## Description
This PR introduces support for custom (non-standard) JSON-RPC methods in
the MCP Go SDK.
This feature enables servers to handle arbitrary JSON-RPC methods and
clients to invoke them, all while maintaining full type safety and
integrating seamlessly with the SDK's existing middleware and session
management.
- Server-Side Registration: Added AddReceivingCustomMethod to allow
servers to register handlers for custom methods. Incoming requests are
automatically unmarshaled into user-defined parameter structs.
- Client-Side Calling: Added AddSendingCustomMethod which returns a
strongly-typed caller function that clients can use to invoke custom
methods and receive strongly-typed results.
- Helper Structs: Provided ParamsBase and ResultBase for users to embed
in their custom structs. This allows them to easily satisfy the SDK's
internal Params and Result interfaces.
Fixes#954
This PR adds the protocol version `2026-07-28` to the list of supported
protocol versions and fixes legacy tests hardcoding the legacy protocol
version for those use cases.
This PR updates the error codes to align with the updated specifications
in
https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2907
ErrServerClosing and ErrClientClosing are reverted to their 1.6.0
version codes, as they do not overlap anymore with the newly introduced
error codes.
To guarantee a better compatibility with legacy server, enable the
fallback to the legacy initialize rpc in case of any error returned by
the server, in case of `server/discover` request.
## Problem
`AuthorizationCodeHandler.exchangeAuthorizationCode` builds the
long-lived token source from the **request context** passed to
`Authorize()`:
```go
clientCtx := context.WithValue(ctx, oauth2.HTTPClient, h.config.Client)
...
h.tokenSource = cfg.TokenSource(clientCtx, token)
```
`golang.org/x/oauth2` captures that context and reuses it for **every**
future refresh:
- `oauth2.go`: `Config.TokenSource(ctx, …)` stores `ctx` in
`tokenRefresher{ctx}`
- `tokenRefresher.Token()` (no ctx arg) calls `retrieveToken(tf.ctx, …)`
- `internal/token.go`: `ContextClient(ctx).Do(req.WithContext(ctx))`
`Authorize()` is normally invoked from a request- or connect-scoped
context — e.g. the streamable client transport calls it during
`setMCPHeaders`/`initialize`, and that context is cancelled once the
operation completes. The cached access token works until expiry; the
**first refresh after expiry** then fails instantly with `context
canceled`, before any HTTP request is sent. The connection can no longer
refresh.
`setMCPHeaders` only re-invokes `Authorize()` for an `invalid_grant`
`oauth2.RetrieveError` (#917). A `context canceled` is not a
`RetrieveError`, so it is never recovered — the connection is wedged
until the client reconnects.
### Reproduce
1. Connect a `StreamableClientTransport` with an
`AuthorizationCodeHandler` to a server whose `initialize` returns 401
(so `Authorize()` runs during connect, under the connect context).
2. Let the connect context be cancelled after connect returns (the
common pattern: a `context.WithTimeout(parent, …)` + `defer cancel()`
bounding the interactive flow).
3. Wait for the access token to expire and issue a request.
4. Every request fails with `Post "<token endpoint>": context canceled`
and `dur≈0` — the refresh never hits the network.
## Fix
A token source outlives the request that created it, so bind its
refreshes to `context.Background()` (still carrying the configured HTTP
client via `oauth2.HTTPClient`). The one-shot token exchange keeps using
the request context.
```go
refreshCtx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), oauth2.HTTPClient, h.config.Client)
h.tokenSource = cfg.TokenSource(refreshCtx, token)
```
`auth` package tests pass. Behaviour is otherwise unchanged: the same
HTTP client value is carried; only the cancellation parent differs.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
## Summary
- Add an exported \`oauthex.MatchesResource(claims []string, resource
string) bool\` helper that compares an \`aud\` claim slice against an
expected resource URL with the canonical-form (trailing slash) tolerance
required by RFC 9728 and RFC 8707.
- Tests cover the common shape combinations (canonical/trimmed in either
direction, surrounding whitespace, multiple claims) plus negative cases
ensuring scheme + path mismatches still fail.
## Motivation
RFC 9728 §3.3 canonicalises the protected-resource identifier with a
trailing slash, but RFC 8707 resource indicators frequently omit it.
