SDK v2 added RFC 9207 §2.4 authorization-response issuer validation
(`validateAuthorizationResponseIssuer` / `IssuerMismatchError`) as a mix-up
attack defense. It is strict: when AS metadata advertises
`authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true` and no `iss` reaches
`exchangeAuthorization`/`auth()`, the exchange throws.
v1.29.0 had no `iss` parameter and no RFC 9207 validation at all, so dropping
the callback `iss` was harmless. The migration swapped in the stricter SDK
without feeding it the new input, breaking the authorization-code exchange
against any RFC 9207 authorization server (Okta/xaa.dev advertise it):
Issuer mismatch in authorization response (RFC 9207):
expected "https://idp.xaa.dev", received undefined
Found by smoke-testing EMA against live xaa.dev staging; not caught by CI
because the mock IdP never advertised the parameter, so the SDK took its
lenient path (a missing `iss` is only fatal when advertised).
`iss` was dropped in three places, with the plumbing half-built —
`oauthManager`/`inspectorClient` already accepted `iss`, but nothing supplied
or forwarded it:
- `parseOAuthCallbackParams` never extracted `iss` from the callback query
- `mcpAuth` never forwarded `options.iss` to SDK `auth()` — its own comment
("forwarded on v2 upgrade; ignored by v1 SDK auth()") predicted this exact
gap, so standard OAuth was broken identically, not just EMA
- EMA leg 1 (`completeIdpOidcAuthorization`) never passed `iss` to
`exchangeAuthorization`
Thread `iss` end to end: callback query -> CallbackParams -> resumeAfterOAuth
-> completeOAuthFlow -> {mcpAuth | EMA leg 1} -> SDK. The Node callback server
and runner carry it for CLI/TUI.
Tests: `ema-mock-servers.ts` now advertises
`authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true` so the mock is at least
as strict as real IdPs — with it absent the SDK silently takes the lenient path
and a dropped `iss` goes unnoticed. Flipping it made three existing tests
reproduce the failure. Adds regression coverage for forwarding and for
rejecting a mismatched `iss` before any network call.
Verified end to end against live xaa.dev staging: EMA legs 1-3 (IdP SSO ->
ID-JAG mint -> resource token) now complete and the MCP session initializes.
web 3099, cli 212, tui 274 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VjMemXZohSR2EndBQYif2b
170 lines
5.5 KiB
TypeScript
170 lines
5.5 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* v2-shaped OAuth orchestrator for standard MCP resource authorization.
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*
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* **Upgrade path:** On `@modelcontextprotocol/client` v2, replace this module
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* with `export { auth as mcpAuth, type AuthOptions as McpAuthOptions } from
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* "@modelcontextprotocol/client"` and delete `authorizeWithoutRefresh`.
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*
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* Until then, `mcpAuth` delegates to SDK v1 `auth()` except when
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* `forceReauthorization: true` — then it runs discovery + `startAuthorization`
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* (the same path v2 `auth()` takes when refresh cannot widen scope).
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*/
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import {
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auth as sdkAuth,
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discoverOAuthServerInfo,
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isHttpsUrl,
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registerClient,
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selectResourceURL,
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startAuthorization,
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} from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
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import type { OAuthClientProvider } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
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import type { FetchLike } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
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/**
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* Thrown when the OAuth client metadata the Inspector would register is
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* invalid (e.g. a non-HTTPS `clientMetadataUrl`). SDK v2 moved the original
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* `InvalidClientMetadataError` into `@modelcontextprotocol/server-legacy`,
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* whose `/auth` entry pulls in Node/Express server handlers that must never
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* reach the browser bundle. This local class preserves the thrown type and
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* message for the Inspector's client-side validation without that dependency.
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*/
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export class InvalidClientMetadataError extends Error {
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constructor(message: string) {
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super(message);
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this.name = "InvalidClientMetadataError";
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}
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}
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export type McpAuthResult = "AUTHORIZED" | "REDIRECT";
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/**
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* Options aligned with v2 SDK `AuthOptions`. v2-only fields are accepted now
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* and forwarded on upgrade; v1 passthrough ignores unsupported fields.
