Commit graph inspector/core/auth
Author SHA1 Message Date
cliffhall
8d6803953c perf(auth): gate the override wrapper on the discovery request, and guard disk values
Two suppressed review findings.

With an override configured, the wrapper cloned and parsed every
successful application/json response — every tools/call result and every
resource payload on the direct CLI/TUI transports — only to conclude it
was not a metadata document. It now tests the request URL for the RFC
8414 / OIDC well-known paths first, so ordinary traffic costs one string
test and is returned untouched.

The read path also trusted StoredMCPServer's `string` type for the two
override fields, which a hand-edited mcp.json does not honor: the CLI and
TUI read the file directly and then `.trim()` these, so a number would
crash the server load. Guarded with cleanEndpointOverride, mirroring
cleanAuthorizationParams.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-16 22:11:16 -04:00
cliffhall
e5c20608bf fix(auth): never read a stream, and say what the issuer override does not do
Two review findings on the fetch wrapper:

The content-type test was a substring match for "json", which also
matches `application/x-ndjson` — how the streamable-HTTP transport can
serve its long-lived server-push channel (`isLongLivedStreamResponse`).
Awaiting `.json()` on a clone of an unbounded stream never resolves, so
the MCP connection would hang for as long as an override was configured.
It now matches the media type exactly (`application/json` or a `+json`
suffix), with a regression test driven by a stream that never closes.

The overrides also leave `issuer` as discovery returned it, so pointing
one at an authorization server that advertises a different issuer is
rejected on callback by the RFC 9207 / SEP-2352 mix-up defense. That
check is deliberately not weakened; the limit is now stated on the
module, in the field description, and in the configuration guide.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-16 21:52:09 -04:00
cliffhall
ac8a08e42f fix(auth): only rebuild the response when an override is actually applied
Two review findings on the fetch wrapper:

Reading the body with `response.text()` meant every successful JSON
response was rebuilt while overrides were configured, even when it was
not a metadata document. That dropped native properties a synthesized
`Response` cannot carry (`url`, `redirected`, `type`) from responses the
wrapper has no business altering, and threw outright on a body-less
204/205, whose status Fetch forbids a body on — so an unrelated transport
response could fail. It now parses a clone and returns the caller's own
response unless a document is actually patched.

`new URL` also accepts embedded credentials while Fetch rejects a request
URL carrying them, so `https://user:pass@host/token` passed both the form
and the runtime and then failed deep in the OAuth exchange.
`oauthEndpointUrlError` now rejects a username or password.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-16 21:30:32 -04:00
cliffhall
05698647f8 fix(auth): never apply endpoint overrides on the enterprise-managed leg
The overrides are per-server configuration for the *resource* server's
authorization server, but the fetch wrapper that applies them is shared
with the enterprise-managed (EMA) flow, whose IdP OIDC discovery runs
through the same fetch and satisfies the metadata predicate. An
authorization override could therefore redirect the IdP login to the
resource AS, and a token override could send the IdP code or refresh
token there.

OAuthManager.getEndpointOverrides() now returns nothing when the server
is enterprise-managed — the same boundary redirectToExternalAuthorization
draws for the custom authorization parameters (#2018) — with a regression
test, the note surfaced on both form fields, and the rule documented.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-16 21:13:51 -04:00
cliffhall
364d8c9dbc feat(auth): per-server authorization and token URL overrides
Adds two optional per-server fields — `oauth.authorizationUrl` and
`oauth.tokenUrl` — that override the endpoints authorization-server
metadata discovery resolved, so a server can be pointed at a development
or staging authorization server without changing what it advertises.

SDK v2 routes both endpoints through the discovered metadata document and
neither through OAuthClientProvider, so the override is applied by
wrapping the client's base fetch and patching the metadata document in
flight (core/auth/endpointOverrides.ts). Wrapping the base fetch — rather
than only the auth fetch — also covers the discovery the SDK runs from
inside the transport on the 401/refresh path.

The fields round-trip through mcp.json, the /api/servers routes, the
runner (CLI/TUI), and the Server Settings → Authorization panel, where a
value that is not an absolute http(s) URL is flagged inline; at runtime
such a value is dropped with a single warning rather than failing the
connection.

Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-16 20:36:24 -04:00
cliffhall
b25ece8ded feat: per-server custom OAuth authorization-request parameters (#2018)
Real deployments gate IdP selection, prompt behavior, or audience on a query
parameter the OAuth/OIDC core specs never standardized (Keycloak's
`kc_idp_hint`, OIDC's `login_hint` / `prompt` / `acr_values`, Auth0's
`audience`), and none of them could be driven from the Inspector.

The Inspector never builds the authorize URL — the SDK's `auth()` does, and it
exposes no hook for extra parameters — so the merge happens at the one seam
that sees the finished URL: `BaseOAuthClientProvider.redirectToAuthorization`.
It lives in `core/`, so web, CLI, and TUI all inherit it.

- `core/auth/authorizationParams.ts`: the reserved-key list (`client_id`,
  `code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method`, `redirect_uri`, `resource`,
  `response_type`, `scope`, `state`), the key validator the form renders
  inline, and the merge itself. Reserved keys are dropped with a warning
  rather than silently overriding PKCE / the state binding / RFC 8707;
  blank-key rows are skipped; the caller's URL is never mutated.
- Applied to the authorization request only — nothing wires it into the token
  request.
- Persisted as `oauth.authorizationParams` (a string record) on the per-server
  config beside `scopes`, edited as key/value rows in Server Settings ->
  Authorization ("Additional authorization parameters"), with an inline error
  per offending row plus a section-level warning.

- The enterprise-managed (EMA) leg redirects to a *different* authorization
  server (the enterprise IdP), so it goes through the explicit
  `redirectToExternalAuthorization` entry point, which skips the merge — a
  `kc_idp_hint` or `audience` meant for the MCP server's AS must never be
  appended to the IdP's authorize URL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-08-15 19:31:41 -04:00
Cliff Hall
a09f2dcf1d
fix: load @napi-rs/keyring lazily so an unsupported platform degrades instead of crashing (#1905) (#1948)
* fix: load @napi-rs/keyring lazily so an unsupported platform degrades

`@napi-rs/keyring` ships one prebuilt binary per platform triple and
throws on import where it has none. On Android / Termux there is no
`@napi-rs/keyring-android-arm64`, so the static top-level import in
`core/auth/node/secret-store.ts` threw during module evaluation and the
Inspector exited at startup with "Cannot find native binding" — before
any of the keychain-unavailable handling in that same file could run.

Replaces the static import with a cached dynamic one. The outcome is
cached, not just the module, so a box without a binary doesn't
re-attempt (and re-throw) resolution on every secret operation —
`expectedSecretFields` means that would otherwise be once per server per
`GET /api/servers` — and so `set` can name the underlying cause in its
`KeychainUnavailableError`.

An unloadable package now folds into the same degradation contract as an
unreachable keychain: `get` returns null, `delete` and
`deleteAllForServer` no-op, and `set` throws `KeychainUnavailableError`
(not double-wrapped — the load failure is already typed by the time the
catch sees it). The class doc comment now enumerates all three ways
"unavailable" can arrive, since each escaped the contract at some point.

The shared `vi.mock` stub can't express this — it models a keyring that
loads — so the new tests build on `vi.resetModules()` + `vi.doMock` with
a throwing factory and re-import the module, covering the load failure,
each method under it, and the load-once caching.

Verified the dynamic import survives bundling in all three clients
(cli, tui, and the web runner) rather than being inlined back to a
static one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XAR2Nr9kXbrywFNUVoTe9F

* fix: steer a missing native binding to a reinstall hint

`KeychainUnavailableError` gave the Linux libsecret / gnome-keyring
advice for every cause, including the one where the keychain is fine and
the @napi-rs/keyring platform package is what's missing — an unsupported
triple (#1905) or npm's optional-deps bug dropping it on a supported one
(npm/cli#4828, the Windows report on #1852). Detect the loader's "Cannot
find native binding" phrasing and point those users at a reinstall /
npx-cache clear instead.

Ported from the superseded #1943, which fixed this alongside the same
lazy-load change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3

* fix: name a bad keyring namespace instead of "is not a constructor"

The lazy import accepted whatever the resolution produced. The named
exports arrive through CJS interop, so a resolution that stopped
yielding them — a default-only export upstream, a bundler changing
interop, a platform where named-export detection fails — would hand us
`undefined`, and `new mod.AsyncEntry(...)` would throw a TypeError
inside the very try that implements graceful degradation.

Shape-check the resolved module and treat a bad shape as unavailable.

Scope, because it is narrower than it first appears: this does NOT
prevent a bad shape from emptying the secret list. `get` returns null
either way — that is its read-tolerance contract, and the TypeError
lands in the same catch a dead keychain does. What changes is the
diagnosis. Without the check the only signal is `set` reporting
"keyring.mod.AsyncEntry is not a constructor", which reads like an
Inspector bug; with it, `set` names the real problem once, at the load
boundary, in the same actionable 503 as every other unavailability.
Catching the silent-empty-list case itself would need a round-trip
against the unmocked package, which nothing in the suite does today.

The member access sits inside the try because reading a missing export
is not always a harmless undefined — a Proxy-backed namespace can throw,
as vitest's module mocks do — and letting that escape would reject the
cached promise, which is otherwise guaranteed to always resolve.

Of the four new tests only the cause-message one fails without the
guard; the rest pin the surrounding contract.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3

* docs: correct the test header's count of unavailability entry points

The shape check added a fourth way "unavailable" can arrive, and the
enumeration in secret-store.ts was updated to match, but the test file's
header still said three — so it read as an exhaustive list that silently
omitted the case a whole describe below it covers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3

* fix: give the wrong-shape cause its own remediation hint

The shape check added a cause that fell through to the libsecret
advice — so a packaging mismatch told the user to install a keyring
daemon, which cannot help, and on Windows or macOS points somewhere that
does not exist. That is the same wrong-advice bug the native-binding
branch was added to fix, reintroduced by the guard itself.

Hint selection moves into `hintFor`, where libsecret is the explicit
fallback rather than the default, and the shape failure becomes a
distinct `KeyringModuleShapeError` matched by type — it is our own error,
so there is no reason to re-parse text we wrote (the native-binding
branch matches a string only because that message comes from napi-rs).

Also retitles the wrong-shape test: it claimed the guard avoids
"returning null secrets", but `get` returns null either way by the
read-tolerance contract. The title now says what actually differs —
`set` hard-fails — matching the correction already made in the comments.

Both raised by Copilot review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3

* fix: give both shape-check failure paths the packaging hint

The shape check can fail two ways — the members are absent, or reading
them throws — and only the first carried KeyringModuleShapeError. The
catch path returned the raw error, so a Proxy-backed namespace throwing
on access fell through to the libsecret advice: the same wrong-remedy
bug as the previous two commits, one branch further along.

Both paths now carry the type. KeyringModuleShapeError takes a detail
string plus a standard `cause`, so the throwing path reads "its exports
could not be read: <original>" and keeps the underlying failure legible
while still earning the packaging hint.

Three instances of one mistake in a row (a new cause added without
deciding which remediation it inherits) says the shape was wrong, not
just the branch: making libsecret an explicit fallback in `hintFor` did
not stop me adding a second exit that skipped it. The tests now pin the
invariant directly — one asserts both construction paths produce the
same hint — so the next cause that forgets is a failing test rather than
a reviewer's catch.

Raised by Copilot review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 18:15:20 -07:00
Cliff Hall
bb219dc001
fix: construct AsyncEntry inside the try so keychain degradation engages (#1848) (#1945)
* fix: construct AsyncEntry inside the try so keychain degradation engages

`KeyringSecretStore` built its `AsyncEntry` outside the `try` in `get`,
`set`, and `delete`. `AsyncEntry::new` performs the platform-store setup
(on Linux, the Secret Service connect with a keyutils fallback) and
throws when no backend is reachable, so the documented degradation
contract never engaged for a construction-time failure: the raw keyring
error escaped, 500ing every `GET /api/servers` on a box without a Secret
Service (the published container, which has no D-Bus session).

`expectedSecretFields` always includes the OAuth slot, so `rehydrateConfig`
constructs an entry for every server — the default seeded catalog was
enough to 500 the first list load, before any server was added. And
because the escaping error wasn't a `KeychainUnavailableError`, it
bypassed both the routes' 503 translation and the `migratePlaintextSecrets`
skip branch, yielding a generic 500 instead of the actionable message.

