Copilot round 5 — three of four findings implemented.
- `cleanAuthorizationParams` validates the field as it comes off disk. Only the
web client's /api/servers route checked the shape; the CLI and TUI read
mcp.json directly, so `authorizationParams: "oops"` enumerated as the
character-indexed pairs 0=o, 1=o, … and `{ audience: 5 }` reached
URLSearchParams.set, which stringifies it — either way the Inspector sent
query parameters the user never wrote. Now validated in shared code so all
three clients enforce the documented string→string contract, warning on each
rejection. Follows `cleanRoots`, which guards the same class for `roots`.
- The form's description now states that these parameters are not sent while
Enterprise-managed authorization is on. The EMA leg authorizes against the
enterprise IdP — a different authorization server — and deliberately sends
none of them, so the copy was presenting a configured-but-inert value as
active.
- The /api/servers malformed-`oauth` warning listed an expected shape omitting
`onInsufficientScope`, which the validator accepts and the docs describe, so
it told users a valid config was malformed.
Ten new cases, all verified to fail against the pre-fix sources.
Declined: recording the authorize URL in the Network tab (repeat of round 2) —
that URL is reached by a top-level browser navigation rather than a tracked
fetch, so it has never appeared there for any authorization request; adding a
synthetic entry changes every OAuth flow and is a product decision for a
maintainer, not a change to make inside this PR.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 4 (one suppressed finding, and a real bug).
`extractSecretsFromStored` rebuilt the stripped `oauth` object from an
allow-list of the non-secret fields. That list had gone stale: it never named
`onInsufficientScope`, so a server carrying both a client secret and a
non-default SEP-2350 policy silently lost the policy on save, falling back to
`reauthorize`. This predates #2018 — the PR only extended the same list with
`authorizationParams` — but the list is the defect, so fix the class rather
than add a third entry to it.
The stripped entry now subtracts the one secret instead of enumerating what to
keep, so any field added to `oauth` later is preserved by construction.
Regression test verified to fail against the allow-list version:
`expected { clientId: 'cid' } to deeply equal { clientId: 'cid', onInsufficientScope: 'throw' }`.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 10.
The scan no longer publishes its malformed entries into the tools/list report
at all. Round 9 only stopped it overwriting the aggregate's; the remaining
case is unsalvageable for a stronger reason than 'two different requests':
- a FAILED strict aggregate runs salvage, which writes the report itself;
- a SUCCESSFUL one means every entry parsed, so the rendered list contains no
malformed entries.
So by the time the scan finds something, either the aggregate already reported
it with indices matching the screen, or the aggregate succeeded and what the
scan found is provably not in the list being displayed. Publishing could only
ever name entries the user cannot see.
Nothing is lost: listToolsForScan still marks its own refused response, so the
finding surfaces on the Protocol entry for the exchange that carried it, where
it is true. The per-page accumulation and raw-entry offset existed only to feed
the removed publish, and go with it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 11. Two of the three are the enum-strip logic this PR added
misbehaving on degenerate input; the third is one more keyword for the
fail-closed rule.
1. An empty `enum` permits nothing at all, but the strip reported "unchanged"
(nothing was removed) and the collapse built a Select with no options — a
required field then had no interaction able to supply a value. It now
reaches the same conclusion as `[null]`: no selectable member, so decline.
The outcome is renamed `unselectable`, since "only-null" no longer describes
both routes to it.
2. Filtering `null` out of `enum` shortens it, which could make an ALREADY
mismatched `enumNames` come out the same length — so `enum: [null, "b"]`
with `enumNames: ["None"]` started labelling `b` as "None", turning labels
both renderers had correctly ignored into a confident mislabel. A list that
was not parallel before filtering is now dropped rather than kept.
3. `$ref` joins the opaque set. It is never resolved here and applies alongside
its siblings, so `{ type: "string", $ref: "#/$defs/intOnly" }` can be
unsatisfiable. The wrapper path already declined on it by virtue of the
annotation allowlist; this extends the same rule to branches, the
`type: [T, "null"]` path, and `admitsNull`.
No round 12 was requested: the review loop was stopped at the user's direction.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 9.
The exclusion scan is a separate, uncached tools/list exchange, so its entries
need not be the ones rendered — the server can answer differently, and a
cache-served aggregate is a different list version. It was overwriting the
aggregate's report wholesale, replacing accurate indices with indices into a
list nobody is looking at. The aggregate now owns the report; the scan
publishes only when the aggregate left nothing, which is the cache-served case
that made it publish at all (round 2).
A conforming re-fetch no longer swallows the mark: the list can change between
the strict page and the lenient one, and a clean second response says nothing
about the first, which was refused. It is marked with the original decode
error when there is nothing per-item to name.
The scan's fallback re-fetch now goes through invokeMcpClient, like the strict
call beside it and like salvageList's walk, so an auth challenge on that
request can still be recovered instead of being swallowed by listAllTools's
best-effort scan catch.
Also fixes listTools dropping an empty-string cursor (truthiness rather than
!== undefined) — its own fallback leg already preserved it, so the two legs of
one scan page disagreed about which page they had fetched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 10: one finding, the last position of the rule the previous two
rounds established. A *non-null* branch can carry its own `anyOf`, and the
hoist drops it — the branch's `anyOf` overwrites the wrapper's in the spread
and is then cleared, so `{ anyOf: [{ type: "string", anyOf: [{ const: "a" }] },
{ type: "null" }] }` widened into an unconstrained nullable string.
Rather than add a fourth inline condition, the four sites that ask "does this
schema compose something I cannot evaluate?" now share one predicate,
`hasUnevaluatedComposition` (an opaque applicator, or a nested `anyOf`):
- the surviving branch in the `anyOf` collapse (this round's finding),
- the null branch in `admitsNull`,
- the `type: [T, "null"]` collapse path,
- and, via `hasOpaqueApplicator`, the top of `admitsNull`.
Each of those was missed independently across rounds 8-10 for the same reason:
the guard existed but was spelled out inline at each site and drifted. Sharing
the predicate is the part that stops a fifth site from repeating it.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 8.
The era contract validated with the wire schema but returned the raw input,
so the wire schema's normalization was discarded — both era schemas are
z.object, which strips unknown top-level fields as the strict codec does, so
salvaged tools could carry fields the strict path drops. The parsed output is
now what gets normalized and returned. This also simplifies the bridge: issues
come straight from the wire parse with their paths intact, so the custom-issue
forwarding (and its early describeIssue application) is gone.