Upstream IdPs vary in which form they emit in the \`aud\` claim (Google
trims, Auth0 retains, some clients round-trip whatever the IdP sent).
Strict byte equality therefore fails routinely on legitimate setups.
Resource servers writing this comparison by hand all converge on the
same trim-trailing-slash + whitespace logic; exporting a canonical
helper saves every consumer from re-deriving it.
## Test plan
- [x] \`go test ./oauthex/... -run MatchesResource\` passes.
- [x] Positive cases: exact match, trailing slash on either side,
surrounding whitespace, multi-claim slice with one match.
- [x] Negative cases: empty slice, no match, path mismatch, scheme
mismatch (HTTPS vs HTTP must still fail).
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
## Summary
Fixes#976.
`DecodeMessage` used `msg.Method != ""` to classify messages. A wire
payload with `"method":""` was decoded as a **response**, so stdio
servers dropped it without a correlated JSON-RPC error.
## Approach
Decode into a `wireDecode` struct whose `method` field is
`json.RawMessage`. Treat the message as a **request** when the `method`
key is **present on the wire** (including `""`), which matches JSON-RPC
semantics.
This revision:
- Uses a **single JSON parse** per message (dedicated decode struct, no
secondary fields-map unmarshal)
- Documents why `json.RawMessage` is used for `method`
- Adds regression coverage so normal responses and id-only payloads
without a `method` key stay on the response path
## Test plan
- [x] `go test ./internal/jsonrpc2/... -v`
- [x] `go test ./mcp/... -run TestIOConnRead_EmptyMethod -v`
- [x] `go test ./... -count=1`
- [x] `go test -race ./internal/jsonrpc2/... -count=1`
- [x] Server conformance (`npx @modelcontextprotocol/conformance server
--url http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp`) — 40 passed, 0 failed
- [x] Client conformance (`./scripts/client-conformance.sh`) — 217
passed, 0 failed
## Scope note
This PR addresses the primary repro in #976 (empty `method` with valid
`id`). Other cases listed in the issue (`id: null`, structurally invalid
envelopes) are unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
## Summary
Part 3 of the SEP-2575 ("Make MCP Stateless") implementation. Builds on
PR #975 which landed the client-side discover/fallback flow and the
per-request `_meta` plumbing. This PR adds the **server-side**
counterparts:
- `server/discover` handler (replaces the
stub),ProtocolVersionSupporter`
- transport hook for per-transport version filtering,
- transport-agnostic version validation and method-removal enforcement
in `ServerSession.handle`,
- HTTP-level wire compliance for SEP-2575 error codes/status codes,
- bug fix in `internal/jsonrpc2`,`processResult` with an `MCPGODEBUG`
opt-out for backward compatibility.
## Summary
- Add a \`ClockSkew time.Duration\` field to
\`RequireBearerTokenOptions\` that bounds the tolerance applied to a
token's \`Expiration\` when checking elapsed validity.
- Default zero preserves the existing strict comparison; positive values
let resource servers tolerate the drift typical of distributed
deployments and cloud-managed IdPs.
## Motivation
Real-world resource servers running behind a CDN, in distributed
deployments, or talking to an authorization server whose clock drifts a
few seconds (common with cloud-managed IdPs) need a small positive
tolerance when checking token expiration. Strict-equality comparison
rejects tokens that are valid by the issuer's clock but momentarily
appear expired by the verifier's. The reverse case — an issuer's clock
running slightly fast at /token issuance — also reaches the verifier as
a token whose \`exp\` lies microseconds in the past.
## Test plan
- [x] \`go test ./auth/...\` passes.
- [x] New \`TestRequireBearerToken_ClockSkew\` exercises four cases:
fresh accept, strict-expired reject, within-skew accept, beyond-skew
reject.
- [x] Existing \`TestRequireBearerToken\` continues to pass with
\`ClockSkew\` defaulting to zero.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
Implements the client half of the SEP-2575 / `2026-06-30` protocol. This
CL is client-only; server-side `server/discover` is still a
`MethodNotFound` stub.
### Changes
- **`server/discover` probe in `Client.Connect()`** (`client.go`). When
the caller opts into `protocolVersion >= 2026-06-30`, the client probes
the server with `server/discover` before falling back to the legacy
`initialize`
handshake.
- **Per-request `_meta` injection** (`shared.go`, `injectRequestMeta`).
