Restructure the incubation into two extensions plus interchangeable data-labelling schemes, shipped as a stack of three PRs: - This PR (base): shared scaffolding + the trust-annotations extension. - action-metadata moves to its own stacked PR. - The IFC/FIDES work moves out of specification/draft/ entirely — it is one data-labelling scheme (ifc.fides.v1) that fills the trust-annotations evidenceRef slot, not an extension and not a sibling. It lands in a schemes/ folder built to hold alternative approaches (data-class, capability tokens, cosigning, sequence-shape, attestation) so no single academic model is baked into the wire. README, sep-disposition, related-work, trust-model, open-questions and the decision log are reframed accordingly (two extensions + a schemes folder; the range of candidate schemes drawn from the SEP-1913 thread and cited literature). Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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Open questions
Tracked here rather than in the spec drafts, so the drafts stay non-temporal.
Cross-cutting
- Where does the policy-enforcement engine live across different user universes (cross-org, cross-domain)? Engines work well within one universe; cross-domain is the hard case. (IG 2026-05-28.)
- Cross-domain integrity verification — is asymmetric crypto for domain identity in scope for a future extension, or out of scope entirely? CLI tools remain a persistent gap for enforcing these constraints.
evidenceRef.typeregistry — who curates the list of well-known profile types, and how do we coordinate with attestation SEPs (e.g. SEP-2787) so values don't collide?
trust-annotations
- Is
sensitivethe right single coarse signal, or do we need thedata-class.v1profile from day one? - Content-block-level vs. result-level attachment — does the draft need a worked multi-result example before it's implementable?
list_changed: confirmed response-level annotations don't participate; revisit only if trust vocabulary ever attaches to tool definitions.
action-metadata
- Coexistence vs. replacement of legacy
destructiveHint/readOnlyHint/idempotentHint/openWorldHint. - Open strings vs. closed enums for
destination/source/sensitivity. - Does
requiresReviewneed a machine-readable reason for good client UX?
ifc-fides (scheme)
- Inline
_meta.ifcfor low-friction adoption vs. always behindevidenceRef. - GitHub Enterprise
internalrepo visibility →public/privatemapping (audience is the whole org, broader than collaborators; resolved host-side). - Reader-set resolution is host-side by design — confidentiality join across two
privatesources needs the intersection, which the opaque wire marker can't express. Is the 3-step host resolution enough, or do some hosts need a standardevidenceRef.refshape to locate the originating system?
Parked (SEP-1913 umbrella)
maliciousActivityHint— if it returns, it is per-ContentBlockwith spans, driven by the host's own detection, not a server-attested boolean.- Session-level propagation rules — escalation semantics and the sequence-shape gap ("this was call N in a flagged sequence" has no response annotation surface today).