton <paulc@anthropic.com>
* feat: add sep-2207 client checks
* Update description for the offline access test
Co-authored-by: Paul Carleton <paulcarletonjr@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Paul Carleton <paulcarletonjr@gmail.com>
* feat: add conformance tests for SEP-990
* Resolving review changes: Removed redundant tests, updated audience params
* fix: unused serverUrl parameter in runCrossAppAccessTokenExchange
* chore: apply prettier formatting
* fix: address PR review comments for SEP-990 conformance tests
- Delete unused separate token-exchange and jwt-bearer scenarios,
keeping only the complete e2e flow (review comment)
- Add missing required token exchange params per SEP-990 spec:
requested_token_type, audience, resource (review comment)
- Use ctx.idp_client_id for token exchange client_id instead of
AS client_id (review comment)
- Client discovers resource and auth server via PRM metadata
instead of receiving auth_server_url via context (review comment)
- Server IdP handler verifies all required token exchange params
with detailed error messages (review comment)
- Add resource, client_id, jti claims to ID-JAG per SEP-990 spec
- Verify ID-JAG typ header (oauth-id-jag+jwt) in JWT bearer handler
- Remove auth_server_url from context schema
* feat: add client auth and ID-JAG validation to XAA conformance test
Server-side (AS) now verifies:
- client_secret_basic authentication on JWT bearer grant
- ID-JAG typ header is oauth-id-jag+jwt
- ID-JAG client_id claim matches the authenticating client (Section 5.1)
- ID-JAG resource claim matches the MCP server resource identifier
- Client credentials provided via context (client_secret)
Server-side (IdP) now:
- Sets ID-JAG client_id to the MCP Client's AS client_id (not the
IdP client_id), per Section 6.1
Example client now:
- Authenticates to AS via client_secret_basic (Authorization: Basic)
instead of sending client_id in body
- Checks AS metadata grant_types_supported includes jwt-bearer
before attempting the flow
* fix: share MockTokenVerifier and remove unadvertised auth method
- Add shared MockTokenVerifier between AS and MCP server so the MCP
server only accepts tokens actually issued by the auth server,
matching the pattern used by all other auth scenarios
- Remove private_key_jwt from tokenEndpointAuthMethodsSupported since
the handler only implements client_secret_basic
---------
Co-authored-by: Paul Carleton <paulc@anthropic.com>
* feat: add resource parameter validation tests (RFC 8707)
Adds conformance tests for OAuth Resource Indicators (RFC 8707) implementation:
1. Resource parameter checks added to token-endpoint-auth-basic scenario:
- resource-parameter-in-authorization: Verify resource in auth request
- resource-parameter-in-token: Verify resource in token request
- resource-parameter-valid-uri: Verify valid canonical URI
- resource-parameter-consistency: Verify consistency between requests
2. New auth/resource-mismatch scenario:
- Tests that client rejects when PRM resource doesn't match server URL
- Server returns mismatched resource in PRM
- Test passes if client does NOT proceed with authorization
Also adds spec references for RFC 8707 and MCP resource parameter spec.
Closes#33
* fix: make resource consistency check a FAILURE and remove dead code
- Change resource parameter consistency from WARNING to FAILURE
- Remove unreachable protocol check in validateCanonicalUri
(URL constructor already validates scheme presence)
* feat: add PKCE conformance tests
Adds conformance checks for PKCE requirements from the MCP auth spec:
- pkce-code-challenge-sent: Verifies client sends code_challenge in auth request
- pkce-s256-method-used: Verifies client uses S256 code challenge method
- pkce-code-verifier-sent: Verifies client sends code_verifier in token request
- pkce-verifier-matches-challenge: Validates BASE64URL(SHA256(verifier)) = challenge
Also adds auth/pkce-no-s256-support scenario that tests clients correctly
refuse when S256 is not in code_challenge_methods_supported.
All PKCE checks are added to the createAuthServer helper, so they automatically
apply to all existing auth scenarios.
Fixes#77
* feat: add bad client example that skips PKCE
Adds auth-test-no-pkce.ts which implements a custom OAuth flow that
deliberately skips PKCE (no code_challenge in auth request, no
code_verifier in token request).
Also adds negative test to verify the conformance suite correctly
detects this non-compliant behavior.
* chore: skip pkce-no-s256-support scenario for now
* chore: fix formatting
* refactor: remove pkce-no-s256-support scenario and always validate PKCE
- Remove pkce-no-s256-support scenario (was skipped anyway)
- Make pkce-verifier-matches-challenge fail if either code_challenge
or code_verifier is missing, rather than only running when both present
- Update negative test to expect the new failure
* docs: add SDK integration guide and fix spec references
- Add SDK_INTEGRATION.md with guide for SDK maintainers on integrating conformance tests
- Link to guide from README.md
- Update spec references to use 2025-11-25 instead of draft URLs
* fix: prettier formatting and correct action version to v0.1.10
* feat: add pre-registration conformance test
Add conformance test for OAuth pre-registration flow where the server
does NOT support Dynamic Client Registration (DCR) and clients must
use pre-configured static credentials.
