## Summary
- The GitHub token method grants `io.github.<org>/*` publish rights
**only to org Owners** (active `admin` membership — `github_at.go`).
- The DNS/HTTP token methods grant `reversed(domain)/*` for any proven
domain, with no `github.io` special-casing and an empty
`BlockedNamespaces` list.
- `<org>.github.io` is served by GitHub Pages from the
`<org>/<org>.github.io` repository. **Push access to that one
repository** — routinely held by ordinary org members, a much weaker bar
than Owner — is enough to serve a key at
`/.well-known/mcp-registry-auth`, exchange it for a JWT, and publish
under the org's entire `io.github.<org>/*` namespace.
- Reject `github.io` (and subdomains) at the shared
`ValidateDomainAndTimestamp` seam used by both DNS and HTTP exchange;
`io.github.*` publishers already have the GitHub method.
## Impact if unsolved
Any org member with write access to the org's GitHub Pages repo (or an
attacker compromising such a member) can mint MCP packages under the
org's trusted namespace — supply-chain poisoning of every downstream
user who installs `<org>`'s servers from the registry, bypassing the
deliberate Owner-only gate.
## Test plan
- New `TestValidateDomainAndTimestampRejectsGitHubPages`: rejects
`my-org.github.io` (incl. mixed case and subdomains), still allows
lookalikes (`github.io.evil-example.com`,
`my-org.github.io.example.com`) and ordinary domains.
- Full `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth` package passes.
Made with [Cursor](https://cursor.com)
Signed-off-by: SashaMIT <sash@ela.city>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Follow-up to #1383, surfaced while validating that change end-to-end
against staging.
## Why
#1383 hardened org-namespace publishing to require Owner (`admin`) role,
read via `GET /user/memberships/orgs`. Validating on staging revealed a
gap: the docs only mention the classic `read:org` scope, but a
**fine-grained PAT** (GitHub's recommended token type) needs a
*different* permission to expose org membership. Without it, GitHub
returns no org memberships for the token, so the exchange silently
grants only the personal namespace — with no hint why org publishing
"doesn't work."
This is **not** a code bug (the behavior is fail-closed and correct
given GitHub's response); it's a documentation/UX gap.
## What
- **Docs** (`authentication.mdx`, `github-actions.mdx`): spell out both
token types —
- Classic PAT → `read:org` scope
- Fine-grained PAT → **Organization permissions → Members → Read-only**
(the equivalent), noting a fine-grained PAT is bound to a single
resource owner.
- Also clarified `read:user` is not required.
- **Test** (`github_at_test.go`): cover the `maxOrgMembershipPages`
pagination cap — when every page is full, the exchange **fails closed**
(no token) rather than returning a possibly-truncated org grant. This
path was previously untested.
- **Comment** (`github_at.go`): qualify the `X-GitHub-SSO` 403 check as
best-effort — we have not confirmed the memberships *list* endpoint
emits that header on SSO enforcement (it may just omit the org). The
check is safe either way, but the comment no longer overstates it as a
guarantee.
## Verification (live, against staging)
Confirmed by exchanging real tokens for `rdimitrov` on
`staging.registry.modelcontextprotocol.io`:
- **Classic `read:org` PAT** across 16 real org memberships → the JWT
granted exactly the 8 **admin** orgs + personal namespace, and **zero**
of the 8 **member** orgs (incl. `stacklok`, `modelcontextprotocol`) —
the core #1383 behavior, working.
- **Fine-grained PAT**: without Members:read → personal namespace only
(fail-closed); after adding Members:read → the org (Owner) namespace is
granted. This is what the new docs describe.
No runtime behavior change here beyond the added test; the docs and
comment are the substance.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## The bug (scoped to `github-at`)
When you exchange a GitHub OAuth/PAT token for a registry JWT, the
handler granted `io.github.<org>/*` publish permission for **every**
organization you belong to. It derived that list from [`GET
/users/{username}/orgs`](https://docs.github.com/en/rest/orgs/orgs#list-organizations-for-a-user),
which:
1. returns only **public** org memberships, and
2. carries **no role** — an org Owner and a brand-new member look
identical.
So membership was silently treated as publishing authority. Anyone who
is (or whose public membership lists them as) a member of `acme` could
publish — and, because publish is a pure namespace-glob with no
per-server ownership check, **overwrite** — any server under
`io.github.acme/*`.