For`>= 2026-06-30` sessions every outgoing request gets the SEP-2575
triple (`protocolVersion`, `clientInfo`, `clientCapabilities`).
- **Server-side fix**: `ServerSession.handle` no longer pre-populates
`state.InitializeParams` from a `server/discover` request's `_meta`, so
a subsequent fallback `initialize` is not rejected as a duplicate.
### Fallback rules
Client falls back to the legacy `initialize` handshake when discover
returns:
- `MethodNotFound` (-32601),
- `UnsupportedProtocolVersionError` (-32004),
- an HTTP `Bad Request` (substring-matched on the error message, to
interop
with pre-2026-06-30 servers).
Fixes#966
## Summary
- Add an `AllowMissingExpiration bool` field to
`RequireBearerTokenOptions` that opts the middleware out of the existing
`tokenInfo.Expiration.IsZero()` reject.
- Default false preserves the existing strict behaviour: every TokenInfo
must carry an Expiration.
## Motivation
Some IdPs emit session-bound bearer tokens that do not carry a
standalone `exp` claim — the token's lifetime is bounded by an external
session and is not advertised in-band. Resource servers integrating with
such IdPs today have to synthesise a fake Expiration from their
TokenVerifier callback (dishonest data through the auth layer) or fork
`RequireBearerToken` to bypass the check.
This option lets the verifier honestly report "no expiration in the
token" via a zero `Expiration` and have the middleware accept it — while
still applying the elapsed-validity check for tokens that DO carry an
Expiration.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
## Summary
- add the optional `description` field to `mcp.Implementation`
- keep the field omitted when empty
- cover JSON marshal/unmarshal behavior with a focused regression test
Fixes#977.
## To verify
- `go test ./mcp -run TestImplementationDescriptionJSON -count=1`
- `go test ./mcp -run TestServerRequest_PerRequestAccessors -count=1`
- `go test ./mcp -count=1`
- `go test ./...`
- `git diff --check`
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
mcp: add configurable keepalive failure threshold
Introduce `KeepAliveFailureThreshold` option in both `ClientOptions` and
`ServerOptions` to control how many consecutive keepalive ping failures
are tolerated before closing the session.
This aligns with the MCP spec's guidance that "multiple failed pings MAY
trigger a connection reset," allowing operators to tune resilience
against transient network hiccups without immediately tearing down
otherwise healthy sessions.
A threshold of 0 or 1 (the default) closes on the first failure,
preserving existing behavior. Higher values let isolated misses pass
while still closing the session once consecutive failures reach the
threshold. A successful ping resets the counter.
Tolerated failures are logged at WARN level; the final failure that
closes the session is logged at ERROR level.
This is rework of #979.
### Context
Design (`design/mrtr.md`) and implementation proposal for Multi
Round-Trip Requests (MRTR) per
[SEP-2322](de6d76fba3/seps/2322-MRTR.md).
### Changes
- Introduce `InputRequest` and `InputResponse` sealed interfaces with
corresponding `InputRequestMap` and `InputResponseMap` types for custom
map JSON codec implementation.
- Extend `CallToolParams`, `GetPromptParams`, and `ReadResourceParams`
with `InputResponses`, `RequestState` and an unexported `resultType`
("complete" or "input_required") for retry round-trips. The type is set
by the SDK based on input requests presence.
- Add client-side MRTR middleware enabled by default that automatically
fulfills input requests and retries.
- Added MRTROptions on ClientOptions to allow disabling the middleware
and configuring the number of retries.
- Add server-side MRTR middleware for backward compatibility:
transparently bridges input requests to direct
Elicit/CreateMessage/ListRoots calls for older clients
This PR functions as a Reference implementation of
[SEP-2468](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2468)
/ [RFC9207](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9207/).
This PR hardens the MCP OAuth Client functionality against Mix-Up
attacks:
> Mix-up attacks aim to steal an authorization code or access token by
> tricking the client into sending the authorization code or access
> token to the attacker instead of the honest authorization or resource
> server
This PR hardens the client by adding support for a new `iss` parameter
in authorization responses:
- Authorization Servers broadcast support for the `iss` parameter via
the `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported` metadata parameter
- If the parameter is supported, clients expect to receive the `iss`
parameter in the authorization response
- Clients compare the `iss` parameter in the authorization response to
the `Issuer` parameter in the authorization metadata. The two must match
exactly for the response to be processed.
