- SkillsScreen: key verdicts and React elements by manifest ROW INDEX,
not URI. The checker deliberately tolerates a duplicated URI so it can
report `duplicate-resource`; a URI key collided those rows into one
verdict, so verifying either updated both and "Verify all" raced two
different digest/size declarations into the same slot.
- SkillsScreen: hold the invalidation generation in React state keyed by
the manifest, not a ref bumped during render. `useValueChange` runs its
callback during render and requires setState-only purity — an abandoned
render left the ref incremented and silently discarded a live
verification.
- SkillsScreen: title a size disagreement "Size mismatch" and render its
reason. `verifySkillResource` catches it before hashing, so the alert
was showing "actual undefined" under "Digest mismatch".
- SkillsScreen: pass `contents` to ContentViewer so a base64 SKILL.md
renders. The text-block form substituted "" and painted a blank preview
for a file verification had just read correctly.
- skills.ts: add `malformed-size` for a size that is not a non-negative
safe integer, and exclude such values from the 16 MiB total. A negative
one could pull the sum back under the limit and hide a violation.
- managedSkillsState: make the overlap guard per-session instead of a
boolean. A disconnect during an in-flight walk left it set, so the
reconnect's own load no-oped and was never retried — permanently, if
the stale request never settled. A stale `finally` can no longer clear
the live session's guard either.
- skillsSchemas: require the `{ skill }` envelope for `skills/get`. The
accepted SEP settles it, and normalizing an inline entry would let a
non-conforming response past the one place that could report it.
- #2248 and the PR description: corrected — they said
`ReadResourceDirectoryResultSchema` was already declared, which round 1
removed. #2248 now owns defining it, and records the frontmatter
cross-check gap too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kfrH3uRNUM4JAk1reKtyY
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
- skills.ts: report a manifest that omits the skill's own SKILL.md
(an empty list included), duplicate URIs, entries outside the skill
root, and a missing size. `Conforms` was reachable for manifests that
break invariants SEP-2640 states.
- skills.ts: cross-check the declared byte length before hashing. A size
that disagrees fails verification on its own — the digest is taken over
the bytes the server served, so agreeing with it says nothing about
whether the manifest describes them.
- skills.ts: copy the view instead of slicing its backing store in
`sha256Digest`. `SharedArrayBuffer.prototype.slice()` returns another
SharedArrayBuffer, which `crypto.subtle.digest` rejects — the cast
claimed to handle the exact input that would have thrown. No cast now.
- skills.ts: state the one obligation NOT checked here — that an entry's
frontmatter matches the fetched SKILL.md's. The digest cannot cover it,
and closing it needs a YAML parser, so it is tracked on #2248.
- managedSkillsState: cap the walk at LIST_MAX_PAGES. The repeated-cursor
guard only catches a server stuck on one cursor; endlessly unique ones
walked forever. Raises rather than truncating, like the salvage walk.
- managedSkillsState: gate every write on a session generation, so a walk
that resolves after a disconnect or destroy cannot repopulate a cleared
store or deliver the previous session's skills into the next.
- inspectorClient: send a cursor when it is `!== undefined`, not when it
is truthy. An opaque cursor may be `""`, and dropping it re-requested
page one — which the store then reported as a repeated-cursor failure.
- SkillsScreen: key verdict invalidation on the manifest (URI + digests +
sizes), not the URI alone. A Refresh that changed the manifest left a
green badge attached to a digest nothing had checked.
- SkillsScreen: epoch-guard every read continuation, so a fetch that
resolves after the selection moved on cannot write into the new one.
- SkillsScreen: bound "Verify all" to 4 concurrent reads. A conforming
manifest may hold 512 files.
- skillsSchemas: drop the guessed `resources/directory/read` result
schema. Nothing calls it, so an unverified shape could sit wrong
indefinitely; phase 3 adds it against the normative text.
- skills-http.json: declare the extension bare. It advertised
`directoryRead: true` with no handler, so Connection Info reported
"Supported" for a method that answers -32601.
- types.ts: restore the Tasks doc comment the Skills interface displaced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kfrH3uRNUM4JAk1reKtyY
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Adds detection, enumeration, and conformance checking for the Skills
extension (`io.modelcontextprotocol/skills`) — phases 1 and 2 of #2234,
which is everything its Acceptance list names.
Skills is a *server*-declared extension, read off the connecting server's
`capabilities.extensions`, so it is deliberately absent from
`ADVERTISABLE_EXTENSIONS` — that registry is what the Inspector advertises
and the user toggles, and an entry there would be a meaningless toggle.
`skills/list` and `skills/get` are consumer-owned extension methods that
neither era codec defines, so the SDK's era gate skips them and they go out
as ordinary `client.request` calls with explicit result schemas. The
raw-wire channel modern `tasks/*` needs is not used, and the Skills tab is
not era-gated: a legacy-era server that declares the extension is serving it.
