inspector/core/auth/cimd.ts
cliffhall 4297ef8449 fix: record CIMD provenance as an issuer-keyed marker, not on the credential
Copilot review (#2287), three findings:

1. **invalid-client recovery lost the provenance.** SDK v2 `auth()` answers
   `invalid_client` / `unauthorized_client` with `invalidateCredentials("client")`
   and an immediate retry; our clear drops the registration *and* its kind, so
   the retry's URL-based client-ID save landed with nothing recorded and was
   stored as `dcr`. Provenance now lives in `cimdClientMetadataUrl`, an
   issuer-keyed marker on the issuer slot that records a property of the AS
   rather than a credential — `clearClientInformation` deliberately leaves it
   alone. `ensureCimdClientRegistration` writes it, and withdraws it when the AS
   stops advertising CIMD, on every connect.

2. **Discovery became a hard network dependency.** Moving the existing-client
   check after discovery meant a well-known outage could fail a reconnect the SDK
   would have served from its persisted discovery state. Reuse
   `provider.discoveryState()` first, and treat a discovery failure as "skip
   pre-registration" rather than an error — this helper is an optimization over
   what `auth()` does for itself.

3. **Dropped an unjustified double cast** in the test fetch helper; the async
   signature is directly assignable to `typeof fetch`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lmj6X2epWpPE7ScdSKQmtA
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
2026-09-07 01:34:03 -04:00

108 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript

import { discoverOAuthProtectedResourceMetadata } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
import type { OAuthClientInformation } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
import { discoverAuthorizationServerMetadataForServer } from "./discovery.js";
import type { BaseOAuthClientProvider } from "./providers.js";
/**
* When the authorization server supports URL-based client IDs (SEP-991 / CIMD),
* pre-register `{ client_id: clientMetadataUrl }` before SDK `auth()`.
*
* SDK `auth()` rejects non-HTTPS `clientMetadataUrl` during registration, but
* accepts an already-stored `client_id` (including `http://` URLs used by local
* dev/test metadata servers). Production CIMD metadata documents should still
* use HTTPS per SEP-991.
*
* `resourceMetadataUrl` is the RFC 9728 document advertised by the
* `WWW-Authenticate` challenge, when the caller has one. It matters here and
* not only in `auth()`: this runs *before* SDK `auth()`, so without it the
* pre-registration probe would do its own default-location discovery and miss
* a document served from a non-default path (#2071).
*/
export async function ensureCimdClientRegistration(params: {
serverUrl: string;
provider: BaseOAuthClientProvider;
fetchFn?: typeof fetch;
resourceMetadataUrl?: URL;
}): Promise<void> {
const clientMetadataUrl = params.provider.clientMetadataUrl?.trim();
if (!clientMetadataUrl) return;
// Prefer the discovery state SDK `auth()` itself persists and reuses. Without
// this, moving the existing-client check after discovery would turn a
// temporary well-known outage into a failed reconnect, even where the SDK
// could have proceeded from cache (Copilot).
let metadata = (await params.provider.discoveryState())
?.authorizationServerMetadata;
if (!metadata) {
let resourceMetadata;
try {
resourceMetadata = await discoverOAuthProtectedResourceMetadata(
params.serverUrl,
{ resourceMetadataUrl: params.resourceMetadataUrl },
// The same fetch the AS-metadata leg below uses. On web that is
// `createRemoteFetch`, which proxies through the backend to sidestep
// CORS — on the global `fetch` this leg would fail in the browser, be
// swallowed by the catch, and leave CIMD probing the wrong
// authorization server (Copilot).
params.fetchFn,
);
} catch {
resourceMetadata = undefined;
}
try {
// Walks the path-scoped authorization-server URL before the bare origin, so
// a server hosted under a path is probed where it actually publishes its
// metadata rather than only at the domain root (#2110).
metadata = await discoverAuthorizationServerMetadataForServer(
params.serverUrl,
resourceMetadata,
params.fetchFn,
);
} catch {
// Pre-registration is an optimization over what SDK `auth()` does for
// itself, so a discovery failure here must never fail the connection: bail
// out and let `auth()` run its own discovery and error handling.
return;
}
}
const issuer = metadata?.issuer;
// Record — or withdraw — this AS's CIMD marker before anything else, so it
// stays current rather than only ever being written once. It is keyed by
// issuer and is not a credential, so `invalidateCredentials("client")` leaves
// it alone; see `IssuerBoundOAuthState.cimdClientMetadataUrl`.
if (issuer) {
await params.provider.saveCimdClientMetadataUrl(
issuer,
metadata?.client_id_metadata_document_supported
? clientMetadataUrl
: undefined,
);
}
if (!metadata?.client_id_metadata_document_supported) return;
// ⚠️ Keyed by the issuer just resolved, not read ctx-less. A ctx-less read
// resolves through the *active* issuer, so it early-returns for every
// subsequent issuer and leaves them with no CIMD record at all. It still
// answers the static case first, since `clientInformation` checks the
// preregistered slot before any issuer slot.
const existing = await params.provider.clientInformation(
issuer ? { issuer } : undefined,
);
if (existing?.client_id) return;
const clientInformation: OAuthClientInformation = {
client_id: clientMetadataUrl,
};
await params.provider.saveClientInformation(clientInformation, {
registrationKind: "cimd",
// An AS metadata document without an `issuer` is malformed (RFC 8414 §2),
// but the type allows it; fall back to the unkeyed slot rather than
// inventing a key.
...(issuer && { issuer }),
});
}