## The fix
Switch to [`GET
/user/memberships/orgs`](https://docs.github.com/en/rest/orgs/members#list-organization-memberships-for-the-authenticated-user),
which returns the **authenticated caller's role** per org (and includes
private memberships), and grant the org namespace only when the role is
`admin` (org Owner).
- **Personal namespaces are unchanged** — you always get
`io.github.<your-username>/*`.
- **Org namespaces now require Owner.** GitHub has no org-level
"maintainer" role; org membership is either `admin` (Owner) or `member`.
We grant only on `admin`.
- **`read:org` is the only scope needed.** A minimal token without it
still authenticates and still publishes to your personal namespace; a
genuine missing-scope `403` from the memberships call is treated as "no
admin orgs" rather than a hard failure, so we don't push anyone to
over-scope a token. A `403`/`429` that is actually a rate limit
(`X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0` / `Retry-After`) fails closed instead, so a
throttle can't silently strip a real Owner's org grant. Critically, the
token needs **no repository scopes** — the registry never reads or
writes code, so an org Owner can hand CI a near-powerless `read:org`
token.
The authorization decision stays stateless and delegated to GitHub — no
new storage, no new endpoints, no schema changes — consistent with
[design principle #2](docs/design/design-principles.md) (minimal
operational burden).
### Containing the CI token
The registry-side change makes the org Owner the only one who can mint
org-namespace authority. But if that Owner drops the resulting PAT into
a plain repo secret, **every repository writer** can reach it (via
branch/tag pushes that run repo-controlled build/test code in the
privileged job) — quietly re-widening publish access beyond Owners.
External fork contributors still cannot reach it by default (no secrets
on fork PRs, no branch push), barring misconfigurations like
`pull_request_target`-with-checkout or self-hosted runners on public
repos.
`docs/modelcontextprotocol-io/github-actions.mdx` documents how to
contain that blast radius:
- store the token as a **GitHub Actions Environment secret** (the PAT
example uses `environment:`),
- restrict that environment to the default branch / release tags and
require PR reviews on it, so only reviewed, maintainer-approved code can
reach the token,
- optionally add a **required environment reviewer** for explicit
per-publish approval,
- and avoid the two footguns (`pull_request_target` checkout,
self-hosted runners on public repos).
This shrinks *who holds* the org credential; it does not change the fact
that an authorized publish can still overwrite a different server in the
same namespace until per-server publisher ownership exists (the
follow-up noted below).
## Why this shape, given the alternatives
[Pree's
writeup](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/issues/982#issuecomment-3982959559)
([Notion analysis
doc](https://www.notion.so/MCP-Registry-Authorization-Model-Analysis-Issue-982-31736f79f74980bc90c6e53de1c564c5))
is the clearest framing of the problem and the option space, laying out
three broad solutions:
- **Approach A — GitHub App as the authority layer.** Strong model, but
its natural unit of authority is a *repo*, so it needs a repo→server
mapping to authorize a namespace. The safe, flexible version of that
mapping is registry-managed state — which collapses into Approach B.
It's also GitHub-only.
- **Approach B — a registry-managed grants table** (OIDC bootstrap, or
device-flow admin check). The most capable and provider-agnostic option,
and probably where v1 wants to go. But it introduces exactly the
"registry manages an authorization database" layer we wanted to avoid
taking on right now: revocation, sync, audit, migration.
- **Approach C — scoped bearer tokens (npm-style).** Good ergonomics,
but again implies issuance/storage the registry would own.
The two-property test (does the registry control the decision? is it
granted through an act requiring real authority?) is the right lens.
This change satisfies it **without** new state: the registry makes the
decision (it filters on role), and the authority is real (live GitHub
Owner role, re-checked on every short-lived token exchange).
**What this deliberately gives up**, so reviewers can weigh it honestly:
- **Owners are always in the loop.** Only org Owners can publish org
servers; there's no delegated "this team can publish this server" — that
needs Approach B's state. Reduced flexibility in exchange for zero new
infrastructure.
- **Blast radius within an org is unchanged.** An Owner (or Owner-scoped
CI token) can still overwrite *any* server under the org namespace,
because there's still no per-server publisher ownership. That
hijack-an-existing-server problem is real but **orthogonal** to this fix
and belongs in its own change (record publisher identity per server;
enforce it on update) — a follow-up to take alongside the OIDC hardening
below.