The checks are the point, not the list view. `core/mcp/skills.ts` reports
each obligation SEP-2640 states — the name/path invariant, the digest
format, the 512-entry and 16 MiB limits, and `resources: "dynamic"`, which
means integrity cannot be verified at all. Digest verification hashes the
fetched bytes with WebCrypto and returns a mismatch with both digests
attached rather than throwing, because showing a mismatch loudly is the
whole value proposition.
Files are fetched on demand: SEP-2640 is explicit that a `resources/read`
of a `SKILL.md` is not a load and confers no standing, so none of the SEP's
host machinery is implemented.
The `skills-http` fixture serves four skills over two pages, three of them
deliberately non-conforming — without those the verification code is
untestable.
Phase 3 (CLI, TUI, `resources/directory/read`, paged mode) is #2248.
Closes#2234
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018kfrH3uRNUM4JAk1reKtyY
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Record each advisory's disposition during the loop instead of deriving
"can this be filed?" from the groups beforehand.
Membership in a group only means an alert exists. Whether an issue
tracks it is decided by the ecosystem check, the manifest read and the
range probe that follow — so if GitHub revised first_patched_version
while that manifest happened to be unparseable, the replacement group
was skipped and the old-key issue was still cleared as "superseded",
claiming an issue that was never filed.
Each advisory is now noted as tracked, not-exposed or indeterminate as
the loop reaches it, and reconciliation refuses to clear while anything
still open is indeterminate or absent. That also splits the clear reason
honestly: a bump whose copies simply left range now says so, rather than
claiming a replacement issue exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
- Reconcile on (package, manifest, GHSA) tuples, not GHSAs alone.
Dependabot alerts are per manifest and this repo has five lockfiles,
so the same advisory legitimately covers the root install and a
client. Keyed on the GHSA alone, another manifest's still-filable
alert could vouch for this one and clear an issue whose own alert is
open with no bump available.
- Rename the cleared-date test: it asserts the NEW date is taken when
the reason changes, which is the opposite of what its name said.
- AGENTS.md no longer implies both sweeps select a dated milestone.
Only the security sweep filters undated buckets; the monthly one's
selection is raised on #2239.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Three findings, all of them the same invariant reached by new routes: a
still-open advisory must never stand itself down, and a cleared issue
must be written once.
- Never clear an advisory that is open but unpatched. groupAlerts drops
an alert with no first_patched_version, so it has no replacement
group and no replacement issue — calling it "superseded" was false
and clearing it removed the only thing tracking a live exposure. Such
an issue is now left exactly as it is, and said so in the log.
- Stop re-editing cleared issues daily. A cleared issue stays open, so
the next run regenerated its body with a new date and edited it
again, forever. The date is now read back off the existing body, so
only a real change writes — and a real change takes today's date.
- Distinguish an absent manifest from an unparseable one. Both returned
null, so a malformed lockfile was treated as "the manifest is gone"
and cleared the issue. A read error is evidence of nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Build the open-GHSA set from the raw alert feed, not from the grouped
alerts. groupAlerts deliberately drops an alert with no
first_patched_version, so an advisory that stays OPEN but loses its
patched version vanished from both the keys and that set — and
reconciliation would have called it "fixed or dismissed".
Same wrong direction as the superseded case fixed last round, reached a
different way: a still-open advisory must never stand itself down.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
- Filter to the npm ecosystem. Dependabot alerts are not npm-only and
this repo has a Dockerfile, so an alert against it would have been
parsed as a lockfile, thrown, and aborted the whole daily sweep
before any npm group ran. A non-npm alert is now reported loudly with
its GHSAs so a human can file it, and readManifest no longer lets one
unparseable manifest take the run down.
- Distinguish a superseded bump from a closed one. GitHub can revise
first_patched_version, moving an advisory to a different key while it
stays open; reporting that as "fixed or dismissed" would stand down a
live exposure. The reason now reads from the open GHSA set.
- Only claim security-update PRs are off when the run actually read the
setting. The guard degrades to UNVERIFIED, and an issue asserting
what the run could not confirm is worse than one that stays quiet.
- README.md and AGENTS.md: scripts/ now holds repo automation run from
CI, not only build/verify tooling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Three reviews I missed: my poll called the reviews endpoint without
--paginate, so it only ever read page one — the same pagination bug
this PR was reviewed for.
- Reconcile marked issues whose bump has left the open alert feed
entirely. openAlerts asks for state=open, so a fixed or dismissed
alert simply vanishes: its group is never built, the loop never
visits it, and its issue kept asserting a vulnerability with a live
Todo/High card. Both cases are covered — the zero-alert run, which
used to return before loading issues at all, and a vanished group
while other groups remain.
