To guarantee a better compatibility with legacy server, enable the
fallback to the legacy initialize rpc in case of any error returned by
the server, in case of `server/discover` request.
## Problem
`AuthorizationCodeHandler.exchangeAuthorizationCode` builds the
long-lived token source from the **request context** passed to
`Authorize()`:
```go
clientCtx := context.WithValue(ctx, oauth2.HTTPClient, h.config.Client)
...
h.tokenSource = cfg.TokenSource(clientCtx, token)
```
`golang.org/x/oauth2` captures that context and reuses it for **every**
future refresh:
- `oauth2.go`: `Config.TokenSource(ctx, …)` stores `ctx` in
`tokenRefresher{ctx}`
- `tokenRefresher.Token()` (no ctx arg) calls `retrieveToken(tf.ctx, …)`
- `internal/token.go`: `ContextClient(ctx).Do(req.WithContext(ctx))`
`Authorize()` is normally invoked from a request- or connect-scoped
context — e.g. the streamable client transport calls it during
`setMCPHeaders`/`initialize`, and that context is cancelled once the
operation completes. The cached access token works until expiry; the
**first refresh after expiry** then fails instantly with `context
canceled`, before any HTTP request is sent. The connection can no longer
refresh.
`setMCPHeaders` only re-invokes `Authorize()` for an `invalid_grant`
`oauth2.RetrieveError` (#917). A `context canceled` is not a
`RetrieveError`, so it is never recovered — the connection is wedged
until the client reconnects.
### Reproduce
1. Connect a `StreamableClientTransport` with an
`AuthorizationCodeHandler` to a server whose `initialize` returns 401
(so `Authorize()` runs during connect, under the connect context).
2. Let the connect context be cancelled after connect returns (the
common pattern: a `context.WithTimeout(parent, …)` + `defer cancel()`
bounding the interactive flow).
3. Wait for the access token to expire and issue a request.
4. Every request fails with `Post "<token endpoint>": context canceled`
and `dur≈0` — the refresh never hits the network.
## Fix
A token source outlives the request that created it, so bind its
refreshes to `context.Background()` (still carrying the configured HTTP
client via `oauth2.HTTPClient`). The one-shot token exchange keeps using
the request context.
```go
refreshCtx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), oauth2.HTTPClient, h.config.Client)
h.tokenSource = cfg.TokenSource(refreshCtx, token)
```
`auth` package tests pass. Behaviour is otherwise unchanged: the same
HTTP client value is carried; only the cancellation parent differs.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
## Summary
- Add an exported \`oauthex.MatchesResource(claims []string, resource
string) bool\` helper that compares an \`aud\` claim slice against an
expected resource URL with the canonical-form (trailing slash) tolerance
required by RFC 9728 and RFC 8707.
- Tests cover the common shape combinations (canonical/trimmed in either
direction, surrounding whitespace, multiple claims) plus negative cases
ensuring scheme + path mismatches still fail.
## Motivation
RFC 9728 §3.3 canonicalises the protected-resource identifier with a
trailing slash, but RFC 8707 resource indicators frequently omit it.
Upstream IdPs vary in which form they emit in the \`aud\` claim (Google
trims, Auth0 retains, some clients round-trip whatever the IdP sent).
Strict byte equality therefore fails routinely on legitimate setups.
Resource servers writing this comparison by hand all converge on the
same trim-trailing-slash + whitespace logic; exporting a canonical
helper saves every consumer from re-deriving it.
## Test plan
- [x] \`go test ./oauthex/... -run MatchesResource\` passes.
- [x] Positive cases: exact match, trailing slash on either side,
surrounding whitespace, multi-claim slice with one match.
- [x] Negative cases: empty slice, no match, path mismatch, scheme
mismatch (HTTPS vs HTTP must still fail).
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
## Summary
Fixes#976.
`DecodeMessage` used `msg.Method != ""` to classify messages. A wire
payload with `"method":""` was decoded as a **response**, so stdio
servers dropped it without a correlated JSON-RPC error.