The malformed-entry report is written by the aggregate walk's salvage, but in
paginated mode the tools/prompts/resources panels render the paged stores,
which neither write nor clear it — leaving a stale warning above a freshly
fetched page it does not describe, with indices into an aggregate the user is
no longer looking at. Those reports are now suppressed in paginated mode;
resource templates keep theirs, having no paged store. Suppressing rather than
adding per-page salvage: pointing at the wrong entry costs more than staying
quiet, and per-page salvage is a feature, not a display fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 9: four findings, all of them places where round 8's fail-closed
inversion was the right idea applied incompletely. The rule was only enforced
at the positions I happened to be editing; it now holds everywhere a schema is
inspected.
1. `admitsNull` returned early on an explicit `type`, ignoring a sibling
`anyOf` — but the two are conjunctive, so `{ type: ["string", "null"],
anyOf: [{ type: "string" }] }` admits no null at all. A sibling union now
withholds the claim.
2. A null-typed branch could be unsatisfiable via its own nested `anyOf`
(`{ type: "null", anyOf: [{ type: "string" }] }`). The branch check tested
`not`/`allOf`/`oneOf` but not `anyOf`; it now treats a nested union as
equally opaque.
3. The `type: [T, "null"]` collapse path had no applicator guard at all —
`collapsed` clears `anyOf` unconditionally and the renderers ignore the
rest, so `{ type: ["string", "null"], anyOf: [{ const: "a" }] }` was widened
into an unconstrained string field. That path now declines the same way the
`anyOf` path does.
4. The `admitsNull` docstring still advertised `oneOf` support that round 8
deliberately removed. Rewritten to state what is recognized, what is
declined and why, and the asymmetry that settles the direction.
The three code fixes share one helper (`hasOpaqueApplicator`) rather than
repeating the condition, so the next position that needs it cannot drift.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 7.
The era contract was derived from the neutral ToolSchema plus one override,
which diverged from the real wire schemas both ways. Measured against SDK
2.0.0 on a real connection:
- modern accepts `inputSchema.properties: 5` and `required: [1]`; ours
rejected them, so a malformed sibling made salvage DROP a conforming tool
and report it as malformed — a false accusation from the screen whose job
is to say which entry is wrong.
- legacy rejects `outputSchema.properties: 5` / `required: [1]`; ours
accepted them, readmitting entries the strict path refused.
- modern rejects a non-string `inputSchema.$schema`, legacy accepts it;
ours accepted on both.
Each era is now expressed as its own wire schema, bridged to Tool by
`eraToolItemSchema`. The bridge exists because both eras accept values the
exported Tool type cannot describe (the SDK returns them typed as Tool
anyway), so the wire schema's output type is irrelevant and z.custom<Tool>
supplies the caller's type — which is what avoids an `as unknown as` here.
Forwarded issues keep their path so the report still names the field.
The full measured matrix is pinned table-driven in listSalvage-era.test.ts:
each row asserts the SDK's verdict AND that our contract agrees, so a
divergence that closes or widens fails loudly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 8 opened the same conjunctive-semantics seam a third time, so
this stops patching cases and inverts the defaults instead. Both guards now
fail CLOSED: anything this module cannot evaluate sends the field to the JSON
editor rather than to a widget built from a partial reading.
1. The wrapper-conflict check enumerated the *validation* keywords and declined
when two of them disagreed — which meant any keyword nobody listed
(`oneOf`, `allOf`, `not`, `$ref`, a future vocabulary) was silently treated
as safe to drop. That whitelist fails open, and open means rendering a
widget for a constraint that is not the schema's. It is replaced by an
allowlist of *annotation* keywords: the collapse declines whenever the
wrapper carries anything beyond annotations and the union itself. Stricter
than the old equality test — a wrapper restating its branch's `type` now
declines too — which costs a dropdown on a rare redundant shape and buys a
rule with no gap in it.
2. `admitsNull` returned true for shapes it had not actually evaluated:
`not: { type: "null" }` rules null out, `allOf` can add a member that does,
`oneOf` requires *exactly one* branch to match (so a null branch does not
by itself mean null validates), and a branch like `{ type: "null",
const: "x" }` is unsatisfiable. All now answer false. Under-claiming
nullability costs a clear button; over-claiming lets the form emit a value
the schema rejects, so the asymmetry decides it.
Note the third finding — draft validity never reaching the submit controls —
is NOT fixed here, and it is worse than I described last round: `ToolDetailPanel`
gates Execute on `isExecuting` alone and never calls `hasMissingRequiredFields`,
so my earlier claim that required fields were already covered was wrong for the
Tools tab. Corrected on #2020, which is where the fix belongs.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 6.
Bound both fallback walks with LIST_MAX_PAGES, which is now also passed to
the SDK client as `listMaxPages` so the strict aggregate and its fallback
share one value by construction. A server emitting endlessly UNIQUE cursors
never trips the repeated-cursor guard, so the salvage re-walk and the
SEP-2243 exclusion scan would page and accumulate without bound. Hitting the
cap aborts rather than returning a truncated list as a complete one.
Mark the exclusion scan's refused response on every fallback-failure path.
`salvageList` can rethrow bare because ManagedListState marks from the error
it receives; the scan has no such backstop — listAllTools catches and logs a
failing scan by design — so an unmarked rethrow left a response the client
demonstrably refused rendering as a clean exchange.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Real deployments gate IdP selection, prompt behavior, or audience on a query
parameter the OAuth/OIDC core specs never standardized (Keycloak's
`kc_idp_hint`, OIDC's `login_hint` / `prompt` / `acr_values`, Auth0's
`audience`), and none of them could be driven from the Inspector.
The Inspector never builds the authorize URL — the SDK's `auth()` does, and it
exposes no hook for extra parameters — so the merge happens at the one seam
that sees the finished URL: `BaseOAuthClientProvider.redirectToAuthorization`.
It lives in `core/`, so web, CLI, and TUI all inherit it.
- `core/auth/authorizationParams.ts`: the reserved-key list (`client_id`,
`code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method`, `redirect_uri`, `resource`,
`response_type`, `scope`, `state`), the key validator the form renders
inline, and the merge itself. Reserved keys are dropped with a warning
rather than silently overriding PKCE / the state binding / RFC 8707;
blank-key rows are skipped; the caller's URL is never mutated.