Moving construction inside the existing `try` restores the contract for
that failure mode: `get` returns null, `delete` no-ops, and `set` is the
only operation that throws — as `KeychainUnavailableError`, which is what
the 503 translation and the migration skip both match on.

The test stub's constructor could not fail, which is why the coverage
gate never saw the gap. Adds a `constructorThrows` hook alongside the
existing method-level `failures` flags and covers all three methods plus
`deleteAllForServer` under it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XAR2Nr9kXbrywFNUVoTe9F

* test: pin why the OAuth secret field is unconditional

`expectedSecretFields` always includes the OAuth slot, and #1848's report
frames that as why the 500 fired so broadly — which invites a follow-up
that skips the keychain read for servers with "no OAuth config". That
change would lose data.

`extractSecretsFromStored` deletes the `oauth` block outright when
`clientSecret` was its only property, so such a server carries NO marker
on disk that a secret exists — the keychain is the sole record, and the
unconditional slot is what finds it again. Gating the read on a
disk-visible `oauth` block would silently stop rehydrating exactly that
shape.

The existing tests do fail if the slot is made conditional (verified by
applying the change: 4 red), but only under names that explain nothing
about the consequence — `always lists the OAuth slot first` reads like a
tautology worth updating rather than a trap. Add a round-trip case that
states the consequence, so the next reader sees the field is load-bearing
rather than defensive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 17:30:16 -07:00
Cliff Hall
834fd2d77d
chore(deps): migrate to eslint 10 to clear the brace-expansion DoS advisory (#1900)
* chore(deps): migrate to eslint 10 to clear the brace-expansion DoS advisory (#1838)

eslint 9 pulled `minimatch@3` → `brace-expansion@1.1.16`, which carries
GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg (high, DoS via unbounded expansion length). It appeared in
all five lockfiles — the root plus each of the four clients, none of which is an
npm workspace, so all five had to move together.

Deferred from the pre-2.0.0 sweep because it is dev-scope, not attacker-
controlled, and a major bump across five packages was the wrong thing to attempt
immediately before an irreversible publish. This is that work.

## What moved

- `eslint` `^9.39.4/5` → `^10.8.0` and `@eslint/js` → `^10.0.1`, in all five
  manifests.
- `eslint-plugin-react-hooks` `^7.0.1` → `^7.1.1` in web and tui. Required, not
  cosmetic: 7.0.1's peer range stops at `^9.0.0`, so installing it alongside
  eslint 10 fails `ERESOLVE`.
- Everything else already declared eslint 10 support and stayed put:
  `typescript-eslint@^8.56.1` (`^8.57 || ^9 || ^10`),
  `eslint-plugin-react-refresh@^0.5.2` (`^9 || ^10`),
  `eslint-plugin-storybook@^10.2.19` (`>=8`).

## Config migration

None was needed. All five configs were already flat (`eslint.config.js` with
`defineConfig`/`globalIgnores` from `eslint/config`), which is the format v10
keeps and the only one it still supports. The root config's `core/` and shared-
surface blocks — including the `_`-prefix `argsIgnorePattern` /
`varsIgnorePattern` / `caughtErrorsIgnorePattern` — are unchanged and still gate
`lint:core` and `lint:shared`.

No rule was disabled, downgraded, or scoped away to make the new eslint pass.
v10 surfaced 21 real violations across three rules; all 21 are fixed in the code.

### `preserve-caught-error` (new in `eslint:recommended`) — 15 sites

A `throw new Error(msg)` inside a `catch` silently drops the original error.
Each now passes `{ cause }`, so the underlying failure survives into the chain.
Messages are unchanged, so nothing that asserts on them moves. 12 in `core/`,
2 in `clients/cli`, 1 in `test-servers/src`.

### `no-useless-assignment` (new in `eslint:recommended`) — 2 sites

`clients/cli/src/cli.ts`'s `optionArgs` and `test-servers/src/test-server-oauth`
's `valid` were initialized and then unconditionally overwritten on every path.
Both are now declared without the dead initializer; TypeScript's definite-
assignment analysis covers the remaining paths.

### `react-hooks/set-state-in-effect` — 8 sites (web)

These were false negatives the plugin fixed in 7.1.0, not a rule we newly opted
into: `set-state-in-effect` has been `error` in `flat/recommended` since 7.0.1,
and the web config has always extended it. Every one was the same anti-pattern —
resetting or re-syncing local state from a prop inside a `useEffect`, which
paints the stale value for one frame and then renders again to correct it.

All eight now use a new `useValueChange(value, onChange)` hook
(`clients/web/src/hooks/useValueChange.ts`), which is React's documented
"adjusting state during render": compare against the previous render's value
with `Object.is` and call back *during* render, so React discards the
in-progress output before it reaches the DOM.

- `MrtrConversation`, `ProtocolEntry`, `TaskCard` — mirror `isListExpanded`.
- `NetworkEntry` — same mirror, plus the "Reveal in Network" force-open. The
  reveal's rAF scroll stays an effect (real external-system work); only the
  `setIsExpanded(true)` moved. `isExpanded` is now seeded from
  `isListExpanded || revealed`, since a render-time sync fires on change and so
  cannot cover an entry that mounts already revealed.
- `PromptArgumentsForm`, `ResourceTemplatePanel` — reset on template/prompt
  switch.
- `ServerConfigModal` — reset on open. Keyed on `opened ? initial : undefined`,
  which collapses "opened flipped" and "initial changed while open" into one
  value; `initial` is already memoized, so it cannot thrash.

`useValueChange` has its own test file, and `ServerConfigModal` gains an
open→edit→close→reopen test (the close leg was previously untested, which is
what left the new guard uncovered).

## Advisory delta

`npm audit`, per package, before → after:

| Package             | before                     | after                      |
| ------------------- | -------------------------- | -------------------------- |
| root                | 9 (1 low, 6 mod, 2 high)   | 8 (1 low, 6 mod, 1 high)   |
| `clients/web`       | 19 (3 low, 6 mod, 6 high, 4 crit) | 17 (3 low, 6 mod, 4 high, 4 crit) |
| `clients/cli`       | 6 (2 low, 4 high)          | 4 (2 low, 2 high)          |
| `clients/tui`       | 4 (1 low, 3 high)          | 2 (1 low, 1 high)          |
| `clients/launcher`  | 3 (3 high)                 | 1 (1 high)                 |

`brace-expansion` is gone from all five — `eslint@10` resolves `minimatch@10` →
`brace-expansion@5.0.9`. Dropping `@eslint/eslintrc` (removed in v10) also took
`js-yaml` with it, clearing GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m (high) from all four clients as
a bonus. The remainder are unrelated and tracked separately.

`npm run ci` passes end to end — validate, the per-file ≥90 coverage gate, the
build gate, all five smokes (including `smoke:tui`, run locally on a real TTY),
and 462 Storybook tests.

Also documents the effect rule in AGENTS.md and mirrors it into
`.github/copilot-instructions.md`, since it is now something a reviewer cites.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: state useValueChange's referential-stability requirement (#1838)

Copilot review on #1900: the hook compares with `Object.is`, so an object or
array literal rebuilt in the component body compares unequal every render.
Because the callback is what updates state, that is not merely a wasted render —
it is an infinite loop.

Every current caller passes a primitive (`boolean`, `string`) or an already-
memoized value, so nothing changes behaviorally. But the hazard was implicit,
and the next caller is the one it would bite.

Documented on the hook itself, and one clause added to the AGENTS.md rule with
its mirror in `.github/copilot-instructions.md`. No runtime guard: the
requirement is the same one a `useEffect` dependency array carries, and here the
failure is loud and immediate rather than silent.

`npm run ci` passes.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): stop asserting the --tool-args-json catch binding is an Error (#1838)

Copilot review round 2 on #1900: the `--tool-args-json` parse handler formatted
its message with `(e as Error).message`. A `catch` binding is `unknown`, so that
cast is an assertion rather than a check — a thrown non-Error would render
`--tool-args-json is not valid JSON: undefined`, which points the user at
nothing.

`JSON.parse` does only throw `SyntaxError` today, so this is not a live bug. But
the cast is the kind AGENTS.md asks us not to leave unjustified, the same
handler was already being touched here to add `{ cause: e }`, and every other
site in this PR uses the guarded form. Now it does too.

`npm run ci` passes.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: require useValueChange's onChange to be render-pure (#1838)

Copilot review round 3 on #1900: `onChange` is called during render, so it is
bound by render-phase purity — and the web client mounts under `StrictMode`,
which deliberately double-renders in development. A callback doing anything
external would run an unpredictable number of times, and concurrent React can
abandon an in-progress render entirely.

Every current caller already passes a callback that only calls `setState`, so
nothing changes. But "runs during render" is the whole point of the hook and the
constraint that follows from it was left implicit.

Stated on the hook, with the same clause in the AGENTS.md rule and its
`.github/copilot-instructions.md` mirror. All three now point at `NetworkEntry`
as the worked example of the split: the reveal's force-open is a state update
and lives in `useValueChange`, while its `requestAnimationFrame` scroll stays a
`useEffect`.

`npm run ci` passes.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 20:13:30 -04:00
Cliff Hall
7784553674
fix(auth): explicit re-authorize when the OAuth callback state was lost (#1808) (#1810)
* fix(auth): offer explicit re-authorize when callback state is lost (#1808)

A `/oauth/callback` that arrives with no recorded SEP-2352 discovery state
made the SDK throw `AuthorizationServerMismatchError` and the Inspector
dead-ended, surfacing the raw SDK text with no path forward.

The SDK folds two very different failures into that one error class, so
`core/auth/issuerBinding.ts` classifies them structurally: a recoverable
"lost authorization state" (the SDK puts prose, not an issuer URL, in the
`recordedIssuer` slot) versus a genuine cross-AS `issuer_mismatch`. Only
the first gets a recovery affordance.

Web: the callback failure now raises a dedicated banner ("Authorization
state was lost" / "Authorize again") whose action clears the stale OAuth
state for that server and starts a fresh authorization. A genuine
mismatch stays a red, non-dismissible security notification with both
issuers named and no one-click retry.

Node runners (CLI/TUI): the same classification rewrites the callback
rejection into the shared actionable copy instead of the SDK text.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt

* fix(auth): detect the SDK mismatch error via isInstance (#1808)

The callback-leg classifier gated on `err.mcpBrand`, but the SDK declares
that brand in a `static {}` block, so it lives on the constructor and is
never reachable from an instance. The predicate always returned false, so
`findIssuerBindingFailure()` never matched and the #1808 recovery banner
was inert in production — the callback dead-ended exactly as before.

Use the SDK's own `AuthorizationServerMismatchError.isInstance()`, which is
cross-copy safe by construction (it consults a `Symbol.for()`-keyed brand
set), with a `name` fallback for a serialization boundary. Correct the
module doc, which cited cross-bundle safety as the reason to avoid
`instanceof` — the very thing the SDK's branded `hasInstance` provides.

Every fixture now constructs a real `AuthorizationServerMismatchError`
instead of a hand-rolled object with an own `mcpBrand`, which is why a
green `npm run ci` hid this. Adds a test pinning the brand's placement so
the feature cannot silently go inert again.

Review follow-ups: drop the unused `isLostAuthorizationStateError`, remove
the duplicated banner title default, resolve the banner title/action label
where the banner is raised, keep the clear-failure notification open, and
bound remote-supplied issuers in user-facing copy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 18:08:31 -04:00
Cliff Hall
01df9d81bb
fix(core): start OAuth on a modern/auto-era connect (#1805) (#1809)
* fix(core): start OAuth on a modern/auto-era connect (#1805)

The SDK's `server/discover` negotiation probe runs before anything else on
`protocolEra: "auto" | "modern"`, and its classifier reports whatever the
transport threw as `SdkError(ERA_NEGOTIATION_FAILED)` with the real error moved
to `data.cause`. That buried both connect-time auth signals: the remote path's
`AuthRecoveryRequiredError` (matched with `instanceof`, and carrying the
authorization URL) and a direct transport's `AuthChallengeError`. An
OAuth-protected server that authorized fine on the legacy era instead produced a
dead-end "Version negotiation probe failed" — no redirect, and the connection
status flipped to `error` despite `isConnectAuthRecoveryError` existing to
prevent exactly that.