## Approach
Decode into a `wireDecode` struct whose `method` field is
`json.RawMessage`. Treat the message as a **request** when the `method`
key is **present on the wire** (including `""`), which matches JSON-RPC
semantics.
This revision:
- Uses a **single JSON parse** per message (dedicated decode struct, no
secondary fields-map unmarshal)
- Documents why `json.RawMessage` is used for `method`
- Adds regression coverage so normal responses and id-only payloads
without a `method` key stay on the response path
## Test plan
- [x] `go test ./internal/jsonrpc2/... -v`
- [x] `go test ./mcp/... -run TestIOConnRead_EmptyMethod -v`
- [x] `go test ./... -count=1`
- [x] `go test -race ./internal/jsonrpc2/... -count=1`
- [x] Server conformance (`npx @modelcontextprotocol/conformance server
--url http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp`) — 40 passed, 0 failed
- [x] Client conformance (`./scripts/client-conformance.sh`) — 217
passed, 0 failed
## Scope note
This PR addresses the primary repro in #976 (empty `method` with valid
`id`). Other cases listed in the issue (`id: null`, structurally invalid
envelopes) are unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
## Summary
Part 3 of the SEP-2575 ("Make MCP Stateless") implementation. Builds on
PR #975 which landed the client-side discover/fallback flow and the
per-request `_meta` plumbing. This PR adds the **server-side**
counterparts:
- `server/discover` handler (replaces the
stub),ProtocolVersionSupporter`
- transport hook for per-transport version filtering,
- transport-agnostic version validation and method-removal enforcement
in `ServerSession.handle`,
- HTTP-level wire compliance for SEP-2575 error codes/status codes,
- bug fix in `internal/jsonrpc2`,`processResult` with an `MCPGODEBUG`
opt-out for backward compatibility.
## Summary
- Add a \`ClockSkew time.Duration\` field to
\`RequireBearerTokenOptions\` that bounds the tolerance applied to a
token's \`Expiration\` when checking elapsed validity.
- Default zero preserves the existing strict comparison; positive values
let resource servers tolerate the drift typical of distributed
deployments and cloud-managed IdPs.
## Motivation
Real-world resource servers running behind a CDN, in distributed
deployments, or talking to an authorization server whose clock drifts a
few seconds (common with cloud-managed IdPs) need a small positive
tolerance when checking token expiration. Strict-equality comparison
rejects tokens that are valid by the issuer's clock but momentarily
appear expired by the verifier's. The reverse case — an issuer's clock
running slightly fast at /token issuance — also reaches the verifier as
a token whose \`exp\` lies microseconds in the past.
## Test plan
- [x] \`go test ./auth/...\` passes.
- [x] New \`TestRequireBearerToken_ClockSkew\` exercises four cases:
fresh accept, strict-expired reject, within-skew accept, beyond-skew
reject.
- [x] Existing \`TestRequireBearerToken\` continues to pass with
\`ClockSkew\` defaulting to zero.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
Implements the client half of the SEP-2575 / `2026-06-30` protocol. This
CL is client-only; server-side `server/discover` is still a
`MethodNotFound` stub.
### Changes
- **`server/discover` probe in `Client.Connect()`** (`client.go`). When
the caller opts into `protocolVersion >= 2026-06-30`, the client probes
the server with `server/discover` before falling back to the legacy
`initialize`
handshake.
- **Per-request `_meta` injection** (`shared.go`, `injectRequestMeta`).
For`>= 2026-06-30` sessions every outgoing request gets the SEP-2575
triple (`protocolVersion`, `clientInfo`, `clientCapabilities`).
- **Server-side fix**: `ServerSession.handle` no longer pre-populates
`state.InitializeParams` from a `server/discover` request's `_meta`, so
a subsequent fallback `initialize` is not rejected as a duplicate.
### Fallback rules
Client falls back to the legacy `initialize` handshake when discover
returns:
- `MethodNotFound` (-32601),
- `UnsupportedProtocolVersionError` (-32004),
- an HTTP `Bad Request` (substring-matched on the error message, to
interop
with pre-2026-06-30 servers).