Fixes#941
## Description
This PR lays the foundational server-side groundwork for the `>=
2026-06-30` sessionless and stateless feature introduced by
[SEP-2575](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/modelcontextprotocol/pull/2575)
and SEP-2567, tracked in
[design/stateless.md](614460a225/design/stateless.md).
### SEP-2575: Stateless MCP
* **Per-request protocol detection in `ServerSession.handle()`**
Unmarshal `_meta` from the raw JSON-RPC params determines whether each
request follows the new protocol.
* **Per-request typed accessors on `ServerRequest[P]`**
```go
func (r *ServerRequest[P]) ProtocolVersion() string
func (r *ServerRequest[P]) ClientInfo() *Implementation
func (r *ServerRequest[P]) ClientCapabilities() *ClientCapabilities
```
* **Reject client->server `initialize`, `initialized` and `ping` for
new-protocol requests**
* **Per-request `_meta` field name constants**
Three constants for the wire-protocol field names
(`MetaKeyProtocolVersion`, `MetaKeyClientInfo`,
`MetaKeyClientCapabilities`)
* **Stop synthesizing fake `InitializeParams` for new-protocol
requests**
Fixes: #966
`ReadOnlyHint` is a `bool` with omitempty, so the zero value (false) is
indistinguishable from unset, and **drops out** of marshaled JSON.
The current behavior causes an issue with the OpenAI MCP app submission
because they require explicit hints.
Consumers that explicitly set `ReadOnlyHint: false` on write tools lose
the field on the wire. Removing `omitempty` ensures `false` is always
serialized, which matches the MCP spec default.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
Co-authored-by: guglielmoc <guglielmoc@google.com>
## Summary
- reject a second `initialize` request on an already initialized server
session
- keep the original `ServerSession.InitializeParams()` instead of
replacing it with later client parameters
- add a raw JSON-RPC regression test for the duplicate-initialize path
Fixes#961.
## To verify
- `go test ./mcp -run TestServerRejectsDuplicateInitialize -count=1`
- `go test ./mcp -count=1`
- `go test ./...`
---------
Co-authored-by: guglielmoc <guglielmoc@google.com>
oauthex/auth_meta.go: fixes metadata issuer comparison to ignore
trailing slash difference
Google's gmail MCP server returns `https://accounts.google.com/` as the
Authorization Server in the Protected Resource Metadata, but returns
`https://accounts.google.com` in the Auth Server Metadata. This causes a
comparison failure per rfc8414 section-3.3: Authorization Server
Metadata Validation. The authorization server URL is meant to be a base
to build other URLs from, it does not seem necessary to enforce that the
trailing slash (or lack thereof) matches with the issuer URL. Please see
#953 for more details.
Fixes#953
---------
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
Fixes#937.
### What this changes
Adds a single line — an SSE comment (`: ok\n\n`) — after `WriteHeader`
and before `Flush` on the standalone SSE GET stream. SSE comments are
explicitly ignored by clients (any line starting with `:` per the SSE
spec), but they produce an HTTP/2 DATA frame, which is what HTTP/2
reverse proxies need before they will forward the HEADERS frame.
### Why the existing fix isn't sufficient
Issue #410 was closed by #413, which added `WriteHeader(StatusOK)` +
`Flush()` to the same site. #870 refactored the `Flush()` to use
`http.NewResponseController`. Both correctly address HTTP/1.1: `Flush()`
writes the headers as text on the TCP stream and any HTTP/1.1-aware
proxy forwards them.
In HTTP/2, headers and body are separate frame types (HEADERS, DATA).
Reverse proxies batch them for efficiency and won't forward the HEADERS
frame on its own. `Flush()` on the response writer only pushes the
in-process buffer to the HTTP/2 stack; the proxy still holds the HEADERS
frame waiting for DATA. The standalone SSE stream never sends body data
on connect (the whole point — it's the long-poll listener for
server-pushed notifications), so without a deliberate "kick" the headers
never reach the client until the proxy tears down the stream on timeout.
The SSE-comment trick is the established mitigation for SSE servers
behind HTTP/2 proxies. It's used in Caddy
(https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/4247), referenced in the Go
issue tracker (https://github.com/golang/go/issues/31125), and is
independent of the proxy implementation.