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*/
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export interface McpAuthOptions {
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serverUrl: string | URL;
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authorizationCode?: string;
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/** RFC 9207 callback `iss`, validated by the SDK against the metadata issuer. */
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iss?: string;
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scope?: string;
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resourceMetadataUrl?: URL;
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fetchFn?: FetchLike;
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/** v2 SEP-2468 — ignored until SDK v2 upgrade. */
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skipIssuerMetadataValidation?: boolean;
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/**
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* Skip refresh and start an authorization-code flow. Required for step-up
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* when the union scope exceeds the current token grant (RFC 6749 §6).
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*/
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forceReauthorization?: boolean;
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}
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export async function mcpAuth(
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provider: OAuthClientProvider,
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options: McpAuthOptions,
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): Promise<McpAuthResult> {
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if (options.forceReauthorization) {
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if (options.authorizationCode !== undefined) {
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throw new Error(
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"forceReauthorization cannot be combined with authorizationCode",
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);
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}
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return authorizeWithoutRefresh(provider, options);
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}
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return sdkAuth(provider, {
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serverUrl: options.serverUrl,
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authorizationCode: options.authorizationCode,
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iss: options.iss,
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scope: options.scope,
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resourceMetadataUrl: options.resourceMetadataUrl,
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fetchFn: options.fetchFn,
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});
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}
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async function authorizeWithoutRefresh(
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provider: OAuthClientProvider,
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options: McpAuthOptions,
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): Promise<"REDIRECT"> {
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const { serverUrl, scope, resourceMetadataUrl, fetchFn } = options;
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const serverInfo = await discoverOAuthServerInfo(serverUrl, {
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resourceMetadataUrl,
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fetchFn,
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});
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const {
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authorizationServerUrl,
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authorizationServerMetadata: metadata,
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resourceMetadata,
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} = serverInfo;
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await provider.saveDiscoveryState?.({
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authorizationServerUrl: String(authorizationServerUrl),
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resourceMetadataUrl: resourceMetadataUrl?.toString(),
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resourceMetadata,
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authorizationServerMetadata: metadata,
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});
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const resource = await selectResourceURL(
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serverUrl,
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provider,
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resourceMetadata,
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);
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const resolvedScope =
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scope ||
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resourceMetadata?.scopes_supported?.join(" ") ||
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provider.clientMetadata.scope;
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let clientInformation = await Promise.resolve(provider.clientInformation());
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if (!clientInformation) {
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const supportsUrlBasedClientId =
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metadata?.client_id_metadata_document_supported === true;
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const clientMetadataUrl = provider.clientMetadataUrl;
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if (clientMetadataUrl && !isHttpsUrl(clientMetadataUrl)) {
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throw new InvalidClientMetadataError(
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`clientMetadataUrl must be a valid HTTPS URL with a non-root pathname, got: ${clientMetadataUrl}`,
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);
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}
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const shouldUseUrlBasedClientId =
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supportsUrlBasedClientId && clientMetadataUrl;
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if (shouldUseUrlBasedClientId) {
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clientInformation = { client_id: clientMetadataUrl };
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await provider.saveClientInformation?.(clientInformation);
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} else {
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if (!provider.saveClientInformation) {
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throw new Error(
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"OAuth client information must be saveable for dynamic registration",
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);
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}
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const fullInformation = await registerClient(authorizationServerUrl, {
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metadata,
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clientMetadata: provider.clientMetadata,
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scope: resolvedScope,
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fetchFn,
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});
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await provider.saveClientInformation(fullInformation);
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clientInformation = fullInformation;
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}
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}
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const state = provider.state ? await provider.state() : undefined;
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const redirectUrl = provider.redirectUrl;
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if (!redirectUrl) {
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throw new Error("redirectUrl is required for authorization_code flow");
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}
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const { authorizationUrl, codeVerifier } = await startAuthorization(
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authorizationServerUrl,
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{
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metadata,
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clientInformation,
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state,
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redirectUrl,
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scope: resolvedScope,
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resource,
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},
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);
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await provider.saveCodeVerifier(codeVerifier);
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await provider.redirectToAuthorization(authorizationUrl);
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return "REDIRECT";
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}
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