Fixes#966
## Summary
- Add an `AllowMissingExpiration bool` field to
`RequireBearerTokenOptions` that opts the middleware out of the existing
`tokenInfo.Expiration.IsZero()` reject.
- Default false preserves the existing strict behaviour: every TokenInfo
must carry an Expiration.
## Motivation
Some IdPs emit session-bound bearer tokens that do not carry a
standalone `exp` claim — the token's lifetime is bounded by an external
session and is not advertised in-band. Resource servers integrating with
such IdPs today have to synthesise a fake Expiration from their
TokenVerifier callback (dishonest data through the auth layer) or fork
`RequireBearerToken` to bypass the check.
This option lets the verifier honestly report "no expiration in the
token" via a zero `Expiration` and have the middleware accept it — while
still applying the elapsed-validity check for tokens that DO carry an
Expiration.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
## Summary
- add the optional `description` field to `mcp.Implementation`
- keep the field omitted when empty
- cover JSON marshal/unmarshal behavior with a focused regression test
Fixes#977.
## To verify
- `go test ./mcp -run TestImplementationDescriptionJSON -count=1`
- `go test ./mcp -run TestServerRequest_PerRequestAccessors -count=1`
- `go test ./mcp -count=1`
- `go test ./...`
- `git diff --check`
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
mcp: add configurable keepalive failure threshold
Introduce `KeepAliveFailureThreshold` option in both `ClientOptions` and
`ServerOptions` to control how many consecutive keepalive ping failures
are tolerated before closing the session.
This aligns with the MCP spec's guidance that "multiple failed pings MAY
trigger a connection reset," allowing operators to tune resilience
against transient network hiccups without immediately tearing down
otherwise healthy sessions.
A threshold of 0 or 1 (the default) closes on the first failure,
preserving existing behavior. Higher values let isolated misses pass
while still closing the session once consecutive failures reach the
threshold. A successful ping resets the counter.
Tolerated failures are logged at WARN level; the final failure that
closes the session is logged at ERROR level.
This is rework of #979.
### Context
Design (`design/mrtr.md`) and implementation proposal for Multi
Round-Trip Requests (MRTR) per
[SEP-2322](de6d76fba3/seps/2322-MRTR.md).
### Changes
- Introduce `InputRequest` and `InputResponse` sealed interfaces with
corresponding `InputRequestMap` and `InputResponseMap` types for custom
map JSON codec implementation.
- Extend `CallToolParams`, `GetPromptParams`, and `ReadResourceParams`
with `InputResponses`, `RequestState` and an unexported `resultType`
("complete" or "input_required") for retry round-trips. The type is set
by the SDK based on input requests presence.
- Add client-side MRTR middleware enabled by default that automatically
fulfills input requests and retries.
- Added MRTROptions on ClientOptions to allow disabling the middleware
and configuring the number of retries.
- Add server-side MRTR middleware for backward compatibility:
transparently bridges input requests to direct
Elicit/CreateMessage/ListRoots calls for older clients
This PR functions as a Reference implementation of
[SEP-2468](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2468)
/ [RFC9207](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9207/).
This PR hardens the MCP OAuth Client functionality against Mix-Up
attacks:
> Mix-up attacks aim to steal an authorization code or access token by
> tricking the client into sending the authorization code or access
> token to the attacker instead of the honest authorization or resource
> server
This PR hardens the client by adding support for a new `iss` parameter
in authorization responses:
- Authorization Servers broadcast support for the `iss` parameter via
the `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported` metadata parameter
- If the parameter is supported, clients expect to receive the `iss`
parameter in the authorization response
- Clients compare the `iss` parameter in the authorization response to
the `Issuer` parameter in the authorization metadata. The two must match
exactly for the response to be processed.
Fixes#941
## Description
This PR lays the foundational server-side groundwork for the `>=
2026-06-30` sessionless and stateless feature introduced by
[SEP-2575](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2575)
and SEP-2567, tracked in
[design/stateless.md](614460a225/design/stateless.md).