- Ask for a PARENT-SCOPED overrides entry when the package is also
declared directly. npm rejects an override contradicting a direct
dependency with EOVERRIDE, so the guidance for the mixed case would
not have applied. The issue now prints the exact nested JSON.
- Correct the body's NOTE: severity, range, GHSA and CVE are the
advisory's own. Only the installed versions, their paths and range
applicability are verified against v2/main.
- Stop the new-advisory comment claiming the body marker "now covers"
the advisory; it is posted before the edit, so that is false at
posting time. It speaks for its own marker instead.
- Cover the successful two-field board placement, not only its failure
modes.
- AGENTS.md: the monthly sweep NEVER boards; only the security sweep
does, and only with a PAT. The old wording promised a card the
monthly job cannot create.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Both findings are consequences of round 6's staleness fix, in the two
places it did not reach.
- Resolve the matching open issue BEFORE the skip paths, and rewrite it
to a cleared state when the exposure is gone. Yesterday's issue is
still open today, so a manifest that has since been removed or copies
that have moved out of range left its body asserting a vulnerability
that no longer exists and its Todo/High card live indefinitely. The
marker is retained so the issue is reused if the advisory returns; the
issue is not auto-closed, because whether the card belongs in Done or
should be deleted depends on why the exposure went away.
- The body's prose counted the marker's monotonic history rather than
the advisories that apply, so it could claim two open alerts while the
title and table correctly showed one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Both were suppressed "previously missed" findings, and both were real.
- isPermissionDenied matched on status alone, so a rate limit (also a
403) and a bad token (401) were waved through as "missing scope" —
contradicting the comment right above it, which said those must stop
the sweep. It now excludes rate-limit wording and drops 401.
- The no-op path asked "were advisories ADDED?" when the question is
"did the issue CHANGE?". An issue filed for A+B whose branch moved so
only B applies has nothing added, yet its table, severity, affected
copies and remediation are all stale. The rendered title and body are
now compared against the issue, and a comment stays reserved for
genuinely new advisories.
- The title counts the advisories that APPLY, matching the body, so it
tracks shrinking exposure as well as growth. The marker's GHSA list
stays monotonic — its job is to remember what has been announced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Both findings were "previously missed" suppressed ones; the two against
scripts/dependency-refresh.mjs and its workflow are relayed to #2239.
- Serialize the sweep with a fixed concurrency group and
cancel-in-progress: false. The marker check is a read-before-write and
a workflow_dispatch can land on top of the scheduled run, so two runs
could both see no open issue and both file one — the duplicate the
whole idempotency design exists to prevent. The queued run must wait
and re-read, never be cancelled.
- Pick the milestone in JS, not in jq. jq sorts null before every
string, so sort_by(.due_on) | .[0] returns an UNDATED open milestone
in preference to every dated one. An undated bucket has no due date
and so cannot be the nearest; pickMilestone drops it, and files the
issue unmilestoned if nothing dated is open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
- Narrow each group to the advisories the installed copies are actually
in range of. Two advisories can share a package, manifest and patched
version while having different vulnerable ranges, so a group-level
"does any match?" left the marker, title, severity and table all
claiming an advisory that does not apply on this branch.
- Escape every free-form Markdown cell, the vulnerable range included.
A semver range may contain `||`, which is also the column separator.
- Paginate the open-issue lookup instead of capping it at 100. The
marker lookup is what makes the sweep idempotent, so a truncated list
would file a duplicate for every issue it could not see — at the same
scale the alert fetch is built to handle. Pull requests, which the
issues endpoint also returns, are dropped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Derive the remediation from WHICH copies are vulnerable, not from
whether the package is declared. A manifest can declare a safe `pkg@4`
while a dependency drags a vulnerable `pkg@3` into a nested folder; the
old boolean called that "direct" and asked for a range bump that would
have changed nothing, omitting the override the nested copy needs.
- `lockfileEntries` keeps each copy's tree path and whether it is the
hoisted one; `lockfileVersions` is now derived from it.
- `remediation(affected, declared)` returns both flags, so the issue can
ask for a range bump, an overrides pin, or explicitly both. The body
lists the vulnerable copies and their paths.
- An undeclared hoisted copy counts as transitive: it got there the same
way any other transitive copy did, and no declared range reaches it.
(Found by a test written for this change.)
The `vulnerability-alerts: read` finding is declined — verified against
a real runner, which reports `VulnerabilityAlerts: read` and reads the
alerts successfully. See the PR comment for the log.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
- Remove the literal NUL bytes that were separating the grouping key's
fields; they classified the whole source file as binary, so repo
searches skipped it. The key is a JSON array now, with no separator
left to justify.
- De-duplicate advisory comments per GHSA rather than per whole set. A
run that comments and then fails before the marker edit left the next
run computing a different set, which matched nothing and announced the
same advisory twice.