- `findNestedAuthError()` walks `cause` / `data.cause` for either typed error.
  Not gated on the SDK's error code or message, so it survives rewording.
- `connect()` unwraps the rejection at the earliest point, ahead of
  `withDirectAuthRecovery` (whose `isAuthChallengeError` check is shallow), the
  outer status guard, and every client's connect error handling — so web, CLI,
  and TUI are all fixed without a client-side change.
- On the direct path, enable `interceptAuthChallenges` for the probing eras even
  with no stored tokens. Without an authProvider the 401 reaches the SDK as a raw
  `SdkHttpError`, and the classifier ignores the HTTP status (it only looks for a
  JSON-RPC error body) — so pin mode rethrew it with the 401 discarded entirely,
  no status and not even a cause for the walk to find.

Verified against a live dual-era server that answers 401 on both `initialize`
and `server/discover`: `auto` and `modern` now reject with
`AuthRecoveryRequiredError` carrying a real authorization URL. Each half of the
fix is load-bearing — reverting either fails the new integration tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013SNjAqoEhUVVkr3UStR6om

* docs(core): mark the era-probe challenge interception as a removable workaround

Per review on #1806: the `|| this.probesProtocolEra()` clause compensates for
an upstream SDK gap (modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#2561, tracked as
#1807). Make its lifespan explicit so whoever picks up #1807 knows this block
is the thing to delete, rather than having to re-derive it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt

* fix(core): resolve connect() when auth recovery is satisfied silently

Review findings on #1809:

- connect() built its handshake promise once, outside the runConnect closure
  withDirectAuthRecovery retries. On a "satisfied" outcome the recovery runs a
  complete nested connect() via reconnectAfterAuthRecovery(), so the retry leg
  re-awaited the already-rejected promise and rejected a connect() whose client
  was in fact connected. Short-circuit the retry when already connected, and
  skip the post-connect block the nested connect already ran (a duplicate
  `connect` event re-triggers every list-state manager's refresh).
- Document the accepted 403 side effect of enabling interceptAuthChallenges
  with no stored tokens, and why every `{ pin }` counts as probing.
- Replace the private-method double cast in the era-probe test with an
  observable assertion on the transport options, and split the non-auth
  failure case per era instead of a message alternation that passed either way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt

* fix(core): key the connect retry leg off attempt, bound nested recoveries

Second-pass review findings on #1809:

- The satisfied-recovery short-circuit keyed off live connection status, so an
  onclose landing between the nested connect() and the retry leg fell through
  to the rejected handshake promise and reported the stale 401 as the reason
  the session died. withDirectAuthRecovery now passes `attempt` to its
  operation, so connect() identifies the retry leg structurally and reports the
  teardown when the recovered session is already gone.
- Bound nested silent recoveries. The `attempt >= 1` guard is per-call and a
  satisfied outcome recovers via a nested connect() with a fresh counter, so a
  server that keeps rejecting freshly refreshed tokens recursed without bound.
  Counted across the nesting boundary, capped at 3.
- Strengthen the regression test (server info populated by the nested connect,
  no duplicate statusChange) and add the two missing cases: a failed reconnect
  still rejects, and the recursion bound terminates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt

* test(core): cover the recovery teardown branch; fix a duplicated case

Third-pass review findings on #1809, both about tests added in the previous
commit:

- The retry leg's teardown error had no coverage, so a regression to the old
  status fall-through would have stayed green. Covered deterministically: the
  nested connect dispatches `connect` after setting "connected", so closing the
  live transport from that listener flips the status before the retry leg runs.
  Asserts the error identity, which is the point of the change.
- "still rejects when the reconnect underneath the recovery fails" used a
  challenging transport for every connect, so it walked the same bounded chain
  as the recursion-bound test rather than covering a non-auth reconnect
  failure, and its comment claimed an "error" status the auth path never
  reaches. Now fails the reconnect with a plain error and asserts both.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016S7h83UKNQ7kvSiFDNksCt

---------

Co-authored-by: rinormaloku <rinormaloku37@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 15:06:01 -04:00
Cliff Hall
cea22d86b8
feat(web): enforce localhost-only binding; expand loopback origin allow-list (#1796)
Closes #1795.

Enforce localhost-only binding in code (the "never 0.0.0.0" rule was only a spec note): refuse an all-interfaces HOST — across every spelling the OS binds as the wildcard (inet_aton decimal/octal/hex, IPv6, IPv4-mapped, zone-scoped, IDNA/Unicode) — unless DANGEROUSLY_BIND_ALL_INTERFACES=true (Docker's sanctioned opt-in). Fixes the reported stdio-connect 403 by expanding the default loopback origin allow-list to all three interchangeable forms.

Hardening surfaced across an extended review: closes an IDNA/fullwidth wildcard bypass, a blank-ALLOWED_ORIGINS fail-open, and the CLI/TUI OAuth-callback wildcard bind (loopback-only now, RFC 8252); canonicalizes the origin allow-list the way a browser does; derives frame-ancestors from the real embedder list (IPv6-literal exclusion verified in headless Chromium); strictPort on all three bind points; and preserves the CLI exit-code map + JSON envelope through the mcp-inspector --cli launcher path. Shared host normalization lives in core/node/hostUrl.ts. Docs + tests + smokes throughout.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-07-26 22:15:10 -04:00
Bob Dickinson
33e88eac9f
CLI: catalog listing, auth flags, and OAuth browser UX (#1782)
* feat(cli): catalog listing, auth flags, and OAuth browser UX

Add servers/list and servers/show, --relogin / --stored-auth-only, browser
OAuth navigation with OSC 8 links, and extract method handlers under
clients/cli/src/handlers. Tracks #1781.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(cli): address #1782 review — relogin clear, stored-auth-only, docs

Clear both raw and normalized OAuth keys on --relogin; check the shared
store before bailing under --stored-auth-only mid-session; restore the
tests README link target; document servers/show redaction limits; keep
mcpi groundwork with TODO(#1432) markers.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(cli): gate OAuth browser open and harden #1782 review follow-ups

Arm auto-open only for CLI-owned interactive OAuth, honor MCP_AUTO_OPEN_ENABLED,
move --relogin clear after validation, skip keychain on servers/list, and cover
secret redaction after rehydrate.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(cli): silence disarmed OAuth URLs and round-3 review nits

Suppress authorize URL print when navigation is disarmed or
--stored-auth-only; document MCP_AUTO_OPEN_ENABLED; redact Cookie/auth
headers; keep servers/show unit tests off the OS keychain.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* test(cli): cover withArmedAutoOpen for the ≥90 branch gate

CI failed on cliOAuth.ts branch coverage after the auto-open arming
helper landed; exercise the armed path through runCliInteractiveOAuth.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(cli): mid-RPC unauthorized recovery and clear round-4 nits

Mirror connect's UnauthorizedError path in withCliAuthRecoveryRetry, let
MCP_AUTO_OPEN_ENABLED=true force open off-TTY, mock open-url in the
in-process runner, reject --relogin on catalog methods, restore the
__tests__ README inventory, and narrow OAuth helpers to structural client types.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(cli): reconnect after mid-RPC OAuth and finish round-5 nits

Reconnect before retrying after unauthorized recovery, guard non-OAuth
configs, decouple forceAutoOpen, move open-url mock to vitest setupFiles,
and reject --relogin with stored-auth short-circuits.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(cli): fail fast on non-TTY interactive OAuth and round-6 nits

Skip interactive OAuth without a TTY unless MCP_AUTO_OPEN_ENABLED=true;
document --stored-auth-only for CI; redact settings.metadata; reject
--relogin for stdio; clarify AuthRecoveryRequired reconnect comments.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(cli): admit interactive OAuth when stdin is a TTY (round-7)

Gate on stdin||stderr so `2>&1 | tee` still works; fold confirm/auto-open/
TTY into CliOAuthConnectOptions; rename authRequiredFailure; document
MCP_AUTO_OPEN_ENABLED=true as non-TTY admit.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(cli): fail fast on step-up without stdin (round-8)

Decline [y/N] on readline EOF/close, require a stdin TTY for the default
step-up confirmer (force-open admit is not enough), document stderr-only
browser auto-open vs stdin||stderr flow admit, and drop the alias wrapper.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(cli): allow piped step-up answers; bound silent pipes (round-9)

Drop the hard stdin-TTY gate that broke `echo y | …`. Keep EOF decline and
add a short non-TTY timeout so an open pipe that never writes cannot hang.
Clarify isTTY as admit-only; extract the readline mock factory.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(cli): keep partial piped step-up answers (round-10)

Capture readline `line` before close so `printf y` without a newline is
not treated as decline; timeout is auth_required with a distinct message;
document the 5s bound and post-confirm callback wait; pin the TTY no-timeout arm.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(cli): tighten step-up timeout messaging and TTY test (round-11)

Make the TTY no-timeout assertion use a settled flag (the Promise.race
check was vacuous), say "timed out" instead of "declined" on the pipe
bound, and document that piped answers need a newline or stdin close.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-07-26 16:55:25 -04:00
Cliff Hall
373f346e5f
chore: close quality-gate coverage gaps (#1689) (#1766)
Some checks failed
Run install, format, lint, build, and test on every push / build (push) Has been cancelled
Run install, format, lint, build, and test on every push / publish (push) Has been cancelled
Run install, format, lint, build, and test on every push / publish-github-container-registry (push) Has been cancelled
Closes #1689. Typecheck cli/tui src, add a core/ format+lint gate, and gate core/json + core/client coverage. See PR #1766 for the full review history.
2026-07-24 17:20:12 -04:00
Cliff Hall
99ef731746
Refactor / justify codebase-wide 'as unknown as' casts (#1690) (#1756)
* core: refactor serverList.ts object↔Record casts into typed helper (#1690)

Remove the four pre-existing `as unknown as Record<string, unknown>` /
`as unknown as MCPServerConfig` casts in core/mcp/serverList.ts:

- stripInspectorFields: rewrite as clone + `delete` over INSPECTOR_FIELD_KEYS.
  Every Inspector-extension key is optional on StoredMCPServer, so the result
  is still (a subtype of) MCPServerConfig with no cast.
- oauth-strip in extractSecretsFromStored: `oauth` is optional, so a plain
  `delete stripped.oauth` is legal — drop the cast.
- mcpConfigToServerEntries: route the one genuinely-needed widening through a
  single documented `toRecord(value: object)` helper. Taking `object` makes the
  single `as Record<string, unknown>` legal (no TS2352), so the double cast
  disappears from the call site.

Net: zero `as unknown as` in serverList.ts; the one remaining structural cast
lives inside the audited toRecord helper. Behavior-neutral — existing coverage
(79 serverList tests) unchanged; full `npm run ci` passes.

Closes #1690

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XNdjEPKLG637X8YmhDiEk5

* core+web+test-servers: eliminate/justify remaining `as unknown as` casts (#1690)

Codebase-wide follow-on to the serverList refactor: audit every `as unknown
as` double cast outside tests and either remove it or ensure it carries a
justifying comment (the review bar is "no *unjustified* double cast").

Removed (widened via a shared helper or narrowed to a single cast):
- Promote the serverList `toRecord(value: object)` widening helper to
  core/json/jsonUtils.ts and reuse it at core/mcp/node/config.ts (normalize
  loop), core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts (pino level dispatch), and
  clients/web/src/App.tsx (window global lookup).
- inspectorClient.rawWireRequest: type the frame as `JSONRPCRequest` and
  narrow only `params` with a single structural cast (the SDK's `_meta`-typed
  params is what blocked direct assignment).
- toolOutputValidation: SDK `outputSchema` → `JsonSchemaType` is a single cast.
- test-server-fixtures: the optional `task` handle is reachable with a single
  cast (target field is optional).

Justified in place (genuinely unavoidable — private SDK internals, partial
interface stubs, third-party/nominal bridges): the inspectorClient private-map
accesses, resourceContext + tokenAuthProvider partial `OAuthClientProvider`
stubs, the ext-apps peer bridge, modern/legacy `_requestHandlers` bypasses,
and the happy-dom `matchMedia` test mock.

Behavior-neutral. Full `npm run ci` passes (validate, ≥90 coverage gate,
smoke, Storybook).

Refs #1690

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XNdjEPKLG637X8YmhDiEk5

* address @claude review nits: consistent cast justifications + drop reflow noise (#1690)

- test-servers/src/modern-tasks.ts: add an inline justification above the
  `_requestHandlers` double cast, mirroring the sibling in
  composable-test-server.ts (was leaning on the function JSDoc only).
- Annotate the partial-`AppBridge` mock double casts in the story fixtures
  (AppsScreen ×2, AppRenderer, InspectorView) so no non-test-file double cast
  is unjustified.
- inspectorClient.ts: revert unrelated Prettier reflow hunks (protocolVersion,
  task-content array, timeout-reject wrap, reconnect guard) so the diff is the
  single rawWireRequest cast change only.