This addresses issue #34 (Client Registration Methods) - specifically
the pre-registration section that was previously not covered.
Changes:
- Add disableDynamicRegistration option to createAuthServer helper
- Add auth/pre-registration scenario with pre-registered client creds
- Add MCP_PREREGISTRATION spec reference
- Add context schema for pre-registration credentials
- Add withOAuthRetryWithProvider helper for pre-configured providers
- Add negative test client (auth-test-attempts-dcr.ts) that ignores
pre-registered credentials and fails
The scenario verifies that when a server does not advertise
registration_endpoint in its OAuth metadata, compliant clients
use pre-registered credentials passed via context instead of
attempting DCR.
Closes#34
* fix: add redirect_uris to saveClientInformation call
* chore: remove unused WithOAuthRetryOptions interface
* Add client credentials conformance scenarios with dynamic keypair generation
Implements SEP-1046 client credentials conformance tests:
- auth/client-credentials-jwt: Tests private_key_jwt authentication
- auth/client-credentials-basic: Tests client_secret_basic authentication
Key changes:
- Generate EC P-256 keypair dynamically at test start (no hardcoded keys)
- Pass credentials to client via MCP_CONFORMANCE_CONTEXT environment variable
- Add context field to ScenarioUrls interface for scenario-specific data
- Update client runner to pass context as env var to spawned client process
The MCP_CONFORMANCE_CONTEXT env var contains a JSON object with:
- client_id: The expected client identifier
- private_key_pem: PEM-encoded private key (for JWT scenarios)
- client_secret: Client secret (for basic auth scenarios)
- signing_algorithm: JWT signing algorithm (defaults to ES256)
* Fix client-credentials scenarios for conformance testing
- Generate EC keypair with extractable: true so private key can be
exported and passed to clients via MCP_CONFORMANCE_CONTEXT
- Fix client_secret_basic scenario to use authorizationHeader param
instead of non-existent headers object
* Fix jose type import - use CryptoKey instead of KeyLike
* Add OAuth 2.1 section 4.2 spec reference to client credentials checks
Add OAUTH_2_1_CLIENT_CREDENTIALS spec reference pointing to OAuth 2.1
draft section 4.2 (Client Credentials Grant) and include it in all
client_credentials conformance checks for both JWT and basic auth flows.
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Add JWT iss claim verification for client credentials
Per RFC 7523, verify that the JWT issuer (iss) claim matches the
expected client_id, in addition to the existing sub claim check.
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* add cimd test and negative test
* Improve auth-test-no-cimd.ts documentation for clarity
Address review feedback: expanded comments to better explain what CIMD is,
why this client is non-compliant, and what behavior it's testing.
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Remove .js extensions from relative imports
tsx doesn't require .js extensions for TypeScript imports.
Keeps .js for @modelcontextprotocol/sdk imports as those are external packages.
Also improves auth-test-no-cimd.ts documentation for clarity.
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Skip auth/basic-cimd test until SDK support lands
Waiting on typescript-sdk PR #1127 for CIMD support.
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix trailing whitespace in auth-test-no-cimd.ts
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* wip scope change
* rm useless bool
* fix-me: package changes for linking
* negative test
* negative test for multiple scopes
* fix displays of warnings
* wip step-up
* negative test for step up auth
* move warning into main request flow
* clean up more checks
* cleanup step-up scenario
* cleanup and simplify
* cleanup middleware
* inline negative tests
* inline the other test
* refactor logging and inlining for standalone execution too
* skip pending tests
* clean up constructor calls for server lifecycle
* add back compat test
* fix dup logging, rm prm
* avoid fallbacks
* better error from example client
* add final endpoint method
* add test for OASM priority order
* s/prepack/prepare/ for npx
* try switching to .js
* make tsdown version happy default
* fix lock
* fix prmPath issue
* back to main package-lock
* fix bin path
* Add comprehensive auth scenario test suite
- Add index.test.ts to test all auth scenarios with auth-test.ts client
- Upgrade @modelcontextprotocol/sdk from 1.20.1 to 1.22.0
- All 5 auth scenarios now pass including auth/basic-metadata-var2
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* consolidate tests into index.test.ts
* rename metadata
* fix comments
* rework auth scenario listing
* add 3rd variation of metadata
* fix some type issues introduced by version bump
* add reusable spec references
* more refs
* fix up spec references
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Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
PieterKas
Robin Otto
Paul Carleton
Max Gerber
Wils Dawson
sagar-okta