- Refresh the issue title on edit; it carries the advisory count, so it
went stale as soon as an issue grew past what it was filed with.
- Correct the test file's header, which still claimed main() was left
to workflow_dispatch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
- `--slurp` the paginated alert feed; a bare `--paginate` emits one JSON
array per page and `JSON.parse` rejects it past 100 open alerts.
- Put `fixedIn` in the marker and in the existing-issue lookup, so a
second bump of one package cannot merge into the first one's issue.
- Only an authorization-shaped failure of the `automated-security-fixes`
read becomes UNVERIFIED; a rate limit or 5xx now throws.
- Distinguish "card never added" (benign, triage picks it up) from
"card added, field not set" — the latter finishes every group, then
fails the run.
- Don't board an unmilestoned issue at Todo; `Incoming` <=> no milestone.
- Comment before rewriting the marker, and give the comment its own
marker, so a failed comment cannot be skipped forever.
- Ask a direct dependency's range to be raised, not widened to `>=`.
- Test `main()` through an injected spawn, as the sibling sweep does.
- Correct the docs that named the removed release-time `npm audit fix`,
the ones promising an unconditional guard, and the sibling sweep's
issue body claiming security updates remain enabled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Closes#2233 — the alert-consuming half of #2229. #2235 removed
`.github/dependabot.yml`, ending Dependabot's version-update PRs; this
ends its security-update PRs and replaces them with a daily sweep that
turns the alerts into ordinary board items.
- `scripts/dependabot-alerts.mjs` groups alerts by
`(package, manifest_path, first_patched_version)` — one issue per
BUMP, not per advisory — re-checks each vulnerable range against
`v2/main`'s own lockfile before filing, and keys idempotency on a
marker comment naming every GHSA the issue covers.
- `.github/workflows/dependabot-alerts.yml` runs it daily and on
`workflow_dispatch`, with `vulnerability-alerts: read`.
- `semver` is declared at the repo root, per Dependency placement:
`scripts/` is root-owned code with no manifest of its own.
- The sibling `dependency-refresh` comments no longer claim security
updates are unaffected, and AGENTS.md gains the flow both halves
now follow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013H6Cew3KB3jVmQ5x4Dq1sq
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot review round 7 on #2239.
The lookup read one page of 100 and the doc comment justified it with an
assumption rather than a guarantee: "the greatest version is within it
for any real action". The list is ordered by release DATE, not version,
so an action that keeps cutting maintenance releases on lower majors
pushes the genuine maximum off page 1. Ranking what remained would
report a lower major as highest — the exact false-current result that
dropping `releases/latest` in round 3 was meant to prevent, arrived at
by a different route.
Now passes `--paginate`. Cost is unchanged for every action this repo
uses (57 and 64 releases are the largest, so still one request each);
it only costs more where correctness actually required it.
The command-shape test now requires `--paginate` as well as the list
endpoint. It has to: pagination is invisible in the result — one page
and every page return an identical-looking tag list until the day they
do not — so nothing about the returned value can detect its absence.
Verified by mutation: removing `--paginate` fails exactly one test.
Adding the flag also moved the URL out of args[1], which the test's own
filter had hardcoded — it caught that itself. Both the filter and
fakeSpawn's matcher are now argument-position agnostic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NGtzPg3UxMLszysQXXfqax
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot review round 5 on #2239.
Round 4 made every non-zero release-list response fatal and deleted
`isMissingRelease`, but `latestReleaseTag`'s JSDoc still promised
`@throws when the lookup fails for any reason other than a 404` — the
exact behavior that change removed. The PR description carried the same
stale claim.
A contract that documents the opposite of the code is worse than none:
the next reader reasonably trusts it, and here it would tell them a
missing action repo is silently tolerated when it now fails the sweep.
The contract now reserves `null` for a successful response carrying no
usable release — an action that has never cut one, or whose tags are all
unparseable — and states that a failed lookup is never `null`.
Documentation only; no behavior change, and the 29 tests are untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NGtzPg3UxMLszysQXXfqax
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Addresses Copilot review round 4 on #2239. Both findings are regressions
I introduced in round 3 and both are correct.
Round 3 moved the lookup from `releases/latest` to the release LIST, to
rank by version rather than by GitHub's designated latest — but kept the
404 suppression that only made sense for the old endpoint. The list
endpoint answers "this action cuts no releases" with a successful empty
array, so a 404 there does not mean that at all: it means the repository
is missing or inaccessible, i.e. a `uses:` ref the sweep cannot check.
Converting it to null silently dropped a broken or renamed action from
the flow that replaced Dependabot — the same silent-success shape this
PR has been closing everywhere else, reintroduced one layer down.
Every non-zero status is now fatal and `isMissingRelease` is gone
entirely; the benign no-releases case is the successful empty array,
covered by its own test.