- Applied to the authorization request only — nothing wires it into the token
request.
- Persisted as `oauth.authorizationParams` (a string record) on the per-server
config beside `scopes`, edited as key/value rows in Server Settings ->
Authorization ("Additional authorization parameters"), with an inline error
per offending row plus a section-level warning.
- The enterprise-managed (EMA) leg redirects to a *different* authorization
server (the enterprise IdP), so it goes through the explicit
`redirectToExternalAuthorization` entry point, which skips the merge — a
`kc_idp_hint` or `audience` meant for the MCP server's AS must never be
appended to the IdP's authorize URL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDXCSrnSBV7vZfxycG5Z6E
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 7: both findings are the same principle applied one level
further — JSON Schema siblings are conjunctive, and this code was treating
them as alternatives.
1. The hoist is a spread, so a branch keyword *replaced* the wrapper's. That
is not a conjunction: a wrapper `enum: ["a"]` around a branch
`enum: ["a", "b"]` means `"a"`, but the spread produced `["a", "b"]` and
the dropdown would have offered — and submitted — a `"b"` the schema
rejects. `type`, bounds, and the object keywords fail the same way.
The collapse now declines when wrapper and branch carry different values
for the same validation keyword, and the field renders through the JSON
editor with its schema intact. Intersecting them properly is a much larger
surface, and a subtly wrong intersection would be worse than none.
Identical values are not a conflict, so the ordinary redundant-`type`
shape still collapses; metadata (`title`, `description`, `default`,
`enumNames`) never conflicts, since nothing validates against it.
2. `admitsNull` let a `{ type: "null" }` branch outvote an explicit
non-null top-level `type`. `{ type: "string", anyOf: [..., { type:
"null" }] }` rejects null — the value must satisfy the type *and* the
union — so an explicit `type` now decides instead of falling through to
the branch scan.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 6: no visible comments, three suppressed. All valid.
1. JSON Schema keywords at one level are conjunctive, so a syntactic null does
not by itself mean the schema accepts null. `{ type: ["string", "null"],
enum: ["envio"] }` names "null" and still rejects it — yet the collapse
marked it `nullable: true`, giving the field a clear button that emits a
value the schema forbids, and `admitsNull` let required-field gating accept
it. Both now consult `nullExcludedBySiblings`.
The distinction that makes this safe: a *branch's* `enum` is not a sibling.
In `anyOf: [{ type: "string", enum: [...] }, { type: "null" }]` — the #1928
shape — the enum constrains that branch alone and the union still permits
null, so `nullable` is read off the ORIGINAL schema rather than the hoisted
merge. Reading the merge would have called the headline case non-nullable.
Flattening is unaffected either way; only the nullability claim is withheld.
2. The collapse newly routed a nullable array of numeric item enums into the
string-only `MultiSelect` path, which would submit `["1"]` for `[1]`. Gated
on `isStringEnum`, matching `toConstOptions`; `isStringEnum` is now a type
predicate so the narrowing is real rather than asserted.
3. Invalid JSON and an empty field both report `undefined`, so an optional
complex argument could be dropped from the submission while invalid text sat
visible in the box. The field now says so via `error`. Note a *required*
field was already gated — its value is `undefined`, which
`hasMissingRequiredFields` treats as missing — so this is specifically the
optional case. Disabling Execute/Open/Submit on an invalid optional draft
needs a validity channel out of `SchemaForm` into all four call sites, which
is wider than this fix; filed separately.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 5: one inline comment, two suppressed. All three valid, and two
were defects from round 4's own fix.
1. Stripping the `null` sentinel from an `enum` left the parallel `enumNames`
untouched. Both renderers discard labels outright when the two lengths
disagree, so `{ enum: ["a", null], enumNames: ["Alpha", "None"] }` lost the
`Alpha` label entirely — a worse outcome than the sentinel it was fixing.
`enumNames` is now filtered by the same indices, and only when it was
positionally parallel to begin with (a mismatched list is already ignored
by both renderers, so re-indexing it would invent an alignment the server
never declared).
2. `enum: [null]` became `enum: undefined`, which widened a schema permitting
*only* `null` into a plain string field accepting arbitrary text — the form
would then invite values the schema forbids. Trading a cosmetic problem for
a correctness one, which was the wrong call. The collapse now declines
entirely for that case and the field renders through the JSON editor.
3. That JSON editor was still carrying #1928's original mechanism: it stored
unparseable text back as the *value*, which the next render
re-`JSON.stringify`d, so typing `[` gave `"["` then `"\"[\""`. Routing
nullable fields to real widgets removed the common way of landing there but
never fixed the editor — and #2007's fix deliberately sends object unions to
it, so a fallback nobody can type into is not a fallback. `SchemaJsonField`
now holds the draft text locally (the split `SchemaNumberInput` already
uses) and reports parsed JSON, or `undefined` while the text is mid-edit —
an inspector must not report a value it cannot send. Keyed by `resetKey`
like the number field, since it now holds state.
Also replaces an `as unknown as string[]` in the round-4 test, which violated
the repo's TypeScript rules and papered over `InspectorFormSchema.enum` being
unable to model a valid `["a", null]`. The fixture is wire data, so it now goes
through `toFormSchema` — the same wire→form narrowing boundary every production
call site uses.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Both findings are the same shape: the fallback accepting what the strict path
would not.
- `ModernResultEnvelopeSchema` typed `ttlMs` as any number, where the codec
requires a non-negative integer. `ttlMs: -1` (or `0.5`) plus one bad entry
would salvage, reporting the entry and hiding the envelope violation. Tightened
to `z.int().min(0)`.
- The item schema was the SDK's era-NEUTRAL `ToolSchema`, and the negotiated
era's wire schema is stricter in ways the SDK does not export. Verified
against SDK 2.0.0 on a real connection: on legacy, a tool with
`outputSchema: { type: "array" }` is refused by the strict aggregate but
accepted by the neutral schema; on modern, `execution` is STRIPPED by the
strict path but kept by the neutral one. Either way a salvaged list could show
— and let the user call — a tool the connection's era says isn't valid.
`toolItemSchemaForEra` closes both. Replicating rules that live in the SDK's
internals is a real cost; `listSalvage-era.test.ts` is what makes it safe to
pay, pinning each rule to the strict path's OBSERVED behavior so a divergence
that closes or widens fails loudly instead of rotting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot round 4: no new visible comments, two in the suppressed block. Both
valid.