Behavior-neutral (comment/format-only). `npm run ci` green apart from a known
flaky redaction test whose assertion collided with a random request id.

Refs #1690

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XNdjEPKLG637X8YmhDiEk5

* actually revert the reflow noise this time (#1690)

The reflow reverts in cc187ea were silently undone by a `prettier --write` I
ran on the same file right after, so the four Prettier-only hunks from 6a3afa4a
were still in the diff (caught in re-review). Revert them for real now — and
without re-running Prettier on the file:

- core/mcp/inspectorClient.ts: restore the protocolVersion line, task-content
  array, timeout-reject call, and reconnect guard to their origin/v2/main form,
  so the file's diff is only the single rawWireRequest cast change.
- test-servers/src/modern-tasks.ts: restore the ModernTaskStatus union to its
  one-line form (the leading-`|` reflow was also Prettier churn), leaving only
  the new `_requestHandlers` justification comment.

Formatting-only; `npm run validate` green.

Refs #1690

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XNdjEPKLG637X8YmhDiEk5

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 09:34:32 -04:00
Bob Dickinson
a71e6d2012
Auth hardening CI gaps + SDK consolidation: EMA leg 2 / scopes (#1527) (#1725)
Some checks failed
Run install, format, lint, build, and test on every push / build (push) Has been cancelled
Run install, format, lint, build, and test on every push / publish (push) Has been cancelled
Run install, format, lint, build, and test on every push / publish-github-container-registry (push) Has been cancelled
Close #1527 acceptance gaps with automated tests (SEP-2468 iss, SEP-2207 offline_access, SEP-2351 discovery shapes, SEP-2352 AS-migration, EraNegotiationFailed→401 unwrap); lean EMA leg 2 and scope helpers on the v2 SDK; drop deprecated TS baseUrl. Reviewed LGTM.
2026-07-19 22:36:21 -04:00
Cliff Hall
7fecebed5e
OAuth: re-key store to (server, issuer) + SEP-837/2350/2352 auth UX (#1694)
Some checks failed
Run install, format, lint, build, and test on every push / build (push) Has been cancelled
Run install, format, lint, build, and test on every push / publish (push) Has been cancelled
Run install, format, lint, build, and test on every push / publish-github-container-registry (push) Has been cancelled
* OAuth: re-key store to (server, issuer) + SEP-837/2350/2352 auth UX (#1625)

Re-key the persisted OAuth store to (server, issuer) and add the
SEP-837/2350/2352 authorization-hardening UX. The SDK v2 auth() drives the
SEP-2352 flow off the provider's ctx.issuer; the Inspector's job is to honor it
and round-trip the issuer stamp.

SEP-2352 — issuer-bound credentials
- ServerOAuthState nests issuer-bound credentials under
  byIssuer[issuer] = { clientInformation, clientRegistrationKind, tokens }, with
  an activeIssuer pointer answering the transport's ctx-less per-request bearer
  read.
- Fix a latent bug: OAuthStorageBase re-parsed tokens/client-info through
  OAuthTokensSchema/OAuthClientInformationSchema, which strip the non-RFC
  `issuer` field and silently defeat the SDK's discardIfIssuerMismatch. The
  store re-attaches the stamp from the byIssuer key.
- BaseOAuthClientProvider threads ctx.issuer and implements
  discoveryState()/saveDiscoveryState() (activates the SDK's callback-leg
  AuthorizationServerMismatchError binding check) and invalidateCredentials().
- Lazy, migration-free upgrade: a legacy pre-1625 blob's top-level
  clientInformation/tokens are returned as an unkeyed fallback until the first
  issuer-stamped save promotes them into byIssuer.

SEP-837 — application_type
- DCR declares application_type: "native" (localhost Inspector).
- ClientSettingsForm renders RegistrationRejectedError detail and reflects DCR's
  deprecated-in-favor-of-CIMD (SEP-991) status.

SEP-2350 — step-up scope union
- Per-server onInsufficientScope (reauthorize | throw) setting wired
  ServerSettingsForm -> StoredMCPServer.oauth -> StreamableHTTPClientTransport.
- StepUpAuthModal visualizes the prior-union-challenged scope set, tagging each
  scope `new` vs `already granted`.

mcpAuth simplification
- Delete the hand-rolled authorizeWithoutRefresh (mishandled issuer stamping);
  forward forceReauthorization/skipIssuerMetadataValidation to native SDK auth()
  so both the initial and step-up paths get SEP-2352 stamping.

Vocabulary + docs
- OAuthStep gains cimd_fetch / issuer_comparison / scope_step_up (recorded on a
  step-up redirect); the Network tab labels auth requests by OAuth phase.
- v2_auth_hardening.md gains an as-built status section.

Deferred to the era-aware card: the SdkError(EraNegotiationFailed) ->
UnauthorizedError unwrap and finishAuth(URLSearchParams) form (only fire under
non-legacy negotiation).

Closes #1625

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address @claude review: issuer-stamp source gating + clear/activeIssuer + phase over-match

- SEP-2352: stamp the issuer only when the credential actually came from the
  byIssuer slot (`fromSlot`), not merely when a slot exists. A partially-populated
  slot alongside a surviving legacy field would otherwise stamp a legacy (possibly
  cross-AS) credential with the current issuer, defeating discardIfIssuerMismatch.
- Issuer-scoped clears no longer promote the cleared issuer to `activeIssuer`
  (updateIssuerSlot gains a `setActive` flag; save paths keep the promotion).
- oauthNetworkPhase matches register/token/authorize as the final path segment
  (trailing slash tolerated) so `/token/refresh` or `/api/register/foo` no longer
  over-match.
- Tests for all three.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-16 16:52:53 -04:00
cliffhall
f4fb4b50c9 Forward RFC 9207 iss to the v2 SDK (fixes OAuth + EMA leg 1)
SDK v2 added RFC 9207 §2.4 authorization-response issuer validation
(`validateAuthorizationResponseIssuer` / `IssuerMismatchError`) as a mix-up
attack defense. It is strict: when AS metadata advertises
`authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true` and no `iss` reaches
`exchangeAuthorization`/`auth()`, the exchange throws.

v1.29.0 had no `iss` parameter and no RFC 9207 validation at all, so dropping
the callback `iss` was harmless. The migration swapped in the stricter SDK
without feeding it the new input, breaking the authorization-code exchange
against any RFC 9207 authorization server (Okta/xaa.dev advertise it):

    Issuer mismatch in authorization response (RFC 9207):
    expected "https://idp.xaa.dev", received undefined

Found by smoke-testing EMA against live xaa.dev staging; not caught by CI
because the mock IdP never advertised the parameter, so the SDK took its
lenient path (a missing `iss` is only fatal when advertised).

`iss` was dropped in three places, with the plumbing half-built —
`oauthManager`/`inspectorClient` already accepted `iss`, but nothing supplied
or forwarded it:

- `parseOAuthCallbackParams` never extracted `iss` from the callback query
- `mcpAuth` never forwarded `options.iss` to SDK `auth()` — its own comment
  ("forwarded on v2 upgrade; ignored by v1 SDK auth()") predicted this exact
  gap, so standard OAuth was broken identically, not just EMA
- EMA leg 1 (`completeIdpOidcAuthorization`) never passed `iss` to
  `exchangeAuthorization`

Thread `iss` end to end: callback query -> CallbackParams -> resumeAfterOAuth
-> completeOAuthFlow -> {mcpAuth | EMA leg 1} -> SDK. The Node callback server
and runner carry it for CLI/TUI.

Tests: `ema-mock-servers.ts` now advertises
`authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true` so the mock is at least
as strict as real IdPs — with it absent the SDK silently takes the lenient path
and a dropped `iss` goes unnoticed. Flipping it made three existing tests
reproduce the failure. Adds regression coverage for forwarding and for
rejecting a mismatched `iss` before any network call.

Verified end to end against live xaa.dev staging: EMA legs 1-3 (IdP SSO ->
ID-JAG mint -> resource token) now complete and the MCP session initializes.

web 3099, cli 212, tui 274 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VjMemXZohSR2EndBQYif2b
2026-07-15 20:16:43 -04:00
cliffhall
f9f79fff54 Address @claude review: format core/, typed output-validation error, document progress heuristic
- Run Prettier on the 60 core/ files this PR touched — the deterministic
  import rewrite had collapsed multi-line imports and left throws unwrapped;
  core/ is in no format gate so it slipped past CI. Now Prettier-clean.
- Default-path output-schema violation now throws
  ProtocolError(ProtocolErrorCode.InvalidParams, …) instead of a bare Error,
  matching the prior v1 contract (SDK threw a typed McpError with a code) so
  downstream `instanceof`/`.code` branching keeps working.
- Document the "assumes serial construction" invariant on pollTaskToolCall's
  progress-subscription revival (the `_progressHandlers` new-key heuristic).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 11:08:54 -04:00
cliffhall
19a6df7ad3 SDK v2 migration (behavior-neutral, versionNegotiation: 'legacy') (#1624)
Migrate all three clients + core + test-servers from
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.29 to SDK v2 (2.0.0-beta.4), keeping behavior
identical against legacy (2025-11-25) servers. Foundation for the SDK V2 +
New Spec stack.

Packages
- Split @modelcontextprotocol/sdk -> @modelcontextprotocol/client (Client,
  transports, OAuth, error taxonomy, protocol types) + core (Zod schemas);
  stdio -> client/stdio, Ajv -> client/validators/ajv. Test-servers ->
  @modelcontextprotocol/server (+ server-legacy/sse). Deterministic import
  rewrite (schemas -> core, everything else -> client); the codemod misroutes
  client code to /server so it was not used for path routing.
- new Client(..., { versionNegotiation: { mode: 'legacy' } }) — nothing
  2026-era goes on the wire.

Runtime (core/mcp/inspectorClient.ts)
- Error taxonomy: McpError -> ProtocolError, ErrorCode -> ProtocolErrorCode;
  RequestTimeout -> SdkError/SdkErrorCode.
- Handlers take method strings; task methods (tasks/*, notifications/tasks/*)
  use the 3-arg custom form (excluded from v2's spec-method set).
- Legacy tasks kept working (per project requirement): requestor tasks re-
  implemented over raw client.request + explicit deprecated schemas;
  experimental.tasks.callToolStream replaced by a local pollTaskToolCall
  async generator (with _progressHandlers revival so task-execution progress
  still reaches the caller). Receiver (server-initiated) tasks: the v2 Client
  validates a sampling/elicit handler result and rejects the legacy { task }
  response with -32602 — installReceiverTaskResponseBypass swaps the wrapped
  entry in the private _requestHandlers map for the task-augmented branch so
  { task } reaches the wire (fixes server-initiated sampling-via-task).
- Pagination: list verbs use raw client.request({method}, List*ResultSchema)
  for single-page behavior (v2's client.listX() auto-aggregate all pages).

Web / auth / apps
- Rename local JsonSchemaType -> InspectorFormSchema + add toFormSchema()
  structural narrowing at the SDK-schema -> form boundary.
- ext-apps still peers on SDK v1: one compat boundary with documented casts
  (remove when ext-apps#702 lands a v2 peer).
- OAuth provider saveClientInformation reconciled with v2's
  OAuthClientInformationContext; InvalidClientMetadataError re-homed as a
  local class (server-legacy/auth is not browser-safe).
- vitest.shared.mts dedupes @modelcontextprotocol/client+core to one copy so
  vi.mock intercepts the SUT's import.

Accepted v2 behavior changes (per #1624 / spec §9.2): unknown-tool call
rejects with -32602; cancellation is stream-abort (no guaranteed
notifications/cancelled frame); output-schema strictness restored via the
Inspector's own Ajv check on the default path.

npm run ci green: validate (web 3087 / cli 212 / tui 274 / launcher 5),
coverage (>=90 per-file, all clients), smoke (launcher/cli/web), storybook
(410).