- **OIDC is untouched and remains coarser.** The `github-oidc` path
still grants the whole `io.github.<owner>/*` namespace to any workflow
with `id-token: write`, i.e. effectively anyone with write access to any
repo in the org, and it excludes non-Actions CI (Jenkins/GitLab can't
mint GitHub Actions OIDC). The admin-PAT path here is the
higher-assurance option for org publishing; OIDC stays as a
lower-assurance Actions convenience to be tightened separately.
## Revocation
The registry JWT is **5-minute, no-refresh** (per #264/#273), so loss of
Owner status propagates within minutes on the next token exchange, with
no revocation list to maintain.
## Tests
`go test ./internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/...` passes, including:
- member-role org is **not** granted; only admin orgs are
- a missing-scope `403` (no `read:org`) still yields the personal
namespace and no error
- an admin org on a **later page** of memberships is still granted
(pagination correctness)
- a `5xx` from the memberships call **fails closed** (no token issued)
rather than degrading to personal-only
- a rate-limit `403` (`X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0` / `Retry-After`)
**fails closed** — not mistaken for a missing-scope `403`
- existing org/name-validation tests updated to the new endpoint + role
shape
`gofmt`/`go vet`/`golangci-lint` (CI-pinned v2.11.4) clean; CI green on
all checks.
## Live verification
Confirmed end-to-end against real `api.github.com` (not just mocks) by
exercising this branch's `ExchangeToken` and decoding the `permissions`
claim of the returned JWT.
A dedicated org, **Tadasant Test Org** (login `Tadasant-Test-Org`), is
Owned by one account and has a second account joined as a plain
**member**. Both memberships are `active`, verified via the same
endpoint the fix uses (`GET /user/memberships/orgs/{org}`):
| Token (role) | `io.github.Tadasant-Test-Org/*` granted? | Other
patterns granted |
|---|---|---|
| Owner (`admin`) | ✅ yes | personal `io.github.<owner>/*` |
| member | ❌ no | personal `io.github.<member>/*` + the orgs that
account actually Owns |
The member case is the meaningful one: that membership is **active and
returned** by `GET /user/memberships/orgs`, and is excluded purely
because its role is `member`, not `admin`. Under the previous `GET
/users/{username}/orgs` behavior (membership = authority, no role), the
same active membership **would have granted** the org namespace. The
role filter is also selective rather than blanket-deny — the member
account still receives the namespaces of the orgs where it genuinely
holds Owner.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Radoslav Dimitrov <radoslav@stacklok.com>
The HTTP namespace-verification fetcher's `isBlockedIP` composed its
blocklist from Go stdlib's `Is*` helpers plus a manual CGNAT range. That
covers IPv4 cloud metadata, RFC1918, ULA, and link-local — but Go's
classification helpers don't recognise IPv6 prefix families that embed
or tunnel to arbitrary IPv4:
- 2002::/16 RFC 3056 6to4 — bits 16-47 are an arbitrary IPv4
- 64:ff9b::/96 RFC 6052 NAT64 well-known — low 32 bits are IPv4
- 64:ff9b:1::/48 RFC 8215 NAT64 local-use — same IPv4-embedding shape
- fec0::/10 RFC 3879 site-local (deprecated, still routed by
some stacks)
On hosts with 6to4 routing or a NAT64 next-hop (the default on
IPv6-only GKE node pools, AWS IPv6-only EC2, Azure IPv6 VMs with
NAT64, and many corporate DNS64/NAT64 networks), an attacker who
controls DNS for a publisher domain can cause the registry to dial
`169.254.169.254`, `10.0.0.0/8`, etc. via the IPv6 wrapper. Same
SSRF class as GHSA-56c3-vfp2-5qqj on n8n-mcp.
Define the four prefixes via a new `mustCIDR` helper (panic on
malformed CIDR at init so a typo can't fail-open silently) and iterate
them in `isBlockedIP` after the stdlib gates. Refactor the existing
CGNAT IIFE to use the same helper for consistency. IPv4-mapped IPv6
(::ffff:0:0/96) needs no special-casing: Go's `Is*` helpers honour the
`To4()` fast-path, so e.g. `::ffff:10.0.0.1` is already classified as
`IsPrivate`.
Adds 17 test cases to `TestIsBlockedIP` covering each new prefix
family, IPv4-mapped IPv6 sanity checks, and just-outside-the-range
positive controls (`2001::1`, `2003::1`, `64:ff9c::1`).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
Follow-up to #1241. Two small tweaks to the `readBody` helper:
- **Rename `readBody` → `readErrorBody`.** The helper is only ever
called on the error path (after a non-2xx status check), where we want a
small string for diagnostics. The generic name made it look reusable on
the success path, where streaming JSON decoding is the right approach.