1. The `type: [T, "null"]` encoding keeps its keywords at the top level, so a
nullable enum written that way carries the null *inside* the list:
`{ type: ["string", "null"], enum: ["envio", "recebimento", null] }`. The
collapse left it there, which broke both renderers in different ways — the
web dispatcher handed `null` to Mantine as option data, and the TUI's
all-strings check rejected the whole enum and fell back to a plain text
field. Neither is the dropdown the schema asks for.
The collapse now strips a `null` member whenever it flattens, since that
fact has already moved onto `nullable`. An enum of nothing but `null`
drops out entirely: it offers no value a dropdown could show, so the plain
widget serves the field better than an empty select. Covered in core and
end-to-end in both dispatchers.
2. The new integration test claimed in its own header to pin the registry and
config wiring, then called `createNullableFieldsTool()` directly — so a
misspelt preset case or a config naming a dead preset would have left it
green. A fair "this does not test what it says" catch. It now resolves the
checked-in `nullable-fields-http.json` through `loadConfig` →
`resolveConfig`, matching `duplicate-tool-names.test.ts`, and asserts the
resolved tool names before booting the server.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Two findings, both about the fallback accepting more than it should.
- The lenient page schema validated pagination and nothing else, so a response
carrying a malformed entry AND an unrelated top-level violation salvaged: the
entry was reported and the other violation vanished with the strict error that
caught it. The page schema is now DERIVED from the method's real result schema
with only its item array relaxed (`lenientListPageSchema`), so every other
field — `_meta`, `nextCursor`, anything a future revision adds — is still
validated. The modern era envelope the raw-wire path bypasses (`resultType`,
`ttlMs`, `cacheScope`) is checked explicitly for the same reason.
Salvage is also narrowed to `InvalidResult`: `UnsupportedResultType` means the
codec doesn't recognize what KIND of frame arrived, so it isn't a list with a
bad entry and reporting an item-level reason would hide a protocol failure.
Marking the Protocol entry still applies to both, hence two predicates.
- On every rethrow path the re-walk had already answered the method, so the
caller's own `markResponseRejected` (in `ManagedListState.refresh`) landed on
the lenient page that succeeded and left the refused response clean. The
correlation is restored before rethrowing — deleted when nothing had answered
before, so the outer mark is a no-op rather than a lie.
`nextCursorOf` / `rawItemsOf` narrow the page's fields instead of casting: the
runtime-keyed `extend()` loses the shape, and asserting it back would be exactly
the unjustified cast the last round removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Three findings (one inline, two in the suppressed block), all valid.
1. `toConstOptions` still stringified every non-null `const`, so
`items: { anyOf: [{ const: 1 }, { const: 2 }] }` submitted `["1"]` where
the schema says `[1]`. Same wrong-type-on-the-wire problem that keeps a
numeric `enum` off the select path, so it gets the same answer: only a
string `const` is selectable, anything else falls to the JSON editor
where the value keeps its type.
2. `hasMissingRequiredFields` derived null admission from the *renderer's*
collapse, which is narrower on purpose — it only flattens a two-member
union. So `anyOf: [string, number, null]` renders through the JSON
fallback (where `null` is typeable) yet was still marked missing,
disabling submit on a value the schema accepts. Null admission is a
validity question, not a rendering one, so it is now its own predicate:
`admitsNull` in core, recognizing `nullable`, `type: "null"`,
`type: [..., "null"]`, and a null branch anywhere in an `anyOf`/`oneOf`
of any size.
3. Nothing exercised the `record_shipment` preset — the web and TUI tests
build the `anyOf` shape by hand, which verifies the renderers but
*assumes* the premise the whole fix rests on: that Zod's `.nullish()`
emits `anyOf: [<branch>, { type: "null" }]` with the enum on the branch.
A Zod output change or a registry typo would leave every unit test green
while the documented reproduction server quietly stopped reproducing.
Added an integration test that boots the preset over HTTP, asserts the
wire shape, and runs it back through the collapse — following the
`duplicate-tool-names.test.ts` precedent, which exists for the same
reason (#1957).
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review: the option's doc still promised the level is set "if server
supports logging" — after the era gate that is exactly the case which now
silently does nothing, since a modern server can advertise `logging` and still
ignore the option.
Document it as legacy-only and point modern callers at the per-request
`io.modelcontextprotocol/logLevel` opt-in (`modernLogLevel` /
`setModernLogLevel()`).
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The visible review was clean; all five findings were in the suppressed block,
two of them real defects.
- The exclusion scan's aggregate offset was wrong twice over: `excluded.length`
counts only invalid-header tools, and on page one it also folded in the
current page's valid count. A reported index therefore pointed at a position
that doesn't exist — worst for an unlabeled entry, whose index is all the user
has. Replaced with a raw-entry offset advanced by each page's valid + malformed
counts.
- The scan's own refused response was never marked. It is a distinct exchange
from the aggregate's, and the lenient re-fetch moves the method correlation
off it, so its Protocol entry rendered as a clean success the client had in
fact refused. Marked with the captured id, as `salvageList` already does.
- Three double casts in the test fixture are gone: `ListPage` now models raw
wire data (`items: unknown`, `nextCursor?: unknown`), which is what a server
built to emit spec-forbidden shapes actually serves. Declaring the validated
type and casting malformed values through it asserted the opposite of what
these tests exist to check. The cursor map narrows to `string` at the one
place a cursor addresses a page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
All four findings taken (one visible, three in the suppressed block), plus the
`excludedTools` sibling leak the round-1 reply had deferred:
- `rawItemsOf` read a missing or non-array list member as an empty page, so a
top-level violation (`{ tools: "invalid" }`) on a later page was discarded
and the call returned a silently truncated list. It now returns `undefined`
for "not a list at all", and the walk rethrows the original strict error.
- A failure of the re-walk ITSELF (a malformed `nextCursor`, a connection lost
mid-walk) escaped in place of the original error, whose response is the one
`rejectedResponseId` was captured for. The walk is now wrapped: the original
surfaces, the secondary is logged so it stays diagnosable.
- The exclusion scan's lenient fallback discarded its malformed entries despite
the comment claiming they were reported. Observable when the aggregate is
served from cache: the salvage never runs, so nothing else reports them. The
scan now returns them and `refreshExcludedTools` reports them — only ever
adding, so a clean scan can't clear what the salvage path just wrote.
