CI is red on `main` and on every open PR (including the Dependabot PRs #1531, #1552–#1554) with: ``` panic: file requires newer Go version go1.27 (application built with go1.26) golangci-lint exit with code 2 ``` ## Cause `actions/setup-go` with `go-version: 'stable'` started resolving to **go1.27.0**. The pinned golangci-lint **v2.11.4** release binary is built with **go1.26**, and its `go/types` refuses to typecheck source files declaring a newer language version. Nothing in the failing PRs is at fault. ## Fix Bump to **golangci-lint v2.13.1**, whose release binaries are built with go1.27, so linting works under `stable` again. That bump also pulls in newer linter versions, which surface 57 findings this tree did not have before. Handled as follows: | Linter | Count | Resolution | |---|---|---| | `goconst` | 50 | 39 were repeated literals in `_test.go` files — goconst started counting those in v2.12.0 (golangci-lint#6480 exposed `ignore-tests`). Fixture data like `"1.0.0"` (89 occurrences) is not a missing constant, so `goconst.ignore-tests: true`. The other 11 were real duplication in production code (OpenAPI tags, the `bearer` security scheme name, `$ref`, `http`/`https`) and became named constants. | | `gosec` G710 | 1 | **True positive, fixed.** See below. | | `staticcheck` SA1019 | 6 | Go 1.26 deprecated `ecdsa.PublicKey.X/Y` and `PrivateKey.D`. Annotated with the same targeted `nolint` + rationale already used for `ScalarBaseMult` in `cmd/publisher/auth/common.go`. | ### The open redirect is real `TrailingSlashMiddleware` copied the entire `*url.URL` before rewriting the path. For an absolute-form request URI — legal for a Go HTTP server to parse, e.g. `GET http://evil.com/foo/ HTTP/1.1` — `r.URL.Scheme` and `r.URL.Host` are populated, and they were echoed straight back in the `Location` header. The redirect target is now built from the cleaned path and query alone. The existing `path.Clean` hardening for GHSA-v8vw-gw5j-w7m6 (protocol-relative `//evil.com/`) is unchanged. ### Also Switched `gomodguard` → `gomodguard_v2`; the former is deprecated as of v2.12.0 and was emitting a warning on every run. ## Verification - `golangci-lint v2.13.1` against this tree: **0 issues**, no deprecation warnings - `make validate`: all validations passed - `go build ./...` and tests for every touched package pass (DB-backed tests need Postgres; left to CI) ## Note on migrating the ecdsa key paths Moving those six sites to `PublicKey.Bytes` / `ParseUncompressedPublicKey` / `crypto/ecdh` touches key parsing and signature verification. It should be its own reviewed PR rather than riding along on a CI unblock. Happy to open one. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
319 lines
13 KiB
Go
319 lines
13 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2"
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v0 "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/api/handlers/v0"
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"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/auth"
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"github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/internal/config"
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)
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// GitHubTokenExchangeInput represents the input for GitHub token exchange
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type GitHubTokenExchangeInput struct {
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Body struct {
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GitHubToken string `json:"github_token" doc:"GitHub OAuth token" required:"true"`
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}
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}
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// GitHubHandler handles GitHub authentication
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type GitHubHandler struct {
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config *config.Config
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jwtManager *auth.JWTManager
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baseURL string // Configurable for testing
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}
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// NewGitHubHandler creates a new GitHub handler
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func NewGitHubHandler(cfg *config.Config) *GitHubHandler {
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return &GitHubHandler{
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config: cfg,
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jwtManager: auth.NewJWTManager(cfg),
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baseURL: "https://api.github.com",
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}
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}
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// SetBaseURL sets the base URL for GitHub API (used for testing)
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func (h *GitHubHandler) SetBaseURL(url string) {
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h.baseURL = url
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}
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// RegisterGitHubATEndpoint registers the GitHub access token authentication endpoint with a custom path prefix
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func RegisterGitHubATEndpoint(api huma.API, pathPrefix string, cfg *config.Config) {
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handler := NewGitHubHandler(cfg)
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// GitHub token exchange endpoint
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huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{
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OperationID: "exchange-github-token" + strings.ReplaceAll(pathPrefix, "/", "-"),
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Method: http.MethodPost,
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Path: pathPrefix + "/auth/github-at",
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Summary: "Exchange GitHub OAuth access token for Registry JWT",
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Description: "Exchange a GitHub OAuth access token for a short-lived Registry JWT token",
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Tags: []string{tagAuth},
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}, func(ctx context.Context, input *GitHubTokenExchangeInput) (*v0.Response[auth.TokenResponse], error) {
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response, err := handler.ExchangeToken(ctx, input.Body.GitHubToken)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, tokenExchangeError(err)
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}
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return &v0.Response[auth.TokenResponse]{
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Body: *response,
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}, nil
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})
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}
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// tokenExchangeError maps an internal ExchangeToken failure to a client-facing
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// 401 without leaking internal detail. huma serializes extra error args into the
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// response body, and the wrapped err here can include the raw upstream GitHub
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// response body captured by readErrorBody — so passing it to huma would echo that
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// detail back to the caller (CWE-209). We log it server-side (like the sibling
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// handlers in servers.go) and return only a generic message.