### The diff
```go
if s.id == "" {
// Issue #410: the standalone SSE stream is likely not to receive messages
// for a long time. Ensure that headers are flushed.
+ //
+ // On HTTP/2, headers and body travel as separate frames (HEADERS and
+ // DATA). Reverse proxies (e.g. Envoy, Caddy, net/http/httputil)
+ // commonly buffer the HEADERS frame until they have a DATA frame to
+ // coalesce it with — there is no HTTP/2 equivalent of HTTP/1.1's
+ // Transfer-Encoding: chunked signal that says "this is streaming, send
+ // headers now". Calling Flush() alone is not sufficient: it pushes
+ // the kernel buffer to the proxy, but the proxy still holds the
+ // HEADERS frame.
+ //
+ // Write an SSE comment (lines starting with ":" are ignored by
+ // clients per RFC) so a DATA frame is produced, which forces the
+ // proxy to forward both frames. See:
+ // https://github.com/golang/go/issues/31125
+ // https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/4247
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+ fmt.Fprint(w, ": ok\n\n")
rc := http.NewResponseController(w)
// Ignore returned error as flushing is best-effort.
_ = rc.Flush()
}
```
`fmt` is already imported in this file; no other dependencies change.
### Test
Added `TestStandaloneSSEEmitsCommentForHTTP2Flush`. It initializes a
streamable session via raw POST, then opens the standalone SSE GET and
asserts the first body byte starts with `:` (the SSE comment marker,
which is what produces the DATA frame HTTP/2 proxies need).
The test catches the bug behaviorally without requiring a full HTTP/2
reverse-proxy setup: it verifies the SDK's contract (emit body bytes
after headers on the standalone SSE stream). HTTP/2-specific behavior is
then a property of any conforming proxy.
I confirmed the test fails on `main` without the patch — it times out at
2s waiting for the first body byte — and passes in <1ms with the patch.
Full streamable test suite still passes.
### Reproduction matrix (from #937)
| Configuration | TTFB | Result |
|---|---|---|
| HTTP/2 + 30s request timeout | ~31s | Headers only on stream tear-down
|
| HTTP/2 + no request timeout | never | Headers never arrive |
| HTTP/1.1 + 30s request timeout | ~300ms | Headers immediate |
| HTTP/1.1 + no request timeout | ~270ms | Headers immediate |
| HTTP/2 POST (response has body) | ~350ms | Works (DATA frame
coalesces) |
| **HTTP/2 + this PR** | ~1ms | Headers immediate |
### Risk
- Behavior-preserving for HTTP/1.1 clients (a leading `:` line is a
valid SSE comment and is ignored by every conforming SSE client).
- No protocol-level concern: SSE explicitly defines comment lines as a
no-op for the consumer.
- The DATA frame adds 7 bytes per standalone SSE connection, sent once
on connect.
Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
Replaces the simple time-interval check in `LoggingHandler` with a
standard `rate.Limiter` from `golang.org/x/time/rate`, as suggested by
the existing TODO comment.
This provides a well-tested implementation and removes the need for
manual `lastMessageSent` tracking. The rate (`1/MinInterval`) and burst
(1) match the previous behavior exactly.
/cc @jba
Closes#924
---------
Signed-off-by: wucm667 <stevenwucongmin@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonathan Amsterdam <jba@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Maciej Kisiel <mkisiel@google.com>
## Bug
`mcp.AddTool` crashes the server with SIGSEGV when input/output struct
tags trigger a nil schema.
## Root Cause
In `mcp/server.go`, the function `setSchema` calls
`internalSchema.Resolve(...)` without checking if `internalSchema` is
nil. If the schema inference (e.g., via `jsonschema.ForType`) or a
provided schema results in a nil value, this dereference causes a panic.
## Fix
Added nil checks for `internalSchema` before calling `Resolve` in two
locations within `setSchema`:
1. After schema generation via `jsonschema.ForType`.
2. After processing a provided schema (which might be nil or fail to
unmarshal).
If `internalSchema` is nil, the function now returns a descriptive error
instead of crashing.
## Verification
- `go test ./mcp/...` passes.
- The fix prevents the crash by handling the nil case gracefully.
Closes#916.
---------
Signed-off-by: wucm667 <stevenwucongmin@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Guglielmo Colombo <guglielmoc@google.com>