- An empty-string cursor is a valid cursor, and `cursor ? {cursor} : {}` dropped
it, re-requesting page one and duplicating its entries until the
repeated-cursor guard fired. Both walks now test `!== undefined`.
- `excludedTools` had the same session leak fixed for `malformedListItems` last
round: cleared only on an explicit `disconnect()`, so the `onerror`-with-no-
`onclose` route carried the previous server's set into the next connection.
Cleared on the start-clean path too — safe because every `listAllTools`
recomputes it, so this can only drop a stale set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Closes#2007.
Two things, both surfaced while answering "does #1928's PR also fix #2007?".
**#2007, and why it belongs in this PR.** `z.array(z.union([z.object(…),
z.object(…)]))` gives an `items.anyOf` whose branches carry no top-level
`const`, so every MultiSelect option was `String(item.const ?? "")` — the
empty string, twice. Mantine *throws* on duplicate option values, greying
out the whole tool panel.
That is a pre-existing bug, but this branch makes it reachable from a new
direction: a *nullable* array of object unions previously had no top-level
`type` and fell to the JSON fallback, and now collapses to `type: "array"`
with `items.anyOf` — straight into the crash. Shipping the collapse without
this fix would widen an existing crash, so the two go together. Both shapes
are covered by tests.
`toConstOptions` now returns `null` unless every branch yields a distinct,
non-empty value, and the field falls through to the JSON editor — which is
the honest widget for a union of object shapes anyway. Applied to the
`string`/`oneOf` path as well, which had the identical `?? ""` and the same
duplicate-throw waiting on it.
**Copilot round 2.** Round 1's fix kept "an explicit `type` is
authoritative", so `{ type: "number", enum: [1, 2] }` still collapses with
its enum hoisted. The TUI's dispatcher tests `property.enum` *before* the
type switch, and `toSelectOptions` stringifies, so that reached a select
that submits `"1"` for `1`. The select path is now gated on `isStringEnum`
(exported from core for this), and a typed non-string enum falls through to
its typed field: the enum constraint is lost, the value's type is not,
which is the safer of the two losses. Pre-existing for a plain numeric
enum; the collapse just made the nullable form reachable too.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
`logging/setLevel` is a legacy-era method, but connect() called it on any
server advertising the `logging` capability, era regardless. The modern wire
era rejects it outright, and because the call sits in the post-handshake
sequence that rejection failed the *connection* — so the CLI (the one caller
passing `initialLoggingLevel`, hardcoded to "debug") could not run any method
at all against a modern server that advertised logging.
Gate it on `protocolEra !== "modern"`. Modern has no session-scoped level to
set: the equivalent is the per-request `io.modelcontextprotocol/logLevel`
`_meta` opt-in, already driven by `modernLogLevel` from the server settings.
So modern skips the call rather than translating it. Legacy is unchanged.
The guard lives next to the capability check in inspectorClient.ts rather
than in the CLI, so any future caller passing `initialLoggingLevel` is
covered too.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Three real defects it caught, plus the tests it asked for:
- The strict `tools/list` aggregate is filtered by the SDK for invalid
`x-mcp-header` annotations (SEP-2243), but the salvage path was not: one
ordinary malformed tool would trip the fallback and readmit every
invalid-header tool beside it. Salvaged tools now go through the same scan.
- `markResponseRejected` resolves "the last response received for this method",
and the re-walk answers that same method — so the mark landed on a salvage
page that succeeded while the actually-invalid response rendered clean. The
correlation id is now captured before the re-walk.
- The report was cleared only on an explicit `disconnect()`. The route out that
tears down nothing (`onerror` with no `onclose`) carried it into the next
connection, so it is now cleared on the start-clean `resetSessionState()` path
as well.
Fixing the first exposed two more, both found by the new test:
- The modern (2026-07-28) codec validates a result against the spec schema
before the caller's, so a lenient `client.request` is rejected exactly as the
strict one was — there was no salvage on the modern leg at all. It now goes
through the raw-wire channel that exists for the modern `tasks/*` methods.
`withModernEnvelope` is split out of `withModernTaskEnvelope` so a list
request doesn't claim the tasks extension the user may have disabled.
- A malformed tool also blanked the SEP-2243 excluded set, leaving a tool that
vanished for an invalid header with no explanation — #1909's own complaint one
level down. The scan walk now tolerates a malformed sibling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Four findings, all valid:
1. Returning `T` was unsound. The collapse genuinely changes two fields —
`type` stops being an array, `anyOf` becomes `undefined` — so a caller
whose `T` typed either that way could keep treating it so afterwards.
The result is now `T | NormalizedNullableUnion<T>`, which states exactly
that: `Omit<T, "type" | "anyOf">` plus a `RenderableType` `type`, a
cleared `anyOf`, and `nullable`. The one assertion left is isolated in a
`collapsed()` helper, needed only because `Omit` stays deferred while `T`
is open.
2. A typeless `enum` does not imply strings. JSON Schema allows
`enum: [1, 2]`, and inferring `"string"` for it would hand numbers to a
`Select` declared `string[]`, and make the TUI submit `"1"` for `1`. Now
only an all-string enum earns the inference; anything else stays on the
JSON fallback. An explicit `type` is still authoritative.
3. `hasMissingRequiredFields` counted every null as missing, so clearing a
*required* nullable enum — newly possible via the clear button — would
disable submit on a value the schema permits. `required` constrains
presence, not content, so null now counts as present exactly when the
field's schema admits it.
4. `collectSchemaDefaults` read the raw union, so a default nested inside a
nullable object's branch was displayed by the form but never seeded into
the submitted values. It normalizes each property first, like the
renderer does.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Closes#2015, folded into #1928 rather than left as a follow-up.
The TUI's `schemaToForm` has the same defect the web `SchemaForm` had: its
local `JsonSchemaProperty` declares only `type?: string` — no `anyOf`, no
array-valued `type` — so a `.nullish()` argument has no top-level `type` or
`enum` for the dispatcher to read and falls to the `switch` default, losing
its select. Milder than the web bug (a plain text field, not a corrupting
JSON textarea), but the same class.
Fixing it in a second place is the argument for not having the logic in a
first place. So the collapse moves to `core/json/nullableUnion.ts` as
`normalizeNullableUnion`, generic over a minimal `NullableUnionSchema`
shape — the least a caller must expose to be *recognized* as a nullable
union — so neither client has to adopt the other's schema type. Both form
builders now share one copy and cannot drift on which schemas they render.