The new name pins the intended use down.
- **Cap the read with `io.LimitReader` (8 KiB).** Defense in depth —
error diagnostics never need more than a few KB, and we shouldn't buffer
an arbitrarily large body from an upstream just to format an error
message. 8 KiB is well above any realistic GitHub API or JWKS error
response.
No behavior change on the happy path. On the unhappy path, error
messages are now bounded.
## Test plan
- [x] `go build ./...`
- [x] `go test ./internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/...`
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
The same pattern for reading an error response body appeared in three
places across the auth handlers:
- `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_at.go` (twice)
- `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go` (once)
A shared `readBody` helper function added to `common.go` now handles
this in one place.
The `io` import is removed from both files since it is no longer used
directly there.
---------
Co-authored-by: Radoslav Dimitrov <radoslav@stacklok.com>
## Summary
Follow-up to #1238 (closes#988). Adds direct unit-test coverage for the
`claimMatches` helper, which was the actual change in #1238.
`claimMatches` and `toAnySlice` are unexported, so the tests live in
`oidc_internal_test.go` (`package auth`) — same pattern as
`http_internal_test.go`. Cases covered:
- scalar/scalar match and mismatch
- scalar actual against array expected (both directions of overlap)
- array actual against scalar expected
- **array/array** — pre-#1238 this combination panicked with `comparing
uncomparable type []interface {}`
- `[]string` typed slice (exercises the typed-slice branch of
`toAnySlice`, which `[]any` skips)
- non-string scalars (int, bool)
- empty actual array
Test values use single letters (`x`, `y`, `p`, `q`) rather than role
labels — only the relationships matter, and short tokens keep `goconst`
quiet.
## Test plan
- [x] `go test ./internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/...` — all 13 subtests
pass
- [x] `golangci-lint run ./internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/...` — no new
issues vs main
Closes#988. Direct `actualValue != expectedValue` fails when the token
claim is an array (groups, roles, scp, aud). Switch to a slice-aware
any-of overlap so OIDC list claims are validated correctly.
## What this does
The publisher CLI now derives the OIDC audience to request from the
`--registry` URL instead of using a fixed constant, and the server
validates the token's `aud` claim against a new per-deployment env var
(`MCP_REGISTRY_GITHUB_OIDC_AUDIENCE`).
Production sets this env var to
`https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io` (and per-environment URL
elsewhere), so the deployment only accepts tokens that were requested
for it.
## Compatibility
This is a breaking change for older `mcp-publisher` binaries that still
request the legacy hardcoded audience. After this rolls to a deployment,
users on old `mcp-publisher` will see a clear `invalid audience:
expected …, got […]` error and need to upgrade. Users following the
documented `releases/latest` install pattern get the new binary
automatically.
## Test plan
- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Run a synthetic publish from a real GitHub Actions workflow
against staging after deploy
- [ ] Confirm an older `mcp-publisher` against the same staging deploy
returns the expected `invalid audience` error
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## What this does
Fixes an open redirect plus a handful of small, mostly-invisible
hardening changes around it.
## What's in it
- **The fix**: trailing-slash redirects no longer let `//evil.com/`
redirect off-host.
- **SSRF block** on the DNS/HTTP namespace verification — refuses to
dial loopback, RFC1918, link-local, multicast, CGNAT, or
IP-literal/single-label \"domains\".
- **Slow-client guard**: `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` on the HTTP
server (no `WriteTimeout` — would risk cutting off legitimate
multi-package publishes).
- **Defence-in-depth headers** on the UI (`/`) and 404 responses.
- **5xx responses** stop leaking raw DB error text to clients (logged
server-side instead).
- **Search filter** stops treating `%` and `_` as wildcards.
- **Validators**: PyPI/NuGet identifiers URL-escaped before fetching;
MCPB no longer follows redirects.
- **Misc**: `Version` field bounded to 255 chars; logs quote user input;
`BlockedNamespaces` denylist now catches subdomain claimants.
Each change is its own commit so they can be reviewed (or reverted)
independently.
