Tests verify that proxyFullAddress query parameter is sent for both
STDIO and SSE transports, but not Streamable HTTP, when
MCP_PROXY_FULL_ADDRESS is configured.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The STDIO and SSE transports use SSE between the client and the proxy
server. SSE requires the client to initiate the MCP conversation
(event-stream) at the endpoint provided by the server. The endpoint
provided by the server must obey where the client sees the server,
rather than being assumed to be server-root `/message`.
The Streamable HTTP endpoint does not need the full proxy address
because the response is an event-stream directly, and does not use SSE.
* Inspect the stderr output of STDIO servers and attempt to assign an appropriate RFC 5424 Syslog Protocol level before sending a leveled logging message to the client
* Inspect the stderr output of STDIO servers and attempt to assign an appropriate RFC 5424 Syslog Protocol level before sending a leveled logging message to the client
Adds stdio inheritance to prevent Node.js from dropping console output after 8192 characters due to premature stdout pipe closure before output finishes flushing. Without this, calls like this would truncate after 8192 characters, leading to broken json output:
```
npx --node-options=--inspect -y @modelcontextprotocol/inspector --cli --config .mcp.json --server notion --method tools/list
```
```
# notion mcp server
"notion": {
"//": "doppler needs to expose OPENAPI_MCP_HEADERS (and NOTION_TOKEN within it)",
"command": "bash",
"args": [
"-c",
"doppler run -p 'mcp' -c \"user_${MCP_USER:-$USER}\" -- npx -y @notionhq/notion-mcp-server"
]
},
```
You can see this in their [openapi spec](https://github.com/makenotion/notion-mcp-server/blob/main/scripts/notion-openapi.json), which powers their MCP server.
- Create shared validateRedirectUrl utility to centralize URL validation
- Only allow HTTP and HTTPS protocols in OAuth authorization URLs
- Fix three vulnerable redirect paths that bypassed validation:
- AuthDebugger.tsx: Direct window.location.href redirect
- OAuthFlowProgress.tsx: window.open() without validation
- OAuthFlowProgress.tsx: Direct anchor href attribute
- Add comprehensive test coverage for URL validation
- Update existing auth.ts to use shared validation utility
This prevents malicious MCP servers from injecting javascript: or data:
protocol URLs that would execute XSS attacks when users are redirected
to the authorization endpoint.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