`buildClearedBody` also overstated its all-clear. Refs pinned to a commit
SHA or a branch return null from `parseVersionRef` and are never ranked,
so "no workflow `uses:` ref is behind" asserted a check that had not
happened for them. It now says version-pinned refs and names the
exclusion explicitly.
Both guards are mutation-checked: restoring the 404 suppression, and
dropping the SHA/branch qualification, each fail exactly one test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NGtzPg3UxMLszysQXXfqax
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Closes#2235.
Switches the old dependency flow off now that #2232 landed the
replacement. Removes the five npm ecosystem entries (root plus each
client under clients/*) and, resolving the question #2229 left open, the
github-actions entry as well — so .github/dependabot.yml goes away
outright rather than being emptied, which its schema does not allow.
The github-actions entry had exactly the property #2229 exists to
remove: it opened a grouped monthly PR carrying no `Closes #N` and no
board card, the one standing exception to "every PR references an
issue". Deleting it unreplaced would have left 9 actions unwatched, and
`npm outdated` says nothing about actions, so the monthly sweep now also
checks every `uses:` ref under .github/workflows and renders the stale
ones as one more section of the same tracking issue.
Ranking comes from the release LIST, not `releases/latest`. That
endpoint returns the release GitHub designates most recent, not the
greatest version, so an action publishing a maintenance release for an
older major (a v6.9.1 cut after v8.0.0) would make a workflow pinned to
v7 compare against v6 and read as current — silently missing a whole
major upgrade, the one thing this check exists to catch.
Staleness is compared only to the precision the ref specifies. `v7` is a
moving major tag that GitHub repoints at every v7.x release, so `v7`
against a highest of `v7.0.1` is current and only `v8` makes it stale;
an exactly-pinned `v7.0.0` is behind `v7.0.1`; a SHA pin is deliberately
immovable and is never reported.
A release lookup suppresses only a 404 — the legitimate "this action has
never cut a release" answer — and throws on anything else. Treating a
rate limit or an expired token as "no release" is indistinguishable from
"not stale", and since every action here already sits on its latest
major, the resulting empty section is byte-identical to a healthy run.
`buildClearedBody` now speaks for both halves: once actions are in scope,
its npm-only wording would assert a clean bill of health the sweep never
checked.
Dependabot security updates are unaffected — they are configured in repo
settings, not in this file, and kept working while it was missing
entirely (#1833, #1840). That note moves into the workflow header rather
than dying with the file; #2233 is where they are turned off
deliberately. The script header, the workflow header and the generated
issue body all say version-update PRs rather than claiming Dependabot is
replaced wholesale.
Also renames the workflow's npm-outdated job to dependency-sweep now
that the sweep is no longer npm-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NGtzPg3UxMLszysQXXfqax
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
`main refuses to run without a repo` called `main(undefined, …)` so the default
parameter would fire, then asserted it throws. The default reads
`process.env.GITHUB_REPOSITORY` — which GitHub Actions sets on every run — so
the assertion held only where the variable happened to be unset. It passed
locally and failed CI, the one environment where the default is always
populated.
The test now clears the variable and restores it, and a second test covers the
other half of the default: with it set, `main(undefined, …)` uses it instead of
throwing. Between them the default's behavior is pinned in both environments
rather than inherited from whichever one is running.
Verified both ways: 14 pass with the variable unset and with it set, and the
full `test:scripts` suite is 411/411 under the CI environment shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RWMJENjs1mExXE5XPJTEei
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Five findings, all valid.
`runOutdated` accepted every exit status and returned `result.stdout ?? ""`.
A failed `npm outdated` (exit 2 on a registry or config error) also prints
nothing, so the empty string parsed to an empty package list — and across five
installs a total outage produced output byte-identical to a clean sweep. It now
throws on any status other than the documented 0/1.
`main()` was untested, which is how that reached review: the helper-only suite
passed while the silent-success path was live. It now takes its spawn function
as a parameter and is driven by a fake, covering npm failure, create vs. edit,
milestone handling, both no-op paths and the missing-repo guard.
The no-op path returned before looking for the marker issue, so once every
install caught up, a still-open tracking issue kept its obsolete package table
indefinitely — contradicting the body's own promise to update in place. It now
rewrites through `buildClearedBody()`. It deliberately does not close the
issue: the sweep takes no board actions, and closing one whose card a
maintainer may have moved would make the board assert work shipped that this
script cannot verify shipped.
The release step mandated `npm audit fix`, which AGENTS.md forbids. The reason
is not `--force`: plain `audit fix` resolves an advisory with no upward escape
in range by silently downgrading, as it did to esbuild across three installs in
#2058, and `local:gate` has no version-regression check to catch it. The step
is now `npm audit` report-only, with fixes applied deliberately via a direct
bump or an `overrides` entry.