## Test plan
- [ ] CI green
- [ ] Synthetic publish in staging for each package type (npm, pypi,
nuget, oci, mcpb) — confirms validator changes don't regress
- [ ] Quick browser check of `/` after deploy to confirm UI still loads
with the new CSP
- [ ] `curl https://<host>//evil.com/` — confirm the open redirect is
closed
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
DNS auth users have repeatedly hit two failure modes that both produce
the same opaque "Ed25519 signature verification failed" error, making
them indistinguishable to debug. This PR makes both diagnosable
end-to-end without changing the auth protocol or any successful path.
The two recurring failure modes:
1. **Wrong placement** — TXT record put under a selector
(`_mcp-auth.<domain>` or `_mcp-registry.<domain>`) instead of the apex.
DKIM-style intuition, but MCP DNS auth uses SPF-style apex placement.
See #385 (PR #388 fixed the docs but the failure recurred), #1103,
#1126.
2. **Stale apex record** — old TXT record left behind after a key
rotation, silently tried first and rejected.
## Changes
**`internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/dns.go`** — when the apex has no
`v=MCPv1` record, probe `_mcp-auth.<domain>` and
`_mcp-registry.<domain>` in parallel (2s individual timeout). If a
record is found there, return a targeted error pointing the user at the
apex. Costs zero extra DNS work in the success path.
**`internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/common.go`** — when verification fails
against records that *are* present, include short fingerprints of every
key the registry tried (`ed25519:YJLsHFhu`-style 8-char prefix). A new
`ErrSignatureMismatch` sentinel keeps structural errors (wrong signature
size, unsupported algorithm) passing through unchanged via `errors.Is`,
so existing assertions on those messages still hold.
**`docs/modelcontextprotocol-io/authentication.mdx`** — anti-pattern
`<Warning>` callout in the DNS section explicitly warning against
selector placement and stale records.
**Tests** — two new tests:
- `TestDNSAuthHandler_WrongSelectorProbe` — verifies the probe surfaces
records found at `_mcp-auth.` / `_mcp-registry.` and falls through to
the standard error when nothing is found anywhere
- `TestDNSAuthHandler_StaleKeyFingerprintInError` — verifies the
fingerprint hint appears in the failure message for #1126's exact
scenario
One existing test assertion was updated from a generic `"signature
verification failed"` substring to the more specific `"invalid signature
size for ECDSA P-384"` it should always have been asserting; the new
sentinel-based logic surfaces structural errors verbatim.
## Test plan
- [x] `make lint` — clean
- [x] `make test-unit` — all auth tests pass (existing + 2 new)
- [x] Verified existing single-key and multi-key paths preserve their
original (more specific) error messages where they were already specific
- [ ] Reviewer to sanity-check the docs callout renders well in the
Mintlify theme
## Out of scope
The publisher-side preflight DNS check (cross-link in #845) is
intentionally **not** in this PR — that belongs in the broader CLI UX
work tracked by #845.
Refs #845, #385, #1103Fixes#1126
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
<!-- Provide a brief summary of your changes -->
## Motivation and Context
<!-- Why is this change needed? What problem does it solve? -->
We keep bumping `go 1.26.x` across the repo every time a new Go patch
drops
## How Has This Been Tested?
<!-- Have you tested this in a real application? Which scenarios were
tested? -->
- **`go.mod` / `deploy/go.mod`**: `go 1.25.8` → `go 1.26` (minor only —
"this module needs Go 1.26")
- **All CI workflows**: `go-version-file: 'go.mod'` → `go-version:
'stable'` — CI always uses the latest stable Go, no more
bump PRs
- **govulncheck**: removed hardcoded `go-version-input: '1.26.1'` →
`go-version-input: 'stable'`
## Breaking Changes
<!-- Will users need to update their code or configurations? -->
## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [ ] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [ ] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [ ] New and existing tests pass locally
- [ ] I have added appropriate error handling
- [ ] I have added or updated documentation as needed
## Additional context
<!-- Add any other context, implementation notes, or design decisions
-->
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Dimitrov <radoslav@stacklok.com>
The DNS auth endpoint was vulnerable to resource exhaustion if an
attacker controlled a domain with a slow/non-responding authoritative
DNS server. Without a timeout, handler goroutines would block on DNS
resolution indefinitely, allowing an attacker to pile up goroutines
until OOM.
Production is protected by NGINX ingress's default 60s proxy timeout,
but this adds defense-in-depth with a tighter 5s bound.
## Motivation and Context
See
https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/issues/482#issuecomment-3436993157
for full details.
This adds ECDSA P-384 (a popular NIST approved curve) in addition to
Ed25519.