### SEP-2575: Stateless MCP
* **Per-request protocol detection in `ServerSession.handle()`**
Unmarshal `_meta` from the raw JSON-RPC params determines whether each
request follows the new protocol.
* **Per-request typed accessors on `ServerRequest[P]`**
```go
func (r *ServerRequest[P]) ProtocolVersion() string
func (r *ServerRequest[P]) ClientInfo() *Implementation
func (r *ServerRequest[P]) ClientCapabilities() *ClientCapabilities
```
* **Reject client->server `initialize`, `initialized` and `ping` for
new-protocol requests**
* **Per-request `_meta` field name constants**
Three constants for the wire-protocol field names
(`MetaKeyProtocolVersion`, `MetaKeyClientInfo`,
`MetaKeyClientCapabilities`)
* **Stop synthesizing fake `InitializeParams` for new-protocol
requests**
Fixes: #966
`ReadOnlyHint` is a `bool` with omitempty, so the zero value (false) is
indistinguishable from unset, and **drops out** of marshaled JSON.
The current behavior causes an issue with the OpenAI MCP app submission
because they require explicit hints.
Consumers that explicitly set `ReadOnlyHint: false` on write tools lose
the field on the wire. Removing `omitempty` ensures `false` is always
serialized, which matches the MCP spec default.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
Co-authored-by: guglielmoc <guglielmoc@google.com>
## Summary
- reject a second `initialize` request on an already initialized server
session
- keep the original `ServerSession.InitializeParams()` instead of
replacing it with later client parameters
- add a raw JSON-RPC regression test for the duplicate-initialize path
Fixes#961.
## To verify
- `go test ./mcp -run TestServerRejectsDuplicateInitialize -count=1`
- `go test ./mcp -count=1`
- `go test ./...`
---------
Co-authored-by: guglielmoc <guglielmoc@google.com>
oauthex/auth_meta.go: fixes metadata issuer comparison to ignore
trailing slash difference
Google's gmail MCP server returns `https://accounts.google.com/` as the
Authorization Server in the Protected Resource Metadata, but returns
`https://accounts.google.com` in the Auth Server Metadata. This causes a
comparison failure per rfc8414 section-3.3: Authorization Server
Metadata Validation. The authorization server URL is meant to be a base
to build other URLs from, it does not seem necessary to enforce that the
trailing slash (or lack thereof) matches with the issuer URL. Please see
#953 for more details.
Fixes#953
---------
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
Fixes#937.
### What this changes
Adds a single line — an SSE comment (`: ok\n\n`) — after `WriteHeader`
and before `Flush` on the standalone SSE GET stream. SSE comments are
explicitly ignored by clients (any line starting with `:` per the SSE
spec), but they produce an HTTP/2 DATA frame, which is what HTTP/2
reverse proxies need before they will forward the HEADERS frame.
### Why the existing fix isn't sufficient
Issue #410 was closed by #413, which added `WriteHeader(StatusOK)` +
`Flush()` to the same site. #870 refactored the `Flush()` to use
`http.NewResponseController`. Both correctly address HTTP/1.1: `Flush()`
writes the headers as text on the TCP stream and any HTTP/1.1-aware
proxy forwards them.
In HTTP/2, headers and body are separate frame types (HEADERS, DATA).
Reverse proxies batch them for efficiency and won't forward the HEADERS
frame on its own. `Flush()` on the response writer only pushes the
in-process buffer to the HTTP/2 stack; the proxy still holds the HEADERS
frame waiting for DATA. The standalone SSE stream never sends body data
on connect (the whole point — it's the long-poll listener for
server-pushed notifications), so without a deliberate "kick" the headers
never reach the client until the proxy tears down the stream on timeout.
The SSE-comment trick is the established mitigation for SSE servers
behind HTTP/2 proxies. It's used in Caddy
(https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/4247), referenced in the Go
issue tracker (https://github.com/golang/go/issues/31125), and is
independent of the proxy implementation.
### The diff
```go
if s.id == "" {
// Issue #410: the standalone SSE stream is likely not to receive messages
// for a long time. Ensure that headers are flushed.