An unmilestoned issue is swept into Incoming, not Todo — Todo asserts a
maintainer signed off. Message corrected and pinned by a test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RWMJENjs1mExXE5XPJTEei
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The npm-entry removal in `.github/dependabot.yml` is split out of this PR so
that every change to that one file lands in a single reviewable piece —
alongside the `github-actions` entry, which #2229 had declared out of scope but
which opens the same issue-less, board-cardless PR the decision exists to
remove.
Reverts `.github/dependabot.yml` to its `v2/main` state, leaving this PR with
the release-time `npm audit fix` and the monthly `npm outdated` sweep: the
replacement flow, not the switch-off.
Both new files' header comments claimed the switch-off had already happened,
which is false until #2235 lands. They now say #2235 does it, and that until
then Dependabot's npm PRs and this sweep overlap — duplicate signal rather than
conflicting action.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RWMJENjs1mExXE5XPJTEei
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Adds npm audit fix (root + every client) as the first sub-step of the
release skill's bump step, before npm version, so a release is never
gated on remembering to check separately. Never --force; anything
audit fix can't resolve is left to the dependabot-alert pipeline
(#2229) or a follow-up issue.
Disables Dependabot npm version updates in dependabot.yml (a
version-update PR carries no issue and no board card) and replaces
them with a monthly scheduled sweep that runs npm outdated across the
root install and every client, filing or updating one idempotent
tracking issue instead of an auto-generated PR.
Closes#2231
Part of #2229
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017N9ha27Qg6LHpBQP7G7zPY
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot: the catalog entry is mutable and the live client is not. A card
can be edited while connected — `onConfigSubmit` writes the catalog and
does not rebuild the client — so after A connects to X and is edited to
Y, the entry reads Y while the session is still authorized against X.
Both consumers read the entry, so both got it wrong in the same way:
- the hook compared a cleared entry against A's *entry* URL, so clearing
another entry still at X missed the match and deleted and revoked the
live client's X-keyed credentials without disconnecting it — the exact
failure this PR exists to prevent;
- `runClear` locked on the entry's key, so a clear of edited-A (`url:Y`)
and a clear of entry B at X (`url:X`) took different locks while both
performed the same X-keyed operation through the same live client.
`InspectorClient.getTransportConfig()` returns the config it was
constructed with, which is what its credentials are keyed under, so both
now resolve from that and fall back to the catalog entry only when there
is no client.
The rule moves into one exported function, `resolveOAuthClearIdentity`.
Two copies of it that disagree is precisely the class of bug #2217 is,
and the two consumers each re-deriving it is how this round's finding
came to exist at all.
Both fakes gain a `getTransportConfig`, and three tests cover the split:
the resolver's own two (the client's URL wins; an active clear locks on
the client's key) and a hook case asserting an edited active entry still
disconnects when the entry sharing the client's real URL is cleared.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VGbw6TezNWnXZSCSp7sqb4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot, and the repo's own rule against an unjustified `as unknown as`.
The `useServers` cast was the more useful catch: removing it surfaced
that the mock omitted `reorderServers` and `importSource`, so App code
calling either would have read `undefined` with this test still passing
type-check. The full result shape is supplied instead, matching the
`mockServersWith` helper above.
The client cast becomes an intersection — the instances are already typed
`EventTarget`, so naming the test-only spy on top of that expresses what
is needed without erasing the rest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VGbw6TezNWnXZSCSp7sqb4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot review round 1.
Refreshes are concurrent — an `oauthComplete` can start a second read while
the first is still in flight — and nothing makes them settle in order. The
new catch made that visible: a slow earlier read could reject *after* a
newer one succeeded and clear the fresh result. Guard both handlers with a
monotonically increasing sequence so only the newest read writes.
The two tests were also too weak to detect their own guards, as the review
pointed out. Both started from an undefined panel, so neither could tell a
correct handler from one that merely swallowed the error:
- The rejection test now seeds a successful read first, then rejects an
`oauthComplete` refresh and asserts the already-loaded details clear.
- The post-cleanup test now reconnects with a replacement client that
populates details, then rejects the stale read, and asserts the current
details survive.
- A third test covers the ordering guard directly.
Each of the three guards has exactly one test that fails without it,
verified by mutation: dropping the sequence check, dropping the clear, and
dropping the `cancelled` check each break one test and no others.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBkPzbuxgyqiz39ytmQzMB
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot: `oauthClearKey`'s unit tests prove the derivation, but a
regression that dropped the `has` check, added or deleted the wrong key,
or invoked the clear twice would still have passed.
Adds an App.test.tsx case that connects entry A, holds its clear open on
a deferred `clearOAuthTokens`, then drives a clear for entry B — a
different catalog id against the same URL — and asserts the underlying
clear ran exactly once, and once more after the first settles, so the
key is proven released rather than leaking a permanently dead control.
Verified to fail against the id-keyed guard.