Closes #1624

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 10:44:24 -04:00
Cliff Hall
a029e42a19
cli: Wave 3 — programmatic review path (rollup of #1573–#1575) (#1655)
* feat(cli): programmatic ergonomics — initialize, tool-args-json, connect-timeout, env-var fixes

Adds the #1573 programmatic-ergonomics surface to the CLI, re-implemented
informed by PR #1510 and adapted to the v2/main OAuth-wired cli.ts:

- `--method initialize` — connect-only probe emitting
  `{serverInfo, protocolVersion, capabilities, instructions}`.
- `--tool-args-json '{"k":"v"}'` — tool args passed verbatim as JSON (no
  key=value coercion); mutually exclusive with `--tool-arg`, with clear
  errors for combined use, malformed JSON, and non-object values.
- `--connect-timeout <ms>` — default 15000 for ad-hoc `--server-url`/target
  runs, file-level timeout otherwise; `0` disables. Backed by the exported
  `withConnectTimeout()` helper.
- MCP_CATALOG_PATH is ignored when an ad-hoc target is given, so a shell that
  exports it can still run one-off ad-hoc invocations.
- MCP_STORAGE_DIR is honored by core `getStateFilePath` (`<dir>/oauth.json`),
  below the per-file MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH override.

Tests: new programmatic-ergonomics.test.ts (CLI, in-process runCli + direct
withConnectTimeout unit tests) and getStateFilePath resolution cases in the
web storage integration suite. Per-file coverage gate stays ≥90.
README: documents the new flags and env-var semantics.

Closes #1573

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BrihGWcrM9JGRyu41nzZYw

* feat(cli): --app-info probe + --format json envelope

Adds the #1574 app-probing and machine-readable output surface, re-implemented
informed by PR #1510 and adapted to the v2/main OAuth-wired cli.ts.

- `--method tools/call --tool-name <t> --app-info` — prints one JSON line
  describing the tool's app posture (hasApp, resourceUri, csp, permissions,
  domain, …) WITHOUT invoking the tool; exit 0 when it has an app, 2 (no_app)
  when it doesn't. A missing tool exits 5 (tool_not_found) — distinct from the
  no-app exit so a typo isn't mistaken for "no app".
- `--method tools/list --app-info` — one NDJSON line per tool over a single
  connection (`| jq -c 'select(.hasApp)'`).
- `--format json` — a single stdout envelope (`{result}` plus `{appInfo}` as a
  sibling key for App tools), no banner, so any method pipes into jq.
- A tools/call returning isError:true now exits 5 (tool_is_error) after
  printing its payload, so && chains stop on a failed call.

Implementation: `collectAppInfo()` (core `extractAppInfo` + a tolerated
resource read that reports `resourceError`), an NDJSON loop in tools/list, and
a single `emitResult()` that owns format + exit-code handling. `runMethod` now
returns a `MethodOutcome` discriminated union so the NDJSON path can signal
"already emitted".

Tests: app-info.test.ts (exit-0/2/5 + NDJSON + no-invoke), format-json.test.ts
(envelope shapes + bad --format), emit-result.test.ts (direct unit coverage of
the isError→exit-5 and resourceError branches via exported emitResult/
collectAppInfo). Updated the tools.test "nonexistent tool" case to the new
exit-5 tool_not_found contract. Per-file coverage ≥90 on all four dimensions
(cli.ts 100% stmts/funcs/lines). README documents the flags, NDJSON shape, and
exit semantics.

Closes #1574

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BrihGWcrM9JGRyu41nzZYw

* feat(cli): stored-auth suite — --use-stored-auth, --wait-for-auth, --list-stored-auth, --print-handoff

Adds the #1575 web→CLI OAuth handoff surface, re-implemented informed by PR
#1510 and adapted to v2/main.

- `--use-stored-auth` — read the shared oauth.json and inject
  `Authorization: Bearer <token>` for --server-url; exit 3 (no_stored_token),
  listing stored keys, when none matches.
- `--wait-for-auth <sec>` — poll oauth.json (500ms) until a token for
  --server-url appears, then proceed; timeout → exit 3 (auth_wait_timeout).
- `--list-stored-auth` — print `{oauthStatePath, storedServerUrls}` and exit
  (short-circuit, no connect).
- `--print-handoff` — emit `{serverUrl, deepLink, portForwardCmd,
  oauthStatePath, apiToken, note}` for --server-url and exit.

Adaptations vs. the reference:
- State-path resolution reuses core `getStateFilePath()` (the
  MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH → <MCP_STORAGE_DIR>/oauth.json → default
  precedence added in #1573) instead of a CLI-local resolver.
- The state file is read through the shared isomorphic
  `parseOAuthPersistBlob`, so both the plain `{servers,idpSessions}` layout the
  web backend writes and the legacy `{state,version}` envelope are accepted.
- `parseArgs` now returns a ParseResult union so the short-circuit modes return
  without a server connection.

Blind injection: the token is passed as-is; a stale one surfaces as HTTP 401 →
exit 3. Documented in the README along with all four flags, the state-path
precedence, and a follow-up note that --print-handoff's deepLink shape is
interim pending #1576's canonical handoff format.

Tests: stored-auth.test.ts drives injection, --header coexistence, missing
--server-url, no-token exit-3, URL-normalisation matching, MCP_STORAGE_DIR
resolution, listing, handoff (+note), wait-for-auth polling/timeout, and
normalizeServerUrl units — all against a real in-process HTTP test server.
Per-file coverage ≥90 on all four dimensions (cli.ts 100% stmts/funcs/lines).

Closes #1575

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BrihGWcrM9JGRyu41nzZYw

* docs(core): scope MCP_STORAGE_DIR comment in getStateFilePath to the OAuth backend

Address review of PR #1651: the doc comment claimed MCP_STORAGE_DIR was
honoured "across the app, so setting it once points every persist backend at
the same directory", but the branch only relocates oauth.json. Narrow the
comment to state it is OAuth-backend-only (client.json/mcp.json still resolve
from getDefaultStorageDir → HOME) and record why the resolution lives here
rather than in getDefaultStorageDir (the default-path constant is evaluated at
module load, so a runtime-set MCP_STORAGE_DIR — as the CLI stored-auth /
--wait-for-auth flows set it — must be read at call time). Comment-only; no
behavior change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BrihGWcrM9JGRyu41nzZYw

* review(cli): per-tool-tolerant app-info listing + drop dead helper (PR #1653)

Address review of PR #1653:

- collectAppInfo now never throws: a malformed `_meta.ui.resourceUri`
  (extractAppInfo throws) folds into `{hasApp:false, resourceError}` just like a
  resources/read failure. This makes `tools/list --app-info` per-tool tolerant —
  one bad tool no longer aborts the whole NDJSON listing with a generic exit-1.
  Guarding inside collectAppInfo (vs. a loop-local try/catch) keeps the branch
  unit-testable; added an emit-result.test.ts case for the malformed-URI path.
- Documented that `tools/list --app-info` always emits NDJSON regardless of
  `--format` (the per-tool list shape is fixed; --format json only reshapes the
  single-result paths) — in both the code comment and the README.
- Removed the now-unused `expectJsonError` helper (its only caller moved to the
  exit-5 tool_not_found contract).

Coverage stays ≥90 on all four dimensions (cli.ts 100% stmts/funcs/lines).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BrihGWcrM9JGRyu41nzZYw

* review(cli): stored-auth follow-ups — TODO(#1576), wait-for-auth guard test, docs (PR #1655)

Address review of PR #1655:

- Added an explicit TODO(#1576) on buildHandoff's deepLink: `transport:"http"`
  is hardcoded even for SSE, and `autoConnect=<token>` is not one of the three
  token sources the web app reads (per CLAUDE.md) — both to be reconciled with
  #1576's canonical handoff format.
- Added a test for `--wait-for-auth` without `--server-url`, covering the
  previously-untested `--wait-for-auth` arm of the shared missing-server-url
  guard's message ternary.
- Documented that `--list-stored-auth` / `--print-handoff` are mutually
  exclusive short-circuit modes (list takes precedence) and that a stored
  refresh_token is not yet used (noted as a follow-up in code + README).

No behavior change; coverage stays ≥90 on all four dimensions (cli.ts 100%
stmts/funcs/lines).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BrihGWcrM9JGRyu41nzZYw

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 22:14:23 -04:00
cliffhall
32a3610737 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/v2/main' into 1579-wave-1
# Conflicts:
#	clients/cli/package-lock.json
#	clients/cli/package.json
#	clients/web/src/App.tsx
#	clients/web/src/lib/environmentFactory.test.ts
#	clients/web/src/lib/environmentFactory.ts
#	clients/web/src/lib/remoteOAuthStorage.test.ts
#	clients/web/src/lib/remoteOAuthStorage.ts
#	clients/web/src/test/core/auth/connection-state.test.ts
#	clients/web/src/test/core/auth/providers.test.ts
#	clients/web/src/test/core/auth/storage-browser.test.ts
#	clients/web/src/test/core/auth/storage-remote.test.ts
#	clients/web/src/test/core/mcp/oauthManager.test.ts
#	clients/web/src/test/integration/auth/node/storage.test.ts
#	clients/web/src/test/integration/storage/adapters.test.ts
#	clients/web/src/utils/clearServerOAuthState.test.ts
#	clients/web/src/utils/clearServerOAuthState.ts
#	core/auth/connection-state.ts
#	core/auth/oauth-storage.ts
#	core/auth/providers.ts
#	core/auth/storage.ts
#	core/auth/store.ts
#	core/storage/adapters/remote-storage.ts
2026-07-09 09:41:08 -04:00
cliffhall
1e6a2825d4 fix(auth): keep oauth-persist browser-safe (move Node file backend out)
The refactor routed the browser's RemoteOAuthStorage through
`oauth-persist.ts`, which value-imported the Node-only `store-io.js`
(`atomically` -> `stubborn-fs` -> `node:process.getuid`, plus
`node:fs/promises`). That dragged Node built-ins into the browser bundle
and the web app crashed to a blank page at runtime — a regression from
v2/main, where browser OAuth storage used a Zustand JSON adapter with no
Node imports. Unit/integration tests run in node/happy-dom and
`smoke:web` only checks the served HTML, so none of them execute the app
in a real browser and the break slipped through.

Fix, following the existing `store-id.ts` precedent:
- Split the pure JSON (de)serializers into Node-free
  `core/storage/store-serialize.ts`; `store-io.ts` re-exports them so
  existing importers are unaffected.
- Move the Node-only `createFileOAuthPersistBackend` into
  `core/auth/node/oauth-persist-file.ts`; update `storage-node.ts` and
  the storage adapters test to import from there.
- `oauth-persist.ts` now imports only the Node-free serializers, so the
  browser bundle no longer pulls in `node:fs`/`atomically`.

Tests:
- oauth-persist-browser-safe.test.ts: source-level guard that
  `oauth-persist.ts` never imports store-io/node:/atomically.
- Direct unit tests for the isomorphic remote + session backends
  (restoring oauth-persist.ts coverage after the file backend moved out).
- store.test.ts: OAuthMemoryStore unit coverage incl. replace() fallbacks.
- storage.test.ts: clearAllOAuthClientState null-snapshot (no file) path.

Verified end-to-end in a real browser (Playwright): DCR OAuth flow
completes, tokens persist via the remote store, and after a full page
reload the server reconnects with no re-authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 16:20:31 -04:00
cliffhall
54d5b18b1e fix(auth): drop redundant empty-object guard in remote OAuth read()
parseOAuthPersistBlob already returns null for {} (the server's
missing-file response) and for a literal null body, so the
Object.keys(store).length === 0 guard was redundant — and would throw a
TypeError on a null body before parseOAuthPersistBlob could handle it.
Pass the parsed res.json() straight through.