- `core/json/nullableUnion.ts` — the shared collapse, plus tests at
`clients/web/src/test/core/nullableUnion.test.ts` (the web suite is what
gates `core/`).
- `clients/web`: `schemaUtils.normalizeUnionType` is gone; `SchemaForm` and
`resolveRefsInMessage` call the core function directly.
- `clients/tui`: `schemaToForm` normalizes each property before dispatch,
and `JsonSchemaProperty` grows the `anyOf` / array-`type` fields the
encoding uses.
Verified by driving the built TUI under a pty against the
`nullable-fields-http.json` showcase server. Before, every argument of
`record_shipment` rendered as a plain text field; after, `direction` is a
select ("No value"), `quantity` an integer, `express` a boolean
("[Not set]").
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The SDK validates a list result as a whole, so a single non-conforming entry
rejected the entire response and the panel showed "Couldn't load resources"
with zero items — the exact opposite of what a debugging tool should do with a
server that is 90% right. Reported against a PHP server whose empty
`annotations` object reaches the wire as `[]` rather than `{}`.
`listAll*` now falls back to a lenient re-walk when — and only when — the SDK
rejects a result it received (`InvalidResult` / `UnsupportedResultType`), keeps
the entries that validate, and reports the rest. A conforming server takes the
strict, cache-aware path exactly as before.
Salvaging is not accepting: the dropped entries are named with their reason in
a warning above the list, and the Protocol entry is still marked rejected, so
the wire truth survives. When every entry validates, the original error is
rethrown rather than swallowed — the rejection was about something the
per-item pass cannot explain.
`isClientDecodeRejection` moves to the new module and is now shared with
managedListState, which had the only copy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 4: every await before the `connect` dispatch is a window
for a `disconnect()` or a transport close to overtake the connect, and the
listen round-trip widened it. Announcing anyway restarts every managed list
refresh against a session being torn down or already dead.
The dispatch is now gated on `status === "connected" && !disconnecting` — the
second because an explicit teardown claims ownership before it awaits
`client.close()`, leaving the status untouched until that block finishes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Copilot review round 3 (no new code findings, three stale-comment ones):
- `openModernListenStreamOnConnect`'s generation guard was justified by a
`connect` listener racing it — which the previous commit made impossible by
dispatching `connect` after this call. The guard is still right, for reasons
that survive the reorder: `statusChange` has already fired, and a concurrent
`subscribeToResource` or `disconnect()` (whose `resetSubscriptionStream` bumps
the generation) can supersede it.
- `reconcileModernStreamStateAfterFailedRefresh`'s JSDoc still described its
branches as "nothing subscribed" vs "URIs live"; they are the empty vs
non-empty *filter* now, which differ exactly on the listChanged-only path.
- The superseded-failure test carried the same stale `connect` rationale.
Comments only; no behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Copilot review round 2: opening the stream after `dispatchTypedEvent("connect")`
left a real gap. The managed list states start their initial `refresh()` from
that event, so `tools/list` could go out ahead of `subscriptions/listen` — and a
list the server changed in that window would notify nobody, leaving the UI
stale with no way to notice.
The handler registration, the initial logging level, and the stream open now all
run before the `connect` dispatch, so no consumer can act on the connection
until the notification channel is established (or its retry armed). Costs one
listen round-trip on a modern connect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Copilot review: `openModernListenStreamOnConnect`'s catch reconciled
unconditionally, unlike the subscribe/unsubscribe call sites. The `connect`
event is dispatched before the stream opens, so a listener subscribing to a
resource can start and acknowledge a newer refresh while this one is still
awaiting its `listen()` — and reconciling anyway would arm a reconnect that
tears down a healthy stream. Apply the same generation test.
Also consolidates the tests' private-member access onto the file's existing
`internals()` helper (one justified double cast, hoisted and documented) and
makes the failure stub bump the generation the way the real method does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
On the modern (2026-07-28) era every server→client notification rides the
`subscriptions/listen` stream, but the Inspector only ever opened that stream
from a resource-subscribe click. A tools-only server advertising
`tools.listChanged` therefore had no path to an open stream, so
`notifications/tools/list_changed` could never arrive — even though
`buildSubscriptionFilter()` already modelled the opt-in.
The trigger now matches the filter it builds: the stream opens (and stays open,
and reconnects) whenever the built filter carries anything — subscribed URIs or
an enabled list-change opt-in the server advertises. That mirrors the SDK's own
`ClientOptions.listChanged` auto-open, which opens on a non-empty config ∩
capability intersection. `connect()` opens it once the handlers are registered;
a failure there is handed to the reconnect machinery rather than failing the
connect.
`ResourceSubscriptionStreamState.active` deliberately keeps its narrower
meaning — "at least one URI is subscribed" — because it drives the Subscriptions
section's badge, which has nothing to report for a listChanged-only stream. That
also preserves the invariant the rest of the file is written against: an empty
subscribed set is never announced alongside an `active` stream.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
Copilot review follow-ups:
- `applyProtocolVersion` took the value straight from an unvalidated JSON
body and went to `RegExp.test`, which coerces — `123` and `true` both
matched the token pattern and reached `Transport.setProtocolVersion` with
the wrong type. It now takes `unknown` and checks `typeof === "string"`
first, with cases for the coercible values.
- Replace `as unknown as Transport` in the new session fixtures with a
`makeTransport()` helper returning a structurally valid `Transport`, so an
interface change stays visible to the tests.
- Drop `as unknown as typeof fetch` in the new transport test —
`vi.fn<typeof fetch>()` is already the right type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0119LaPQ3v4NyBK3ZTdM9j84
The web client's SDK Client owns the `initialize` handshake, so the
`setProtocolVersion()` call it makes after initialize lands on
RemoteClientTransport — a pass-through to the Node backend, not the real
HTTP transport. The backend's StreamableHTTPClientTransport therefore never
learned the negotiated version and stamped no `Mcp-Protocol-Version` on any
request after initialize, starting with `notifications/initialized`. A
stateful server that requires the header rejects that notification with
HTTP 400.