+ //
+ // On HTTP/2, headers and body travel as separate frames (HEADERS and
+ // DATA). Reverse proxies (e.g. Envoy, Caddy, net/http/httputil)
+ // commonly buffer the HEADERS frame until they have a DATA frame to
+ // coalesce it with — there is no HTTP/2 equivalent of HTTP/1.1's
+ // Transfer-Encoding: chunked signal that says "this is streaming, send
+ // headers now". Calling Flush() alone is not sufficient: it pushes
+ // the kernel buffer to the proxy, but the proxy still holds the
+ // HEADERS frame.
+ //
+ // Write an SSE comment (lines starting with ":" are ignored by
+ // clients per RFC) so a DATA frame is produced, which forces the
+ // proxy to forward both frames. See:
+ // https://github.com/golang/go/issues/31125
+ // https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/4247
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+ fmt.Fprint(w, ": ok\n\n")
rc := http.NewResponseController(w)
// Ignore returned error as flushing is best-effort.
_ = rc.Flush()
}
```
`fmt` is already imported in this file; no other dependencies change.
### Test
Added `TestStandaloneSSEEmitsCommentForHTTP2Flush`. It initializes a
streamable session via raw POST, then opens the standalone SSE GET and
asserts the first body byte starts with `:` (the SSE comment marker,
which is what produces the DATA frame HTTP/2 proxies need).
The test catches the bug behaviorally without requiring a full HTTP/2
reverse-proxy setup: it verifies the SDK's contract (emit body bytes
after headers on the standalone SSE stream). HTTP/2-specific behavior is
then a property of any conforming proxy.
I confirmed the test fails on `main` without the patch — it times out at
2s waiting for the first body byte — and passes in <1ms with the patch.
Full streamable test suite still passes.
### Reproduction matrix (from #937)
| Configuration | TTFB | Result |
|---|---|---|
| HTTP/2 + 30s request timeout | ~31s | Headers only on stream tear-down
|
| HTTP/2 + no request timeout | never | Headers never arrive |
| HTTP/1.1 + 30s request timeout | ~300ms | Headers immediate |
| HTTP/1.1 + no request timeout | ~270ms | Headers immediate |
| HTTP/2 POST (response has body) | ~350ms | Works (DATA frame
coalesces) |
| **HTTP/2 + this PR** | ~1ms | Headers immediate |
### Risk
- Behavior-preserving for HTTP/1.1 clients (a leading `:` line is a
valid SSE comment and is ignored by every conforming SSE client).
- No protocol-level concern: SSE explicitly defines comment lines as a
no-op for the consumer.
- The DATA frame adds 7 bytes per standalone SSE connection, sent once
on connect.
Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
Replaces the simple time-interval check in `LoggingHandler` with a
standard `rate.Limiter` from `golang.org/x/time/rate`, as suggested by
the existing TODO comment.
This provides a well-tested implementation and removes the need for
manual `lastMessageSent` tracking. The rate (`1/MinInterval`) and burst
(1) match the previous behavior exactly.
/cc @jba
Closes#924
---------
Signed-off-by: wucm667 <stevenwucongmin@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonathan Amsterdam <jba@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
## Bug
`mcp.AddTool` crashes the server with SIGSEGV when input/output struct
tags trigger a nil schema.
## Root Cause
In `mcp/server.go`, the function `setSchema` calls
`internalSchema.Resolve(...)` without checking if `internalSchema` is
nil. If the schema inference (e.g., via `jsonschema.ForType`) or a
provided schema results in a nil value, this dereference causes a panic.
## Fix
Added nil checks for `internalSchema` before calling `Resolve` in two
locations within `setSchema`:
1. After schema generation via `jsonschema.ForType`.
2. After processing a provided schema (which might be nil or fail to
unmarshal).
If `internalSchema` is nil, the function now returns a descriptive error
instead of crashing.
## Verification
- `go test ./mcp/...` passes.
- The fix prevents the crash by handling the nil case gracefully.
Closes#916.
