Commit graph inspector/clients/web/src/test/integration/mcp/ema-mock-servers.ts
Author SHA1 Message Date
cliffhall
f4fb4b50c9 Forward RFC 9207 iss to the v2 SDK (fixes OAuth + EMA leg 1)
SDK v2 added RFC 9207 §2.4 authorization-response issuer validation
(`validateAuthorizationResponseIssuer` / `IssuerMismatchError`) as a mix-up
attack defense. It is strict: when AS metadata advertises
`authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true` and no `iss` reaches
`exchangeAuthorization`/`auth()`, the exchange throws.

v1.29.0 had no `iss` parameter and no RFC 9207 validation at all, so dropping
the callback `iss` was harmless. The migration swapped in the stricter SDK
without feeding it the new input, breaking the authorization-code exchange
against any RFC 9207 authorization server (Okta/xaa.dev advertise it):

    Issuer mismatch in authorization response (RFC 9207):
    expected "https://idp.xaa.dev", received undefined

Found by smoke-testing EMA against live xaa.dev staging; not caught by CI
because the mock IdP never advertised the parameter, so the SDK took its
lenient path (a missing `iss` is only fatal when advertised).

`iss` was dropped in three places, with the plumbing half-built —
`oauthManager`/`inspectorClient` already accepted `iss`, but nothing supplied
or forwarded it:

- `parseOAuthCallbackParams` never extracted `iss` from the callback query
- `mcpAuth` never forwarded `options.iss` to SDK `auth()` — its own comment
  ("forwarded on v2 upgrade; ignored by v1 SDK auth()") predicted this exact
  gap, so standard OAuth was broken identically, not just EMA
- EMA leg 1 (`completeIdpOidcAuthorization`) never passed `iss` to
  `exchangeAuthorization`

Thread `iss` end to end: callback query -> CallbackParams -> resumeAfterOAuth
-> completeOAuthFlow -> {mcpAuth | EMA leg 1} -> SDK. The Node callback server
and runner carry it for CLI/TUI.

Tests: `ema-mock-servers.ts` now advertises
`authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true` so the mock is at least
as strict as real IdPs — with it absent the SDK silently takes the lenient path
and a dropped `iss` goes unnoticed. Flipping it made three existing tests
reproduce the failure. Adds regression coverage for forwarding and for
rejecting a mismatched `iss` before any network call.

Verified end to end against live xaa.dev staging: EMA legs 1-3 (IdP SSO ->
ID-JAG mint -> resource token) now complete and the MCP session initializes.

web 3099, cli 212, tui 274 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VjMemXZohSR2EndBQYif2b
2026-07-15 20:16:43 -04:00
Bob Dickinson
13dafe457b
Guided-auth removal, OAuth smoke testing, and TUI/CLI support (#1531)
* refactor(web): update OAuth E2E tests to use new authentication method

- Replaced `runGuidedAuth` with `authenticate` in the InspectorClient OAuth end-to-end tests to support quick authentication with CIMD pre-registration.
- Updated comments to reflect the change in authentication method and its support for HTTP test metadata URLs.
- Ensured that the tests continue to validate the expected authorization URL after the change.

Additionally, imported `ensureCimdClientRegistration` in the OAuthManager to streamline client registration during the authentication process.

* Guided-auth removal, OAuth smoke testing, and TUI/CLI support

* Added CLI OAuth runner flags tests

* Added clarifying comment on port 0 binding

* README notes on TUI oauth callback port, prettier fixes for CLI tests

* CIMD validation uses inline like EMA IdP

* Fixed TUI test failures from merge

* test: bring 5 OAuth files over the 90 per-file coverage gate

The guided-auth-removal work added/touched several files that fell below
the repo's >=90 per-file coverage gate (npm run coverage). CI doesn't run
the gate (it's local-only), so validate + test:integration passed while
these gaps slipped through. Bring them all back over the line:

- core/auth/node/runner-oauth-callback.ts: test bad-URL/non-http-scheme
  throws, no-port->80 default, and IPv6 hostname bracketing. Annotate the
  provably-dead guards (empty host, out-of-range port, String(err)
  fallback, pathname "/" fallback) -- all rejected by new URL() upstream --
  with justified v8 ignore comments instead of lowering the gate.
- core/auth/cimd.ts: test the AS-doesn't-support-CIMD early return.
- core/react/useClientSettingsDraft.ts: test the functional-updater path,
  the stale-onChange-after-close prev===null guard, and the
  timer-fires-after-close value===null guard.
- ClientSettingsForm.tsx: test the CIMD checkbox toggle and CIMD URL clear.
- clients/tui/src/utils/oauthDisplay.ts: test static/dcr registration
  kinds, the expired IdP session, and the configured-scope/empty-scope
  branches of formatScopes.

npm run coverage now passes (exit 0) across web, cli, tui, launcher.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-29 15:35:51 -04:00
Bob Dickinson
5de4e911e3
feat(web,core): enterprise-managed authorization (EMA) (#1509) (#1512)
Adds enterprise-managed authorization (EMA): browser-side IdP login + RFC 8693 token-exchange and JWT-bearer resource-token mint, per-server EMA opt-in in Server Settings, IdP config in Client Settings, and IdP clientSecret keychain storage. Includes the v2/main merge and review follow-ups (400 on malformed client config; normalizeIdpIssuer import consolidation).
2026-06-24 22:15:12 -04:00