RemoteClientTransport now records the version and rides it on every
`/api/mcp/send`; the backend applies it to its transport before the send, so
that request and everything the transport issues afterwards (the standalone
SSE GET, the session DELETE) carry the header. The version is validated
against a token pattern on the backend so a client can't push arbitrary
bytes into an upstream header.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0119LaPQ3v4NyBK3ZTdM9j84
* fix: load @napi-rs/keyring lazily so an unsupported platform degrades
`@napi-rs/keyring` ships one prebuilt binary per platform triple and
throws on import where it has none. On Android / Termux there is no
`@napi-rs/keyring-android-arm64`, so the static top-level import in
`core/auth/node/secret-store.ts` threw during module evaluation and the
Inspector exited at startup with "Cannot find native binding" — before
any of the keychain-unavailable handling in that same file could run.
Replaces the static import with a cached dynamic one. The outcome is
cached, not just the module, so a box without a binary doesn't
re-attempt (and re-throw) resolution on every secret operation —
`expectedSecretFields` means that would otherwise be once per server per
`GET /api/servers` — and so `set` can name the underlying cause in its
`KeychainUnavailableError`.
An unloadable package now folds into the same degradation contract as an
unreachable keychain: `get` returns null, `delete` and
`deleteAllForServer` no-op, and `set` throws `KeychainUnavailableError`
(not double-wrapped — the load failure is already typed by the time the
catch sees it). The class doc comment now enumerates all three ways
"unavailable" can arrive, since each escaped the contract at some point.
The shared `vi.mock` stub can't express this — it models a keyring that
loads — so the new tests build on `vi.resetModules()` + `vi.doMock` with
a throwing factory and re-import the module, covering the load failure,
each method under it, and the load-once caching.
Verified the dynamic import survives bundling in all three clients
(cli, tui, and the web runner) rather than being inlined back to a
static one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XAR2Nr9kXbrywFNUVoTe9F
* fix: steer a missing native binding to a reinstall hint
`KeychainUnavailableError` gave the Linux libsecret / gnome-keyring
advice for every cause, including the one where the keychain is fine and
the @napi-rs/keyring platform package is what's missing — an unsupported
triple (#1905) or npm's optional-deps bug dropping it on a supported one
(npm/cli#4828, the Windows report on #1852). Detect the loader's "Cannot
find native binding" phrasing and point those users at a reinstall /
npx-cache clear instead.
Ported from the superseded #1943, which fixed this alongside the same
lazy-load change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
* fix: name a bad keyring namespace instead of "is not a constructor"
The lazy import accepted whatever the resolution produced. The named
exports arrive through CJS interop, so a resolution that stopped
yielding them — a default-only export upstream, a bundler changing
interop, a platform where named-export detection fails — would hand us
`undefined`, and `new mod.AsyncEntry(...)` would throw a TypeError
inside the very try that implements graceful degradation.
Shape-check the resolved module and treat a bad shape as unavailable.
Scope, because it is narrower than it first appears: this does NOT
prevent a bad shape from emptying the secret list. `get` returns null
either way — that is its read-tolerance contract, and the TypeError
lands in the same catch a dead keychain does. What changes is the
diagnosis. Without the check the only signal is `set` reporting
"keyring.mod.AsyncEntry is not a constructor", which reads like an
Inspector bug; with it, `set` names the real problem once, at the load
boundary, in the same actionable 503 as every other unavailability.
Catching the silent-empty-list case itself would need a round-trip
against the unmocked package, which nothing in the suite does today.
The member access sits inside the try because reading a missing export
is not always a harmless undefined — a Proxy-backed namespace can throw,
as vitest's module mocks do — and letting that escape would reject the
cached promise, which is otherwise guaranteed to always resolve.
Of the four new tests only the cause-message one fails without the
guard; the rest pin the surrounding contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
* docs: correct the test header's count of unavailability entry points
The shape check added a fourth way "unavailable" can arrive, and the
enumeration in secret-store.ts was updated to match, but the test file's
header still said three — so it read as an exhaustive list that silently
omitted the case a whole describe below it covers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
* fix: give the wrong-shape cause its own remediation hint
The shape check added a cause that fell through to the libsecret
advice — so a packaging mismatch told the user to install a keyring
daemon, which cannot help, and on Windows or macOS points somewhere that
does not exist. That is the same wrong-advice bug the native-binding
branch was added to fix, reintroduced by the guard itself.
Hint selection moves into `hintFor`, where libsecret is the explicit
fallback rather than the default, and the shape failure becomes a
distinct `KeyringModuleShapeError` matched by type — it is our own error,
so there is no reason to re-parse text we wrote (the native-binding
branch matches a string only because that message comes from napi-rs).
Also retitles the wrong-shape test: it claimed the guard avoids
"returning null secrets", but `get` returns null either way by the
read-tolerance contract. The title now says what actually differs —
`set` hard-fails — matching the correction already made in the comments.
Both raised by Copilot review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
* fix: give both shape-check failure paths the packaging hint
The shape check can fail two ways — the members are absent, or reading
them throws — and only the first carried KeyringModuleShapeError. The
catch path returned the raw error, so a Proxy-backed namespace throwing
on access fell through to the libsecret advice: the same wrong-remedy
bug as the previous two commits, one branch further along.
Both paths now carry the type. KeyringModuleShapeError takes a detail
string plus a standard `cause`, so the throwing path reads "its exports
could not be read: <original>" and keeps the underlying failure legible
while still earning the packaging hint.
Three instances of one mistake in a row (a new cause added without
deciding which remediation it inherits) says the shape was wrong, not
just the branch: making libsecret an explicit fallback in `hintFor` did
not stop me adding a second exit that skipped it. The tests now pin the
invariant directly — one asserts both construction paths produce the
same hint — so the next cause that forgets is a failing test rather than
a reviewer's catch.
Raised by Copilot review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HDdo1rNRVQnVRRdsqSrvG3
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: construct AsyncEntry inside the try so keychain degradation engages
`KeyringSecretStore` built its `AsyncEntry` outside the `try` in `get`,
`set`, and `delete`. `AsyncEntry::new` performs the platform-store setup
(on Linux, the Secret Service connect with a keyutils fallback) and
throws when no backend is reachable, so the documented degradation
contract never engaged for a construction-time failure: the raw keyring
error escaped, 500ing every `GET /api/servers` on a box without a Secret
Service (the published container, which has no D-Bus session).