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func tokenExchangeError(err error) error {
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log.Printf("github-at token exchange failed: %v", err)
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return huma.Error401Unauthorized("Token exchange failed")
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}
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// ExchangeToken exchanges a GitHub OAuth token for a Registry JWT token
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func (h *GitHubHandler) ExchangeToken(ctx context.Context, githubToken string) (*auth.TokenResponse, error) {
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// Get GitHub user information
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user, err := h.getGitHubUser(ctx, githubToken)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get GitHub user: %w", err)
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}
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// Get the organizations the user administers. Org namespaces are only granted
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// to org Owners (membership role "admin"), not to ordinary members.
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orgs, err := h.getGitHubAdminOrgs(ctx, githubToken)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get GitHub organizations: %w", err)
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}
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// Build permissions based on user and organizations
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permissions := h.buildPermissions(user.Login, orgs)
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// Create JWT claims with GitHub user info
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claims := auth.JWTClaims{
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AuthMethod: auth.MethodGitHubAT,
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AuthMethodSubject: user.Login,
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Permissions: permissions,
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}
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// Generate Registry JWT token
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tokenResponse, err := h.jwtManager.GenerateTokenResponse(ctx, claims)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate JWT token: %w", err)
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}
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return tokenResponse, nil
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}
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type GitHubUserOrOrg struct {
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Login string `json:"login"`
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ID int `json:"id"`
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}
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// getGitHubUser gets the authenticated user's information
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func (h *GitHubHandler) getGitHubUser(ctx context.Context, token string) (*GitHubUserOrOrg, error) {
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, h.baseURL+"/user", nil)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
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}
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
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req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/vnd.github.v3+json")
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req.Header.Set("X-GitHub-Api-Version", "2022-11-28")
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resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get user info: %w", err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("GitHub API error (status %d): %s", resp.StatusCode, readErrorBody(resp.Body))
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}
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var user GitHubUserOrOrg
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if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&user); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode user response: %w", err)
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}
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return &user, nil
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}
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// githubOrgRoleAdmin is the membership role GitHub returns for an organization
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// Owner. It is the only role we treat as carrying publish authority for the org
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// namespace. GET /user/memberships/orgs reports the caller's role as either
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// "admin" (Owner) or "member" (GitHub has no org-level "maintainer" role); only
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// "admin" carries publish authority, so a "member" is intentionally not granted.
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const githubOrgRoleAdmin = "admin"
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// githubMembershipStateActive is the membership state for an accepted (as opposed
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// to merely invited/pending) org membership. We only honor active memberships so a
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// not-yet-accepted owner invitation never grants the org namespace.
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const githubMembershipStateActive = "active"
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// orgMembershipsPageSize is the page size we request when listing the user's org
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// memberships. 100 is GitHub's maximum.
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const orgMembershipsPageSize = 100
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// maxOrgMembershipPages bounds the pagination loop. At orgMembershipsPageSize=100
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// this covers 10,000 org memberships — far beyond any real user — and exists only
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// as a backstop so a misbehaving or redirected upstream cannot drive an unbounded
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// number of requests.
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const maxOrgMembershipPages = 100
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// githubOrgMembership is one entry from GET /user/memberships/orgs: the
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// authenticated user's membership in a single organization, including their role.
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type githubOrgMembership struct {
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State string `json:"state"`
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Role string `json:"role"`
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Organization GitHubUserOrOrg `json:"organization"`
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}
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// getGitHubAdminOrgs returns the organizations in which the authenticated user is
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// an Owner (membership role "admin").
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//
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// This deliberately uses GET /user/memberships/orgs rather than
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// GET /users/{username}/orgs. The latter only returns *public* memberships and
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// carries no role, so it cannot distinguish an Owner from an ordinary member —
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// historically every org a user belonged to was granted publish access to its
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// namespace regardless of the user's role. The memberships endpoint returns the
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// caller's role per org (and includes private memberships), letting us grant the
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// org namespace only to people who actually administer the org.
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//
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// The endpoint requires the read:org scope. A minimal token used only for
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// personal-namespace publishing won't have it and will get a 403 here; that is
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// treated as "no admin orgs" (see fetchOrgMembershipsPage) so personal publishing
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// keeps working without asking users to over-scope their token.