---------
Signed-off-by: wucm667 <stevenwucongmin@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
Change the error code returned by ResourceNotFoundError from -32002 to
-32602 (jsonrpc.CodeInvalidParams), aligning with
[SEP-2164](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2164).
* Not gated with a protocol version check, because the previous error
code was never formally specified and the behaviour varied across SDKs.
* In case clients which rely on the old error code exist, the previous
behaviour can be restored with `MCPGODEBUG=customresnotfounderrcode=1`.
* `CodeResourceNotFound` deprecated since its only purpose going forward
is backward compatibility. The new code should use
`jsonrpc.CodeInvalidParams` directly.
* `CodeResourceNotFound` changed to `var` so it can stay in sync with
`ResourceNotFoundError` and existing code doing `code ==
mcp.CodeResourceNotFound` keeps working in both the default and compat
modes.
Bumps [actions/cache](https://github.com/actions/cache) from 5.0.4 to
5.0.5.
<details>
<summary>Release notes</summary>
<p><em>Sourced from <a
href="https://github.com/actions/cache/releases">actions/cache's
releases</a>.</em></p>
<blockquote>
<h2>v5.0.5</h2>
<h2>What's Changed</h2>
<ul>
<li>Update ts-http-runtime dependency by <a
href="https://github.com/yacaovsnc"><code>@yacaovsnc</code></a> in <a
href="https://redirect.github.com/actions/cache/pull/1747">actions/cache#1747</a></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Full Changelog</strong>: <a
href="https://github.com/actions/cache/compare/v5...v5.0.5">https://github.com/actions/cache/compare/v5...v5.0.5</a></p>
</blockquote>
</details>
<details>
<summary>Changelog</summary>
<p><em>Sourced from <a
href="https://github.com/actions/cache/blob/main/RELEASES.md">actions/cache's
changelog</a>.</em></p>
<blockquote>
<h1>Releases</h1>
<h2>How to prepare a release</h2>
<blockquote>
<p>[!NOTE]<br />
Relevant for maintainers with write access only.</p>
</blockquote>
<ol>
<li>Switch to a new branch from <code>main</code>.</li>
<li>Run <code>npm test</code> to ensure all tests are passing.</li>
<li>Update the version in <a
href="https://github.com/actions/cache/blob/main/package.json"><code>https://github.com/actions/cache/blob/main/package.json</code></a>.</li>
<li>Run <code>npm run build</code> to update the compiled files.</li>
<li>Update this <a
href="https://github.com/actions/cache/blob/main/RELEASES.md"><code>https://github.com/actions/cache/blob/main/RELEASES.md</code></a>
with the new version and changes in the <code>## Changelog</code>
section.</li>
<li>Run <code>licensed cache</code> to update the license report.</li>
<li>Run <code>licensed status</code> and resolve any warnings by
updating the <a
href="https://github.com/actions/cache/blob/main/.licensed.yml"><code>https://github.com/actions/cache/blob/main/.licensed.yml</code></a>
file with the exceptions.</li>
<li>Commit your changes and push your branch upstream.</li>
<li>Open a pull request against <code>main</code> and get it reviewed
and merged.</li>
<li>Draft a new release <a
href="https://github.com/actions/cache/releases">https://github.com/actions/cache/releases</a>
use the same version number used in <code>package.json</code>
<ol>
<li>Create a new tag with the version number.</li>
<li>Auto generate release notes and update them to match the changes you
made in <code>RELEASES.md</code>.</li>
<li>Toggle the set as the latest release option.</li>
<li>Publish the release.</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li>Navigate to <a
href="https://github.com/actions/cache/actions/workflows/release-new-action-version.yml">https://github.com/actions/cache/actions/workflows/release-new-action-version.yml</a>
<ol>
<li>There should be a workflow run queued with the same version
number.</li>
<li>Approve the run to publish the new version and update the major tags
for this action.</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
<h2>Changelog</h2>
<h3>5.0.4</h3>
<ul>
<li>Bump <code>minimatch</code> to v3.1.5 (fixes ReDoS via globstar
patterns)</li>
<li>Bump <code>undici</code> to v6.24.1 (WebSocket decompression bomb
protection, header validation fixes)</li>
<li>Bump <code>fast-xml-parser</code> to v5.5.6</li>
</ul>
<h3>5.0.3</h3>
<ul>
<li>Bump <code>@actions/cache</code> to v5.0.5 (Resolves: <a
href="https://github.com/actions/cache/security/dependabot/33">https://github.com/actions/cache/security/dependabot/33</a>)</li>
<li>Bump <code>@actions/core</code> to v2.0.3</li>
</ul>
<h3>5.0.2</h3>
<ul>
<li>Bump <code>@actions/cache</code> to v5.0.3 <a
href="https://redirect.github.com/actions/cache/pull/1692">#1692</a></li>
</ul>
<h3>5.0.1</h3>
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<h3>5.0.0</h3>
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<li><a
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Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
Previously, an expired refresh token in the oauth2.Token returned from
OAuthHandler.TokenSource() would cause the connection to fail.