Two supporting changes it needs:
- an `open-settings-b` control on the mocked InspectorView, the only way
to reach a settings modal for a server other than the active one;
- `@inspector/core/mcp/remote/index.js` becomes a partial mock.
`getWebProxiedFetch` reaches for `createRemoteFetch` there, and the
bare stub threw a missing-export error before the clear under test ever
ran — the failure surfaced as the generic "Could not clear the stored
OAuth state" toast.
The case carries an explicit 20s timeout and `delay: null`: it drives
three full modal interaction sequences against the whole App tree, which
runs past the 5s default when the suite is under load.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VGbw6TezNWnXZSCSp7sqb4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Clearing the retry from the mirror effect raced: an async command continuation
can open a prompt and install its retry before a previous commit's passive
effect flushes, and that effect's stale `pendingStepUp === null` snapshot would
then delete the new prompt's retry.
Install it in `trySetPendingStepUp` instead, in the same synchronous step that
opens the prompt — `null` for an ambient prompt, the operation for a
command-scoped one. Every prompt comes through there and `handleStepUpAuthorize`
is the only reader, so a slot cleared as a side effect can leave a stale closure
behind harmlessly: the next prompt overwrites it. A refused prompt still
installs nothing (#2165).
Copilot round 3 on #2237.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S4WZSxx6XMKzRdgPce9CAd
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot: `runClear`'s double-click guard deduped by `server.id`, which is
the same identity mismatch this PR fixes, one layer up. Two catalog
entries against one URL share one credential blob, one grant and one
revocation, so an id-keyed guard let exactly the race it exists to
prevent through between them — concurrent store writes, concurrent RFC
7009 requests, and two contradictory teardown toasts.
The guard now keys on `oauthClearKey`, a pure helper that resolves the
OAuth storage key and falls back to the entry id for a config that has
none (stdio), where there is no shared state to collide over. The id
fallback keeps such entries distinct from each other rather than
collapsing them onto one key, and both forms are prefixed so a
user-supplied id can never impersonate a URL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VGbw6TezNWnXZSCSp7sqb4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Copilot: the stale-session guard deliberately skips `disconnect()` after a
switch, and `disconnect()` can also reject (which gets its own toast), so
claiming the active session "was disconnected too" is not always true.
What is always true is that its stored tokens went with the shared blob
and it must reconnect, so the message says that instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VGbw6TezNWnXZSCSp7sqb4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The retry closure belongs to the prompt, but the two paths that clear the
step-up slot as a *consequence* of something else — the server-switch reset
and `resetOAuthRecoveryState` on disconnect — left `pendingStepUpRetryRef`
installed. The next prompt to open without a retry of its own would inherit
it, so authorizing an ambient step-up on server B ran the command server A was
left mid-way through.
Clear it in the existing mirror effect whenever the slot is null, so no arm has
to remember. A ref write in an effect, since the render-phase reset must stay
pure.
Copilot on #2237.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S4WZSxx6XMKzRdgPce9CAd
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
`useOAuthRecovery` cleared its two server-scoped pending-OAuth slots — the
deferred re-auth and the step-up prompt — in a `useEffect` keyed on
`activeServerId`. An effect runs after the commit, so a server switch painted
one frame still carrying the previous server's re-auth banner or step-up
prompt: an authorization affordance attached to the wrong server.
Reset both during render with `useValueChange` instead. `activeServerId` is a
primitive, so it satisfies the helper's `Object.is` stability requirement, and
the previous value is read from the `setState` updater argument rather than
from `sessionRef.current`, keeping the render-phase callback pure.
`react-hooks/set-state-in-effect` did not fire on the original because the
effect read the previous value through a ref rather than from a prop or state.
The test records one entry per committed render and asserts both slots are
empty in the first frame after the switch — the pre-existing `waitFor`-based
tests pass against the effect version too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S4WZSxx6XMKzRdgPce9CAd
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The connection-details refresh effect in useOAuthRecovery voided
inspectorClient.getOAuthState() with a lone .then and no rejection
handler. In the browser that read goes through the remote OAuth store, so
it is a network round trip that can reject — a backend that is down or
restarting, a 401 on the API token, malformed stored state. void silences
no-floating-promises without terminating anything, so every such failure
became an unhandled rejection, on the initial refresh and on every
oauthComplete refresh.
Terminate the chain with a .catch that clears the panel details rather
than leaving the last successful read on screen: the panel reports the
current OAuth state, and a stale answer is indistinguishable from a fresh
one. The cancelled guard is repeated on the catch so a rejection arriving
after unmount does not write. The void stays, now with the one-line
justification AGENTS.md asks for — a synchronous useEffect body cannot
await.