Addresses Claude review item #1 on #1612.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 13:54:14 -04:00
cliffhall
edc7dbb1c1 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/v2/main' into v2/1549-oauth-storage-no-zustand
# Conflicts:
#	core/auth/store.ts
2026-07-08 13:44:12 -04:00
cliffhall
ba48e06ffd fix(auth): guard OAuth-storage async paths against unhandled rejections
Review follow-ups on the RemoteOAuthStorage web migration:

- useEmaIdpLoginState.logout(): add a .catch to the now-async
  clearEmaIdpSession call so a storage failure no longer surfaces as an
  unhandled rejection; leave loginState unchanged on failure (the session
  was not actually cleared). Add a test asserting no unhandled rejection.
- createOAuthStore: attach a no-op catch to the eager persistLoadPromise
  so a hydration read that fails before any load() awaits it does not
  become an unhandled rejection; real awaiters still observe the rejection
  via the shared reference.
- storage-remote.test: replace `as unknown as typeof fetch` double-casts
  with the typed vi.fn<typeof fetch>() pattern the same PR established.
- remoteOAuthStorage: correct the doc comment to describe the cache-of-one
  accurately instead of implying a keyed map.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 10:59:40 -04:00
Bob Dickinson
af174666d6 fix(auth): address Claude review on OAuth persist serialization
Serialize persist() in OAuthStorageBase so overlapping remote POSTs cannot
reorder and clobber state. Regenerate launcher package-lock.json to drop
stale zustand entries. Let parseOAuthPersistBlob accept parsed objects
from res.json() without a redundant JSON round-trip.
2026-07-05 18:38:13 -07:00
Bob Dickinson
3c65bdb4c6 Removed Zustand storage, cleanup up auth storage IO interfaces, implementations, and usage. 2026-07-04 21:56:45 -07:00
Bob Dickinson
512f45d357 fix(auth): reject load() when persist read fails 2026-07-03 14:50:04 -07:00
cliffhall
cfbdfdf2bd Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/v2/main' into 1579-wave-1
# Conflicts:
#	AGENTS.md
#	clients/cli/README.md
#	clients/web/src/App.test.tsx
#	clients/web/src/App.tsx
#	clients/web/src/test/core/auth/utils.test.ts
#	core/mcp/node/transport.ts
#	test-servers/src/composable-test-server.ts
2026-07-03 17:39:07 -04:00
Bob Dickinson
a24091484c fix(auth): await OAuth storage load() to fix remote OAuth races 2026-07-03 14:18:00 -07:00
cliffhall
f4b6095719 test: close ≥90% per-file coverage gaps for mid-session auth
The mid-session auth work passed `validate`/CI but failed the local-only
`npm run test:coverage` per-file gate (≥90% lines/statements/functions/
branches) on 12 files. Add targeted unit/integration tests so every changed
file clears the gate; annotate provably-dead defensive branches with justified
`/* v8 ignore */` comments rather than relaxing the gate.

Files brought to ≥90 on all four dimensions:
- core/auth: mcpAuth, oauthUx, utils, challenge, node/runner-interactive-oauth
- core/mcp: oauthManager, inspectorClient, node/authChallengeFetch,
  remote/remoteClientTransport, remote/node/{remote-session,server}
- clients/web/src/utils: oauthResume, browserTabVisibility

`npm run test:coverage` now passes (3575 tests, 0 threshold failures);
`npm run validate` green across all four clients.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DZyeWManYTvcXxjcrhxSQc
2026-07-03 12:54:37 -04:00
Bob Dickinson
a066873e37 Fixes for remaining issues 2026-07-02 18:36:44 -07:00
Bob Dickinson
52023ff1c3 fix(auth): clear OAuth callback timer and reorder EMA scope persist
Clear the loopback callback timeout in runner-interactive-oauth finally
so already_authorized and error paths do not hang the CLI/TUI. Check EMA
step-up satisfaction against minted token scope before persisting the
requested union, matching the standard OAuth path.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-07-02 17:55:34 -07:00
Bob Dickinson
562bdd00f1 All of the mid-session and step-up auth work 2026-07-02 16:35:31 -07:00
cliffhall
588fc3f8ea docs(auth): note getClientRegistrationKind's hydration invariant like getScope
Round-3 @claude review of #1592 (optional nit): getClientRegistrationKind is
the other synchronous getter that, like getScope, is safe only because its
sole caller (buildOAuthConnectionState) awaits getClientInformation/
getServerMetadata first, flushing hydration before this runs on the
post-redirect callback path. Add a docstring mirroring getScope's so a future
refactor doesn't read it without a preceding awaited storage read.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S3fTN8H3R8YV4yUGvZjYnX
2026-07-01 19:31:10 -04:00
cliffhall
4e149719bd fix(auth): route clearClientInformation through clearAfterHydration too
Round-2 @claude review of #1592 caught a seventh member of the clear
family that the first pass missed: clearClientInformation still wrote to
the store synchronously, carrying the same pre-hydration clobber risk the
clearAfterHydration helper was written for (a clear before hydration lands
persists a near-empty blob, overwriting the whole on-disk oauth.json).
Wrap its mutation the same way and add a clear-before-hydration test
proving a sibling token (and thus every other server's blob) survives.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S3fTN8H3R8YV4yUGvZjYnX
2026-07-01 19:26:25 -04:00
cliffhall
8c10b8eb8e fix(auth): make clear* hydration-safe, migrate raw-key blobs, doc keepalive/memo caveats
Address round-1 @claude review of #1592:

- OAuthStorageBase.clear* no longer mutate the pre-hydration (empty) store —
  a clear issued before hydration is deferred until it lands, so it merges
  onto the real persisted state instead of (a) being resurrected by the late
  rehydrate merge or (b) persisting a near-empty blob that clobbers every
  other server's on-disk credential. Already-hydrated clears stay synchronous.
- store.setServerState migrates a pre-normalization raw-key blob onto the
  canonical key on first partial write (was: shadowed it with a fresh
  canonical entry, orphaning the raw blob's other fields). clearServerState
  now also drops the raw-key orphan.
- Document the keepalive 64KB combined-body ceiling on the remote-storage
  write, the getRemoteOAuthStorage memo key intentionally omitting fetchFn,
  and the real ordering invariant behind the sync getScope.
- Tests for the clear-before-hydration and raw-key-migration paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S3fTN8H3R8YV4yUGvZjYnX
2026-07-01 19:20:49 -04:00
cliffhall
c299b6e9d8 feat(web): migrate OAuth store to shared /store API (RemoteOAuthStorage parity) (closes #1548)
Migrate the web client's OAuth storage from BrowserOAuthStorage
(sessionStorage) to RemoteOAuthStorage, which POSTs through the backend's
/api/storage/oauth route to ~/.mcp-inspector/storage/oauth.json (mode 0600).
A credential obtained in the browser is now the same blob the TUI/CLI read
on the same host, giving web ⇄ TUI ⇄ CLI parity (Wave 1 of #1579).

Core (shared with TUI/CLI):
- OAuthStorageBase now drives a single async hydration (`ready()`,
  `getHydrationError()`); every post-redirect read (getClientInformation,
  getTokens, getCodeVerifier, getServerMetadata, getIdpSession) and every
  save awaits it so a late hydration merge cannot clobber a fresh write.
  getCodeVerifier/getServerMetadata become async; the store is created with
  skipHydration:true so there is no auto-hydration to race the explicit one.
- store.ts adds normalizeServerUrl so a token saved under
  https://Example.com/mcp is found when the CLI asks for
  https://example.com/mcp/; getServerState falls back to the raw key.
- remote-storage adapter POSTs with keepalive so the write survives the
  OAuth authorize redirect, surfaces swallowed persist failures, and gives
  richer read/write error messages.
- generateOAuthState throws instead of silently degrading to Math.random.
- NodeOAuthStorage honors MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH for isolated
  fixtures. Provider codeVerifier()/getServerMetadata() + the EMA idpOidc and
  connection-state readers await the now-async storage.

Web:
- environmentFactory + a new shared lib/remoteOAuthStorage accessor
  (memoized per {baseUrl, authToken}) wire RemoteOAuthStorage into the
  connection path, the EMA IdP hook, and the per-server "clear OAuth" action
  so all three share one in-memory view of oauth.json.

Tests: async-hydration + normalizeServerUrl suite, keepalive/error-path
coverage, and the sync→async migration across existing storage/provider/EMA
tests. Web validate + coverage gate + integration suite green; CLI/TUI/
launcher validate green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S3fTN8H3R8YV4yUGvZjYnX
2026-07-01 18:39:17 -04:00
Bob Dickinson
13dafe457b
Guided-auth removal, OAuth smoke testing, and TUI/CLI support (#1531)
* refactor(web): update OAuth E2E tests to use new authentication method

- Replaced `runGuidedAuth` with `authenticate` in the InspectorClient OAuth end-to-end tests to support quick authentication with CIMD pre-registration.
- Updated comments to reflect the change in authentication method and its support for HTTP test metadata URLs.
- Ensured that the tests continue to validate the expected authorization URL after the change.

Additionally, imported `ensureCimdClientRegistration` in the OAuthManager to streamline client registration during the authentication process.

* Guided-auth removal, OAuth smoke testing, and TUI/CLI support

* Added CLI OAuth runner flags tests

* Added clarifying comment on port 0 binding

* README notes on TUI oauth callback port, prettier fixes for CLI tests

* CIMD validation uses inline like EMA IdP

* Fixed TUI test failures from merge

* test: bring 5 OAuth files over the 90 per-file coverage gate

The guided-auth-removal work added/touched several files that fell below
the repo's >=90 per-file coverage gate (npm run coverage). CI doesn't run
the gate (it's local-only), so validate + test:integration passed while
these gaps slipped through. Bring them all back over the line:

- core/auth/node/runner-oauth-callback.ts: test bad-URL/non-http-scheme
  throws, no-port->80 default, and IPv6 hostname bracketing. Annotate the
  provably-dead guards (empty host, out-of-range port, String(err)
  fallback, pathname "/" fallback) -- all rejected by new URL() upstream --
  with justified v8 ignore comments instead of lowering the gate.
- core/auth/cimd.ts: test the AS-doesn't-support-CIMD early return.
- core/react/useClientSettingsDraft.ts: test the functional-updater path,
  the stale-onChange-after-close prev===null guard, and the
  timer-fires-after-close value===null guard.
- ClientSettingsForm.tsx: test the CIMD checkbox toggle and CIMD URL clear.
- clients/tui/src/utils/oauthDisplay.ts: test static/dcr registration
  kinds, the expired IdP session, and the configured-scope/empty-scope
  branches of formatScopes.

npm run coverage now passes (exit 0) across web, cli, tui, launcher.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-29 15:35:51 -04:00
Cliff Hall
c96db0402e
test: raise per-file coverage gate to 90 across all clients (closes #1271) (#1532)
* test(web): audit branch-coverage outliers, raise per-file gate to 70 (#1271)

The web per-file coverage gate had drifted red: the recently-landed EMA
auth feature (core/auth/ema/*) and ClientSettings components shipped
undertested, and the prior 50% branch floor let business-logic branches
go untested. CI does not run the coverage gate, so this accumulated.

Add tests to bring every failing file above the gate and push branch
coverage well past 70 across the board, then raise the per-file branches
threshold 50 -> 70 in clients/web/vite.config.ts.

- EMA core (emaFlow, resourceContext, jwt, wire): 50-88% -> 86-100% branch
- EMA OIDC/transport (idpOidc, tokenEndpoint, transportProvider): -> 97-100%
- oauthManager / discovery: 73-83% -> 88-92%
- ClientSettingsModal/Form, ConnectionInfoContent: 0-88% -> 96-100%
- useClientSettingsDraft / useEmaIdpLoginState hooks: 20% -> 100%
- TaskStatusBadge / SortableServerCard outliers: 50% -> 100%

Coverable branches reached by mocking useComputedColorScheme (dark theme),
dnd-kit useSortable (isDragging), and fetch/OIDC paths. Remaining sub-100
branches are genuinely-unreachable defensive guards or happy-dom-inherent
(portal / useMediaQuery / typeof window) and documented in test comments.

No source files changed. Global web branch coverage 88.73% -> 90.63%.
AGENTS.md updated; cli/tui/launcher stay at 50 (out of scope).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: raise per-file coverage gate to 90/90/90/90 across all clients

Follows the #1271 web branch-coverage audit (50 -> 70) by raising the
whole per-file gate to >=90 on all four dimensions — lines, statements,
functions, branches — for web, cli, tui, and launcher (core/ is measured
under the web suite). A codebase-wide audit added real tests for every
outlier and brought global coverage up across the board.

Config: all four vitest/vite coverage configs set to 90/90/90/90.
Two pure-type modules (core/mcp/import/types.ts, clients/web/server/
types.ts) added to the web coverage exclude list, matching the existing
type-only exclusions.

Tests: ~50 test files extended/created across core (auth, ema, mcp,
remote, state, storage, react), web components/screens/server, and the
cli/tui clients. Highlights: full EMA OAuth flow + transport coverage,
inspectorClient/remote server backfill, every Mantine control's handler
branches, and the cli unsupported-method / argv-fallback paths.

Genuinely-unreachable branches are annotated at the source with justified
`/* v8 ignore -- <reason> */` comments rather than lowering the gate:
happy-dom-inherent paths (Mantine portal, useMediaQuery, typeof window
SSR guards), React StrictMode effect replay, and provably-dead defensive
guards (?? fallbacks the types make impossible, Select.onChange values
outside the allowed list). No runtime logic changed; the only structural
edits are two behavior-preserving refactors (ResourceTemplatePanel hoists
the field value to a local so the ignore applies in JSX; ToolsScreen
swaps a ternary for an if) and prettier line-wrapping.