## How Has This Been Tested?
I have tested with a local deployment against `mcp.joelverhagen.com`.
Also, I have added significant tests.
## Breaking Changes
None. (hopefully)
## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [x] Documentation update
## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [x] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [x] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [x] New and existing tests pass locally
- [x] I have added appropriate error handling
- [x] I have added or updated documentation as needed
## Additional context
<!-- Add any other context, implementation notes, or design decisions
-->
@domdomegg and I spoke a bit about this on Discord:
https://discord.com/channels/1358869848138059966/1369487942862504016/1423710918180606052
---------
Co-authored-by: adam jones <domdomegg+git@gmail.com>
<!-- Provide a brief summary of your changes -->
## Motivation and Context
<!-- Why is this change needed? What problem does it solve? -->
Follow up from #658 addressing the feedback from @tadasant
## How Has This Been Tested?
<!-- Have you tested this in a real application? Which scenarios were
tested? -->
## Breaking Changes
<!-- Will users need to update their code or configurations? -->
## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [ ] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [ ] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [ ] New and existing tests pass locally
- [ ] I have added appropriate error handling
- [ ] I have added or updated documentation as needed
## Additional context
<!-- Add any other context, implementation notes, or design decisions
-->
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Dimitrov <radoslav@stacklok.com>
<!-- Provide a brief summary of your changes -->
## Motivation and Context
<!-- Why is this change needed? What problem does it solve? -->
The following PR adds a new v0.1 API version.
The goal is to mark v0.1 as a "freeze" point while keeping v0 as the
moving target for new features so integrators can start building on top
of something stable(r).
Details:
* This change is quite simple - we re-register the same handlers twice,
once as `v0` and once as `v0.1`
* Going forward, we'll keep v0.1 frozen while we add changes either on
top of both (non-breaking) or we'll have to branch if breaking changes
are necessary
* We all acknowledge this is not exactly best-practice, but it gives us
a way to gather feedback and allow clients to start integrating with the
API without breaking them (**note** this implies a follow up PR that
would branch the handlers used in v0.1).
* For integrators/clients: please provide your feedback - what works
well, what doesn't so we can take this into account going towards GA.
## How Has This Been Tested?
<!-- Have you tested this in a real application? Which scenarios were
tested? -->
## Breaking Changes
<!-- Will users need to update their code or configurations? -->
No, this just adds a new API version alongside the existing one.
## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [ ] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [ ] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [ ] New and existing tests pass locally
- [ ] I have added appropriate error handling
- [ ] I have added or updated documentation as needed
## Additional context
<!-- Add any other context, implementation notes, or design decisions
-->
Fixes: #649
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Dimitrov <radoslav@stacklok.com>
## Summary
- Applied `gofmt -s -w` across the entire codebase to ensure consistent
Go formatting
- This will trigger a deployment with minimal code changes
## Test plan
- [x] Pre-commit hooks pass
- [x] No functional changes, formatting only
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add workflow_dispatch to deploy.yml for manual deployment triggers
- Document that releases don't auto-deploy to production
- Add instructions for deploying releases to production
- Add verification steps for deployment
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
<!-- Provide a brief summary of your changes -->
## Motivation and Context
Currently the `dns` and `http` based auth flows share code well in the
publisher tool. However there is a lot of duplication in the auth
endpoint. This on it's own is not a problem but it does make
enhancements to the proof record (the `v=MCPv1; ...` string) harder to
keep in sync.
This PR adds a `common.go` file to share logic between the two.
This supports work I am prototyping for
https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/issues/482.
## How Has This Been Tested?
Added new test cases for the permissions. Ran them before and after the
refactoring to ensure no behavior change.
Ran existing UTs.
Ran the integration tests.
Manually exercised the flows locally.
## Breaking Changes
None.
## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [x] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [x] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [x] New and existing tests pass locally
- [x] I have added appropriate error handling
- [ ] I have added or updated documentation as needed
## Additional context
<!-- Add any other context, implementation notes, or design decisions
-->
## Motivation and Context
Replace server-only `http.MaxBytesReader(nil, ...)` with
`io.LimitReader` to cap the fetched body to 4KB in key fetcher. This
avoids passing a `nil` ResponseWriter and aligns with Go idioms. If more
than 4KB is received, return a clear error. Previously `MaxBytesReader`
returned a misleading `http: request body too large` error, which is
server-oriented. With this change the error becomes `HTTP auth key
response too large`.