From the client perspective, this meant that the MCP connection was in a
hard-failed state with no way to re-authorize.
The change in this commit causes Authorize() to be called in the event
of both an oauth2.RetrieveError from the token endpoint, as well as in
the pre-existing case of a 401/403 HTTP response from the MCP server.
Clients will handle this in their existing Authorize() flows to get a
new valid token for the connection.
Supersedes and closes: #909.
Co-authored-by: Yaroslav <yarolegovich@gmail.com>
## Summary
The DELETE request that terminates a streamable HTTP session discards
the `*http.Response` without closing its body. Per the `net/http`
documentation, this prevents the underlying TCP connection from being
reused and leaks it.
## The bug
```go
// mcp/streamable.go:2239 (before)
} else if _, err := c.client.Do(req); err != nil {
c.closeErr = err
}
```
On the success path (no error), the response is silently discarded. The
default client is `http.DefaultClient` with keep-alives enabled, so the
leaked connection stays open until GC or process exit.
## The fix
```go
// mcp/streamable.go:2239 (after)
} else if resp, err := c.client.Do(req); err != nil {
c.closeErr = err
} else {
resp.Body.Close()
}
```
All 10 other `client.Do` call sites in this file close the response
body. This one was missed.
## Test plan
- [x] `go build ./...` passes
- [x] `go test ./... -short` passes
Fixes#928
## Summary
- Add `ClientCredentialsHandler` implementing `auth.OAuthHandler` using
the OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials grant (RFC 6749 Section 4.4) for
service-to-service authentication with pre-registered credentials.
- Bypasses both dynamic client registration and the authorization code
flow — the handler takes a client ID + secret directly and exchanges
them at the token endpoint.
- Supports two modes: direct `TokenEndpoint` URL, or metadata discovery
via `AuthServerURL` (RFC 8414).
- Add `client_credentials` grant type support to the fake authorization
server in `internal/oauthtest` for testing.
## Context
Per @jba's [comment on
#627](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk/issues/627#issuecomment-3640982691):
> Our default implementation for that framework should support client ID
and client secret as options, to handle that variant. [...] If those are
set, our implementation would bypass dynamic client reservation. That is
just a couple of lines of code, I believe.
The client-side OAuth scaffolding (#785) that this was blocked on is now
complete, as @brkane noted.
Implements the client credentials variant of
[SEP-1046](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/issues/1046).
The JWT Assertions variant (RFC 7523) is left for a follow-up as its API
surface needs more design discussion.
## Test plan
- [x] `TestNewClientCredentialsHandler_Validation` — validates all
config error cases (nil config, missing fields, mutual exclusivity)
- [x] `TestClientCredentialsHandler_Authorize/direct_token_endpoint` —
end-to-end with fake auth server
- [x] `TestClientCredentialsHandler_Authorize/metadata_discovery` —
discovers token endpoint via RFC 8414 metadata
- [x] `TestClientCredentialsHandler_Authorize/bad_credentials` —
verifies failure with wrong secret
- [x] `go test ./... -count=1` passes
- [x] `go vet ./...` clean
Refs #627
Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