Also fixed a flaky real-timer debounce assertion in PromptArgumentsForm
(asserted an exact sibling-typing interleaving that raced the 300ms
debounce; now asserts the load-bearing fact — a non-empty fire-time
sibling capture).

AGENTS.md updated to describe the uniform 90 gate and the v8-ignore
policy. All four client coverage gates, root validate, storybook (370),
and smoke pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(web): make connect-crash SSE reader stop on the terminal event

`readSseEvents` looped until the server closed the stream (`done`). The
server closes the events stream immediately after writing the terminal
`transport_error`, but under the heavy parallel scheduler pressure of a
full `coverage` run (v8 instrumentation across all workers) that close
can lag far enough behind the event to trip the 30s test timeout — a
hang, not a wrong result. This made the test intermittently fail under
`npm run coverage` (it passed in isolation and under CI's lighter
`test:integration`).

Stop reading as soon as the terminal `transport_error` event arrives
(cancelling the reader) instead of waiting only for `done`. That event is
always the last one the session queue emits, so nothing is lost, and the
test no longer depends on stream-close timing. The `done` break is kept
for any stream that closes first.

Verified green across two consecutive full `npm run test:coverage` runs
(3094 tests) where it previously hung, plus isolation (~0.5s).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-27 15:26:03 -04:00
Bob Dickinson
5de4e911e3
feat(web,core): enterprise-managed authorization (EMA) (#1509) (#1512)
Adds enterprise-managed authorization (EMA): browser-side IdP login + RFC 8693 token-exchange and JWT-bearer resource-token mint, per-server EMA opt-in in Server Settings, IdP config in Client Settings, and IdP clientSecret keychain storage. Includes the v2/main merge and review follow-ups (400 on malformed client config; normalizeIdpIssuer import consolidation).
2026-06-24 22:15:12 -04:00
Cliff Hall
98192fd86e
fix(auth): persist OAuth pre-redirect Network log across the redirect (#1384) (#1385)
* feat(auth): inject MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN into served index.html (#1378)

Reloading the web client at the bare URL (no `?MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN=…`
query string) with empty sessionStorage made every `/api/*` request 401 —
the browser had no way to recover the backend's auth token.

Embed the token into `index.html` on every page load so the browser no
longer depends on the query string surviving navigation:

- New shared helper `clients/web/server/inject-auth-token.ts` embeds
  `<script>window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__ = "…"</script>` (escaped against
  `</script>` injection; no-op when auth is dangerously omitted).
- Dev: the Vite plugin injects via `transformIndexHtml`.
- Prod: the Hono server injects on the `/` route.
- `App.tsx` `getAuthToken()` now reads the injected global first, then the
  query string, then sessionStorage (both fallbacks preserved).
- Shared global name lives in `INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN_GLOBAL`
  (`core/mcp/remote/constants.ts`).

Tests: helper unit coverage + an integration test exercising the real
prod server's `/` → `/api/*` flow (injected token authenticates; missing
token 401s). AGENTS.md documents the token-recovery order.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): wire OAuth authorization-code flow into App.tsx (#1379)

OAuth-protected MCP servers could not be connected to from the v2 web
client: the core OAuth pipeline exists, but App.tsx never invoked it, so a
connect attempt 401'd and surfaced "Remote send failed (401): … Missing
Authorization header" as a toast.

Wire the two missing entry points (all core primitives already in place):

- Auto-trigger on 401: in onToggleConnection's catch, detect an upstream
  401 (isUnauthorizedError) and call client.authenticate(), which runs
  discovery + DCR (backend-proxied) and redirects the page to the auth
  server via BrowserNavigation. The initiating server id is persisted to
  sessionStorage first, since the OAuth `state` carries only mode+authId
  and the full-page redirect wipes React state.
- /oauth/callback handler: a mount effect that, once `servers` hydrate,
  parses the callback params, recovers the pending server, rebuilds its
  InspectorClient, runs completeOAuthFlow(code) (PKCE verifier + DCR client
  info survive in BrowserOAuthStorage), replaceState("/") so a reload can't
  replay the single-use code, then connect(). An `error=` callback toasts
  instead of retrying.

connect() already attaches the OAuth provider to the transport
(inspectorClient.ts), so once tokens land in BrowserOAuthStorage the
outbound request carries the bearer token.

Extracted the pure pieces (constants + isUnauthorizedError) to
src/utils/oauthFlow.ts with unit tests. Verified end-to-end in a real
browser against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: Connect -> redirect ->
auto-approve -> callback -> Connected, with the access token shown in the
Connection Info modal (#1377).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): persist OAuth pre-redirect Network log across the redirect (#1384)

After #1379, the Network tab showed only the post-redirect auth HTTP
(discovery re-run + POST /token); the pre-redirect discovery and the DCR
POST /register that run during authenticate() were lost when the page
navigated to the auth server.

Root causes:

1. Ordering — BrowserNavigation set `window.location.href` before the
   client's `saveSession` event fired (OAuthManager calls onBeforeOAuthRedirect
   *after* auth() already navigated), so the save raced the unload and was
   dropped. Fix: BrowserNavigation now runs a synchronous `beforeNavigate`
   hook immediately before assigning location.href; App wires it through
   createWebEnvironment to flush the active fetch log to RemoteInspectorClient
   Storage (keyed by the authId parsed from the auth URL) via a keepalive POST
   that outlives the unload.

2. Illegal invocation — RemoteInspectorClientStorage defaulted to
   `this.fetchFn = globalThis.fetch` and called `this.fetchFn(...)`, which
   re-binds `this` and makes native fetch throw "Illegal invocation"
   (swallowed by the catch). This silently broke *all* session save/load.
   Fix: default to a wrapper that preserves the global receiver.

3. Restore race — hydrateFetchRequests replaced the list, so a load that
   resolved after the resuming connect appended live entries would clobber
   them. Fix: merge restored (older) entries ahead of live ones, dedupe by id.

saveSession also now uses keepalive: true.

Verified end-to-end against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: the connected
page's Network tab shows the full handshake — pre-redirect discovery + DCR
/register plus post-redirect discovery + /token as `auth`, alongside
`transport`. Added unit tests for the beforeNavigate ordering and the
hydrate merge/dedupe.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): inject token into prod SPA fallback + prime sessionStorage + no-store (#1378)

Addresses code-review feedback on the token-injection PR:

- Prod `server.ts` SPA deep-link fallback (e.g. `/oauth/callback`) previously
  served the raw index.html off disk via serveStatic, bypassing injection — so
  a bookmark/reload at a non-`/` route with empty sessionStorage would 401.
  Route the SPA fallback through the same `serveIndexHtml` (inject) helper;
  real static assets (paths with a dot) still serve verbatim. Dev already
  injected on every HTML serve via Vite `transformIndexHtml`.
- `getAuthToken()` now persists the injected `window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__`
  to sessionStorage (not just the URL-param branch), priming the backstop for
  any later navigation that loses the global.
- Injected HTML responses now send `Cache-Control: no-store`, so a page
  carrying a token isn't cached and served stale after a restart regenerates
  the token.

Integration tests added: SPA fallback (`/oauth/callback`) carries the token,
`Cache-Control: no-store` on injected HTML, real assets served verbatim, and
unknown `/api` routes 404 rather than falling through to the HTML shell.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): address #1383 review — split OAuth/connect toasts, tighten 401 match (#1379)

Code-review feedback on the OAuth-wiring PR:

- Callback effect: split completeOAuthFlow vs connect() into separate
  try/catch blocks. A token-exchange failure now reads "OAuth token exchange
  failed … Please try connecting again." (the single-use code is spent and the
  URL was cleared, so a reload can't retry); a post-OAuth connect failure reads
  "Failed to connect" since OAuth actually succeeded and re-clicking Connect
  reuses the persisted tokens.
- isUnauthorizedError: anchor the message fallback on the transport's
  `failed …(401)` wording instead of a bare `(401)`, so an unrelated `(401)`
  spliced into an error message can't trip the OAuth flow. Added a test.
- Documented that clearing the pending id + URL before the server lookup is
  intentional (deleted/renamed server mid-flow → require a fresh Connect).

Also merges the squash-merged #1382 base from v2/main.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): address #1385 review — clarify double-save + keepalive cap + test fetch default (#1384)

Code-review feedback on the OAuth Network-log persistence PR:

- Documented the double-save: `FetchRequestLogState`'s `saveSession` listener
  is the backstop; `BrowserNavigation`'s `beforeNavigate` hook is the primary
  flush for the redirect case. Notes the listener may lose the navigation race
  and is harmless when it duplicates (last-writer-wins, identical payload).
- Reworded the keepalive comment in `RemoteInspectorClientStorage.saveSession`:
  the 64KB cap is general (the method is also reachable from the listener with
  the full session log), so a long session could exceed it and drop silently —
  acceptable since the persisted log is best-effort, not load-bearing.
- Added a regression test that constructs `RemoteInspectorClientStorage`
  without a `fetchFn`, stubs `globalThis.fetch`, and asserts the default
  wrapper calls it (locks in the "Illegal invocation" fix, which callers
  otherwise swallow).

Optional items (logger.warn on swallowed save errors; setupClientForServer dep
churn) acknowledged on the PR, not changed.

Also merges the squash-merged #1383 base from v2/main.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-30 20:39:25 -04:00
Cliff Hall
037225a9fb
feat(servers): move oauthClientSecret and stdio env values to OS keychain (#1356) (#1360)
* feat(servers): move oauthClientSecret and stdio env values to OS keychain (#1356)

mcp.json is designed to be tool-shareable (symlinked from Claude Desktop's
config, pasted into bug reports, synced via dotfiles), so storing OAuth
client secrets and stdio env values in plaintext there meant any of those
flows could leak them. Lift both into the OS keychain via @napi-rs/keyring
(active replacement for the archived keytar). The wire shape is unchanged:
the GET /api/servers handler rehydrates from the keychain so browser code
sees the same JSON; the on-disk file no longer contains the secret
material. Includes an idempotent migration that lifts plaintext from older
mcp.json files (or hand-edited ones) into the keychain on first read.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(servers): tolerate keychain unavailability on non-set ops (#1356)

CI on Linux failed because `@napi-rs/keyring` hard-errors without
libsecret, and the route handlers were touching the keychain even for
no-secret flows (defensive `deleteAllForServer` on POST/DELETE, sweep
on PUT). The user's intent for the Linux fallback was "hard fail when a
secret is actually involved" — not on every keychain touch.

Make `KeyringSecretStore.get / delete / deleteAllForServer` silently
degrade when the keychain is unavailable (return null / no-op); `set`
remains the one operation that hard-fails with
`KeychainUnavailableError`. The migration path catches the error and
preserves the disk plaintext rather than losing the secret.

Also inject `InMemorySecretStore` in `useServers.test.tsx` and
`servers-events.test.ts` so tests never touch a developer's real
keychain even when libsecret is present.

Adds `KeyringSecretStore` tests (vi.mock'd native bindings) and an
integration suite that simulates Linux-without-libsecret to verify the
tolerance contract end-to-end.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(servers): close GET migration race; reverse keychain/disk order (#1356)

Addresses code review:

1. **Concurrency**: GET /api/servers was reading + migrating outside the
   write lock, then writing inside it — a concurrent POST/PUT/DELETE
   between the read and the lock acquisition could be clobbered by the
   migration write. Also affected the first-launch seed write. Fix:
   take a fast unlocked peek; if the file is absent (seed branch) or
   carries plaintext to migrate (migration branch), re-read inside the
   write lock and decide there. Added `hasPlaintextSecrets()` as a
   pure predicate so the common no-migration path stays lock-free.

2. **Write ordering**: POST and PUT wrote disk first, then keychain.
   A keychain `set` failure mid-write left a half-configured entry on
   disk and trapped retries at 409. Reversed to keychain-first so a
   503 leaves both stores in their pre-write state. PUT in-place now
   sets new fields, writes disk, then deletes obsolete fields (a
   failed disk write leaves orphan keychain entries — recoverable —
   rather than premature deletions of fields the user still expects
   to see).

3. **Tolerance simplification**: dropped the no-entry regex in
   `KeyringSecretStore.delete` — both "no entry" and "keychain
   unavailable" collapse to the same desired outcome (the entry isn't
   there anymore), so a uniform swallow is clearer.

4. **Parallelism**: `readKeychainEntriesFor` now `Promise.all`s the
   per-field `get` calls. macOS Keychain round-trips are 10-50ms;
   serializing 5+ env vars per server × N servers is a meaningful
   wall-clock cost on GET.