## How Has This Been Tested?
<!-- Have you tested this in a real application? Which scenarios were
tested? -->
Add tests covering success, oversized bodies, connection failure,
non-200 status, and read failures. This covers almost all lines of
`FetchKey` method of `DefaultHTTPKeyFetcher`. For tests, I also added a
new initialiser `NewDefaultHTTPKeyFetcherWithClient` so that the HTTP
client could be modified for test use.
Tests use `httptest.NewTLSServer` plus a helper to construct a client
pinned to the test server.
`auth` package test coverage increased from 56.8% to 59.3%.
## Breaking Changes
<!-- Will users need to update their code or configurations? -->
None.
## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [x] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [x] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [x] New and existing tests pass locally
- [x] I have added appropriate error handling
- [ ] I have added or updated documentation as needed
## Additional context
<!-- Add any other context, implementation notes, or design decisions
-->
Signed-off-by: Ville Vesilehto <ville@vesilehto.fi>
## Summary
Fixes a concurrent map access vulnerability in the OIDC handler that
could cause remote unauthenticated DoS.
## Changes
- Removed OIDC authorization flow endpoints ( and )
- Removed the unsynchronized map that caused the data race
- Kept only the OIDC token exchange endpoint ()
- Simplified by removing OAuth2 flow dependencies
The map was being accessed concurrently by the start (write) and
callback (read/delete) endpoints without synchronization, causing
runtime panics. Since the token exchange flow doesn't require session
state, removing the authorization flow eliminates the vulnerability
entirely.
<!-- Provide a brief summary of your changes -->
## Motivation and Context
<!-- Why is this change needed? What problem does it solve? -->
The following PR eliminates duplicate struct definitions by migrating
the publisher tool to use canonical types from pkg/model, creating a
single source of truth across the codebase. The publisher tool
previously had its own copies of structs that were duplicated, ie.
ServerJSON, Package, Repository, VersionDetail, EnvironmentVariable,
RuntimeArgument and a few others which was not optimal
**Changes in the PR:**
- Refactored the structs to single canonical types located at pkg/model
- Refactor the implementation to use/build canonical structures directly
- Remove all duplicate definitions (5 structs eliminated)
- Publisher now uses model.ServerJSON, model.Package, model.Repository,
etc.
- Renamed some of the structs to better reflect their use case, i.e.
ServerJSON instead of ServerDetail
- Fixes an issue where the Remote property was missing from the previous
publisher copy of the Server
**Benefits:**
- Single source of truth - Schema changes in one place
- Type safety - Compiler catches mismatches
- Enhanced validation - Field constraints and bson tags
- Zero breaking changes - Same CLI interface and JSON output
- Future-proof - New canonical fields automatically available
Supersedes: #217 and #240
## How Has This Been Tested?
<!-- Have you tested this in a real application? Which scenarios were
tested? -->
Locally
## Breaking Changes
<!-- Will users need to update their code or configurations? -->
No
## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [ ] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [ ] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [ ] New and existing tests pass locally
- [ ] I have added appropriate error handling
- [ ] I have added or updated documentation as needed
## Additional context
<!-- Add any other context, implementation notes, or design decisions
-->
---------
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Dimitrov <radoslav@stacklok.com>
## Summary
This PR implements OIDC authentication support for admin users,
specifically configured for Google Cloud Identity. The implementation
includes:
- Configurable OIDC authentication endpoints and validation
- Google Cloud Identity integration for admin access
- JWT token validation and user session management
- Deployment configuration updates for OIDC provider settings
Fixes#283
Add HTTP-based authentication to prove domain ownership, similar to
https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/pull/238's DNS
authentication but using HTTPS well-known URIs instead of DNS TXT
records.
Fixes#280
## Motivation and Context
Some organizations don't have easy access to DNS records, but can easily
deploy web assets. They would therefore prefer to be able to complete a
HTTP challenge rather than a DNS one to authenticate to the registry.
This would in some way mirror ACME challenges: where you can do a DNS-01
or a HTTP-01 challenge.
## How Has This Been Tested?
- Tested locally by stubbing out the HTTP getter
- Added unit tests
## Breaking Changes
None
## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [x] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [x] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [x] New and existing tests pass locally
- [x] I have added appropriate error handling
- [x] I have added or updated documentation as needed
## Additional context
I concern I had when building this that it might expose us to SSRF
attacks.
I think on reflection this is not a significant problem:
- We only GET a fixed file `.well-known/mcp-registry-auth` (redirects
disallowed) after sanitizing the domain, and then also don't expose the
response to the user. This means the user shouldn't be able to hit
anything very interesting.