`expectedSecretFields` always includes the OAuth slot, so `rehydrateConfig`
constructs an entry for every server — the default seeded catalog was
enough to 500 the first list load, before any server was added. And
because the escaping error wasn't a `KeychainUnavailableError`, it
bypassed both the routes' 503 translation and the `migratePlaintextSecrets`
skip branch, yielding a generic 500 instead of the actionable message.
Moving construction inside the existing `try` restores the contract for
that failure mode: `get` returns null, `delete` no-ops, and `set` is the
only operation that throws — as `KeychainUnavailableError`, which is what
the 503 translation and the migration skip both match on.
The test stub's constructor could not fail, which is why the coverage
gate never saw the gap. Adds a `constructorThrows` hook alongside the
existing method-level `failures` flags and covers all three methods plus
`deleteAllForServer` under it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XAR2Nr9kXbrywFNUVoTe9F
* test: pin why the OAuth secret field is unconditional
`expectedSecretFields` always includes the OAuth slot, and #1848's report
frames that as why the 500 fired so broadly — which invites a follow-up
that skips the keychain read for servers with "no OAuth config". That
change would lose data.
`extractSecretsFromStored` deletes the `oauth` block outright when
`clientSecret` was its only property, so such a server carries NO marker
on disk that a secret exists — the keychain is the sole record, and the
unconditional slot is what finds it again. Gating the read on a
disk-visible `oauth` block would silently stop rehydrating exactly that
shape.
The existing tests do fail if the slot is made conditional (verified by
applying the change: 4 red), but only under names that explain nothing
about the consequence — `always lists the OAuth slot first` reads like a
tautology worth updating rather than a trap. Add a round-trip case that
states the consequence, so the next reader sees the field is load-bearing
rather than defensive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two fixes from Copilot's review of #1953.
useManagedListError re-synced React state from the `state` prop inside a
useEffect, which renders one frame carrying the PREVIOUS store's error
after `state` changes (switching servers) before the effect corrects it —
the pattern AGENTS.md forbids. useSyncExternalStore reads the snapshot
during render, so a store swap lands in the same frame, and it also
closes the window where an error recorded between render and subscribe
was missed. The snapshot returns the stored Error instance (or null), so
it is referentially stable as the API requires.
The `markResponseRejected` correlation maps were never cleared. Ids of
requests that never got a response — a timeout, a dropped connection —
are the only entries trackResponse can't remove, so they accumulated
across reconnects. Cleared on the start-clean connect path, per the
convention documented on resetSessionState (one route out, `onerror`
with no `onclose`, tears down nothing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SW1p8E2uiyyLx4RKwrwSrt
markResponseRejected was called for ANY refresh failure. The id it
recovers is "the last response received for this method", which is the
failing exchange only when a response actually arrived and was refused
while decoding. A transport drop, a timeout, or an abort produces no
response frame at all — the last-answered id then still points at an
EARLIER successful call, so marking it stamped "Rejected by the
Inspector" onto an exchange that worked. That is the same class of lie
this issue exists to remove.
A server-sent JSON-RPC error is excluded for a different reason: the id
would be right, but the failure is the server's and its entry already
renders as an error from the error frame.
Gated on SdkErrorCode.InvalidResult / UnsupportedResultType — decisions
the client made about a frame in hand. The failure is still recorded as
list state either way; only the Protocol attribution is gated.
Caught in Copilot's review of #1953.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SW1p8E2uiyyLx4RKwrwSrt
A list load that failed — a transport error, or a result the SDK's era
codec rejects as invalid — reported nothing. The connect-time refresh is
fired with no caller to await it (`void this.refresh()`), so its rejection
became an unhandled rejection: the header said "Connected", the panel
rendered an empty list indistinguishable from a server that has none, and
the failed exchange showed in the Protocol panel as a clean success.
Two surfaces now tell the truth:
- ManagedListState records the failure as observable state (`getError` +
an `errorChange` event) and still re-throws, so App's auth-recovery
wrapper keeps working. The four `useManaged*` hooks expose it via a
shared `useManagedListError`, and the Tools/Prompts/Resources sidebars
render a `ListLoadError` alert with the reason and a Retry.
- A response the client refused is attributed back to its Protocol entry
(`markResponseRejected` → `responseRejected` → `MessageEntry.clientError`),
which now renders an Error status and a "Rejected by the Inspector"
alert rather than the green resultType badge alone. The SDK gives no
request id with a decode failure, so the id is recovered by correlation;
see the comment on `markResponseRejected` for why that is exact.
Also stops `listAllTools` from dropping a failing excluded-tools walk on
the floor — it stays non-fatal but is logged.
Closes#1953
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SW1p8E2uiyyLx4RKwrwSrt
Firefox does not hand a streaming `fetch()` response to JS until the
first *body* byte arrives; Chromium resolves the promise as soon as the
headers do. Both SSE endpoints flushed headers immediately and then
stayed silent until there was something to report, which deadlocked
`/api/mcp/events`: `RemoteClientTransport.openEventStream()` awaits that
fetch *before* the MCP client sends `initialize`, so no `initialize` ->
no event to report -> no body byte -> the fetch never resolves. The web
UI hung on "Connecting..." forever with nothing in the UI, the console,
or the node logs.
Write an inert `:` SSE comment the instant each stream opens. Conforming
parsers ignore a comment line, so this unblocks the read without
inventing a wire event and needs no client-side protocol change.
`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` was also proposed on the issue but does
not fix it -- verified against Firefox 153, the fetch still never
resolves with the header set and no body byte. The delay is not MIME
sniffing.
The priming write is deliberately ordered *after* each handler registers
its consumer (the session event consumer; the file-watch subscriber plus
`ensureWatcher()`). Callers treat the arrival of the stream's first bytes
as proof they are subscribed, so priming first would hand out that proof
across an `await` and drop an edit made in the gap.
`/api/servers/events` gets the same treatment: its fetch was equally
stuck on Firefox until the first real change event, which for an unedited
`mcp.json` never comes. Its client-side reader counted any `\n\n` as a
change, so the inert frame would have fired a spurious background
re-fetch on every connection -- it now skips frames carrying no
`event:`/`data:` field. The transport's own `parseSSE` already drops
comment frames correctly and needed no change.
Verified end to end in real Firefox against a live streamable-HTTP test
server: before, stuck on "Connecting..." past 25s; after, initialize ->
notifications/initialized -> tools/list, connected.
Closes#1858
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YAt8rqxysNbhYWLhoRm3fU