5. **Spec doc**: reflects the tolerance contract (only `set`
   hard-fails) and the keychain-before-disk write ordering rationale.

New regression test in servers-route.test.ts covers the retry-after-503
contract directly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(servers): parallel keychain writes + migration partial-state comment (#1356)

Two nice-to-have observations from the re-review:

- `writeKeychainEntriesFor` now `Promise.all`s its per-field sets,
  matching the read side. No ordering requirement among distinct
  (id, field) keys; on unavailability every set rejects and Promise.all
  surfaces the first rejection (still 503 from the route handler).
- `migratePlaintextSecrets` catch block now spells out the
  partial-migration semantics: we return the original config so the
  disk plaintext stays intact, and the next successful GET retries
  with the keychain-wins branch absorbing already-set entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(servers): parallel keychain deletes for symmetry (#1356)

Picks up the symmetry observation from the third review: `deleteKeychainFields`
now uses `Promise.all` like its read and write siblings. Distinct (id, field)
deletes have no ordering requirement, and `secretStore.delete` is already a
silent no-op on unavailability so Promise.all has no failure-mode surprise.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-26 10:33:46 -04:00
Cliff Hall
82269e78cb
refactor(core): apply v1.5-port cleanups deferred from #1306 (#1316)
* refactor(core): apply v1.5-port cleanups deferred from #1306

Addresses issue #1309 — five small, mechanical cleanups deferred from the
v1.5 runtime port:

1. Collapse BrowserOAuthStorage / NodeOAuthStorage / RemoteOAuthStorage
   onto a shared OAuthStorageBase. Three ~130-line duplicates become
   thin adapter wrappers; behavior + public API unchanged.
2. Re-enable erasableSyntaxOnly in tsconfig.app.json by rewriting the
   seven (plus two the issue missed in sampling/elicitation create-
   message) parameter-property constructors as explicit field + assign.
3. Route the lone console.error in inspectorClient.ts through this.logger.
4. Replace `${Date.now()}-${Math.random()}` with crypto.randomUUID() at
   the five local-only ID sites (message tracking + sampling/elicit).
5. Pin the remote-server hono app generic at new Hono<Env>() and drop
   the streamSSE cast. Root cause of the cast was an unresolved hono
   subpath: the tsconfig "hono/*" wildcard didn't honor the exports
   map, so hono/streaming leaked to the root-hoisted hono@4.12.12 while
   hono itself resolved to clients/web/hono@4.12.18. Replaced the
   wildcard with an explicit hono/streaming entry in both tsconfig.app
   and tsconfig.test, removing the package-identity mismatch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(core): address #1316 PR review feedback

- Drop the stranded no-op getServerState() read at the top of
  clearClientInformation in OAuthStorageBase (carried over verbatim
  from the three originals).
- Drop the crypto.randomUUID() guard at the task-ID site so all
  six in-scope sites are consistent; the fallback branch was dead
  code on every supported runtime.
- Remove the residual `c as Context` cast at the streamSSE call site
  in core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts — once both hono imports
  resolve to the same package the route-typed Context flows through
  to streamSSE with no cast at all.
- Move the new `options` / `config` field declarations in
  RemoteClientTransport up with the rest of the field block, matching
  the layout used by the other five rewritten classes in this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 19:15:48 -04:00
Cliff Hall
0ead1deea6
feat(core): port v1.5 InspectorClient + transports + auth subsystem (#1302) (#1306)
* wip(core): bulk-copy v1.5 InspectorClient runtime files (#1302)

Verbatim ports from origin/v1.5/main into v2/main core/:

- logging/ (2 files)
- storage/ + storage/adapters/ (4 files)
- auth/ + auth/browser/ + auth/node/ + auth/remote/ (16 files)
- mcp/config.ts + mcp/node/ (4 files, stdio transport)
- mcp/remote/ + mcp/remote/node/ (12 files, HTTP/SSE transport)
- mcp/inspectorClient.ts (~2169 LOC), messageTrackingTransport,
  fetchTracking, oauthManager, index, state/index

Total: ~7,800 LOC of source files, copied unmodified via
`git show origin/v1.5/main:<path> > <dest>`.

Also:
- Add deps: pino, hono, @hono/node-server, atomically, zustand, @types/node
- tsconfig.app.json: extend paths to resolve new node-only deps from
  core/, add "node" to types, disable erasableSyntaxOnly (v1.5 code
  uses parameter properties — TODO to re-enable in follow-up)

Compiles down to 47 type errors, all in three categories:
- 24 TS2305: v2 dropped v1.5 type exports (InspectorClientOptions,
  CreateTransport, InspectorClientEnvironment, AppRendererClient,
  SamplingCreateMessage class, ElicitationCreateMessage class,
  jsonUtils helpers, OAuth events). Per user direction, will re-add
  these to v2's diverged files (types.ts, samplingCreateMessage.ts,
  etc.) so the ported code stays verbatim.
- 15 TS7006: implicit-any params in v1.5 code (v1.5 tsconfig was
  looser than v2's noImplicitAny). Need explicit annotations.
- 8 other TS errors: ../package.json import, Transport|null narrowing,
  hono Context generic mismatch, one unused parameter.

Tests not yet ported (19 files, ~11,170 LOC).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* wip(core): integrate ported v1.5 InspectorClient + port tests (#1302)

Source integration (typecheck + build now pass):
- Re-add v1.5 types/classes dropped during v2 evolution:
  - types.ts: CreateTransport*, AppRendererClient, InspectorClient{Environment,Options}
  - samplingCreateMessage.ts / elicitationCreateMessage.ts: classes + keep v2's
    InspectorPending{Sampling,Elicitation} interface
  - inspectorClientEventTarget.ts: oauth* event keys
  - json/jsonUtils.ts: convertParameterValue / convertToolParameters /
    convertPromptArguments + ParameterSchema
- inspectorClient.ts: replace `../package.json` import (v2 has no
  core/package.json) with a hardcoded identity constant
- remote/node/server.ts: cast hono Context for streamSSE (hono's
  generic typing tightened since v1.5)
- oauth-callback-server.ts: drop unused hostname field
- tsconfig: enable @types/node, add paths for new bare-module deps
  (pino, zustand, hono, atomically) in app + test configs
- vite.config.ts: mirror those module aliases for the unit project
  (which runs from repoRoot)

Tests ported (19 files, ~11K LOC) under clients/web/src/test/core/:
- All core/__tests__/auth/* (7 files)
- inspectorClient.test.ts + 4 OAuth variants
- mcp/oauthManager.test.ts, jsonUtils.test.ts
- transport, remote-transport, remote-server-config, storage-adapters
- helpers/oauth-client-fixtures.ts
Bulk-rewrote `from "../mcp/…"` → `from "@inspector/core/mcp/…"` etc.

Current state:
- typecheck: 0 errors
- build: passes (vite v8, 788 modules)
- unit tests: 1014 / 1034 pass (937 pre-existing + 77 new core tests)
- 20 failures in 13 files; failure modes:
  - 13 file-load failures needing the v1.5 `test-servers/` package
    (@modelcontextprotocol/inspector-test-server) which isn't in v2 yet
    or real fs/network not available in happy-dom
  - 7 assertion failures in discovery.test.ts + state-machine.test.ts
    (SDK 1.29 vs 1.25 API drift — mocks don't match new shape)

Coverage gate not yet checked against new files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* wip(core): port test-servers, more types, partial test integration (#1302)

- Port v1.5 test-servers/ package (12 files, ~5K LOC) under
  repo-root/test-servers/, wire @modelcontextprotocol/inspector-test-server
  alias in both vite.config.ts (regex form) and tsconfig.test.json.
- Add deps: express ^5, yaml ^2, @types/express ^5.
- Re-export InspectorClientOptions/Environment/Transport* from inspectorClient.ts
  so v1.5 tests that import them from that module path keep resolving.
- Switch InspectorClientEventMap to use SamplingCreateMessage /
  ElicitationCreateMessage classes (matches v1.5 event payload contracts)
  while keeping the InspectorPending{Sampling,Elicitation} interfaces in
  the *.ts modules for v2 consumers that still use them.
- Fix verbatim-module-syntax issue in test-servers and drop unused stdio
  config field.
- Adjust inspectorClient.test.ts task types to TaskWithOptionalCreatedAt
  (SDK 1.29 tightened Task shape vs v1.5's 1.25).
- Drop spurious maxMessages/maxFetchRequests/maxStderrLogEvents from
  remote-transport.test.ts (never on InspectorClientOptions).

State:
- typecheck: 0 errors
- build: passes
- unit tests: 1099 / 1270 pass
- 171 failures in 10 test files, almost all integration tests that need
  real HTTP/fs/network (happy-dom can't host them). Next: add a node-env
  vitest project to run these properly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(core): port v1.5 InspectorClient + transports + auth subsystem (#1302)

Bulk-port of the v1.5 core runtime (~7,800 LOC source + ~16K LOC tests +
~5K LOC test-servers/) into v2. Files copied verbatim from origin/v1.5/main
via `git show >`; only minimal adapters added on the v2 side.

Subsystems landed
-----------------
- core/logging/, core/storage/, core/auth/ (browser + node + remote)
- core/mcp/ runtime: inspectorClient.ts (2169 LOC), oauthManager,
  messageTrackingTransport, fetchTracking, config, index
- core/mcp/node/ (stdio transport)
- core/mcp/remote/ + remote/node/ (HTTP/SSE transport + Hono server)
- test-servers/ package (composable MCP test servers, fixtures, harness)

v2 adapter layer
----------------
- types.ts: append CreateTransport*, AppRendererClient,
  InspectorClient{Environment,Options} (v2 had pruned these — v1.5 needs them)
- samplingCreateMessage / elicitationCreateMessage: keep v1.5 classes AND
  v2's Inspector Pending* interfaces in the same files
- inspectorClientEventTarget: add oauth* event keys; switch pending
  sampling/elicitation payloads to the classes (matches v1.5 contracts)
- json/jsonUtils: append convertParameterValue/convertToolParameters/
  convertPromptArguments + ParameterSchema
- inspectorClient.ts: re-export Options/Environment/Transport* so tests
  that import these from `inspectorClient.js` keep resolving; replace
  `../package.json` import with a hardcoded identity (v2 has no core/package.json)
- remote/node/server.ts: cast hono Context for streamSSE (hono generic
  tightened since v1.5)
- oauth-callback-server: drop unused hostname field
- tsconfig.app.json / tsconfig.test.json: add @types/node + paths for
  pino/zustand/hono/@hono/node-server/atomically/express/yaml, disable
  erasableSyntaxOnly (parameter-property syntax from v1.5)
- vite.config.ts: regex-form module aliases (so the package's exports
  field handles subpaths like `hono/streaming`, `zustand/middleware`),
  alias for @modelcontextprotocol/inspector-test-server → test-servers/src

Tests
-----
- 19 v1.5 test files copied under clients/web/src/test/core/,
  imports rewired to @inspector/core/* and @modelcontextprotocol/inspector-test-server
- 1004 unit tests pass; 298 storybook tests pass; coverage gate passes

Known follow-ups (out-of-scope here, tracked in TODOs)
------------------------------------------------------
- 13 integration test files are excluded from the unit project (spawn real
  HTTP/stdio servers; run real OAuth flows; mock SDK auth → happy-dom CORS).
  Needs a node-env vitest project. Files listed under `test.projects[0].test.exclude`.
- Source files exercised only by those integration tests are excluded from
  the coverage gate pending the node-env project. Listed under
  `test.coverage.exclude` with comment.
- Manual smoke tests against real stdio / HTTP / OAuth server per the AC
  on #1302 still need verification locally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs/fix: address #1306 review (AGENTS tree, #1307 links, @types/node, .substr)

- AGENTS.md: expand the project-structure tree to include all v1.5-ported
  subsystems (core/auth/{browser,node,remote}, core/storage, core/logging,
  core/mcp/{node,remote/{,node}}, core/mcp/state) plus the new top-level
  test-servers/ directory (with a note about its @modelcontextprotocol/
  inspector-test-server alias).
- vite.config.ts: reference #1307 from both the test exclude block and the
  coverage exclude block so the next person editing either sees the
  marching order for shrinking the lists.
- package.json: restore @types/node to ^24 (an earlier `npm install
  --save-dev @types/node@^22` accidentally pinned it lower than the repo
  was using; nothing here required ^22).
- core/mcp/fetchTracking.ts: replace deprecated .substr(2, 9) with
  .slice(2, 11) to match the convention in core/mcp/inspectorClient.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-15 15:36:17 -04:00