- The information they might get is what domains/servers exist in the
network. Our infrastructure is already all open-source, so attackers
aren't getting any additional real info by prodding at the environment
this way.
Fixes#270Closes#233
Adds support for DNS-based authentication for proving ownership of a
particular domain. E.g. if you can add a TXT record to `anthropic.com`,
you can publish anything at `com.anthropic/*` or `com.anthropic.*`.
Notes:
- Uses Ed25519 signatures with 15-second timestamp windows to prevent
replay attacks
- Supports multiple public keys in DNS TXT records for key rotation
scenarios
- Publisher CLI supports DNS auth via --dns-domain and --dns-private-key
flags
- Includes key generation commands in publisher README for easy setup
## Motivation and Context
This implements DNS-based public/private key authentication to allow
people to actually publish at their own domains. Currently,
authentication requires GitHub accounts which limits publishing to the
io.github.* namespace.
DNS-based auth enables:
- Publishing under your actual domain (e.g., com.anthropic/* for
anthropic.com)
- Independence from GitHub or other external auth providers
- Organizations managing their own keys and access to publishing
## How Has This Been Tested?
- Unit tests cover signature verification, DNS TXT parsing, timestamp
validation, and error cases
- Tested locally by editing my own DNS records
- All existing auth methods covered by passing tests
## Breaking Changes
None
## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [x] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [x] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [x] New and existing tests pass locally
- [x] I have added appropriate error handling
- [x] I have added or updated documentation as needed
## Additional context
Will be adding HTTP challenge auth in a similar way as a separate PR,
e.g. for verifying you own `github.com` by hosting a
`github.com/.well-known/mcp-server-challenge` or similar. Just
mentioning this as we discussed HTTP challenges as closely related to
DNS challenges elsewhere, and want to reassure reviewer that this hasn't
been forgotten with this approach. :) Update: tracking the HTTP auth in
https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/issues/280
Adds support for auth'ing to the registry via [GitHub Actions
OIDC](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/concepts/security/openid-connect).
Fixes#271
## Motivation and Context
People will probably want to publish to the registry from CI
environments. DNS auth can work here fine
(https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/issues/270). But for
people who haven't set up DNS, the standard GitHub device flow won't
really work here. We could make this nice by supporting GitHub Actions
OIDC.
## How Has This Been Tested?
Tested locally with a real GitHub OIDC token from a personal repo.
## Breaking Changes
None
## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [x] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [x] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [x] New and existing tests pass locally
- [x] I have added appropriate error handling
- [x] I have added or updated documentation as needed
## Motivation and Context
- Adds credentials for the new MCP Registry Login GitHub Apps (local,
staging, prod)
- Adds support for "none" auth to publisher
## How Has This Been Tested?
- Tested publisher workflows locally
- Unit and integration tests passing
## Breaking Changes
None
## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [x] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [x] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [x] New and existing tests pass locally
- [x] I have added appropriate error handling
- [x] I have added or updated documentation as needed
---
Merging based on Tadas's approval review, and only making minor docs changes on top of that.
Fixes#264. Adds endpoints:
```
/v0/auth/github # exchange a github token for a registry token that gives you access to namespaces io.github.username and io.github.org for your orgs
/v0/auth/none # get a registry token for namespace io.modelcontextprotocol.anonymous (only for testing/local dev purposes)
```
Updates `/v0/publish` to accept one of these registry tokens.
## Motivation and Context
See #264
## How Has This Been Tested?
- Running locally and getting a token from `/v0/auth/none` and then
publishing to `/v0/publish`
- Updating the integration tests that get a token and then publish, and
them passing
## Breaking Changes
This is a breaking change to the auth API. This is fine for registry
given it's not deployed yet.
## Types of changes
<!-- What types of changes does your code introduce? Put an `x` in all
the boxes that apply: -->
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [x] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [x] Documentation update
## Checklist
<!-- Go over all the following points, and put an `x` in all the boxes
that apply. -->
- [x] I have read the [MCP
Documentation](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
- [x] My code follows the repository's style guidelines
- [x] New and existing tests pass locally
- [x] I have added appropriate error handling
- [x] I have added or updated documentation as needed
## Additional context
<!-- Add any other context, implementation notes, or design decisions
-->
---------
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <209825114+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: adam jones <domdomegg@users.noreply.github.com>