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func (h *GitHubHandler) getGitHubAdminOrgs(ctx context.Context, token string) ([]GitHubUserOrOrg, error) {
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var adminOrgs []GitHubUserOrOrg
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for page := 1; page <= maxOrgMembershipPages; page++ {
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memberships, err := h.fetchOrgMembershipsPage(ctx, token, page)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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for _, m := range memberships {
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// state=active is already requested in the query string, but re-check it
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// here as defense in depth: if that param is ever dropped or changed, this
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// keeps a pending (not-yet-accepted) owner invitation from being granted
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// the org namespace.
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if m.State == githubMembershipStateActive && m.Role == githubOrgRoleAdmin {
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adminOrgs = append(adminOrgs, m.Organization)
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}
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}
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// A short page is the last page: return the complete result.
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if len(memberships) < orgMembershipsPageSize {
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return adminOrgs, nil
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}
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}
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// Every page up to the cap was full. A real user never has this many org
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// memberships, so rather than return a possibly-truncated set (which would
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// silently strip a legitimate Owner's grant), fail closed.
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("org memberships exceeded %d pages; refusing to issue a possibly-truncated grant", maxOrgMembershipPages)
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}
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// fetchOrgMembershipsPage fetches a single page of the authenticated user's
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// active organization memberships.
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func (h *GitHubHandler) fetchOrgMembershipsPage(ctx context.Context, token string, page int) ([]githubOrgMembership, error) {
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url := fmt.Sprintf("%s/user/memberships/orgs?state=active&per_page=%d&page=%d", h.baseURL, orgMembershipsPageSize, page)
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
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}
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
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req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/vnd.github.v3+json")
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req.Header.Set("X-GitHub-Api-Version", "2022-11-28")
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resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get user organization memberships: %w", err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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// GitHub returns 403 here for two very different reasons, which we must not
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// conflate:
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// 1. The token lacks the read:org scope. This is the common, benign case for a
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// minimal personal-publishing token: GET /user still works, but org
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// memberships are forbidden. We degrade gracefully to "no admin orgs" so
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// personal-namespace publishing keeps working without over-scoping.
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// 2. Rate limiting. GitHub signals primary/secondary rate limits with 403 (or
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// 429), setting X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0 and/or Retry-After. Degrading here
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// would silently strip a legitimate Owner's org grant, so we fail closed
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// (return an error) rather than mistake a throttle for "not an admin".
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if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden {
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if resp.Header.Get("X-RateLimit-Remaining") == "0" || resp.Header.Get("Retry-After") != "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("GitHub API rate limit exceeded while listing org memberships (status 403): %s", readErrorBody(resp.Body))
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}
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// Best-effort defense: GitHub uses the X-GitHub-SSO header to signal that a
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// resource is behind SAML/SSO the token hasn't been authorized for. If we see
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// it, treat that as an Owner being blocked (not a missing scope) and fail
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// closed rather than silently degrading them to personal-only. NOTE: we have
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// not confirmed that the memberships *list* endpoint emits this header on SSO
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// enforcement (it may instead just omit the SSO-protected org); this check is
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// safe either way — if the header is absent we fall through to the same
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// graceful degrade as before — but it is not a proven guarantee that every
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// SSO-blocked Owner is caught here.
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if resp.Header.Get("X-GitHub-SSO") != "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("GitHub org memberships require SSO authorization for this token (status 403): %s", readErrorBody(resp.Body))
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}
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return nil, nil
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}
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("GitHub API error (status %d): %s", resp.StatusCode, readErrorBody(resp.Body))
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}
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var memberships []githubOrgMembership
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if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&memberships); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode organization memberships response: %w", err)
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}
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return memberships, nil
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}
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// buildPermissions builds permissions based on GitHub user and their organizations
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func (h *GitHubHandler) buildPermissions(username string, orgs []GitHubUserOrOrg) []auth.Permission {
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// Assert the username matches the expected regex, to harden against people doing
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// weird things in names. The username is the caller's own identity, so if it is
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// invalid we grant nothing.
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if !isValidGitHubName(username) {
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return nil
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}
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// Add permission for user's own namespace
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permissions := []auth.Permission{{
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Action: auth.PermissionActionPublish,
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ResourcePattern: fmt.Sprintf("io.github.%s/*", username),
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}}
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// Add permissions for each organization the user administers (Owner role). Skip
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// any org whose name fails validation rather than rejecting the whole set, so one
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// unexpected org name can't strip the caller's personal namespace or their other
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// (valid) org grants.
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for _, org := range orgs {
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if !isValidGitHubName(org.Login) {
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continue
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}
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permissions = append(permissions, auth.Permission{
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Action: auth.PermissionActionPublish,
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ResourcePattern: fmt.Sprintf("io.github.%s/*", org.Login),
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})
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}
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return permissions
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}
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func isValidGitHubName(name string) bool {
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return regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9-]+$`).MatchString(name)
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}
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