Two tests cover it. Both fail against the unfixed source with unhandled
rejections, which is the failure mode itself: an unhandled rejection
fails the whole vitest run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GBkPzbuxgyqiz39ytmQzMB
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
OAuth state is keyed by server URL, but `clearServerOAuthAndDisconnect`
decided "is this the active connection" from the catalog entry id. Those
are different identities and nothing keeps them in sync: `serverList`
enforces no URL uniqueness, so two entries with distinct ids against one
URL are a supported state — and a natural one, since separate entries are
how a user keeps different names, headers or per-server settings against
the same server.
Clearing the inactive entry therefore deleted the shared URL-keyed blob —
the active session's tokens, DCR client id and PKCE state — and, with
#2144 in, revoked its grant at the authorization server, while the id
check took the inactive branch: no live-client clear, no disconnect, no
session cleanup. The active session was left connected on credentials
that no longer existed, with nothing told to the user; the break then
surfaced somewhere else entirely, on the next refresh, 401 or reload.
The branch now compares the OAuth storage key of the cleared entry
against the active entry's, and treats a match as affecting the active
session — live-client clear, disconnect, session cleanup — exactly as
clearing the active entry does. The existing id and client-identity
checks stay on top: they guard the separate stale-session race from
#2144, and the snapshotted id they revalidate is now the active one
rather than the cleared entry's, which for a shared-key clear are not the
same. The toast says why the session went away.
The alternative, prohibiting duplicate URLs in `serverList`, would remove
a legitimate workflow to fix a bug in the consumer and could not repair
catalogs that already hold duplicates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VGbw6TezNWnXZSCSp7sqb4
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Bumps the root package.json from 2.4.0 to 2.5.0 on v2/main, ahead of the
v2.5.0 milestone merge into main. Applied with
`npm version minor --no-git-tag-version` — the tag is deliberately omitted
because the release is cut from main, so the tag must point at the merge
commit there rather than at a v2/main commit that is never released.
Closes#2212
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017bussXiM47PBttWqFUkPN1
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Restrict the truncation guard to PLAIN scalars. `yaml` attaches a legitimate
trailing comment to quoted and block scalars too, so keying on `.comment` alone
rejected valid frontmatter — `description: "Complete value" # note` was reported
as truncated, telling the author to quote a value that was already quoted. The
regex this replaced tested the same thing by reading the first character; moving
to the node dropped the check rather than encoding it. Verified all three
shapes (double-quoted, single-quoted, block) against the parser, and added the
regression cases.
Also correct the `--max-turns 1` bullet in docs/skill-authoring.md, which
claimed the skill must be the model's first tool CALL. `collectSkillInvocations`
scans every tool_use block in the assistant event without regard to order, so a
turn calling Read and Skill together scores a hit. What actually loses the
sample is needing a tool RESULT first — that decision lands in turn two, which
never runs. The practical advice is unchanged; the mechanism now matches the
collector.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SyBPs7caoMcyvnp9ArMBhV
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
Ask the YAML parser what it discarded instead of re-deriving it from the raw
frontmatter text. `yaml` hangs the comment it stripped on the scalar node, so
`parseDocument(...).get(field, true).comment` IS the truncation signal: a plain
scalar that lost text has one, a quoted or block scalar never does, and
`Issue#28` (no preceding space, so no comment) keeps its full value.
That closes both findings at once. The line-locating regex only ever matched
the canonical `description:` key, so `"description":` and `description :`
populated the mapping while the guard skipped them and left verify:skills green
on a truncated listing; and the continuation scan stopped at the first blank
line, inspecting only the opening paragraph of a plain scalar that YAML happily
continues past one.
It also retires the scanning itself — three rounds of regex here each fixed one
shape and missed the next (tags and anchors, then indented continuations, now
key forms and blank lines). The node carries all of them for free, so 65 lines
of hand-rolled parsing come out. Parsing once with `parseDocument` keeps the
node view and the value view from ever disagreeing.
Tests cover the three noncanonical key forms, the blank-line continuation, and
the standalone comments that must NOT read as truncation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SyBPs7caoMcyvnp9ArMBhV
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
The truncation guard read only the first physical line of the scalar, so
a multiline plain scalar slipped past it:
description: Covers boards
#28 and #11
YAML parses that as `Covers boards`, and the first-line-only comparison
saw `Covers boards` on both sides and reported no loss — passing the
exact silent truncation the guard exists to reject.
It now walks the whole plain scalar: the value line plus every indented
continuation, whitespace-collapsed to match YAML's folding of newlines to
spaces. Quoted and block scalars are still skipped, since neither loses
text to a comment.
Two regression cases: the multiline truncation, and a multiline scalar
with no `#`, which must stay clean — the fix cannot be "reject anything
multiline".
No skill description or eval case changed, so skills:eval is unchanged
from round 4's 63/63. local:gate passes, 34/34. 390/390 script tests.
Signed-off-by: cliffhall <cliff@futurescale.com>
