inspector/core/auth/node
Repository files (latest commit first)
Filename Latest commit message Latest commit date
cliffhall f4fb4b50c9 Forward RFC 9207 iss to the v2 SDK (fixes OAuth + EMA leg 1)
SDK v2 added RFC 9207 §2.4 authorization-response issuer validation
(`validateAuthorizationResponseIssuer` / `IssuerMismatchError`) as a mix-up
attack defense. It is strict: when AS metadata advertises
`authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true` and no `iss` reaches
`exchangeAuthorization`/`auth()`, the exchange throws.

v1.29.0 had no `iss` parameter and no RFC 9207 validation at all, so dropping
the callback `iss` was harmless. The migration swapped in the stricter SDK
without feeding it the new input, breaking the authorization-code exchange
against any RFC 9207 authorization server (Okta/xaa.dev advertise it):

    Issuer mismatch in authorization response (RFC 9207):
    expected "https://idp.xaa.dev", received undefined

Found by smoke-testing EMA against live xaa.dev staging; not caught by CI
because the mock IdP never advertised the parameter, so the SDK took its
lenient path (a missing `iss` is only fatal when advertised).

`iss` was dropped in three places, with the plumbing half-built —
`oauthManager`/`inspectorClient` already accepted `iss`, but nothing supplied
or forwarded it:

- `parseOAuthCallbackParams` never extracted `iss` from the callback query
- `mcpAuth` never forwarded `options.iss` to SDK `auth()` — its own comment
  ("forwarded on v2 upgrade; ignored by v1 SDK auth()") predicted this exact
  gap, so standard OAuth was broken identically, not just EMA
- EMA leg 1 (`completeIdpOidcAuthorization`) never passed `iss` to
  `exchangeAuthorization`

Thread `iss` end to end: callback query -> CallbackParams -> resumeAfterOAuth
-> completeOAuthFlow -> {mcpAuth | EMA leg 1} -> SDK. The Node callback server
and runner carry it for CLI/TUI.

Tests: `ema-mock-servers.ts` now advertises
`authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true` so the mock is at least
as strict as real IdPs — with it absent the SDK silently takes the lenient path
and a dropped `iss` goes unnoticed. Flipping it made three existing tests
reproduce the failure. Adds regression coverage for forwarding and for
rejecting a mismatched `iss` before any network call.

Verified end to end against live xaa.dev staging: EMA legs 1-3 (IdP SSO ->
ID-JAG mint -> resource token) now complete and the MCP session initializes.

web 3099, cli 212, tui 274 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VjMemXZohSR2EndBQYif2b
2026-07-15 20:16:43 -04:00
..
index.ts Removed Zustand storage, cleanup up auth storage IO interfaces, implementations, and usage. 2026-07-04 21:56:45 -07:00
oauth-callback-server.ts Forward RFC 9207 iss to the v2 SDK (fixes OAuth + EMA leg 1) 2026-07-15 20:16:43 -04:00
oauth-persist-file.ts fix(auth): keep oauth-persist browser-safe (move Node file backend out) 2026-07-08 16:20:31 -04:00
runner-interactive-oauth.ts Forward RFC 9207 iss to the v2 SDK (fixes OAuth + EMA leg 1) 2026-07-15 20:16:43 -04:00
runner-oauth-callback.ts Guided-auth removal, OAuth smoke testing, and TUI/CLI support (#1531) 2026-06-29 15:35:51 -04:00
secret-store.ts feat(web,core): enterprise-managed authorization (EMA) (#1509) (#1512) 2026-06-24 22:15:12 -04:00
storage-node.ts cli: Wave 3 — programmatic review path (rollup of #1573–#1575) (#1655) 2026-07-11 22:14:23 -04:00